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This dissertation addresses the role of the U.S. Army as an instrument of national and 
alliance strategy in the era of the Cold War. The army was confronted with the 
fundamental question of its utility in the nuclear age. This dissertation argues that 
after the Korean War army leaders pursued a consistent policy to create a force that 
could deter limited, i.e., conventional and tactical-nuclear war in Central Europe. This 
policy resulted in a three-decade long transition process, as the army had to respond 
to influences ranging from the Soviet threat to inter-service rivalry, budgetary 
concerns, rapidly evolving technology, and military and political developments in 
Europe and Asia. The transition process occurred in three stages. First, army leaders 
redefined the mission of their institution from war-fighting to the deterrence of war. 
Then, the structure of combat divisions was altered to reflect the requirements of 
nuclear as well as conventional battlefields. Finally, and only after the Vietnam War, 
doctrine was introduced that combined specific objectives in Central Europe, modern 
divisional structure, weapons technology, and newly defined principles of operational 
art in a coherent system of air and land warfare. At the heart of the dissertation rests 
the question of strategic decision-making and the impact of military institutions. But 
it also addresses NATO’s military and political capabilities and considers the effect of 
nuclear weapons on land warfare and the deterrence of war. Moreover, it is a study of 
civil-military relations in the United States. Finally, it offers a fresh view of the 
Vietnam War by placing both the periphery and center of the Cold War in the context 
of potentially devastating nuclear war. Scholarship of the Cold War to date has 
emphasized the effects of nuclear deterrence and neglected the contribution of ground 
forces to the prevention of war. This dissertation is based on archival research in 
Europe and the United States, including the archives of NATO and the German 
military, the U.S. National Archives, the National Security Archive, several 
presidential libraries, and other major repositories of manuscripts of diplomats, 
military officers, and political leaders. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Defense is a stronger form of fighting than attack. 
(Carl von Clausewitz, On War).1
After the Korean War, the army defined its primary mission as the deterrence of 
war in Central Europe.2 The global nature of the Cold War, however, demanded general-
purpose forces that could be deployed to fight elsewhere as well. The creation of such 
general-purpose forces proved to be unattainable. The requirements of an army capable 
of fighting effectively in Europe against the Soviet army and those of its satellites were in 
important respects different than those of a force capable of dealing with irregular 
opponents in underdeveloped countries. Army leadership therefore made the deliberate 
decision to emphasize preparedness in Europe and neglect preparing for contingencies in 
other parts of the world.3 This process began with the reorientation from purely 
conventional to conventional and nuclear forces at the end of the Korean War and 
culminated in 1982 with the close alignment of operational doctrine with mission, force 
structure, organization of the combat division, and weapons technology. The Cold War 
 
1Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and transl. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 84. 
 2The best study of conventional force levels in relation to NATO strategy is John 
S. Duffield, Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO’s Conventional Force Posture 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995). Duffield’s political analysis is exhaustive, 
but he does not consider particular military questions of doctrine, institutional 
development, or technology. 
 3Andrew F. Krepinevich jr. The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1986) argues that this decision was based on tradition and the 
desire of generals to recapture the glory of past wars, but he viewed the Vietnam War in 
isolation from the Cold War and did not consider the legitimate need for a different force 
structure and doctrine in Europe. 
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army did not just happen, but rather had to be created through a protracted and difficult 
process that was shaped by internal conflict and external imperatives. 
 At this point it is necessary to describe deterrence as a concept. In general terms, 
deterrence was equated with dissuasion. During the Cold War, and in historical and 
scientific scholarship since its conclusion, deterrence has generally been understood as a 
function of nuclear arsenals.4 Some scholars have discussed a theoretical model of 
conventional deterrence based on historical case studies or in the particular circumstances 
of Europe in the late 1970s and 1980s.5 They are a small minority, however, and did not 
 
4Among the best studies on nuclear deterrence with emphasis on Europe are 
Frederic Bozo, Two Strategies for Europe: deGaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic 
Alliance transl. Susan Emanuel (Lanham, MD; Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), Bernard 
Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 
Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1989), Beatrice Heuser, NATO, Britain, France, and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and 
Forces for Europe, 1949-2000 (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1997), Beatrice Heuser and 
Robert O’Neill (eds.), Securing Peace in Europe, 1945-1962 (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1992), Catherine McArdle Kelleher, Germany & the Politics of Nuclear Weapons 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), David Alan Rosenberg, “The Origins of 
Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960,” in: International 
Security, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Spring 1983), David N. Schwartz, NATO’s Nuclear Dilemmas 
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1983), and Robert Wampler, NATO 
Strategic Planning and Nuclear Weapons, 1950-1957, Nuclear History Program: 
Occasional Paper 6 (University of Maryland: Center for International Security Studies, 
1990). A comprehensive discussion of the nuclear strategists of the early Cold War 
period has been provided by Lawrence Freedman, “The First Two Generations of 
Nuclear Strategists,” in: Peter Paret (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli 
to the Nuclear Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 735-78.  
 5See, for instance, Richard K. Betts, Conventional Deterrence: Predictive 
Uncertainty and Policy Confidence; Compound Deterrence vs. No-First-Use - What’s 
Wrong Is What’s Right (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985), Thomas Boyd-
Carpenter, Conventional Deterrence into the 1990s (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1989), Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign 
Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), James Reed 
Golden, Asa A. Clark, and Bruce E. Arlinghaus, Conventional Deterrence: Alternatives 
for European Defense (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1984), Paul K. Huth, 
Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
3
consider the specific circumstances of Central Europe in the first decades of the Cold 
War. The intricate interplay of nuclear and conventional deterrence has received short-
shrift in the literature on the subject. The critical question may be stated as follows: What 
role, if any, did conventional force play with respect to the deterrence of any possible 
Soviet offensive? European leaders, most notably Charles de Gaulle and Konrad 
Adenauer, did not believe that the United States would have been willing to fight a 
nuclear war if Western Europe was under conventional attack. Thus, it would appear that 
historians and political scientists have posited a much more clear-cut conception about 
conventional deterrence as practiced than the evidence suggests. 
 This dissertation focuses on the experience of the U.S. Army in the Cold War. 
The contribution of air force, navy, and marines to the defense of Western Europe will be 
discussed only with respect to its impact upon ground forces. It will acknowledge the 
usefulness of strategic nuclear weapons in deterring general war at the outset of 
hostilities. Tactical nuclear weapons will be taken into account as they greatly influenced 
tactics and operational planning for conventional as well as nuclear war and deterrence. 
This dissertation argues that the capacity for war fighting and deterrence are very closely 
related. The nuclear deterrent was immediately apparent to the enemy, but effective 
territorial defense depended on readiness and structure of ground forces as well as 
integration of tactical nuclear weapons. Consequently, army leaders adopted a concept of 
 
1988), and John R. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1983). None of these works pays much attention to the particular case of Central 
Europe in the first three decades of the Cold War. An exception is Glenn H. Snyder, 
Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1961), who does consider both nuclear and conventional deterrence in 
the context of NATO and the 1950s. 
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limited war that allowed for the use of tactical nuclear weapons but offered an alternative 
to Massive Retaliation, the strategy of nuclear deterrence that was adopted in 1953. The 
capacity to wage limited war became the main focus of the army’s political struggle for 
survival in the Eisenhower years. War in Europe could have remained in the realm of the 
tactical forces for a short period of time in which deterrence - of general nuclear war - 
was still a useful concept. 
 Limited war as a concept was perceived differently by the army, the Kennedy and 
Johnson administrations, and theorists who devised a literature on the subject in the 
1950s and 1960s. The army defined it as any war below the level of strategic nuclear 
exchange. Defense officials of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations considered a 
more specific type of conflict: counterinsurgency warfare in places such as Laos, 
Indonesia, or Vietnam. Scholars thought in terms of a conflict such as the Korean War, 
where political objectives were limited and use of nuclear weapons was avoided.6 This 
ambiguity led to serious misunderstandings. The army’s suggested strategy of flexible 
response was based on the fundamental belief that the U.S. needed an alternative to 
strategic nuclear weapons for the defense of Europe. This was expressed publicly by 
 
6For the scholarship on limited and conventional war in the nuclear age see, for 
instance, Michael Carver, “Conventional Warfare in the Nuclear Age,: in: Peter Paret 
(ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 779-814, Seymour J. Deitchman, Limited War and 
American Defense Policy (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1964), Christopher M. Gacek, 
The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Limited War in American Foreign Policy (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1994), Morton H. Halperin, Limited War in the 
Nuclear Age (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1963), Otto Heilbrunn, Conventional 
Warfare in the Nuclear Age (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), Henry A. 
Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 
1957), and Robert Endicott Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957). 
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General Maxwell Taylor, U.S. Army Chief of Staff from 1955 to 1959.7 John F.  
Kennedy’s reading of Maxwell Taylor’s work, however, indicated that the president did 
not fully grasp the difference between flexible response and limited war as the army 
perceived it and Flexible Response as Kennedy installed it as national military strategy. 
Taylor defined the army’s mission as creating a credible deterrent with respect to a 
limited war in Europe. Kennedy, on the other hand, believed that the army’s ability to 
wage limited war made it suitable for deployment in Europe and elsewhere. 
 Taylor concluded that in order to create the proper force for the defense of 
Western Europe, the army needed to acquire nuclear weapons and alter its organizational 
structure and doctrine.8 But there was never a master plan to achieve such a 
transformation. The army responded to crises, pressures, and influences ranging from the 
Soviet threat to national strategy, inter-service rivalry, budgetary concerns, technological 
innovation, and European military and political developments. The Cold War army, 
whose capacity to wage limited war against a Soviet-style opponent was made manifestly 
evident in the Gulf War in 1991, matured over three decades. This transition process was 
evolutionary and occurred in several stages.  
 First, a new basic purpose for the army had to be found in order to adapt to the 
realities of the nuclear age and to ensure the survival of the institution as a premier 
fighting force. By the end of the Eisenhower administration, limited war, without use of 
 
7Maxwell Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper Brothers, 1959). 
 8Doctrine, in a broad sense, has been defined by army historian Paul Herbert as 
“an approved, shared idea about the conduct of warfare that undergirds an army’s 
planning, organization, training, leadership style, tactics, weapons, and equipment.” Paul 
Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 
Edition of FM 100-5, Operations, Leavenworth Paper No. 16 (Ft. Leavenworth, Ks: 
Command and General Staff College, 1988). 
6
the most destructive nuclear weapons in the arsenal of the United States or the Soviet 
Union, was widely debated in military and political circles. With the notable exception of 
the air force, all military services agreed that limited war was possible. As a consequence, 
strategic nuclear deterrence expressed in the threat of Massive Retaliation had lost much 
of its dogmatic interpretation. Thus, by the end of 1960, the army had secured a role as a 
primary contributor to national security and strategy of the United States. 
 The second phase of the transition process brought a fundamental reorganization 
of the army’s combat divisions. The introduction of the pentomic division in 1956 - so-
called because it consisted of a  pentagonal unit with five battle groups armed with 
conventional and atomic weapons - had been designed to counter bureaucratic pressure 
for reform and provide dual capability for conventional and nuclear war. It provided a 
rationale for the army’s own nuclear weapons. While it was impractical from an 
operational perspective, it marked a sharp break from the traditional combat division, 
thus opening the way for future change. Its successor, the Reorganization Objective 
Army Division (ROAD), served as the basic divisional organization of the Cold War 
army. The result of the organizational change was a flexible combat division with three 
brigade headquarters to which a varying number of maneuver battalions could be 
attached. ROAD was developed in 1960 and 1961 by generals who had served in senior 
command positions in Germany. It was greatly influenced by the structure of West 
German army divisions. Despite the focus on war in Europe, the inherent flexibility of the 
ROAD division also was a significant step toward preparing the army for challenges in 
secondary theaters of the Cold War. 
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The third crucial step was the adjustment of operational and tactical doctrine to 
suit both the new mission and the new combat division as well as address the fighting 
methods of the Soviets. This was achieved only in the post-Vietnam recovery of the 
army. Here, the institution discovered the concept of operational art. Once more, 
examples in Germany, both contemporary and historical, served as useful points of 
reference. Active Defense, the tactical doctrine of 1976, was modeled upon West German 
concepts of mechanized conventional and tactical nuclear warfare. Its successor, the 
operational doctrine of AirLand Battle, introduced in 1982, drew heavily upon the 
Reichswehr conception of command and control of combined arms in battle that had 
emerged between 1920 and 1932. The German influence was augmented by attention 
paid to Soviet intentions and capabilities, based upon study of Soviet manuals and 
military journals as well as the Yom Kippur War of 1973.  
 The critical points in time of the army’s transition were the mid-1950s, when the 
service redefined its mission, the early 1960s, when the organizational structure of the 
combat division was improved, and the late 1970s, when operational doctrine specifically 
tailored to the threat and circumstances in Central Europe was written.9 The changes in 
doctrine have been addressed in great detail by official historians of various army 
commands and schools.10 It is not the purpose of this dissertation to restate their 
 
9For a theoretical model of punctuated equilibrium and evolution in nature as well 
as its recent application to historical studies see Stephen Jay Gould, Wonderful Life: The 
Burgess Shale and the Nature of History (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1989) 
and Clifford J. Rogers, “Review Essay: The Field & the Forge,” in: The Journal of 
Military History, Vol. 68, No. 4 (October 2004), pp. 1233-39. 
 10 Romie L. Brownlee and William J. Mullen III, Changing an Army: An Oral 
History of General William E. DePuy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military 
History, 1986), Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done, Jonathan House, Combined 
Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001), 
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arguments. It will be necessary, however, to show the crucial links to the first two stages 
of the transition process. The two decades between the end of the wars in Korea and 
Vietnam have been neglected by military historians, who have been preoccupied with the 
study of the Vietnam War in order to explain the defeat of the U.S. military at the hands 
of a poorly equipped irregular enemy. The army in particular has been criticized for its 
unpreparedness for the conflict and its unwillingness to make fundamental changes 
necessary to win the war. In the larger context of the Cold War, however, the Vietnam 
War was merely an episode. It is difficult to conceive how else the army could have acted 
given the requirements of its primary mission to prevent nuclear war between the 
superpowers. 
 The central question of this dissertation is the role of a military institution within a 
nation’s strategy. Strategy is defined as the proper relationship of means to ends in order 
to achieve a political objective. It would be unwise to equate civilian oversight of the 
military with civilian control of strategy. It would be foolish to argue that military 
services should be permitted to define national strategy. Strategy is neither dictated from 
the top nor shaped from the bottom of the chain of command. Instead, it is arrived at in 
the intricate interplay of several layers of the state and its defense establishment.11 As a 
 
John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army 
Doctrine, 1973-1982 (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 
Historical Office, 1984), Donn A. Starry, “A Tactical Evolution: FM 100-5,” in: Military 
Review, Vol. 58, no. 8 (August 1978), pp. 2-11, and Richard M. Swain, “AirLand Battle,” 
in: George F. Hofmann and Donn A. Starry (eds.), Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The 
History of U.S. Armored Forces (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1999), 
pp. 360-402. 
 11See also David Alan Rosenberg, “Reality and Responsibility: Power and 
Process in the Making of United States Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1968,” in: The Journal of 
Strategic Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1 (March 1986), pp. 35-52. 
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consequence of the primary research focus on the army, it might at times appear that the 
argument was made that military means define the ends of strategy. Such a conclusion 
would be unfortunate. A comprehensive study has to consider all aspects that shaped the 
strategy of the United States. But while much of the diplomatic, economic, financial, 
social, and cultural context of the Cold War has been addressed in articles and 
monographs, the military means that helped the U.S. contain the Communist challenge 
have been largely ignored or taken for granted.12 
In addition, this study pursues the subject of operational art as a binding link 
between strategy and tactics.13 Military strategy is concerned with the use of battles to 
 
12Among the most prominent studies of American strategy in the Cold War are 
Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman. Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an 
Enduring Cold War Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), Saki Dockrill, 
Eisenhower’s New Look National Security Policy, 1953-1961 (Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire: Macmillan Press, 1996), John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A 
Critical Reappraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1982), Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National 
Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1992), and Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1991).  
 13The recognition of operational art as a level of war between strategy and tactics 
is a fairly recent phenomenon in English-language scholarship. The concept was 
developed by the Soviets in the 1920 and 1930s. The German military practiced a 
comparable approach in the World War II era. See, for instance, Robert M. Citino, The 
Path to Blitzkrieg: Doctrine and Training in the German Army, 1920-1939 (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), Robert M. Citino, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The 
Evolution of Operational Warfare (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004), David 
Glantz, Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle (London: Frank Cass, 
1991), Mary R. Habeck, Storm of Steel: The Development of Armor Doctrine in Germany 
and the Soviet Union, 1919-1939 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), Richard W. 
Harrison, The Russian Way of War: Operational Art, 1904-1940 (Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 2001), B.J.C. McKercher and Michael E. Hennesy (eds.), The 
Operational Art: Developments in the Theories of War (Westport: Praeger, 1996), 
Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory 
(London: Frank Cass, 1997), and R. Clayton Newell, The Framework of Operational 
Warfare (London: Routledge, 1991). 
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win a campaign or a war. Tactics are concerned with fighting a battle. Operational art 
combines the need to coordinate multiple battles and apportion resources, both men and 
materiel.14 This dissertation argues that early in the Cold War the U.S. Army conceived 
of war in tactical terms and began to consider operational art only after its defeat in 
Vietnam. Moreover, it offers evidence of developments in Europe that will show to what 
extent the army’s attitude toward conflict in general was determined by the particular 
requirements of Central Europe. The very presence of five combat divisions in Germany 
altered the nature of the institution but, more dramatically, so did the close interaction 
with the German army, with each institution drawing upon the ideas, concepts, and 
traditions of the other to a much greater extent than has been acknowledged thus far.  
 This dissertation reconsiders German-American defense relations. Historians have 
addressed aspects thereof, such as rearmament, nuclear weapons, alliance relations, 
economics, and finance, but little has been done to analyze the overarching issue of the 
defense of West Germany.15 Most scholars have accepted the argument that nuclear 
 
14For a concise definition of operational art see Kenneth E. Hamburger, 
“Operational Art,” in: John Whiteclay Chambers II (ed.), The Oxford Companion to 
American Military History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 517-18. 
 15Among the best works are A. J. Birtle, Rearming the Phoenix: U.S. Military 
Assistance to the Federal Republic of Germany, 1950-1960 (New York: Garland, 1991), 
Hans Ehlert et al., Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik, Vol. III: Die NATO Option 
(Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1993), Heuser, NATO, Britain, France, and the FRG,
Kelleher, Germany & the Politics of Nuclear Weapons, David Clay Large, Germans to 
the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era (Chapel Hill: The University 
of North Carolina Press, 1996), Robert McGeehan, The German Rearmament Question: 
American Diplomacy and European Defense after World War II (Chicago: University of 
Illinois Press, 1971), Roger Morgan, The United States and West Germany 1945-1973: A 
Study in Alliance Politics (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), and Hubert 
Zimmermann, Money and Security: Troops, Monetary Policy, and West Germany’s 
Relations with the United States and Britain, 1950-1971 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press; for the German Historical Institute, Washington, D.C., 2002). 
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deterrence worked.16 A somewhat different explanation has been put forth by historian 
Marc Trachtenberg. He sees the German question as the central issue of the Cold War, 
but argues that the United States and the Soviet Union came to a tacit agreement that 
assured that the U.S. would control German ambitions in Europe. Trachtenberg contends 
that Soviet Cold War policy was driven by the fear of a militarily powerful Germany, 
which would threaten Soviet security, either as an instrument of western aggression or 
after severing ties with NATO.17 The agreement was the result of crises in Berlin and 
Cuba as well as failed attempts of the western alliance to create a European nuclear force. 
While the Soviets may have had good reason to fear a resurgent Germany, Trachtenberg 
treats Germany as a client state that did little more than respond to American initiatives. 
A close reading of military and political records, however, reveals that German 
politicians greatly influenced the debates of NATO strategy, that the Bundeswehr combat 
division served as a model for the U.S. Army, and that German doctrine became a critical 
measuring stick for army operational thinking. 
 
16On the opposite side of the argument, John Mueller contends that social, 
cultural, and intellectual dynamics rather than nuclear deterrence had made war obsolete. 
John E. Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: 
Basic Books, 1989). The difficulty of assessing the likelihood of war between the 
superpowers is best illustrated by Cold War and disarmament scholar Christoph Bluth. In 
a single paragraph he both disavowed and acknowledged the possibility of major war in 
Europe. He concluded that it “had to be deterred by military means and mitigated by 
political means.” Bluth, The Two Germanies and Military Security in Europe 
(Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 2. 
 17Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European 
Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). Trachtenberg 
claimed that the Soviets ultimately tolerated German rearmament because West Germany 
was to be controlled within the confines of NATO. This argument has recently been 
challenged by Vojtech Mastny in his introductory essay “The Warsaw Pact as History,” 
in: Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne (eds.), A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of 
the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991 (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2005), p. 3. 
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At the heart of the exposition stand U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR) and its 
operational arm, Seventh Army, the largest and best prepared field army the United 
States ever deployed abroad in peacetime.18 The mere fact that the crises on the periphery 
of the Cold War have taken on great prominence serves as an illustration of the quiet 
effectiveness of deterrence in Europe. The difficulty for the army lay in the need to be 
prepared for both conventional and tactical nuclear war. This dual capability became a 
dominating issue of civil-military relations and inter-service rivalry in the United States. 
This dynamic also drove the development of tactical and operational doctrine within the 
army. A temporary solution was found in the reorganization of army divisions, first to the 
pentomic division of the late 1950s and then to ROAD in the early 1960s. This, however, 
was an attempt to solve a very complex problem without addressing all of its component 
parts. Doctrine lagged behind, especially in the 1950s. It was really only after the 
Vietnam War that the army found itself in a strategic environment that permitted the 
linkage of doctrine to operational necessity rather than bureaucratic, fiscal, or 
technological pressures. Nevertheless, the reforms of the 1950s and 1960s must not be 
overlooked. They constituted the first serious steps toward transformation of the U.S. 
Army. 
 Military histories of the Cold War are scarce.19 Army historiography of the 1950s 
and 1960s has been preoccupied with the wars in Asia. Studies of the Vietnam War stand 
 
18Historians have thus far almost entirely ignored USAREUR and Seventh Army. 
The only comprehensive study has been provided by a political scientist, Daniel J. 
Nelson, A History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987). 
 19David Miller, The Cold War: A Military History (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1998) is essentially journalistic in nature. David Stone, Wars of the Cold War: 
Campaigns and Conflicts, 1945-1990 (London: Brassey’s, 2004), offers a global view of 
a confrontation that Stone, a retired British army officer, views as a mixture of “strategic 
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out, even though some attention has also been paid to the Korean War.20 Andrew 
Bacevich’s study The Pentomic Era offers the only comprehensive treatment of the army 
in the 1950s.21 He argues that the army had to find a way to survive within the strategic 
doctrine of Massive Retaliation while at the same trying to obtain major changes in 
national military strategy. He concludes that the army introduced force structure for 
political reasons that only served as a deterrent but had little actual fighting capability. 
This dissertation shows, however, that one could not be achieved without the other. 
Bacevich’s conclusions are also limited by the chronological focus on the Eisenhower 
years, which did not allow him to consider ROAD and its relationship to Flexible 
Response. Army historian John B. Wilson takes a chronologically broader view. His 
 
and operational deterrence and warfare.” Ibid., p. 16. Norman Friedman, The Fifty-Year 
War: Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2000) 
provides a history of strategy but suffers from a somewhat polemic argumentation and 
over-reliance on secondary sources. The pertinent chapters in Russell A. Weigley, The 
American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (New 
York: Macmillan, 1973) remain the best academic work on the subject. 
 20Among the best military histories of the Korean War are Roy E. Appleman, 
South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu: June-November 1950 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Army Center of Military History, 1961), Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in 
Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Times Books, 1987), Billy C. Mossman, Ebb and Flow: 
November 1950 - July 1951 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 
1990), David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1964).The 
most comprehensive studies on the Army in Vietnam are Jeffrey Clarke, Advice and 
Support: The Final Years, 1965-1973 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military 
History, 1988), Douglas Kinnard, The War Managers: American Generals Reflect on 
Vietnam (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1977), Krepinevich, The Army 
and Vietnam, Ronald H. Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years of the United 
States Army in Vietnam, 1941-1960 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military 
History, 1983), Shelby L. Stanton, The Rise and Fall of an American Army: U.S. Ground 
Forces in Vietnam, 1965-1973 (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985), and Summers, Harry G. Jr. 
On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, Ca: Presidio Press, 1982). 
 21A. J. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era: The US Army between Korea and Vietnam 
(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1986). 
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chapters of the pentomic division and ROAD are among the best works on the subject but 
do not go much beyond discussions of the structural changes.22 
There is a strange absence of considerations of operational doctrine in most 
histories of the Cold War army before 1973. This may reflect the contemporary attitude 
within the army toward doctrine, but it is apparent that unified tactical and operational 
concepts did exist and were widely accepted even prior to the wide-ranging discussion of 
doctrine in the wake of the defeat in Vietnam. The most comprehensive treatment 
remains Robert A. Doughty’s The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76.23 
Two political-science studies on army nuclear doctrine are also useful.24 But 
contemporary publications of army officers struggling with the lack of a coherent tactical 
doctrine for atomic warfare are quite revealing in their own right. In 1953, colonels 
Reinhardt and Kintner, both on the faculty of the Command and General Staff College, 
provided a semi-official expression of doctrinal thinking.25 Their book is permeated by 
cautious optimism about the deployment of nuclear weapons, their usability at the tactical 
level, and even their offensive value, but the authors lamented that the army had not 
implemented any of the methods suggested in the book. In 1958, two instructors at the 
 
22John B. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and 
Separate Brigades (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1998). 
 23Robert A. Doughty, The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-1976,
Leavenworth Paper No. 1 (Ft. Leavenworth, Ks: Command and General Staff College, 
1976). 
 24John R. Midgley, jr., Deadly Illusions: Army Policy for the Nuclear Battlefield 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1986) and John P. Rose, The Evolution of U.S. Army Nuclear 
Doctrine, 1945-1980 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980).  
 25G. C. Reinhardt and W. R. Kintner. Atomic Weapons in Land Combat 
(Harrisburg: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1953). 
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Infantry Training School published a manual for tactical nuclear warfare of the pentomic 
division.26 They noted that many pertinent articles had appeared in service journals, but 
that analysis was scattered and that commanding officers had nowhere to turn to keep up 
with the dynamic changes required by nuclear weapons. While the book praised the value 
of the pentomic division on the nuclear battlefield, it was written as a substitute for 
official doctrine. 
 At this point, it is necessary to introduce terms of army organization, weapon 
systems, and operational concepts for conventional and nuclear war. Specific 
developments will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters, but this broad 
outline provides essential background information to administrative, institutional, and 
operational decisions made by army leaders in the course of the Cold War. Throughout 
the twentieth century, the division was the principal operational and administrative unit in 
the U.S. Army. It served as the smallest combined-arms force that was capable of 
sustained independent combat operations. During the Second World War, there were 
three types of army divisions in the European theater of operations: infantry (14,000 
officers and men in combat and combat support units), armor (11,000 officers and men), 
and airborne infantry (13,000 officers and men). These were grouped into corps of two or 
more divisions, armies of several corps, and army groups of two or more armies. For 
tactical deployment, infantry divisions had three regiments (3,200 officers and men) - 
each of which had three maneuver battalions (870 officers and men), a cannon company, 
an anti-tank company, and other combat support forces - four artillery battalions (520-
 
26Theodore C. Mataxis and Seymour L. Goldberg. Nuclear Tactics, Weapons, and 
Firepower in the Pentomic Division, Battle Group, and Company (Harrisburg: The 
Military Service Publishing Company, 1958). 
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530 officers and men), and logistical and administrative units. Armored divisions were 
essentially similar, except that they had two combat command headquarters under which 
tank battalions could be combined with armored infantry and self-propelled artillery to 
operate as semi-independent mobile task forces.27 
During the Cold War, army combat units were adjusted to the requirements of 
conventional and nuclear warfare. In the mid-1950s, battle groups of 1,500 officers and 
men in five companies replaced regiments and battalions. They were intended to function 
as autonomous tactical formations on a nuclear battlefield for several days or even weeks. 
Five battle groups and supporting artillery battalions and logistical units formed an 
infantry or airborne division. Armored divisions remained similar to those of the Second 
World War. In the 1960s, the battle-group concept was superseded by brigades. Divisions 
had three brigade headquarters and a flexible number of maneuver battalions of between 
800 and 1,000 officers and men in three or four line companies. At the same time, 
mechanized infantry as well as airmobile and air assault formations were added to the 
order of battle. For most of the Cold War, the army deployed in Germany five combat 
divisions and several independent brigades and armored cavalry regiments. These were 
grouped in two corps, which in the event of war were to have been combined with two 
German army corps and French forces in southern Germany to form Central Army Group 
(CENTAG).28 
27For World War II divisions and their wartime reorganization see Wilson, 
Maneuver and Firepower, pp. 179-201.  
 28For an overview of army reorganization in the early Cold War see ibid., pp. 239-
322. 
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Conventional arms were improved significantly. During World War II, the army 
relied upon riflemen who moved on trucks, half-tracks, or foot. Infantry had no armored 
personnel carriers (APC) besides M3 half-tracks that were ill suited to operate alongside 
tanks. Infantry was used primarily to assault strong points, traverse rivers and establish 
bridgeheads, fight in urban environments, and defeat enemy formations that had been 
bypassed by American tanks. During the Cold War armored and mechanized infantry 
replaced conventional infantry.29 In the early 1950s, American infantry battalions and 
battle groups received M59 armored personnel carriers, but it was impossible to provide 
enough of them to equip entire divisions. Moreover, while it could transport ten soldiers 
into battle, its .50 caliber machine gun could not provide much fire support for riflemen 
who had to fight dismounted. The M59 had a cruising range of 120 miles and maximum 
speed of thirty miles per hour. It was replaced in the early 1960s by the M113 APC, 
which could transport a squad of eleven. The M113 moved at greater speed than main 
battle tanks and matched their range, but its armor was weak and the machine gun 
remained its main armament.30 
Soviet APCs matched American models in speed and range and could transport 
between sixteen and twenty-two officers and men. Unlike M59 and M113, Soviet APCs 
provided protection against nuclear, bacteriological, and chemical weapons (NBC). In 
1967, the Soviet army introduced the BMP, an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) that could 
 
29In the U.S. Army, armored infantry was a term used in the 1950s for infantry 
mounted on armored personnel carriers. In the 1960s, similar formations were called 
mechanized infantry, even though that term implied the ability to fight mounted, which 
was in fact not achieved until the early 1980s. 
 30John M. Collins, U.S.-Soviet Military Balance: Concepts and Capabilities 1960-
1980 (n.p.: McGraw-Hill, 1980), p. 482. 
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transport a squad of eleven officers and men into battle, who could then fight mounted or 
dismounted. It was armed with a 73-mm gun and an anti-tank gun with a range of 3,000 
meters.31 The Germans had adopted IFVs even earlier. The U.S. Army, on the other hand, 
tried without success to develop an armored IFV throughout the 1960s and 1970s. It 
finally adopted the Bradley in 1981. While infantry was still supposed to fight 
dismounted, the Bradley was armed with a 25-mm Bushmaster gun, which could fire 200 
rounds per minute at ranges of up to 2,000 meters. The Bradley also could engage enemy 
tanks with its anti-tank missile launcher. At the end of the Cold War, the army had an 
infantry fighting vehicle that could transport infantrymen, provide fire support for their 
dismounted operations, and had enough firepower to destroy enemy tanks and other 
armored vehicles.32 
Tanks were the primary weapon system of maneuver forces.33 Light tanks were 
used primarily for screening and reconnaissance functions, but also served as a mobile 
weapon to attack enemy infantry. In this role, they were sometimes supported by assault 
guns, which were infantry guns mounted on light tank chassis. Medium tanks were 
designed to engage other tanks and spearhead the assault on enemy forces. American 
 
31Ibid., p. 484.
32For history and specifications of the Bradley see W. Blair Haworth, jr. The 
Bradley and How It Got that Way: Technology, Institutions, and the Problem of 
Mechanized Infantry in the United States Army (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1999), R.P 
Hunnicutt,  Bradley: A History of American Fighting and Support Vehicles (Novato: 
Presidio Press, 1999), and Diane L. Urbina, “‘Lethal beyond all expectations’: The 
Bradley Fighting Vehicle,” in: George F. Hofmann and Donn A. Starry (eds.), Camp Colt 
to Desert Storm: The History of U.S. Armored Forces (Lexington: The University Press 
of Kentucky, 1999), pp. 403-31. 
 33The best recent discussion of tanks and armored vehicles throughout the 
twentieth century is Bruce I. Gudmundsson, On Armor (Westport: Praeger, 2004). 
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light tanks of the Second World War were the M3A1 Stuart, primarily used for 
reconnaissance operations, which weighed 14.3 tons, had a 37-mm gun, maximum speed 
of thirty miles per hour, and a cruising range of seventy miles, and the M24 Chaffee, 
which arrived in Europe in late 1944 and provided greater fire support with its 75-mm 
gun. The M4 Sherman was the principal American medium tank. It was armed with a 75-
mm (1942 model) or 76-mm gun (1945 model), weighed thirty tons, had a maximum 
speed of twenty-four (1942 model) or twenty-nine miles per hour (1945 model), and a 
cruising range of 100 miles. While the Sherman tank did not match armor or armament of 
the modern German Tiger and Panther tanks and could defeat them only in extraordinary 
circumstances, it was mechanically reliable and could be produced in much greater 
numbers than German tanks.34 
The lethality of tanks increased significantly throughout the Cold War. Where a 
medium tank during World War II had to fire thirteen rounds to achieve a fifty percent 
likelihood of hitting a standing target at 1,500 meters, a main battle tank of the 1970s 
needed only one round.35 This was the result of more powerful tank guns, which fired 
high velocity rounds that were much more destructive than the shells used in the Second 
World War, as well as of improved sights and range-finding technology.36 But at the 
same time, infantry fielded greatly improved anti-armor weapons, such as TOW and 
Dragon lightweight shoulder-fired guided missiles and posed a greater threat to tanks.  
 
34Christopher R. Gabel, “World War II Armor Operations in Europe,” in: 
Hofmann and Starry, Camp Colt to Desert Storm, pp. 144-84, and R.P Hunnicutt, 
Sherman: A History of the American Medium Tank (Novato: Presidio Press, 1978) and A 
History of the American Light Tank, Volume 1: Stuart (Novato: Presidio Press, 1992). 
 35FM 100-5, 1976, Ch. 2, p. 3. 
 36Gudmundsson, On Armor, p. 165.
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During the Cold War, tank battalions and armored cavalry regiments received 
new light and medium-gun tanks. The M41 Walker Bulldog replaced the M24 Chaffee at 
the end of the Korean War. It was armed with a 76-mm gun, weighed 23.5 tons, had a 
maximum speed of forty-five miles per hour, and a cruising range of 100 miles. It was 
later replaced by the M551 Sheridan, a lightweight assault vehicle that could be 
transported by air. The Sheridan was strongly armed with a 152-mm gun and Shillelagh 
anti-tank missile launcher, although the gun was not fully reliable when used to dispense 
high-explosive conventional ammunition. The Sheridan weighed seventeen tons, could 
reach speeds up to forty-three miles per hour, and had a cruising range of 375 miles, a 
result of the shift from gasoline to diesel engines. It was a hybrid vehicle that was 
intended to function as light tank as well as assault vehicle for armored cavalry, which 
had previously relied upon a modified version of the M113 APC. The Sheridan was used 
in combat in Vietnam and introduced briefly in Europe, but while it was a capable anti-
tank weapon system, it could not perform effectively other missions of light tanks and 
required more maintenance than commanders in Germany deemed worthwhile.37 
For medium-gun and main battle tanks, USAREUR received M47 and M48 
Patton tanks with 90-mm guns. While their armament and armor were sufficient, they 
weighed over fifty tons, had maximum speed of thirty miles per hour, and cruising ranges 
well below 100 miles, although the M48A2 tank of 1956 increased cruising range to 160 
miles. Patton tanks were replaced after 1961 by M60 main battle tanks propelled by 
diesel engines, which increased operating range to 300 miles. The M60 had a 105-mm 
 
37Gudmundsson, On Armor, p. 169. For history and specifications of the Sheridan 
see R.P. Hunnicutt, A History of the American Light Tank, Volume 2: Sheridan (Novato: 
Presidio Press, 1995). 
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gun with an effective range of 2,000 meters.38 In the early 1980s, M60 tanks were 
replaced by Abrams tanks, which were armed with a 105-mm gun, could reach speeds of 
forty-five miles per hour, and provided protection against NBC attacks.39 Abrams tanks 
also had a much more sophisticated laser rangefinder system, which improved the 
likelihood of hitting enemy tanks with the first round. Against this stood Soviet T-55, T-
62, and T-75 main battle tanks, armed after 1962 with 115-mm guns (1,500 meter range). 
All Soviet main battle tanks since the late 1950s provided NBC protection.40 Heavy 
tanks, such as the M26 Pershing tank and the M103 Heavy Tank, designed for direct 
assault and to support main battle tanks against Soviet armor, played no significant role 
in operational plans for the defense of Western Europe. 
 Field artillery provided indirect fire support for offensive and defensive 
operations of armor and infantry formations. Direct support came from mortars and anti-
tank guns organic to maneuver battalions. At the outset of combat operations in the 
Second World War, U.S. Army divisions had towed 75-mm guns, towed and self-
propelled 105-mm howitzers (range of 12,150 yards), and towed 155-mm howitzers 
 
38Main battle tanks of the 1960s and 1970s are usually perceived as improved 
Patton tanks because their design characteristics were similar. For history and 
specifications of medium-gun and main battle tanks see Oscar C. Decker, “The Patton 
Tanks: The Cold War Learning Series,” in: Hofmann and Starry, Camp Colt to Desert 
Storm, pp. 298-323 and R.P. Hunnicutt, Patton: A History of the American Main Battle 
Tank (Novato: Presidio Press, 1984). 
 39Later model Abrams tanks had 120-mm guns. See Gudmundsson, On Armor, p.
165. For history and specifications of Abrams tanks see R.P Hunnicutt, Abrams: A 
History of the American Main Battle Tank (Novato: Presidio Press, 1990) and Robert J. 
Sunell, “The Abrams Tank System,” in: Hofmann and Starry, Camp Colt to Desert 
Storm, pp. 432-73. 
 40For specific characteristics of American and Soviet tanks see Collins, U.S.-
Soviet Military Balance, pp. 482-84. 
22
(range of 16,350 yards).41 In the course of 1942, corps began to receive 155-mm guns, 8-
inch howitzers, and 240-mm howitzers (all of them towed). Field artillery was 
modernized further throughout the war and a new generation of towed and self-propelled 
105-mm howitzers, 4.5-inch guns (20,500 yards), towed and self-propelled 155-mm guns 
(ranges of 20,100 and 18,750 yards, respectively), 8-inch howitzers (18,510 yards), and 
towed 8-inch guns (35,000 yards) became the most effective weapons in the American 
arsenal. These guns fired high-explosive shells, steel shrapnel rounds, or armor piercing 
ammunition.42 
At the outset of the Korean War, the army still relied on guns that had been 
available at the end of the Second World War: 105 and 155-mm howitzers, 155-mm 
guns, 8-inch howitzers, 8-inch guns, and tractor-pulled 240-mm howitzers.43 But nuclear 
weapons made concentration of forces dangerous and required greater mobility. 
Consequently, the army attempted to design artillery pieces that were self-propelled, 
could be transported by air, provided NBC protection, and could traverse 360 degrees in 
order to fight in all directions. While some aspects of the ambitious rearmament program 
were unattainable, the army introduced a new generation of artillery pieces in the 1960s. 
These 105-mm, 155-mm, and 8-inch howitzers as well as 175-mm guns increased range, 
traverses, and mobility. Their detonating methods and high-explosive shells also 
 
41Howitzers differ from other types of artillery pieces by their trajectory. They fire 
at higher angles and can drop projectiles on targets that are fortified or obscured. 
 42For artillery in the European Theater of Operations see Boyd L. Dastrup, King 
of Battle: A Branch History of the U.S. Army’s Field Artillery (Fort Monroe, Va.: Office 
of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1992), pp. 203-
26 and 237. 
 43Ibid., p. 263.
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increased lethality.44 In Europe, army combat divisions relied primarily upon self-
propelled 105-mm (11,500 meters) and 155-mm howitzers (14,500 meters and 18,000 
meters). Self-propelled howitzers moved at a maximum speed of thirty-five miles per 
hour and had cruising ranges of 220 miles. In the mid-1950s, divisional artillery obtained 
nuclear capability with a composite battalion of self-propelled 8-inch howitzers, which 
could fire conventional or nuclear shells at ranges between 16,800 and 20,600 meters, 
and four Honest John missile launchers.45 Later generations of 155-mm howitzers were 
to be capable of firing nuclear ammunition. In addition, towed 203-mm howitzers were 
distributed to USAREUR primarily for nuclear fire. Corps and army group also had self-
propelled 175-mm guns, which fired conventional shells for 32,800 meters. Soviet 
artillery had towed and self-propelled 122-mm howitzers, towed and self-propelled 152-
mm guns, and towed 180-mm guns with a range of thirty kilometers (probably nuclear 
capable). Both the towed 203-mm gun and the towed and self-propelled 240-mm 
howitzer could fire nuclear shells.46 
Towed guns remained part of the army’s arsenal in locations outside of Europe. 
The light M102 105-mm howitzer (1.6 tons) was introduced during the Vietnam War. It 
was transportable by utility helicopters and could be air dropped by parachute. Its rate of 
fire was higher than that of heavier howitzers (three rounds per minute sustained fire, ten 
 
44For the development of field artillery from the mid-1950s to 1980 see ibid., pp.
265-304. 
 45Ibid., p. 271.
46For a concise discussion of artillery during the Cold War see Bruce I. 
Gudmundsson, On Artillery (Westport: Praeger, 1993), pp. 143-62. For design and 
performance of American self-propelled artillery see Hunnicutt, Sheridan, pp. 198-224. 
See also Collins, U.S.-Soviet Military Balance, pp. 483-85 for performance 
characteristics of American and Soviet guns. 
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rounds per minute maximum). The fundamental differences between towed and self-
propelled guns lay in the size of the crew, rate of fire, and mobility. The American M109 
self-propelled 155-mm howitzer required a crew of six, moved at thirty-five miles per 
hour with a cruising range of 216 miles, and could fire four rounds per minute for a short 
period of time or one round per minute sustained. The M114 towed 155-mm howitzer 
required a crew of eleven, needed to be emplaced, and could sustain a rate of fire of forty 
rounds per hour. Fire-control was improved significantly with the adoption of the Field 
Artillery Digital Automatic Computer (FADAC) in the early 1960s and the Tactical Fire 
Direction System (TACFIRE) in the mid-1970s, which allowed forward observers to 
communicate directly with the fire-control computer.47 In the late 1960s and 1970s, the 
army intended to employ most of its firepower against tanks, but artillery officers found 
that the effect of long-range howitzer fire on enemy armor could be supplanted by more 
cost-effective rocket launchers. As a result, the army adopted the multiple-launch rocket 
system (MLRS), which could fire hundreds of anti-tank bomblets over thirty kilometers 
in less than one minute.48 Today, the army relies primarily on MLRS as well as 105-mm 
and 155-mm howitzers. 
 Besides conventional artillery, the army adopted tactical nuclear weapons. The 
earliest atomic weapon system was the 280-mm cannon, which was introduced in 
USAREUR in 1953. But only a few atomic cannons were manufactured and the system 
was soon replaced by rockets and missiles. First among them was the Honest John, a
truck-mounted rocket launcher that could fire conventional and atomic ammunition. In its 
 
47Dastrup, King of Battle, pp. 277 and 290. 
 48For developments from the 1960s to the 1990s see Gudmundsson, On Artillery,
pp. 151-62 and House, Combined Arms Warfare, pp. 231-86. 
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heaviest version, it could fire a forty-seven kiloton warhead up to thirty-eight miles. Its 
smaller cousin, the air-transportable Little John rocket launcher, could fire warheads of 
up to ten kilotons for a range of 11.3 miles.49 For close combat, the army adopted the 
Davy Crockett, fired by jeep-mounted recoilless rifles, with a maximum range of four 
kilometers and an atomic warhead with a yield of 0.4 kilotons. Its reliability on target was 
questionable and soldiers in Seventh Army liked to point out that the range of the weapon 
barely exceeded the burst radius of the warhead. Historian Sean Maloney applauded the 
decision of the Canadian Army not to adopt the weapon system.50 It was deployed briefly 
in Germany in the first half of the 1960s. At the end of the 1950s, the army deployed 
surface-to-surface missiles. The Corporal guided missile had a range of seventy-five 
miles and could fire warheads of up to forty kilotons. It was replaced in the 1960s by the 
Sergeant ballistic missile, which had the same range, but an improved target acquisition 
mechanism. The Redstone, designed by Wernher von Braun and his engineering team in 
Huntsville, Alabama, had a 200-mile range and could carry a three megaton warhead. 
After 1963, the Redstone was replaced by the even more lethal Pershing I.51 In the mid-
1960s atomic demolition munitions were placed at the intra-German border as first line of 
defense. Medium nuclear land mines had yields of between one and fifteen kilotons. In 
 
49See Phillip A . Karber, “Nuclear Weapons and the U.S. Army in Europe: 1953-
1989,” unpublished draft manuscript, January 1990, p. 7. Nuclear History Database, Box 
3, NSA and David McKinley Walker, “Eisenhower’s New Look, Tactical Nuclear 
Weapons, and Limited War with a Case Study of the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958” (Ph.D. 
dissertation, George Washington University, 2004), p. 116.  
 50Sean M. Maloney, War Without Battles: Canada’s NATO Brigade in Germany, 
1951-1993 (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1997), pp. 140-41. 
 51Bacevich, Pentomic Era, pp. 82-96. 
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comparison, the atom bombs exploded over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 had yields 
of thirteen and twenty-five kilotons, respectively. 
 Exactly how tactical nuclear weapons were to be used in combat operations was 
unclear. Army leaders assumed that forward defense near the intra-German border would 
force the Soviets to mass troop formations on East German territory. These massed 
formations would present lucrative targets for atomic strikes. Conversely, defensive 
forces were to disperse in order to avoid presenting an equally lucrative target to Soviet 
nuclear weapons. Planning for conventional as well as nuclear war in Europe 
acknowledged the lethality of firepower and assumed that only fast mobile formations 
could operate effectively. Army operational concepts of the 1960s and early 1970s 
centered on channeling the enemy attack into prepared killing zones, in which 
conventional and atomic fire could be brought to bear with maximum effect. Toward the 
end of the Cold War, concepts of airmobility and deep battle added to the depth of the 
battlefield and the tempo of anticipated operations. In 1982, the army adopted AirLand 
Battle doctrine, which was designed to take advantage of technology in an attempt to 
retain initiative in defensive and offensive operations. 
 The second chapter of the dissertation discusses the army’s marginal role in 
nuclear deterrence strategy of the 1950s. Eisenhower’s New Look defense policy with its 
threat of Massive Retaliation raised serious questions about the utility of ground forces in 
the atomic age. The Army Staff, under the leadership of Matthew B. Ridgway was put on 
the defensive in domestic discussions of defense budgets, military strategy, and 
availability of new technology for ground forces. In the alliance, meanwhile, the sense of 
urgency that had been displayed after the outbreak of the Korean War had waned. NATO 
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adopted Massive Retaliation in 1954 and shifted its emphasis from conventional 
rearmament to nuclear deterrence. On the operational level, alliance commanders 
developed sophisticated concepts for the nuclear battlefield. These doctrinal 
considerations were advanced in contrast to the army’s emphasis on large formations and 
firepower. But while American tactical and operational doctrine may have been ill suited 
to the military circumstance in Central Europe because it treated atomic weapons merely 
as a more powerful and destructive form of artillery, the ideas developed in NATO 
headquarters were much too advanced to be adopted by any existing army of the alliance. 
 The third chapter discusses the army’s operational and political response to the 
New Look. It focuses on Maxwell Taylor, Ridgway’s successor, and his attempt to 
transform the army. Air force and navy had adopted nuclear weapons and were widely 
regarded as the principal military means for nuclear strategy. The army had been slow to 
adjust, and its budgets did not allow it to respond to the increasing cost of land warfare 
with conventional and nuclear means. Therefore, Taylor believed that nothing short of 
radical reform would suffice to improve the army’s standing. It found new purpose in 
creating the concept of a deterrent for conventional and tactical-nuclear limited war in 
Europe and Taylor initiated a reform of the combat division. His pentomic division was 
impractical, but it secured the army’s hold on tactical nuclear weapons and provided 
political leverage that allowed the service to reclaim a premier position among the armed 
forces of the United States. NATO’s supreme military commander, General Lauris 
Norstad, also approached the issue of limited war and credibility of deterrence in Central 
Europe. He believed that conventional and tactical- nuclear defense could force the 
Soviets to consider the consequences of escalation to higher levels of nuclear war and 
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reconsider their resort to war. The chapter shows that Massive Retaliation remained the 
strategic concept of the alliance throughout the 1950s, but that the deterrent value of 
NATO ground forces was strengthened by the integration of conventional and tactical 
nuclear weapons. 
 The fourth chapter discusses the reorganization of Seventh Army into pentomic 
divisions, their reception by commanders in the field, and the ultimate rejection of the 
concept. It shows parallel developments in Germany and NATO that led army generals to 
believe that European combat divisions were structurally superior. The tendency toward 
dispersion, mobility, and mechanization continued, as brigades and maneuver battalions 
replaced regimental combat teams and battle groups. Eventually, generals Bruce Clarke 
and Clyde Eddleman, both with recent command experience in Germany, introduced 
concepts to replace the pentomic division. Eddleman’s ROAD concept proved better 
suited to the changing global perception of the army. Clarke had introduced a universal 
combat division that could operate in the mechanized, and potentially nuclear, 
operational environment of Central Europe. But as the pressures of the New Look on the 
army were reduced in the late 1950s, army leadership began to consider seriously the 
possibility of military intervention in crises on the periphery of the Cold War. This new 
approach never challenged the deterrence of war in Europe as the primary mission of the 
service, but it did contribute to the introduction of combat divisions built around three 
brigade headquarters and a flexible number of maneuver battalions. 
 The fifth chapter discusses the adoption of the ROAD concept and its relation to 
changing national and alliance strategy. It considers the strategy of Flexible Response, 
introduced by the Kennedy administration in 1961, and describes the impact of ROAD on 
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Seventh Army and on the deterrence posture of NATO ground forces in Central Region. 
The army did not fully embrace Flexible Response, despite agreement with the notion 
that greater strategic flexibility was necessary. In order to maintain uncertainty about the 
kind of American response to Soviet aggression and thus enhance the deterrent effect of 
Flexible Response, the strategy was left vaguely defined. This led to distinctly different 
interpretations even within the administration. Large parts of the administration believed 
that conventional defense of Western Europe could be sustained for several weeks. The 
army’s operational concept on the other hand did not include protracted conventional 
operations. Both the Secretary of Defense and NATO’s supreme commander supported 
the position of the army, although Robert McNamara was less convinced of the absolute 
need to employ tactical nuclear weapons that was General Lyman Lemnitzer. Lemnitzer 
feared that increased emphasis on conventional defense threatened the concept of forward 
defense at or near the intra-German border, which was predicated on the notion that 
nuclear weapons would be used to destroy massed Soviet or Warsaw Pact formations that 
were trying to cross the border. NATO commanders believed that their forces were too 
small for defensive operations without nuclear weapons. 
 The sixth chapter addresses the global nature of the Cold War and the 
fundamental strategic dilemma of the army in the 1960s. Its primary mission remained 
the deterrence of war in Europe, but secondary missions included preparedness for 
different kinds of limited war in the Third World. The chapter discusses why the army 
found it impossible to fulfill both aspects of its mission. It shows that ground forces built 
for armored and mechanized warfare were ill suited for counterinsurgency operations in 
an environment with poor infrastructure. The chapter explains why ROAD contributed 
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greatly to deterrence in Europe but could not win the Vietnam War. As the war 
protracted, light infantry divisions had to be created, the development of critical weapon 
systems and equipment items for use in Europe was delayed, and officers and skilled 
personnel had to be withdrawn from Europe. Nevertheless, the U.S. maintained the 
equivalent of five combat divisions in Germany and the German army achieved a degree 
of readiness that compensated for some of the weaknesses of USAREUR. While national 
strategic demands exceeded army capability, deterrence in Europe remained the priority 
of army leaders. This contributed to the defeat in Vietnam, but unlike Western Europe, 
Southeast Asia was never a critical theater of the Cold War nor was there much danger of 
escalation to nuclear war. 
 The final chapter discusses the recovery of the army in the decade following the 
war in Vietnam. The focus of the institution almost immediately returned on Germany. 
Soviet intentions, capabilities, and operational plans were considered as the basis for U.S. 
Army planning. The Yom Kippur War of 1973 between Israel and Egypt and Syria had 
shown the effects of modern armor and anti-tank weaponry. It also served as illustration 
that Soviet armored weapons were equal to those of the western alliance. As a result of 
such observations, the army published new doctrine in 1976. Active Defense was 
advocated as the operational future of the army, but the concept drew much criticism 
from within and without the service for its emphasis on the first battle and on the 
defensive. General Donn Starry and other doctrinal planners realized that the Soviets had 
perfected ideas of deep battle, characterized by several echelons of attacking forces that 
could be fed onto a battlefield with precise timing. In order to counter skill, brute force, 
and superior numbers, the army could not rely upon tactical expertise and firepower 
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alone. In 1982, Active Defense was replaced by AirLand Battle doctrine. Now, the Cold 
War army had come into its own, through the marriage of mission, organizational 
structure of the combat elements, weapons technology, and operational doctrine geared 
toward a specific type of warfare in Germany. But this was only possible because in the 
decade after the Vietnam War, national strategic objective and army operational objective 
were perfectly aligned. 
 The primary sources for many aspects of this study were difficult to assemble and 
by its very nature no work on national-security questions in the twentieth century could 
reasonably claim to be complete. Presidential, foreign, defense, and alliance politics since 
the Second World War have created a vast store of public records, but a great number of 
documents remain classified. In addition, this study cuts very close to current affairs and 
some of the protagonists of the later chapters are still alive. While this has offered the 
opportunity for oral history interviews, it has also limited access to personal papers. 
Research for this dissertation has been conducted in government and military archives in 
the United States and Western Europe, although American records naturally comprise the 
bulk of the evidence presented. It is an empirical multi-archival study, but the available 
record cannot answer all questions. At times it has proven necessary to employ carefully 
crafted theory to explain specific courses of action and their alternatives. These sections 
have been clearly identified.  
 The study of the Cold War army has become timely and even pressing. The U.S. 
military, presumably in the midst of transformation to face the challenges of the twenty-
first century, is once again encountering many of the questions addressed in this 
dissertation. Technology, skill, and the tendency toward specialized forces may be 
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enticing, but the question to what extent a small and specialized force can serve its 
purpose in a global context needs to be considered carefully. The army’s experience 
during the Cold War offers an important American case study of transformation. The 
reform, at first driven by budgetary pressure and new technology, was not an immediate 
success. Deterrence suffered from the introduction of the pentomic division. It is true that 
ROAD was a vast improvement, but tactics, operations, and military strategy remained 
unconnected due to the lack of applicable doctrine and conflicting strategic objectives. 
The United States had allowed itself to believe that its army could fight anywhere in the 
world and win under difficult circumstances. This dissertation suggests that an army will 
fight as well as it has been prepared by its military leaders. But the degree of preparation 
is conditioned by the policies of the state, national and military strategy, civil-military 
relations, and society’s willingness to contribute the immense human and materiel 
resources necessary for postmodern war.
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Chapter 2: The U.S. Army in National and Alliance Strategy 
In 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower became President of the United States and 
hostilities in Korea ended. Both events, the election of an army general to the White 
House and the conclusion of a grueling war promised better times for the army. But it 
soon became apparent that its position as the primary agent of American national security 
was in danger. Eisenhower’s fiscal conservatism favored nuclear deterrence, which was 
in theory no less effective and much cheaper than the maintenance of large conventional 
ground forces. Massive Retaliation thus came to replace defense of territory as the 
preferred means to meet the threat of Soviet expansion during the 1950s. In effect, this 
required reductions in spending on the army in order to enhance the strategic offensive 
capabilities of the air force and, to a lesser degree, the navy. Political leaders in the 
United States and Western Europe questioned the utility of conventional forces. By 1955, 
air power was seen as the dominant form of war, with land power relegated to the status 
of an auxiliary service. 
Army Doctrine, 1949-1954 
After the Second World War, the general public regarded ground forces as 
unfashionable. Although the army had fought valiantly in the Second World War, the 
advent of atomic weapons made land forces appear to be of limited utility. Even the 
army’s own first postwar operational doctrinal manual was self-effacing. Its mission 
statement emphasized training and proper equipment of combat units for the defense of 
the United States, but it also pointed at the provision “of Army units for attachment to the 
Air Force for performance of prescribed functions; to provide common type support for 
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Navy and Air Force as directed.”1 For land-warfare tactics, it prescribed offensive spirit 
and emphasized firepower. Both infantry and armor would be best employed offensively. 
Defensive operations were to be employed only where dictated by the circumstances. 
Divisions on the defensive were advised to choose strong points and attempt to defend in 
place.2 In general, the manual left little doubt that army planners strongly favored the 
offensive as the best way to preserve freedom of action and impose one’s will upon the 
enemy.3
The effect of offensive operations on the enemy was believed to be both physical 
and psychological. Assault of defensive positions and aggressive pursuit of retreating 
units would inflict disproportionately heavy losses. Rapid attacks on command and 
logistics functions were to degrade the enemy’s ability to coordinate operations of 
forward deployed combat units. The goal was to direct a well planned effort against 
dominating terrain, supply lines, and vital areas in the enemy’s rear.4 There, he would 
have to stand and fight. Army doctrine held that decisive battle was to be sought in a war 
of movement, but that ultimately it would be necessary to reduce enemy strong points. In 
operations against fortified positions, commanders needed to allow for sufficient time to 
assemble the right combination of firepower and maneuver capability, signal 
communications, and other vital support. Once the force had been assembled, and 
 
1Department of the Army, Field Manual, FM 100-5: Field Service Regulations - 
Operations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1949), p.2. Hereafter cited as 
FM 100-5, 1949. 
 2Ibid., pp. 6-13. 
 3See, for instance, ibid., p. 20. 
 4Ibid., pp. 80-99. 
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reconnaissance had revealed the weak points in the defensive position, the attack would 
commence under the assumption that fire superiority had to be established before combat 
units could launch an assault. Armored reserves had to be prepared to exploit a 
breakthrough and drive into the rear of the enemy’s front-line positions.5 Their objective 
was to attack enemy command and control functions, to cause confusion, and kill or 
capture large numbers of enemy troops.6
The defensive was primarily for the purpose of gaining time “pending the 
development of more favorable conditions for undertaking the offensive, or to economize 
forces on one front for the purpose of concentrating superior forces for a decisive action 
elsewhere.” Based on hard-fought defensive battles of the Second World War, such as the 
defense of Bastogne during the Battle of the Bulge, the army recognized only positional 
defense as a legitimate form of the defensive. There was awareness, of course, of 
successful German employment of mobile defense in depth on the Eastern Front, but that 
did not yet have a significant place in official doctrine. For the time being,  
defensive doctrine contemplates the selection and organization of a battle position 
which is to be held at all costs. Forward of that position maximum use is made of 
covering forces to delay and disorganize the advance of the enemy and deceive 
him as to the true location of the battle position. Strong reserves are held out to 
destroy the enemy by counterattack if he penetrates the battle position and after 
the momentum of the attack has been spent.7
The main line of resistance was considered the last resort, while forward units added 
depth to an otherwise linear defense.8 Atomic weapons did not yet enter into operational 
 
5Ibid., pp. 99-113. 
 6Ibid., pp. 114-18. 
 7Ibid., p.120. 
 8Ibid., p. 141. 
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doctrine beyond a few veiled remarks about technological advances. As the manual was 
published, in August of 1949, the U.S. still believed that it possessed a monopoly on the 
weapon. Pentagon officials had only just begun to contemplate tactical use of atomic 
weapons. 
 The Korean War shifted army attitudes that had prevailed in the immediate post-
war period. After the Second World War, the U.S. Army had been demobilized rapidly. 
Its main task became the occupation of Germany and Japan. By the end of the 1940s, 
increasing tension between the U.S. and the Soviet Union had polarized international 
relations and war was again considered possible. But there seemed little use for large 
fighting formations of men armed with the weapons of World War II. The Korean War 
exposed the fallacy of such arguments. It showed that war could be limited, even in the 
atomic age. It also demonstrated that the army had been reduced to a point that its 
effectiveness as a fighting force had been degraded seriously. At the beginning of the 
war, North Korean troops held the advantage in manpower, equipment, and readiness. 
The army had four infantry divisions in Japan, but all of them were severely under 
strength and lacked even basic weaponry and equipment.9 The first American soldiers 
 
9In the wake of the Korean War, it was argued that individual soldiers, rather than 
entire divisions had been unprepared for the war because occupation duty and life in 
Japan had softened them. See T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study in 
Unpreparedness (New York: Macmillan, 1963). The recent work of Thomas E. Hanson, 
“The Eighth Army’s Combat Readiness Before Korea: A Reappraisal,” in: Armed Forces 
& Society, Vol. 29, No.2 (Winter 2003), pp. 167-84 clearly demonstrates that individual 
soldiers were quite capable but lacked necessary guns, tanks, and vehicles. Lack of tanks 
and anti-tank guns is also discussed in Gudmundsson, On Armor, p. 162.
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that encountered the enemy were barely able to delay  the North Korean advance so that 
other elements of Eighth Army could take up suitable defensive positions.10 
The defense of the Pusan Perimeter offers several interesting examples of tactics 
that did not correspond with the official doctrine promulgated in 1949. Of course, the 
divisions, regiments, and battalions defending Taegu and other critical points also bore 
little resemblance to the tables of organization and equipment prescribed by the army. In 
practice, while relying on linear defense of the southeastern tip of the Korean Peninsula, 
General Walton Walker installed a system in which mobile, centrally located reserves 
could eradicate any infiltration. Walker’s ad-hoc defense resembled German battle group 
actions in the Second World War.11 As Eighth Army gathered strength and found its 
footing, its tactical behavior changed accordingly and came to resemble stated doctrine 
more closely. 
 In September and October 1950, army units recovered the initiative and 
conducted offensive operations in accordance with current doctrine. When Chinese 
troops entered the war and forced the Americans on the defensive, army units conducted 
area defense, based on strong positions and high grounds. This was a response to the 
numerical superiority of the Chinese forces, but it was also a consequence of the quality 
of available personnel. Reservists who had not received much training before being sent 
 
10Roy K. Flint, “Task Force Smith and the 24th Division: Delay and Withdrawal, 
5-19 July 1950,” in: Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft (eds.), America’s First 
Battles: 1776-1965 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1986), pp. 266-99. 
 11As Kevin Soutor shows, the studies of German army officers conducted for the 
U.S. Army since the end of the Second World War had begun to resonate with their 
American counterparts. Kevin Soutor, “To Stem the Red Tide: The German Report Series 
and Its Effects on American Defense Doctrine, 1948-1954,” in: The Journal of Military 
History Vol. 57, No. 4 (October 1993), pp. 653-88. 
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to Korea as individual replacements could more easily learn basic skills for the defense of 
strong points than those required for attack. In spite of the much longer duration of 
offensive operations and the war of posts from September 1950 until 1953, it was the 
experience of defensive operations in the summer of 1950 that was to contribute more 
greatly to the development of doctrine for war in Europe.  
 Once American forces had established superiority in firepower on the ground and 
in the air, the course of the Korean War reinforced the army’s tendency to rely on heavy 
firepower rather than maneuver.12 This appears to have originated in the conclusions 
drawn from the experience of the American Expeditionary Force during the First World 
War. Moreover, the influence of tactical ideology of the French army, which was widely 
admired by American officers before the Second World War, should not be 
underestimated. It is generally assumed that the quick defeat of French arms in 1940, 
coupled with the stunning operational success of German war of movement, prompted a 
shift in American thinking, but the events of the Second World War as well as the Korean 
War do not support such a conclusion. U.S. Army doctrine continued to emphasize a 
methodical offensive in which firepower was seen as the means to reduce enemy strong 
points and collapse the enemy’s front line. Armored and mechanized maneuver elements 
of the army were used to support the infantry, although it was acknowledged that they 
could become the main instrument of offensive action if the enemy was disorganized or 
could not hold its fortifications. Conversely, on the defensive, the enemy was to be forced 
to expend vast amounts of manpower in assaults on fortified positions covered by 
concentrations of artillery and machine guns. The Korean War did not challenge this line 
 
12For the use of artillery in the Korean War see Gudmundsson, On Artillery, pp.
144-47. 
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of thinking because American artillery was superior to that of the enemy and terrain and 
weather conditions favored the use of infantry. 
 With the introduction of the 280-mm atomic cannon, tactical use of atomic 
weapons by ground forces became possible. This amplified the predilection to rely on 
heavy firepower both as a means of fighting a numerically superior enemy and 
minimizing friendly casualties. In practice, however, it was unclear what changes atomic 
weapons would bring to tactics and operational planning. For the next few years, atomic 
weapons were regarded as a more powerful form of artillery, rather than as basis for a 
different kind of tactics, operations, and strategy. In 1953, the Weapons System 
Evaluation Group (WSEG) in the Pentagon prepared a study that “analyzes critical 
phases of the assault by a USSR mechanized army (reinforced) on prepared defenses of 
the U.S. type corps deployed on a wide front on representative terrain in Western 
Germany.” While all major weapons systems of the corps were being evaluated, attention 
was focused on atomic capabilities. The Joint Strategic Plans Committee concluded in 
January 1954 that the study was not ready to be shown to Allied officers.13 
Nuclear weapons would also affect the ability of the United States to move 
reinforcements and supplies to Europe by air and sea. At a Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting 
on May 14, 1954, the question was raised “as to the feasibility of re-enforcing ground 
forces in Western Europe from North America during the first 30 days of a general war.” 
Thirty days were deemed to be the critical time period, but it was unclear whether the 
 
13J.S.P.C. 902/381, 25 February 1954, Report by the Joint Strategic Plans 
Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on WSEG Staff Study No. 14. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Geographic File 1954-56, CGS092 Western Europe (3-12-48), Sec. 261, RG 218, 
National Archives (hereafter cited as NA). The quotation is on page 2. 
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U.S. and its allies had sufficient transport. Moreover, bomb damage to ports and radiation 
in general could seriously limit the capability to unload and distribute men and materiel.14 
In 1954, new army operational doctrine was published that attempted to integrate 
the recent experience of the Korean War and possibilities for action made possible by the 
availability of atomic weapons for tactical purposes. Concern about the emphasis of the 
Eisenhower administration on nuclear deterrence was manifest. The manual left no doubt 
that only land forces could win wars. For that purpose they had to be supported by the 
other services, while “Army combat forces do not support the operations of any other 
component.” There was also a stern warning not to neglect ground forces in peacetime: 
“Their [army, air force, and navy] maintenance in proper balance is essential if the 
objectives of national policy are to be attained.” Limited wars against Soviet satellite 
states were possible, as demonstrated by the Korean War. Strategic mobility and the 
ability to fight on a conventional or atomic battlefield, therefore, were essential. Unlike 
the more enthusiastic advocates of atomic weapons, the authors of the manual reminded 
army officers that the final objective of war had to be political and that “victory alone as 
an aim of war cannot be justified, since in itself victory does not always assure the 
realization of national objectives. If the policy objectives are to be realized, policy and 
not interim expediency must govern the application of military power.” Still, the manual 
stressed the quest for decisive victory on the battlefield through offensive action.15 
14J.L.P.C. 405/12/D, Joint Logistic Plans Committee, Directive, 18 June 1954, 
Implications of Atomic Warfare. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Geographic File 1954-56, CGS092 
Western Europe (3-12-48), Sec. 282, RG 218, NA. The quotations are on page 1. 
 15Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5: Field Service Regulations - 
Operations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1954), pp. 4-8. Hereafter cited 
as FM 100-5, 1954. The quotations are, in order, on pages 4, 5, and 7. 
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The offensive depended on the massing of superior force at the point of decision 
and the effective application of firepower. To achieve numerical superiority in one sector 
of the battlefield, strength had to be conserved in other sectors and it might be necessary 
to accept a defensive position temporarily.16 Once the assault force had been assembled, 
heavy artillery was expected to subdue the defenders and enable the ground attack to 
proceed at a deliberate pace. But the manual failed to prescribe proper employment of 
tactical atomic weapons. Instead, division commanders were left with the options to 
“consider atomic fires as additional firepower of large magnitude to complement other 
available fire support...[or] fit his maneuver plans to the use of atomic fires.”17 It was 
stated that atomic weapons were more suitable for attacks with deep objectives, but there 
was no mention of the potential negative effects of their use on the movement of friendly 
forces.18 Commanders were reminded that it was critical to maintain a sufficient reserve 
to exploit a breakthrough and to commit that reserve decisively rather than piecemeal. 
Otherwise, the defenders might recover and force the attacker into a battle of attrition.19 
In general, infantry was assigned to the reduction of enemy strong points or to the 
defense of favorable ground or critical positions. Commanding officers had to keep in 
mind, however, that defense or conquest of terrain features were not ends in themselves.20 





19Ibid., p. 74-75. 
 20Ibid., p. 77.
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help to achieve that by rendering the enemy more vulnerable to the application of heavy 
conventional or atomic firepower. The preparation of offensive action was supposed to be 
conducted in a methodical fashion, albeit not quite as deliberately as had been the case 
prior to the Korean War.21 The main effort was to be concentrated on a narrow front and 
supported as much as possible. Diversionary attacks, designed to draw enemy forces 
away from the point of decision, could be developed on wider fronts. Once the attack was 
underway, the commander was to influence the course of action mainly by committing 
his reserves and directing artillery fire.22 There was little doubt that the army considered 
fire support to be the decisive factor.23 
Plans for the offensive were characterized by great hope that war of movement, 
for the purpose of applying overwhelming firepower, would break the cohesion of enemy 
forces. The defensive on the other hand was still treated as the stepchild of tactical and 
operational thought.24 There was some movement toward more active defense, but 
positional defense was still regarded as more universally applicable, especially for 
infantry units. Nonetheless, for the first time, mobile defense was acknowledged as an 
equal form of the defensive, particularly in situations and terrain that would allow the 
defender to maneuver and defend in depth.25 Positional defense was characterized by the 
 
21Ibid., pp. 78-87. 
 22Ibid., pp. 87-89. 
 23Ibid., p. 94.
24A mere page count of the 1954 edition of FM 100-5 shows thirty-nine pages 
devoted to the offensive and only twenty-four to defensive operations. Ibid., pp. 74-112 
and 113-36. 
 25Ibid., pp. 117-21. 
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forward deployment of most available combat units to deny the enemy critical terrain 
features. Within the operations branch of USAREUR, there was a great degree of 
skepticism about the applicability of static defensive tactics. Major Melbourne C. 
Chandler expected the tactical situation in Europe to be reminiscent of the initial phase of 
the Korean War, during which American forces tried to maintain cohesive defensive 
positions but were repeatedly attacked from the flanks and forced to abandon their 
positions. He concluded that Seventh Army needed to emphasize mobile defense and 
maneuver in depth.26 
Mobile defense in current doctrine featured a small forward-deployed combat 
force with the bulk of the defenders in reserve for local counterattacks. Defense was 
conducted either to gain time while conditions more favorable to offensive actions would 
develop, or as a local expedient while offensive operations were under way in other parts 
of the combat zone.27As in the offensive, the proper utilization of terrain was critical. To 
improve on natural obstacles, field fortifications and barriers might have to be built. In 
the balance, however, the enemy could only be contained on the defensive. Counterattack 
was necessary to destroy him.28 
With respect to the threat posed by atomic weapons, commanders were advised to 
“intensify appropriate individual and unit training,” disperse their forces in order to avoid 
offering a “lucrative target,” seek shelter, intercept enemy reconnaissance, and conduct 
 
26Melbourne C. Chandler, “Notes on Defense,” in: Military Review, Vol. 34, No. 
11 (February 1955), pp. 38-49. Major Chandler served in the G-3 branch (Operations) of 
USAREUR headquarters. 
 27FM 100-5, 1954, p. 113. 
 28Ibid., pp. 114-15. 
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counterintelligence operations. During mobile defensive operations, it was crucial to 
disperse the reserve to the greatest degree possible without impeding its ability to strike at 
the appropriate moment. Generally, enemy atomic attacks were to be considered “as a 
warning signal for mobile reserves to prepare for employment in counterattacks or in 
blocking roles,” since the enemy would surely use atomic weapons in preparation for 
ground attacks. For higher command echelons, the “threat of enemy use of atomic 
requires that plans be prepared for replacement of complete tactical units.”29 The army 
was wary of the degree of destruction that enemy atomic fire could bring on its units, but 
army leaders were optimistic that properly concealed defensive positions, mobility, and 
initiative would be sufficient means to avoid offering concentrated and exposed targets. 
National Strategy and the Army: From NSC-68 to the New Look 
The basic principle underlying the grand strategy of the United States during the 
Cold War was attrition. In the late 1940s, the Soviet Union had yet to recover its 
economic strength. The U.S. on the other hand had become the strongest economic 
power. Despite fear of Soviet military aggression, American leaders recognized that in 
protracted peaceful competition the more robust economic and social system of liberal 
capitalism would outlast the repressive authoritarianism of the Kremlin.30 This was the 
belief of George Kennan, a policy analyst in the U.S. embassy in Moscow and 
subsequently director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, who first 
 
29Ibid., pp.120-21. 
 30The political scientist Aaron Friedberg has introduced the terms “contract state” 
and “garrison state” for the two different types of economies and societies. He argues that 
a contract state generally possesses greater strength and flexibility. Aaron L. Friedberg, 
“Why Didn’t the United States Become a Garrison State?” in: International Security,
Vol. 16, No. 4 (Spring 1992), pp. 109-42. 
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introduced the policy of containment. Containment of communism ultimately meant 
denial of any further Soviet, and after 1949 also Chinese, territorial advances, while 
waiting for the much inferior economic and social system of the dictatorships to crumble 
under the strains of the competition with the West.31 
Soviet control of the rich resources and skilled manpower of Western Europe 
would have redressed the economic imbalance and thus compromised the assumptions of 
American grand strategy. Thus, the defense of Western Europe was not only desirable, 
but necessary. The basis of defense was economic, political, and military cooperation. 
Economic integration, both within Western Europe and of Europe with the U.S., was 
furthered by the Marshall Plan of 1947. The resulting European Recovery Program 
became a symbol for the economic recovery of the western half of the continent, 
including the occupation zones in Germany that were soon to form the Federal 
Republic.32 This course of action addressed two significant problems of the late 1940s: 
the danger of communist electoral victories, particularly in France and Italy, and the 
gradual filling of a power vacuum in Europe left by the destruction of Germany as a great 
 
31See Kennan’s “Long Telegram” of 1946 in Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1946, Volume VI: Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 696-709 (hereafter cited as FRUS, year, volume). 
His views were expressed with greater depth in the initially anonymous article Mr. X., 
“The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 4 (July 1947), pp. 
566-82. For a discussion of Kennan’s role in the formulation of containment see Gaddis, 
Strategies of Containment, pp. 25-53. 
 32There is some controversy, however, whether the Marshall Plan was a necessary 
element to the recovery process of Western Europe. See, for instance, William I. 
Hitchcock, France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in 
Europe, 1944-1954 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998), Michael 
J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western 
Europe, 1947-1952 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), and Alan S. 
Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1951(Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984). 
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power and by the weakening of France and Great Britain. Militarily, Western Europe felt 
vulnerable to Soviet attack despite the American monopoly of atomic weapons. On the 
other hand, the great manpower base, economic strength, and social and political 
cohesion of the U.S. and Western Europe favored long-term success. To achieve greater 
political ties and increase the defensive posture of the region, the U.S. abandoned a 
founding principle of its foreign policy and entered into a military alliance in peacetime.  
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed in 1949 as a step 
toward the creation of a more credible military deterrent to Soviet aggression. Prior to the 
outbreak of the Korean War, there had been little realistic hope of defending Western 
Europe with conventional forces. Atomic weapons were, as a consequence, by default the 
basis of deterrence. The Soviets were warned that aggression in Europe would result in 
serious repercussions and American war plans of the period revolved around atomic 
attacks by the air force. But in the summer of 1949 the Soviet Union successfully tested 
its first atomic bomb. The loss of the atomic monopoly altered the theoretical 
underpinnings of deterrence. Until then, strategic deterrence had been theoretically 
plausible. In reality, the small size of the stockpile of atomic bombs in the U.S. precluded 
their liberal use that was suggested in several plans for war against the Soviets.33 
Hundreds of atomic bombs were needed to achieve the objectives, but only dozens were 
available. Ground defense as an element of deterrence became even more important once 
 
33For a comprehensive summary see Steven T. Ross, American War Plans, 1945-
1950: Strategies for Defeating the Soviet Union (London: Frank Cass, 1996). Some of the 
plans have been published by David Alan Rosenberg and Steven T. Ross (eds.), 
America’s Plans for War Against the Soviet Union, 1945-1950, 15 volumes (New York: 
Garland, 1989-1990). For the stockpile of atomic bombs see David Alan Rosenberg, 
“U.S. Nuclear Stockpile, 1945-1950,” in: The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 38 (May 
1982), pp. 25-30. 
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the Soviets had the means to launch atomic attacks of their own. Nonetheless, in spite of 
the need for much greater spending on the army, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson 
intended to comply with the ceiling for the defense budget that President Truman had set 
at $13 billion.34 
The State Department’s Policy Planning Staff moved the process of conventional 
rearmament along with the formulation of NSC-68 in the spring of 1950. Historian David 
Fautua argues that this critical document of U.S. Cold War strategy saved the army. But it 
is unlikely that the policy paper would have led to major changes in defense policy 
without the outbreak of the Korean War and the fear in the U.S. and Europe that this 
event signaled more aggressive tactics on the part of the Soviet Union.35 In response to 
the war, both atomic and conventional armament were accelerated and NSC-68 became 
the blueprint for the defense policy of the second term of the Truman administration. Paul 
Nitze, the primary author of the study, estimated a need for annual defense budgets of 
about $40 billion.36 An NSC estimate concurred. The U.S. military could achieve the 
objectives of NSC-68 with less than $30 billion per year, but $10 billion to $12 billion 
 
34For Johnson’s tenure as Secretary of Defense, as well as his previous career in 
the War Department, see the recent comprehensive biography by Keith D. McFarland and 
David L. Roll, Louis Johnson and the Arming of America: The Roosevelt and Truman 
Years (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005).  
 35David T. Fautua, “The ‘Long Pull’ Army: NSC 68, the Korean War, and the 
Creation of the Cold War Army,” in: The Journal of Military History, Vol. 61, no. 1 (Jan. 
1997), pp. 93-120 argues that NSC 68 allowed the army to sharpen its intellectual 
rationale for manpower, weapons, and structure for the Cold War. Given the dramatic 
developments of 1955 through 1961 in terms of personnel and budget cuts, as well as the 
apparent reorientation of the army under Taylor, the argument is not convincing. Rather, 
the halt of the downward slide was temporary and the intellectual rationale remained 
open to significant change.. 
 36Paul H. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision (New 
York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), p. 96. 
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were needed for other defense-related expenditures, including military assistance to 
allies.37 The justification for higher defense spending was that the atomic monopoly had 
been lost and with it the security that had been provided by strategic deterrence. In order 
to deter war, it would be necessary to provide sufficient military force to convince the 
Soviets that an attack would not succeed. To this end both atomic and conventional 
means were necessary, and the bulk of them would have to be prepared for the defense of 
Western Europe.38 
NSC-68 projected the year of maximum danger of a Soviet attack to be 1954. 
Consequently, the achievement of force objectives was initially scheduled to be met by 
then, although in the event their realization had to be postponed until the end of 1955. 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended an army of twenty-one combat divisions.39 The 
price tag for balanced atomic and conventional military forces was high. Because of the 
outbreak of the Korean War, the defense budget for 1951 soared from the initial 
appropriation of $13 billion to $48 billion. The army had been scheduled to receive only 
$4 billion of the initial budget, but in the event was given $19 billion, which exceeded the 
money spent on the other services. The 1952 defense budget was set at over $60 billion, 
with spending on the air force surpassing that on the army, but in absolute figures the 
 
37Interim Report by the National Security Council on The Program and Cost 
Estimates of NSC 68 and their Implications for the United States, undated, Part II: 
Tabulation of Cost Estimates, p. 1. Papers of George Elsey, National Security folder, Box 
89, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library (hereafter cited as HSTL). 
 38The full text of NSC-68 can be found in FRUS, 1950, Volume I: National 
Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1977), pp. 234-92. 
 39Robert W. Coakley, Karl E. Cocke, and Daniel P. Griffin, Demobilization 
Following the Korean War (Washington, D.C.: Histories Division, Office of the Chief of 
Military History, 1968), pp. 1-2. 
49
army budget still increased to more than $21 billion. The 1953 defense budget was 
lowered to approximately $47 billion. The army received only $13 billion even though 
the war in Korea continued. The air force received more than $20 billion in the same year 
and the navy had almost caught up to the army. The final defense budget proposal of the 
Truman administration, for 1954, requested $41 billion.40 
In 1951, the U.S. deployed four army divisions to augment the lone division 
stationed on occupation duty in Germany. This was largely a political signal, as even five 
American divisions had little hope of containing a determined Soviet offensive. The 
Soviet Union was credited by Western intelligence with 175 active divisions and the 
potential to mobilize 500 divisions. While there were questions about the combat 
readiness of these divisions, which were significantly smaller and less well supported 
than their American counterparts, the force was regarded as overwhelmingly superior.41 
40For convenient summaries of the budgeting process see Steven L. Rearden, 
History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense: The Formative Years, 1947-1950 
(Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1984), pp. 309-
84 and Doris M. Condit, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense: The Test of 
War, 1950-1953 (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, 1988), pp. 223-306. Both publications also contain several detailed tables on the 
defense budget and its component parts. 
 41For estimates of Soviet military strength in the late 1940s and early 1950s see 
John S. Duffield, “The Soviet Military Threat to Western Europe: U.S. Estimates in the 
1950s and 1960s,” in: The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (June 1992), pp. 
208-27, Matthew A. Evangelista, “Stalin’s Postwar Army Reappraised,” in: International 
Security, Vol. 7, No.3 (Winter 1982-83), pp. 110-38, Raymond L. Garthoff, Assessing the 
Adversary: Estimates by the Eisenhower Administration of Soviet Intentions and 
Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1991),  Philipp A . Karber 
and Jerald A. Combs, “The United States, NATO, and the Soviet Threat to Western 
Europe: Military Estimates and Policy Options, 1945-1963,” in: Diplomatic History, Vol. 
22, No. 3 (Summer 1998), pp. 299-329, Scott A. Koch (ed.), Selected Estimates on the 
Soviet Union, 1950-1959 (Washington, D.C.: History Staff, Center for the Study of 
Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1993), and John Prados, The Soviet Estimate: 
U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Soviet Strategic Forces (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1986). Evangelista contends that the military services deliberately overestimated 
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Clearly, West Germany would have to be rearmed to take advantage of its military and 
economic potential and of the experience of veterans of the Second World War.42 While 
there had been tentative private conversations, it was the Korean War that made German 
rearmament possible.43 The decision was made in 1950, but the details had to be worked 
 
the Soviet threat as a leverage in the budgetary debates of the Truman administration. 
Duffield also expresses a degree of skepticism about the reliability of intelligence 
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the French army there were voices that pointed at the need to rearm West Germany at 
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November 1950, Report by the Standing Group to the Military Committee on Military 
Aspects of German Participation in the Defense of Western Europe. International 
Military Staff, NATO Archive. 
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out over the next four years.44 Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and other 
European states had serious concerns about German rearmament. By late 1954 it was 
decided that twelve West German army divisions, a small air force, and a navy in the 
Baltic Sea should be created to augment the existing and planned forces of the Western 
alliance. 
 For the time being, the U.S. military was guided by war plans that called for the 
defense of the Rhine River but prepared fallback positions on the Iberian and Italian 
peninsulas.45 The anticipated worst cases projected the loss of all continental territory. 
This was the result of a shortage of combat divisions. Sixty divisions at the outbreak of 
war were deemed necessary to defend the Rhine, but only twenty-six were available as of 
August 1949 and only two measured up to American standards.46 An intelligence report 
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of late 1949 put the combat effectiveness of French army divisions at seventy percent of 
that of a U.S. Army division. The other continental European armies ranged between 
forty and sixty percent.47 There was hope that greater defense spending in the U.S. and an 
increased sense of urgency in Europe would create the means to defend the Rhine. This 
was expressed in REAPER, the first American war plan that was largely written against 
the backdrop of NSC-68.48 In the event, European rearmament was slow and there were 
insufficient troops to achieve the goals set in REAPER. Even the U.S. Army planned to 
contribute only two infantry divisions in the first days of defensive operations.   
 Soviet superiority on the ground forced the allies to re-adopt a strategy of nuclear 
deterrence. The Eisenhower administration quickly abandoned the parallel buildup of 
conventional and nuclear forces that had been at the core of NSC-68 in favor of Massive 
Retaliation. British military and civilian leadership had called for nuclear deterrence even 
prior to Eisenhower’s election.49 Nevertheless, the British Chiefs of Staff (COS), who 
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had been very pessimistic about the defense of Europe, were more optimistic in late 1952. 
Plan FAIRFAX, the outline of intentions for the first half of 1953 was based on the 
assumption that both sides would use atomic weapons. The plan stated that “survival of 
the United Kingdom base and western Europe in the initial intense phase is of overriding 
importance.” This included “the holding of the front in western Europe.”50 Such a feat 
could not be accomplished with conventional forces alone, but the development of atomic 
weapons that could be used for tactical purposes was on the brink of fruition. 
 Dwight D. Eisenhower entered the White House with the conviction that 
American and NATO strategy needed to be overhauled. The alliance required a military 
build-up in the short term, prompted by concerns generated by the unprovoked 
Communist attack in Korea. NATO leaders had agreed to very ambitious force goals at 
the Lisbon summit in 1952, but Eisenhower doubted the ability or willingness of the 
signatories to deliver on their promise.51 Ultimately, the American contribution to the 
build-up would necessitate a high level of defense spending that could slow or even 
reverse the growth of the U.S. economy. Eisenhower assumed that the Cold War would 
be a protracted struggle over decades and he believed that the U.S. would prevail because 
 
50J.P. (52)108(FINAL), Chiefs of Staff Committee, Joint Planning Staff, 27 
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of its much stronger economy. The deterrence of war, the security of the U.S., and the 
defense of America’s allies were essential, but they could not come at the expense of 
weakening the American economy. Hence, the New Look defense policy was introduced 
in 1954 after thorough review. The basic premise was that U.S. overseas deployments 
had to be reduced if a suitable strategic reserve was to be built within a sustainable 
defense budget. Military leaders warned that this policy would endanger the credibility of 
the NATO alliance and weaken the deterrence posture of the United States.52 
Eisenhower proposed a reduction of the armed services from 3.5 million officers 
and men to 2.5 million. In his view, a sufficient stockpile of atomic weapons, and 
technologically advanced delivery vehicles, were the most credible deterrent that could 
be afforded. The allies would have to carry a greater share of the burden of regional 
territorial defense. The U.S. would provide strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, 
maintain a strong mobilization base, and control the essential lines of maritime 
communication, but existing overseas force deployments could not be maintained 
indefinitely. In the long run, Eisenhower hoped to withdraw most American troops, 
leaving only a token ground force. The New Look also introduced covert operations 
behind enemy lines and in unstable states as a significant element of strategy. The policy 
was driven by fiscal and economic considerations. It would have been possible, from the 
vantage point of 1953, to build-up nuclear and conventional forces to a degree that would 
have increased deterrence on all levels of war. But the price tag was too great and 
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Eisenhower was afraid that such a policy would corrupt American democracy by placing 
too much power into the hands of the federal government.53 
Eisenhower and his advisors believed that Massive Retaliation, in spite of the risk 
of nuclear annihilation, was the price that had to be paid for prosperity, freedom and 
security.54 Nuclear deterrence was deemed more affordable and sustainable in the long 
run than the defense program outlined in NSC-68. But by placing such great emphasis on 
nuclear weapons, the Eisenhower administration greatly reduced its options of response 
to Soviet aggression. Should war break out despite the threat of Massive Retaliation, the 
only alternative to executing the strategy was to surrender Western Europe to the Soviets. 
NSC 162/2, the policy paper that defined the New Look as national security policy, 
emphasized diplomatic, political, economic, and covert measures to contain Soviet 
aggression or subversion. Militarily, air power was the essential tool of deterrence. The 
role of the ground forces in national strategy was left undefined. It was suggested that the 
army might serve as an occupation force after nuclear weapons had driven away enemy 
forces, and that it could maintain order at home if the U.S. itself ever came under nuclear 
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State: America’s Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy (Princeton: Princeton 
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European Relations” in his History and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1991), pp. 100-68 also remain useful. 
56
attack. Major combat operations, however, were deemed unlikely. Consequently, the 
service was relegated to third place with respect to the allocation of defense funds.55 
Initially, Eisenhower was more generous to the army than Harry Truman. 
Eisenhower’s 1954 defense budget was on the whole $5 billion less than Truman’s $41 
billion proposal for the same year. However, while the army was to receive only $12 
billion under Truman, or just below thirty percent of the defense budget, Eisenhower 
asked Congress for an army budget of almost $13.7 billion. Congress appropriated a 
defense budget of $34.4 billion, with an army share of $13 billion. The air force received 
$11 billion and the navy $9.4 billion. But after the Korean War the army’s budget and its 
share in overall defense appropriations declined sharply. The 1955 defense budget was 
reduced by $5.5 billion. The army bore the brunt of the reduction and its budget dropped 
to $7.6 billion, about one quarter of overall defense appropriations. This reduction, and 
the fact that the army was the only service to receive less money in 1955 than in the 
previous year, contributed greatly to the subsequent drive to reform the service. By 1957 
the fiscal situation had worsened. The army received $7.5 billion, less than half of the 
$16.5 billion granted to the air force. In fact, the air force received almost as much as 
army and navy ($10 billion) combined. Within three years, the army’s share of the budget 
had declined from thirty-eight to less than twenty-two percent.56 
55Bacevich, Pentomic Era, pp. 14-16. See also FRUS, 1952-1954, Volume II: 
National Security Affairs, Pt. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1984), 
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Eisenhower’s defense budgets were within the range envisioned by NSC-68, but 
strong emphasis on air power indicated a significant shift of emphasis. The air force 
budget more than tripled between 1950 and 1957 (from $5.2 billion to $16.5 billion). The 
army budget increased by $3.4 billion between 1950 and 1957 (from $4.1 billion to $7.5), 
but budgets prior to the Korean War did not have to provide for atomic armament, while 
the post-1950 budgets had to cover the high acquisition costs of extensive atomic 
weapons procurement. The cost for research and development of rockets and missiles had 
to be added to conventional armaments as well as personnel and operating costs. As a 
result, the army faced severe reductions in manpower and in the number of active 
divisions. In December 1953, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved new force objectives for 
1957, which called for a reduction of the army from 1.5 million to one million men in 
fourteen rather than twenty combat divisions.57 The Army Staff accepted the guideline, 
based on the assumption that eight Japanese divisions would be created, that most 
American divisions in the Far East could be withdrawn, and that West German 
rearmament would commence quickly.58 
Despite the agreement in principle, General Matthew B. Ridgway, the Army 
Chief of Staff, had serious reservations about the new force goals. He considered it a 
grave mistake to cut the size of the army prior to the actual achievement of certain force 
levels by West Germany and Japan. Moreover, he questioned whether new weapons 
systems would indeed reduce the need for manpower. The great philosophical difference 
between Admiral Radford, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and outspoken 
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proponent of the New Look, and Ridgway rested on their interpretations of economics 
and the role of military leadership. Radford viewed economic stability as a crucial 
element of military preparedness, whereas Ridgway thought that soldiers should stay out 
of economic questions and focus on sound military advice to their civilian superiors.59 
The question for Ridgway was how he could gain sufficient financial resources, within a 
limited defense budget, for an army of fourteen or even seventeen active divisions.60 
Ridgway had been appointed Army Chief of Staff in 1953, after one year as 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).61 He was a decorated World War II 
airborne general and had commanded Eighth Army and the U.S./UN forces in Korea. But 
while Ridgway was a distinguished combat leader, he lacked the diplomatic sensibility 
required to execute his difficult task. To some extent this had already shown during his 
tenure in Europe, which had provided thinly veiled complaints about “the American 
headquarters at Paris.” He found that his time as Chief of Staff  “was to be spent in the 
unhappy task of defending the U.S. Army from actions by my superiors which, to my 
mind, would weaken it, physically and spiritually.”62 Ridgway was caught between two 
 
59Ibid., pp. 32-34. Ridgway’s qualified consent to the force goals meant that the 
claim of unanimous approval by the Joint Chiefs was technically correct. Admiral 
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 60See Leighton, Strategy, Money, and the New Look, p. 260. In December 1953, 
approved service goals called for a fourteen-division, one-million-men Army by June 30, 
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 61Ridgway relates that General Bradley had inquired about his preferences, 
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fundamental pillars of his professional ethic: military professionalism and adherence to 
civilian control of the military.63 
General Ridgway discovered that Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson was 
adamantly opposed to a large army. His relationship with Wilson was difficult from the 
beginning. He had hoped that Eisenhower would retain Truman’s last Defense Secretary, 
Robert Lovett, in the Pentagon because of Lovett’s proven ability to see beyond partisan 
issues.64 Instead, Eisenhower chose Wilson, a former General Motors director, whom 
Ridgway regarded as dangerously simplistic in his blind reliance on nuclear deterrence.65 
Ridgway did not reject the need for a capability of massive retaliation, but he also noted 
that the capacity to respond flexibly was of no less importance. He doubted that strategic 
bombing could defeat the enemy. The Soviet Union and China were large land masses 
and the attacking planes would have to penetrate deep into enemy air space to find 
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significant targets, which would be guarded by capable air defense systems. He warned 
that the destruction of the enemy’s economy and will to fight by strategic bombing 
campaigns would take time, while Soviet ground forces might well be able to advance 
across Western Europe quickly. There was, moreover, a strong religious undertone in 
Ridgway’s rejection of the final objective of Massive Retaliation: “such mass destruction 
is repugnant to the ideals of a Christian nation. It is incompatible with the basic aim of 
the free world in war, which is to win a just and enduring peace.”66 
The Army Chief of Staff found it difficult to accept that defense policy 
detrimental to the army was directed by a former army general - President Eisenhower.67 
Ridgway’s relationship with Eisenhower had changed: “the old informal Ike and Matt 
relationship” was gone. He may still have been “Matt,” but Eisenhower was now “Mr. 
President.”68 The apparent abandonment of his old service by the President contributed to 
an overall decline in morale that found its expression in a large number of resignations. 
Between 1954 and 1956, 132,000 junior grade officers quit the service. Major General 
Gerald Higgins prefaced his letter of retirement with the words that “if present trends 
continue the Army will soon become a service support agency for the other armed 
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services.” Contemporary articles in service journals indicated that many officers who 
stayed in the army agreed with Higgins. They felt a sharp decline in their status and 
resented the public admiration for bomber pilots and naval aviators. Among the most 
extreme responses was that of an army major, who questioned whether an institution that 
had become an auxiliary service should be retained in the first place. His ironic 
suggestion was unification of the army and air force.69 
Motions for a Chief of Staff to control all armed forces had in fact been army 
policy in the early 1950s. They were shelved for fear that such a position would be filled 
by an air force general and that it would accelerate the marginalization of the army as a 
civil defense force that would uphold law and order.70 Maxwell Taylor, Ridgway’s 
successor as Chief of Staff, made it clear that the army would not accept the civil defense 
mission as its primary raison d’Ltre. He argued that deterrence offered an alternative 
mission, because conventional, and even tactical nuclear deterrence relied heavily on the 
combat readiness of active forces, while the nuclear deterrent looked imposing at any 
rate. But this did not draw a positive response from the other service chiefs or the 
administration. General Lyman Lemnitzer summed up the feelings of many of the senior 
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officers in the mid-1950s when he wrote: “today it seems to me that the very survival of 
the Army...is at stake.”71 
The Korean War had done little to improve public opinion about the army. The 
war had been fought in a remote geographic locale that was of no consequence to most 
Americans. Moreover, the war had not been won. Instead, a stalemate had developed that 
seemed to resemble the senseless slaughter of the western front in the First World War. 
As in the 1920s and 1930s, common sense appeared to dictate that land forces were too 
slow and ponderous for twentieth-century warfare. Air power, especially when equipped 
with atomic weapons, afforded a faster and cheaper way to fight. It also reduced the 
likelihood of American casualties. As long as the Soviet Union did not possess a large 
long-range bomber force or inter-continental missiles, the American homeland appeared 
safe. And once the Soviet Union acquired the means to strike at the United States, there 
seemed even less use for ground forces. The army devoted much energy and resources to 
developing anti-aircraft defense systems. Such systems could of course be useful in the 
defense of Western Europe, but in the mid-1950s, even prior to the Sputnik shock of 
1957, they were largely connected to considerations of nuclear war. 
 Ridgway argued that balanced conventional and atomic military forces were 
required to prevent war. Therefore, he was distressed with the permanent reduction of 
army expenditures and the force cuts that had been agreed upon in 1953. The goal of a 
one-million-man army remained in place, but Secretary Wilson moved up the schedule 
from 1957 to 1956. He suggested that this could be achieved by reducing all army units 
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statement in his address “This Is a Significant Beginning,”in: The Army Combat Forces 
Journal, Vol. 6, No. 4 (November 1955), p. 62. 
63
to eighty-five percent of their current personnel strength, coupled with the deactivation of 
some units. Ridgway objected on the grounds that a balanced and ready force was the 
best, and the only credible deterrent. Tactical atomic weapons offered greater firepower 
but there was little evidence to suggest that a combat unit so equipped would need fewer 
men. Ridgway also strongly advised against placing great expectations in the combat 
readiness of the reserve in the crucial opening months of war. The argument of Wilson’s 
allies that West German troops would fill the gap could easily be dismissed by pointing at 
the delayed decision to allow rearmament and the slow subsequent military build-up.  
 General Ridgway was surprised to find that President Eisenhower claimed in his 
1954 State of the Union address that the defense budget proposal for 1955 had been 
unanimously recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.72 He was particularly embittered 
by the political character of the process. Ridgway emphasized that he believed in civilian 
control of the military and thus supported any decision once it had been made, but he also 
clarified that the unanimous agreement had in fact been about force objectives for 1957 
and not the 1955 defense budget as the President had claimed.73 
There was in fact significant opposition to the proposed budget and personnel 
cuts. The Secretary of the Army, Robert Stevens, had informed Wilson in October 1953 
that the ceilings mandated by economic considerations would force the army to eliminate 
two divisions and to withdraw four divisions from the Far East by June 1955. The 
planned general reserve force in the U.S. would have only one of eight intended 
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divisions, one regimental combat team, and several antiaircraft batteries ready for 
combat.74 Wilson himself had raised the possibility of withdrawing all but a token U.S. 
ground force from Europe in an NSC meeting on October 1. Wilson’s position was 
supported by the Secretary of the Treasury, but Eisenhower insisted that the presence of 
American forces boosted the morale of the allies and that any immediate force 
withdrawals would have a negative psychological effect. He hoped that the proposed 
personnel cuts could be achieved without further reduction in the number of combat 
units.75 
Ridgway explained the army’s situation in a congressional hearing in February 
1954. He agreed to achieve the one-million-man army by June 1956.76 As a result, there 
were to be sixteen combat and two training divisions. The combat divisions could be 
maintained only if a greater proportion of army personnel went into combat units. That 
would leave support and logistics units short of personnel, but it might be possible to 
employ civilian contractors for some positions. Ridgway questioned whether the smaller 
army could maintain sufficient forces for a major crisis outside of Europe. Greater 
strength and proficiency of the reserve may have helped to assure that the army could still 
fulfill its global requirements, but there was no provision for recalling discharged 
 
74Leighton, Strategy, Money, and the New Look, p. 169. 
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servicemen, who were technically part of the reserve, to their reserve or national guard 
divisions.  
 Ridgway also stated that the army had begun to modernize during the Korean 
War. He estimated that by 1956 all combat units would command the most advanced 
weapons technology. He noted that “the dollar value of our inventory of weapons, 
including artillery, tanks, and combat vehicles, will be more than double that of June 
1954.” In addition, major support equipment had been greatly enhanced and there was a 
greater number of army aircraft that were better integrated into strategy and tactics. But 
while Ridgway expressed pride in the improvement of technology, he fundamentally 
believed that wars were won by men, and not by machines.77 Moreover, there was a 
significant downside to the modernization of weapon systems based on the tactical, 
operational, and even strategic conceptions of 1950. Most of the new equipment had been 
conceived for conventional warfare. Some of it might still be useful on an atomic 
battlefield, but most was already outdated. The army did not have enough money to 
replace it and Congress, having just spent on the modernization of the army, would be 
loath to allocate more funds unless the Army Staff conceived a persuasive new concept 
for the nuclear age.  
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Muzzled by his superiors in the Pentagon and the White House, Ridgway 
defended publicly policies that he was convinced were dangerous.78 The army was 
overextended geographically and soldiers could soon expect to spend half of their time in 
the service overseas. But the real problem, as Ridgway saw it, lay in the mobilization 
potential. The active forces were good, albeit too small, but in both world wars the major 
bottleneck had been military and economic mobilization. Ridgway feared that the 
manpower of the reserve would be available but that the capacity of the army to absorb 
the reservists would be insufficient, both from a standpoint of training and equipment. 
While soldiers could be trained relatively quickly, weapons and equipment would have to 
be produced with equal rapidity. Not only did the army not have sufficient stockpiles of 
critical materiel, but even more serious was the lack of an up-to-date industrial 
mobilization plan. In addition to the armed services of the U.S., allied forces would also 
require American weapons and equipment should war indeed break out.79 The U.S. 
economy was strong, of course, and the industrial potential of the nation had overcome a 
similar predicament in the Second World War, but then there had been enough time to 
react. The next war could be decided within days. 
 Ridgway did not propose that increases in army budget, maintenance of a 
sufficient force, and greater stockpiles of weapons and equipment for the reserve should 
be taken from the other services. He did not concern himself with the overall defense 
budget. It was his job to give the President the best advice that he knew. What disturbed 
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him most was the unquestioning belief of many military officers, politicians, and private 
citizens in strategic bombing as the method to win the next war. Ridgway would have 
liked to have seen a more balanced air force that contained strong strategic and tactical 
capabilities and also long-range transports for intercontinental deployment of army units 
and specialized aircraft for employment on the battlefield. Much of the latter might be 
provided by the army itself if only disputes with the air force over mission could be 
resolved. Atomic weapons had changed the timetable of war. Movement in force by sea 
was no longer fast enough. For the army, strategic air lift and close air support were the 
most essential aspects of the air force. In Korea, Ridgway had observed operations of the 
Marine Corps that were greatly aided by its possession of tactical aircraft of its own. 
Ideally, the army should have such support, or its equivalent from the air force in the next 
war.80 
In March 1955, the JCS sent new recommendations with respect to prospective 
force levels to the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Chiefs proposed a gradual reduction of 
the army to seventeen divisions by 1957, but also suggested that a thinning out of the 
divisions might prevent further cuts. Thirteen divisions would be mobile, one static, and 
three for training purposes. In that way, the army could be cut to one million by 1957. By 
June 1956, the army had indeed been reduced to eighteen divisions, ten regimental 
combat teams, and 133 antiaircraft battalions.81 In 1961, at the end of the Eisenhower 
administration, there were fourteen army divisions, and only eleven were combat-ready. 
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In the mid-1950s, the army’s role in national strategy remained poorly defined. 
General Ridgway thought it should be “an Army trained, equipped, and organized to fight 
and win in an atomic war,”82 but he had little time and energy to deal with the practical 
implications of this objective.83 Naturally, the army studied the problem in terms of 
practical requirements. The form and shape of the combat elements of the army would 
have to be radically different from the fighting forces in existence. Ridgway initiated 
medium-term studies, hoping to shape the army of the 1960s. His preferred solution was 
a streamlined force that would be built around small combined-arms battle groups that 
could fight semi-independently from the division. All but the heaviest forces should be 
transportable by air to assure transcontinental reinforcement and in-theater mobility. Fire 
and maneuver remained the basic tenets of land combat, but there would be little use for 
preconceived concepts of battle. Instead, commanders had to apply initiative and 
imagination. Atomic weapons would force the units to disperse on the defensive so as not 
to offer a lucrative target, but the capacity to reassemble swiftly to prevent enemy 
infiltration had to be retained. This would also allow for offensive capabilities, in the 
exploitation of friendly atomic strikes.84 
Ridgway interpreted the mission of the army as one of readiness and deterrence 
but he questioned a strategy that could serve no political purpose if war broke out. Army 
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generals also feared the implications of radiation and nuclear fallout for ground forces 
that were to occupy enemy territory.85 War in general, and atomic war in particular, were 
not very likely, but the intelligence community conceded that the Soviets would use the 
years from 1954 to 1957 to increase their atomic-weapons stockpile while maintaining 
their conventional superiority. Most likely, U.S. strategic deterrence would dissuade the 
Soviet leadership from starting a war in Central Europe. Nevertheless, it was possible that 
Western activities could be misread as aggressive and that the Soviet response might lead 
to general war. It was also possible that the Soviet Union or an Eastern European satellite 
state could trigger war inadvertently.86 
Ridgway retired on June 30, 1955. Once more, he expressed his views to the 
Secretary of Defense. Wilson decreed that Ridgway’s parting letter should not be 
released to the public as it was quite critical of national defense policy. A copy was 
leaked to the New York Times shortly afterwards, but it is unlikely that the general 
himself had a hand in this. The letter emphasized Soviet superiority in ground forces that 
would force the U.S. under its current policies to strike first with atomic weapons. To 
Ridgway this was politically unwise and morally reprehensible. He believed that the U.S. 
should have the option of meeting conventional attack with conventional forces. Ridgway 
judged U.S. forces to be “inadequate in strength and improperly proportioned to meet 
[alliance] commitments.” He cautioned that the atomic superiority of the United States 
was temporary. Furthermore, the U.S. was lacking the “mobile-ready” force called for by 
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defense officials in public statements, and America’s allies would be defeated in detail if 
the Soviets waged a global war.87 
Beginning on January 21, 1956, Ridgway’s memoirs were published in the 
Saturday Evening Post. The general pulled few punches, sharply attacked Secretary 
Wilson, blamed a sinister conspiracy within the administration for having decided upon 
cuts in the army even prior to listening to Ridgway’s advice, and only stopped short of 
openly attacking Eisenhower. The quick publication of such a critical account was in 
itself an unusual occurrence. The public reaction showed that the army had friends among 
the media. While conservative and isolationist papers, such as the Washington Star, the 
Chicago Tribune, and the New York Sunday News, predictably dismissed Ridgway’s 
account and criticized the army’s internationalism, more liberal papers, including the 
New York Times, Washington Post, Atlanta Constitution, and St. Louis Post-Dispatch 
agreed with some or all of Ridgway’s criticism. Army officers also gleefully observed the 
outpouring of support from Democrats in Congress.88 
Maxwell Taylor, Ridgway’s successor, publicly defended the administration 
against the charge of political meddling. But he championed a limited-war strategy and 
privately urged retired generals to help the army maintain the momentum created by 
Ridgway’s retirement and memoirs. Specifically, Taylor believed it was necessary to 
educate the public about “the proper composition and strength of our defense forces. In 
the discussions of new weapons there is the danger that the continued indispensability of 
land forces may be obscured in visions of more attractive solutions to national 
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security.”89 Taylor’s efforts could not change the fact, however, that the army faced an 
official attitude best summarized in the words of the Secretary of Defense: “maximize air 
power and minimize the foot soldier.”90 As a result, planning for the defense of Western 
Europe commenced in a climate that favored atomic over conventional weapons. 
Strategy and Operations: The North Atlantic Alliance 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was founded in April 1949. Alliance 
leaders endorsed deterrence as the primary military objective but also realized that 
measures to ensure the forward defense of NATO terrain had to be taken in case 
deterrence should fail.91 Beyond statements of intent, however, there was very little 
military substance. In 1949, NATO was a political alliance, a diplomatic deterrent. In 
case of war, the atomic umbrella extended by the United States would have to protect 
Western Europe. There was little doubt, despite the unfavorable military balance of 
power on the ground, that the West would win a general war against the Soviets. But how 
exactly atomic weapons would stop the Soviet military offensive was left unsaid. 
 NATO members envisioned that a war would be fought in several phases. The 
first objective was to contain the Soviet offensive. Use of atomic weapons by both sides 
was expected. American planners believed that the determining factor in the medium 
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term - that is between 1951 and 1954 - was the economic weakness of the Soviet Union, 
which practically ruled out a protracted war. The main thrust of the Soviet offensive was 
expected to sweep through the North German plains to the English Channel and proceed 
due south into France and the Iberian Peninsula. Simultaneously, attacks would occur in 
Northern and Southern Europe. To counter the threat in Central Region (West Germany, 
France, and the Benelux countries), NATO envisioned forward defense in Germany. 
Ground forces, the Shield of the alliance, were to buy time for the mobilization of the 
alliance’s great military potential and protect air bases from which the strategic atomic 
counteroffensive was to be launched. NATO estimated that ninety divisions would be 
necessary by 1954 for this purpose.92 Throughout the conflict it would be crucial to 
maintain open sea lanes between Western Europe and North America.  
 When Dwight D. Eisenhower took command in 1951 as the first NATO supreme 
commander, he found that his force consisted of only eighteen divisions. Upon 
mobilization, he could count on eleven additional divisions. This added up to only one 
third of the ground force required to implement the alliance’s medium-term defense plan 
for Central Europe, which called for the employment of fifty-four combat divisions in the 
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center.93 The U.S. hoped to provide over two thirds of its promised commitment by the 
end of the year. This was within reason, as the build-up plan called for only forty percent 
of the 1954 objective forces by July 1951.94 On the other hand there was no strategic 
guidance beyond the medium-term defense plan and operational planning was scant. 
Even placing a telephone call from Paris to Oslo, one of the future regional NATO 
headquarters, took twelve hours and could only be completed with Soviet assistance, as 
the lines ran through East Germany.95 
Nevertheless, NATO intended to build ground forces that would serve as a 
credible deterrent, bolstered with the American atomic potential. At the very least, 
ground forces had to provide the “shield” behind which the atomic forces - NATO’s 
“sword” for offensive operations deep into enemy territory - could be employed. This has 
become known as NATO’s Shield-and-Sword strategy. The force goals that the political 
leaders of the NATO member states agreed upon in 1952 were an ambitious step toward 
establishing such a conventional shield. If they had been implemented, NATO would 
have increased its ground forces from twenty-five combat divisions to over forty-one 
active divisions in 1954, with the potential to mobilize forty-nine reserve divisions within 
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one month. Eleven of these ninety divisions were supposed to be American and 
Canadian. Although the mechanics of West German rearmament had not yet been agreed 
upon, it was expected that the Germans would contribute eight active and four ready-
reserve divisions. In reality, the Bundeswehr did not reach a strength of twelve divisions 
until well into the 1960s.96 
The Lisbon agreement revealed a bias toward infantry. Including the reserve, 
there were to be thirty-eight infantry divisions and division equivalents by 1952. This 
number would rise to sixty-two divisions in 1954, with twenty-one armored divisions to 
provide mobility and striking power.97 That would have been a formidable fighting force 
and a very credible deterrent, but unfortunately, NATO’s actual strength never 
approached this level. The cost of the commitment was prohibitive. Aggregate defense 
expenditures of European NATO countries stood at $7.4 billion in 1951. To fulfill their 
commitment, the European allies would have had to quadruple defense spending.98 
NATO military commanders suspected that the force commitment was never more than 
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the expression of an ideal and the basis for further negotiations.99 Still, the military 
capability of NATO in the course of the 1950s began to reach levels where the Soviets 
had to worry about the cost of victory. The main contributors to the increase in forces 
were the U.S. and West Germany. 
 Both General Ridgway and his successor, General Gruenther, conceded that 
territorial defense would be difficult. Ridgway established a unified headquarters for 
Central Region and appointed the French Marshal Alphonse Juin as commanding general 
of all allied land forces in the region.100 Ridgway stressed that deterrence was the primary 
mission of NATO and that its success depended on “strong, balanced, combat-ready 
forces, capable of challenging aggression, or at least of rendering its success doubtful.”101 
NATO began to consider the effect of atomic warfare on the tactics of land forces.102 But 
the relaxation of the European military build-up led Ridgway to conclude at the end of 
his tenure in 1953 that “a full-scale Soviet attack within the near future would find Allied 
Command Europe (ACE) critically weak to accomplish its present mission.”103 ACE 
comprised of seventeen active divisions and a significant reserve. In addition, tactical 
atomic weapons had made their appearance in U.S. Seventh Army, in form of the 280-
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mm atomic cannon. The political alliance had been able to generate a military force that 
could be seen as a significant deterrent. Central Europe could be contested if not 
defended if the European allies took decisive steps to maintain the momentum of the 
military build-up and if West German rearmament was permitted soon.104 
General Gruenther urged that “atomic weapons must be used in a major war, by 
the Allies, without delay, and regardless of initial Soviet use thereof.” He believed that 
only the combination of tactical atomic weapons and increased ground forces with a 
German contingent would give NATO the ability to arrest a Soviet offensive. In nuclear 
war, ground forces were needed for counter-attacks and to retake lost ground. Gruenther 
expected that both sides would expend most of their atomic arsenal within the first thirty 
days of a war. If the initial atomic phase was not decisive, war was expected to drag on. 
The first thirty days were critical because it was the length of time that NATO required to 
complete its mobilization. In addition, NATO planners expected that the bombing 
campaign of the first month would interdict or at least impede the Soviet supply system, 
and thus disrupt their offensive operations for the first four months of the war.105 
SHAPE’s plans included the preemptive use of atomic weapons. Politically, this was a 
delicate proposition, particularly since the Eisenhower administration had advanced plans 
for the pre-delegation of nuclear weapons to SACEUR.106 
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105SGM 600-54, Standing Group Modified, 1 July 1954, Capabilities Plan Allied 
Command Europe 1957. International Military Staff, NATO Archive. The quotation is on 
page 1. 
 106See Peter J. Roman, “Ike's Hair Trigger: U.S. Nuclear Predelegation, 1953-60,” 
in: Security Studies, 7 (Summer 1998), pp. 121-65 and Trachtenberg, A Constructed 
Peace, pp. 146-200. Documentary evidence has been published by the National Security 
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No one should have been more opposed to an atomic strategy than the Germans. 
But the territorial defense of Germany posed tremendous difficulties. This is borne out in 
SHAPE’s general assessment of the defense of Western Europe. General Gruenther’s 
staff listed several problems with executing operational plans. Operations east of the 
Rhine would be hard to support given that the ammunition dumps were west of the river 
and the lines of communication still stopped at its banks. Furthermore, West Germany 
lacked strong enough natural obstacles. To complicate matters, current U.S. Army 
doctrine emphasized concentration of force, which offered a better and more lucrative 
target for atomic weapons than dispersed units. Finally, there still was no definite 
assurance when German troops would become available and how effective they would 
be. SHAPE planners added that they worried about “the psychological effect on civilian 
population and military personnel of mass use of atomic weapons, both in the battle area 
and rear areas, and in particular, its effect on the refugee problem.”107 
Still, NATO plans provided for forward defense east of the Rhine, as soon as a 
good number of West German divisions had become available. At the very least, the 
Soviet advance had to be delayed to assure mobilization of the ready reserve within the 
first thirty days of war. Minimum objective was to hold a line along the Rhine and Ijssel 
rivers. Naturally, there was also the realization that no German defense contribution 
could be expected to be made to an alliance that would not attempt to defend Germany. 
SHAPE hoped to deny to the Soviets the Rhine and Ruhr industrial areas as well as large 
parts of Bavaria, but warned that strong mobile self-contained forces were needed to hold 
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significant portions of West Germany and add to the depth of allied defenses. In addition, 
operations between the Weser and Rhine rivers would have to be treated as one coherent 
battle.108 Overall, SACEUR hoped to hold a line from the Weser to the Main River, 
running through Fulda, and extending to the Ludwig Canal. 
 US European Command (USEUCOM) generated a secret operational concept that 
could not be revealed to the allies. USEUCOM largely agreed with SHAPE planning for 
thirty days of atomic war, but suggested that the Soviets might seek terms for a cease fire. 
If they did not, subsequent operations would be far-reaching. American planners 
expected that a large-scale counteroffensive could begin four months into the war, after 
the sufficient build-up of Western ground forces. This counteroffensive would move with 
two pincers out of Central and Southeastern Europe. Within three months all of Germany 
was to be swept clean of Soviet forces, largely through the employment of armored, 
motorized assault, and airborne units, although an amphibious landing near Rostock was 
also intended. From the Oder and Neisse rivers, the land forces would advance along the 
axis Frankfurt/Oder - Posen - Kutno - Warsaw. At the end of the first year of the war, 
NATO troops were supposed to hold a line deep inside Poland running from Gdansk at 
the Baltic Sea to the Vistula River and on to Cracow. Finally, they were expected to reach 
the Polish-Soviet border area within one year of the beginning of the counteroffensive. 
The forces advancing from Greece, Northern Italy, and Turkey were supposed to sweep 
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through Austria, take the Balkans, aided by the Yugoslavian army, and threaten the 
Ukraine and the Black Sea from Romania and Bessarabia.109 
The practicality of the American plan was doubtful. General Gruenther, who 
served both as SACEUR and as U.S. Commander-in-Chief Europe (USCINCEUR), 
insisted that his command had to issue the plan according to the guidance of the U.S. 
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, but personally he saw little use for it. Gruenther argued 
that “the concept of a large-scale, more or less conventional penetration of the heartland 
of Russia in a war extending over some two or more years is open to serious question 
from an economic as well as military standpoint.” Gruenther doubted that the war plan 
would be supported by the NATO partners. He favored “limited advance to protect and 
recapture NATO territory pending further guidance as to the role of SACEUR’s forces in 
concluding a general war.” In response, the Joint Chiefs of Staff clarified that no 
international approval of the plan should be sought at this point. First, the alliance would 
have to agree on a concept on how to defeat the Soviet Union rather than merely contain 
its armed forces. Until such a decision, “[U.S. and USEUCOM] planning must be 
accomplished on a unilateral basis.”110 
109USEUCOM, 1955 [no more specific date on the document], Outline Concept 
for the Conduct of Subsequent Operations. Lauris M. Norstad Papers, Pre-SACEUR 
Subject Series, Box 46, “Requirements Study [atomic weapons & strategy],” Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Library (hereafter cited as Norstad Papers and DDEL). Mandatory-review 
release.  
 110SM-33-56, 17 January 1956, Memorandum for the Commander in Chief, U.S. 
European Command, USEUCOM Joint Capabilities Plan 1-55 with Enclosure: 
Headquarters United States European Command, Office of the Commander in Chief, 12 
November 1955, USEUCOM Joint Capabilities Plan, 1-55. Records of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, Central Decimal File 1954-56, CGS381 (11-15-48), Sec. 10, RG 218, NA. The 
quotations are on pages 459 and 460 of the enclosure and page 1 of the memorandum, 
respectively. 
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SHAPE was more concerned with defensive operations. SACEUR expected the 
Soviet and satellite armies to attack Central Region with seventy divisions, twenty in 
tactical reserve, and sixty more to follow within thirty days of mobilization. Four Soviet 
and four Polish divisions were expected to attack from Mecklenburg into Jutland. Fifteen 
Soviet, thirteen Polish, and four East German divisions were expected to launch across 
the Elbe River. In the area of operations of Seventh Army, ten Soviet, six Czech, and four 
East German divisions were expected to attack from Thuringia, through the Fulda Gap 
and two Soviet and eight Czech divisions from Bohemia, and possibly Austria, into 
Bavaria.111 Against that stood thirty-two active and twenty ready reserve divisions. 
SHAPE, however, estimated that ten of its infantry divisions would not be effective.112 
This raised several questions. If the bulk of the attack was expected north of Kassel, why 
were the best NATO forces, the two corps of Seventh Army, deployed to the south? Who 
was supposed to stop the onslaught of thirty-two Soviet and eastern bloc divisions at the 
Weser, or at least between the Weser, Rhine, and Ijssel rivers? There were no German 
troops yet and British Army of the Rhine was smaller and less effective than Seventh 
Army. The Belgian and Dutch troops in the area were of low quality and Canada 
deployed only one brigade. Of course, these were force projections for 1957. But at the 
end of 1954, SACEUR commanded only forty-four active divisions in all of Europe. Of 
these, eighteen were deployed in Central Region.113 Even with eight German divisions, 
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SACEUR would be nearly twenty percent short and it was doubtful that four French 
divisions could be disengaged from the war in Algeria. It was certainly unrealistic to list 
sixteen French divisions under command of SACEUR within one month of 
mobilization.114 SHAPE planners clearly understood that known measures of force ratio 
were of little use since “the conduct of the land operations will be so different from the 
past, that it would be unwise to judge their course and eventual outcome solely by 
conventional standards and comparison with experiences from the last war.” Tactics and 
operations were based primarily on the employment of tactical and strategic nuclear 
weapons. Ultimately, NATO operational planning rested on the assumption that the 
Soviet ground forces could be arrested by atomic weapons because their ability to move 
and be supplied would be disrupted.115 
SHAPE proposed new tactics and organization for ground forces on the atomic 
battlefield. Field Marshal Montgomery, the Deputy SACEUR, had lamented that western 
armies were still designed for set-piece attacks of artillery and infantry supported by 
tanks, with a pace of 2.5 miles per hour. In this he saw very little evolution since the First 
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World War.116 In contrast, General Gruenther advised his field commanders to conduct 
defensive operations from behind a natural or artificial obstacle, with the forward edge of 
the defensive zone based at the obstacle itself. In order to traverse the obstacle, the enemy 
would have to concentrate forces and would thus offer a suitable target for atomic 
weapons. It was not stated how the necessary dispersion of the defending forces at the 
time of atomic strikes could be assured without risk of losing control or the ability to 
mass for counterattacks. The key operative terms were dispersion and mobility, somehow 
to be achieved by smaller formations, better control, rapid command decisions, and a 
small park of vehicles. Should the enemy still advance, mobile striking forces had to 
counterattack in order to prevent a breakout from the established bridgehead.117 
Defense in depth was envisioned to begin with a covering force of one infantry 
battalion, which was to be supported by a battery of light artillery or mortars, with one 
squadron of light armor, possibly a troop of combat engineers, and a small signal 
element. This task force would be deployed right at the obstacle. The battalion of less 
than 1,000 officers and men would have to defend a front of 12,000 to 15,000 yards. The 
strike force for the counterattack was to consist of two armored divisions, possibly 
organized in two groups. This task force would have two infantry battalions, two armored 
battalions or regiments, two artillery battalions or regiments, one engineer battalion or 
two companies, and one special signal unit. In addition, the Corps was to hold one 
infantry division in reserve, whose regiments or battalions had to be capable of 
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independent operations. Moreover, there was to be a central reserve, wherever possible, 
of one armored and two infantry divisions to repel infiltration that exceeded the strength 
of the striking force. Reserve formations were to defend vital installations in the rear area 
against deep penetration or airborne attacks.118 In general, forces were to be prepared to 
operate as battalions or brigades, respectively regiments. Divisional actions were to be 
conducted only in desperate situations.  
 U.S. Army doctrine was conventional at this point and ill suited to the tactics 
proposed by Allied Command Europe. That is to say, even though atomic weapons were 
to be employed under the guidelines of FM 100-5, the tactical deployment of forces had 
changed very little and the offensive remained the focal point of command thinking. 
SHAPE emphasized active defense, somewhat comparable to the mobile defense portions 
of U.S. Army doctrine. But there was no suggestion of linear positional defense in the 
NATO plans. This is surprising, given that political pressure from the West German 
administration forced SHAPE to consider forward defense to begin further east than 
militarily prudent and in less suitable terrain. Like U.S. Army doctrine, NATO plans also 
featured counterattacks, but in General Gruenther’s thinking it was atomic firepower that 
would kill the enemy, most effectively where he was on the attack and had been forced to 
mass troops to overcome defensive obstacles. 
 The difference in tactical and operational thinking between SHAPE and the army 
rested to a large degree on the political objectives of the respective manuals and plans. 
The army needed to prove that ground forces could still make a valuable, even decisive 
contribution to war. NATO on the other hand was a defensive alliance. It was thus only 
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natural for SHAPE to outline how defensive operations would lead to the defeat of the 
Soviet offensive. For the army to do the same would have played into the hands of 
advocates of Massive Retaliation, who saw air power as the future of war. There is also a 
measure of doubt about the defense of Western Europe that can be inferred from army 
doctrine. Large-scale amphibious landings are discussed in great detail. In part, this may 
have stemmed from the recent history of the Normandy and Inchon operations, but it is 
surprising to see nearly as much discussion of such operations as of the defensive, 
particularly because landing forces would be exposed to attacks with nuclear weapons.119 
Finally, army doctrine was tailored toward an existing force while SHAPE attempted to 
initiate a transformation of the NATO armies. It has to be added, of course, that most of 
the thinking that went into army doctrine was shaped during the Korean War and before 
the formal adoption of the New Look and Massive Retaliation. 
 In essence, SHAPE suggested active defense in depth, with mobile units for 
counterattacks. But SHAPE planners failed to attune their suggested operations to 
political objectives. If pursued, their plans would have almost certainly led to the 
destruction of large parts of Western and Central Europe.120 Exercise CARTE 
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BLANCHE in June 1955, which featured large-scale use of air forces and atomic 
weapons, revealed that the loss of lives and destruction of territory in Germany would be 
horrific.121 The COS seriously doubted the feasibility of forward defense as stated by 
SHAPE, but recognized Gruenther’s dilemma. For political reasons, SACEUR had to 
provide operational plans for forward defense. Moreover, he could not expect to receive 
additional divisions in the current political climate that favored nuclear deterrence. The 
COS doubted that NATO forces could arrest a Soviet offensive. Consequently, they 
suggested that the ground forces of the alliance should be considered as supplement to the 
nuclear deterrent rather than as a capable first line of defense.122 
NATO evaluated the capabilities study for war in 1957 to be essentially sound. 
For the first time SACEUR’s plan outlined a strategy based on unrestricted use of atomic 
weapons.123 SHAPE expected that the intensive atomic exchange in the first month of the 
war would deny Soviet reinforcements from moving west, the enemy tactical air force 
could be grounded, and enemy logistics would be disrupted severely if not severed 
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altogether. The notion that NATO might employ atomic weapons first raised questions in 
the minds of the political leaders of the alliance, but given the lack of sufficient forces for 
a conventional defense there was general tacit agreement on its necessity. The 
organizational and tactical changes suggested by SACEUR were scrutinized more closely 
by NATO military committees, which deemed necessary to submit to further study before 
acting on the recommendations: “For example, the organization, disposition, depth, and 
strength of the sample ‘yardstick’ must be examined thoroughly in light of enemy mass 
infiltration tactics over a broad front.” The imminent German defense contribution, 
coupled with the tactical use of atomic weapons offered the prospect of the Rhine River 
being held and that forward defense in West Germany could be attempted. The Standing 
Group of the Military Committee concluded that ACE had presented a proposal that 
provided a credible deterrent and allowed for realistic operational defense while the 
strategic offensive would ensure that the West won the war.124 
The time-table of the German military build-up was critical, yet it remained 
uncertain. Officially, NATO expected twelve German divisions to be committed to ACE 
by 1957. General Gruenther, however, feared that German arms might be effective only 
at the end of the decade. Still, in Gruenther’s own words,  
we should defend with a forward strategy....We will be able to implement such a 
strategy when we have a German contribution. We are trying to create a force 
with sufficient strength, land and air, to create a shield which will force an enemy 
to concentrate as he comes against it. As he concentrates, he becomes very 
vulnerable to atomic weapons.”125 
124M.C. 49, 18 November 1954, Report by the Standing Group to the Military 
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But whether forward defense could be achieved in 1957 as originally intended had been 
cast into doubt. The Standing Group no longer believed that it was possible unless the 
NATO partners increased their defense contributions. The delayed build-up of the 
Bundeswehr had serious consequences for NATO strategy. In addition, the committee 
complained that military forces of other NATO members had been temporarily 
redeployed, obviously a reference to French forces in Algeria.126 Later in 1955, the 
Military Committee once more defended the crucial importance of forward defense to 
NATO strategy, but it was quite clear that the forces at hand did not correspond with the 
commitments for 1956.127 
The U.S. meanwhile was in the midst of reappraising its policy for the defense of 
Western Europe in the wake of the rejection of the European Defense Community (EDC) 
by the French.128 Military officers were aware that a choice between Germany and France 
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might be looming.129 The army leadership did not think that the alliance was politically or 
militarily feasible without either country, but navy and air force indicated that they would 
be comfortable with relying on West Germany as the primary continental European 
defense partner even if that meant that France would withdraw from the alliance.130 In 
any case, German entry into NATO would allow the implementation of SACEUR’s 
forward-defense concept. Of course, NATO infrastructure and force dispositions had 
been “based on the assumption that German military forces, under EDC or otherwise, 
would be available to lend the essential strength to a forward strategy, so vital to a 
successful defense of Western Europe.”131 The JCS concluded that basic U.S. defense 
policy toward Western Europe remained valid and that West German territory should be 
defended. 
 With regard to German rearmament, the Joint Chiefs recommended retaining the 
force objective of the EDC proposal, which foresaw eight infantry and four armored 
divisions. The JCS supported a German proposal to mechanize two of the infantry 
divisions. This was thought suitable “in view of the probable tactical employment of the 
German Army.”132 In addition, Germany was to create four corps and one field army 
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headquarters. It was believed that this could be achieved within two years, but the Joint 
Chiefs suspected that another six months might have to be granted in addition.133 The 
Joint Chiefs assumed that this force could later be increased. For the rearmament period, 
the Germans could rely on the U.S. type field army and modified tables of organization 
and equipment.134 In the event, the Bundeswehr needed the better part of a decade to 
create all twelve of its divisions, manpower goals were drastically reduced by the late 
1950s, and there was no intention to create additional active divisions at a later point. The 
field army was also never created. Instead, two German corps were integrated into 
Seventh Army, one served in NORTHAG, and one under Allied Forces, Northern 
Europe, in Schleswig-Holstein. 
 In November 1954 NATO adopted the strategy of Massive Retaliation. Central 
Europe was indefensible on the ground with the forces available or likely to become 
available. It remained crucial to convince the Soviets that quick victory in Europe was 
impossible. To this end, and in step with the position of the Eisenhower administration in 
Washington, NATO certified the immediate use of atomic weapons even if the Soviets 
attacked with conventional forces. The initial phase of war, intended to blunt and arrest 
the Soviet offensive, rested on good intelligence of Soviet capabilities, intentions, and 
operations, on the secure operations of NATO air forces from European bases, on 
defensive and retaliatory use of atomic weapons, and on the development of highly 
trained and mobile ground forces, deployed in depth and ready to confront the Soviets 
without delay. The ground forces also had to have atomic capability, defined as “the 
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ability to integrate the delivery of atomic weapons with the delivery of present type 
weapons. This involves the integration of intelligence and communications systems, and 
a common tactical doctrine.”135 
Reliance on nuclear deterrence did not absolve the allies from providing ground 
forces. Lauris Norstad, a U.S. Air Force general serving as Deputy SACEUR for air 
operations, explained the function of the Shield under Massive Retaliation:  
In contributing to the deterrent, our forces in being, adjacent to our frontiers, 
impose upon the Soviets the critical decision of initiating hostilities by employing 
armed forces and carrying out any active aggression against Allied Command 
Europe. This decision to use force, involving as it does consideration of the real 
threat of instant, large-scale atomic retaliation, could not be taken except as a last 
resort. Regardless of the advantages to be gained by an act of aggression, the price 
would be the destruction of Russia.136 
MC 48 called for fifty-eight active combat divisions. The firm commitments for 1955 
stood at forty-four divisions and those for 1956 at forty-one.137 Part of the discrepancy 
stemmed from the inclusion of twelve German divisions in the MC 48 force objectives. 
But these could not yet be counted toward the firm commitments and German 
rearmament proceeded much slower than expected. When the Military Committee 
approved MC 70 in 1958, a revised strategic guidance report, force requirements were 
increased. Active-force objectives and the forces of the first and second echelon of 
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reinforcements should total over eighty divisions for 1958 and almost ninety by 1963. All 
twelve German divisions were to be committed to SACEUR by 1961.138 Once again, this 
was a force objective that could be met by the U.S. but not by its European allies.  
 NATO struggled with the implementation of forward defense throughout the 
1950s. The forward-defense line only reached the intra-German border in 1963. But the 
U.S. Army discovered that the deterrent value of forward defense in Germany afforded 
the best argument for the utility of ground forces in the atomic age. Upon General 
Ridgway’s retirement in 1955, General Maxwell Taylor set about to transform the army 




Chapter 3:  
Atomic Weapons and Limited War - Maxwell Taylor and the Pentomic Reorganization 
 
In 1956, the Army Staff introduced a new divisional structure for operations on 
conventional and nuclear battlefields. The existing divisions were triangular - that is, they 
consisted of three regiments or regimental combat teams. The new divisions were made 
up of five battle groups and were thus called pentagonal. They were to be equipped with 
atomic weapons. The common assessment of these pentomic divisions is that they were 
hastily designed, prematurely adopted, and operationally impracticable. Most scholars 
have taken the view that the reorganization constituted the army’s attempt to adjust its 
combat organization and tactics to nuclear war.1 Others have pointed out that the 
reorganization was driven by budgetary as well as technological considerations.2 Such 
concerns indeed influenced the thinking of General Maxwell Taylor, the Army Chief of 
Staff. But Taylor had a more radical objective. He intended to transform the army into a 
modern, dual-capable force, armed with conventional and atomic weapons. Taylor 
defined the army’s mission to be the prevention of war in Central Europe. If war broke 
out, it would be the army’s objective to prevent escalation from limited to all-out nuclear 
war. In creating a combat force that could fulfill this mission, Taylor intended to shift the 
emphasis of national strategy from reliance on nuclear deterrence to war-fighting based 
on flexible and proportional response. 
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Designing the Atomic Army 
 The first practical steps toward redesigned ground forces for the atomic age were 
taken overseas. General Maxwell Taylor, in command of Eighth U.S. Army in Korea, 
advised the South Korean ground forces to experiment with a division that had five 
instead of three major combat elements in order to facilitate greater dispersion and 
flexibility on the battlefield.3 General James Gavin took command of U.S. VII Corps in 
Germany in December 1952. Gavin had been an innovator in the field of airborne 
operations during the Second World War and, after the war, he became interested in 
rocket and missile technology as well as tactical military applications of atomic 
weapons.4 In 1951 and 1952, Gavin had participated in the joint-service VISTA project, a 
study of future ground and air warfare in Europe.5 In VII Corps, he commanded two 
infantry divisions, two armored cavalry regiments, and supporting artillery, engineer, 
signal, and transportation units that he could use for experimental and training purposes. 
Gavin presided over map exercises and maneuvers in which a new structure for combat 
divisions was developed. He concluded that appropriate tactics for nuclear war could not 
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Europe,” in: International Security, Vol.11, No. 1 (Summer 1986), pp. 163-83 and  
Project Vista: An Early Study of Nuclear Weapons in Europe (Santa Monica: California 
Seminar on International Security and Foreign Policy, 1987). The project did not yield a 
coherent proposal, largely because the air force was not willing to underwrite air support 
and airlift at the cost of reducing resources for strategic air power.  
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be devised for the World War II style infantry and airborne division. The armored 
division, on the other hand, seemed adaptable due to its preexisting task-force structure, 
the combat commands.6
Gavin and his staff proposed a fundamental reorganization of combat elements of 
the army for nuclear war. Cavalry units, forward deployed at the intra-German border, 
needed to possess tactical air mobility. Gavin argued that helicopters offered a proven 
method of providing airmobility for infantry divisions. Conventional artillery could be 
replaced by missiles to effect a significant increase in range, adding a tactical atomic 
capability to the division where necessary. As the depth of the battlefield increased, 
communications would become even more important than ever. Gavin suggested that 
battalions and regiments now needed the kind of equipment that regiments and divisions 
had in their inventories during World War II. Moreover, Gavin argued that linear defense, 
with its fixed lines of communications, was no longer appropriate. The atomic battlefield 
would be much deeper, wider, and less structured than the one of the Second World War 
- it would be in a word, “amorphous.” Infantry divisions for such an environment would 
have to be built around battle groups that were smaller than the existing regimental 
combat teams. These were to be dispersed widely in order to offer a less attractive target 
for atomic attacks.7 Pentomic divisions would have to be larger than the triangular, 
 
6Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age, pp. 132-37. 
 7Colonels Reinhardt and Kintner arrived at the same conclusion: dispersion of 
small battle groups offered the best available protection against destruction by atomic 
weapons. Reinhardt and Kintner, Atomic Weapons in Land Combat, pp. 201-11. 
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conventional division.8 Upon concluding his command tenure in Germany, General 
Gavin became Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations. 
Meanwhile, in Washington, the Chief of Staff was working on proposals of his 
own. General Matthew B. Ridgway agreed that the combat division should be built on 
semi-independent combined-arms battle groups that would be transportable by air. 
Ridgway explained to General Gruenther that:  
I am...very much concerned with our readiness to air move intra-theater and inter-
theater forces. Specifically, I envision our being confronted with problems of 
considerable magnitude in the event that a major portion of the European 
Peninsula falls to the enemy. The ability to move across large bodies of water and 
reestablish a lodgment in Europe through the combined use of special weapons 
and airborne assault forces may well be decisive.9
Ridgway endorsed the concept of the battle group because he recognized that atomic 
weapons made the ability to disperse rapidly essential, but he insisted that it was also 
necessary to be able to mass quickly to strike at enemy formations. Firepower would be 
decisive in future battles, but maneuver remained crucial in order to concentrate all 
available forces at the point of decision.  
 General Ridgway initiated studies on how to organize the combat elements of the 
army for the 1960s. Pressure from the Defense Department directed such studies toward 
reductions in the dimensions of the division even though all available evidence pointed at 
 
8Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age, pp. 137-39. For the battle-group 
principle see also James Gavin, “New Divisional Organization,” in: Army-Navy-Air 
Force Register, Vol. 76, No. 3923 (February 12, 1955), pp. 1-2. For Gavin’s thoughts on 
air cavalry see his “Cavalry, and I Don’t Mean Horses,” in: Harper’s Magazine, Vol. 
208, No. 1247 (April 1954), pp. 54-60. 
 9Ridgway to Gruenther, 22 April 1954. Alfred M. Gruenther Papers, NATO 
Series, Box 4, “RIDGWAY, Matthew B., General, U.S.A., Chief of Staff [1954-56],” 
DDEL. The use of the term “special weapons” is unexplained in this context, but it 
usually referred to atomic weapons. 
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the need to increase their size. Ridgway nevertheless believed that increased mobility, 
greater flexibility, and a decline in vulnerability to atomic attacks could be achieved if 
several basic tenets were adhered to in future reorganizations of the division. Absorption 
of personnel cuts required a better ratio of combat to support manpower and units. 
Combat units needed to gain mobility and flexibility. Technological improvements were 
to be the backbone of reorganization. Overall, the Army had to improve its capability for 
protracted war. Tactical doctrine would have to be reconsidered accordingly. Ridgway 
thought that reorganization should not be delayed beyond 1956.10 
The schedule was tight, since many of the guidelines, as well as the shift in 
emphasis to smaller units, were only announced in April 1954. By the fall Army Field 
Forces, supported by the Command and General Staff College, presented plans for the 
Atomic Field Army (ATFA-1). The proposal had a great degree of built-in flexibility. 
Infantry divisions were to resemble current armored divisions in that they would gain 
task force organizations that could respond to changing situations. ATFA-1 suggested a 
building-block structure, based on three combat command headquarters, maneuver 
battalions, and support units. Every infantry division should have seven infantry 
battalions as well as tank, signal, and engineer battalions, and a support command, which 
included medical, maintenance, supply, transport, and service companies. Division 
artillery would be one 4.2 inch mortar battalion, capable of firing both conventional and 
atomic ammunition, and two towed 105-mm howitzer battalions. ATFA-1 also suggested 
that staffs could be reduced and administrative functions could be lessened by moving 
many of the tasks from division headquarters to battalions and support command. 
 
10Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, pp. 264-65. 
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Proposed personnel strength was 13,500 officers and men, a reduction of almost 4,000. 
Little change was deemed necessary for the armored division, but it would still be 
possible to eliminate over 2,500 personnel slots and present a leaner division of 12,000 
officers and men. Moreover, all aircraft generic to combat divisions were to be gathered 
in an aviation company, attached to the divisional headquarters battalion. Command over 
atomic weapons rested with the field army commander rather than the commanding 
generals of the divisions.11 
ATFA-1 was tested by 3rd Infantry Division and 1st Armored Division in exercises 
FOLLOW ME and BLUE BOLT, respectively, in February 1955. The results were 
disappointing. While the infantry division gained flexibility from the combat commands, 
it lacked the capacity for sustained combat. The likely conditions of nuclear war were 
such as to require more manpower and an increase particularly in reconnaissance 
functions, because frontages would be extended and the battlefield would be deep. The 
division also lacked sufficient antitank and artillery weapons. The personnel reduction 
compromised the performance of important staff functions, and staffs at division, combat 
command, and battalion levels were simply too small. BLUE BOLT proved inconclusive 
as to whether the new armored division would be less vulnerable to atomic attacks. 
Renewed testing in SAGEBRUSH, a joint army and air force exercise in November and 
December 1955, showed that the infantry division was salvageable if its staff was 
increased and an infantry battalion was added. All told, the strength of the infantry 
 
11Ibid., pp. 265-66. 
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division had increased to 17,027 officers and men, only slightly less than the pre-ATFA-1 
division. The personnel strength of the suggested armored division stood at 13,97l.12 
Such an increase ran counter to the basic principles of defense policy in the 
Eisenhower years and there is little doubt that the army would have been severely 
criticized had it endorsed the concept. From an operational standpoint, the situation was 
even worse. Major General George Lynch, who had commanded 3rd Infantry Division in 
SAGEBRUSH, concluded that the improvements over the traditional division were not 
significant enough to justify the changes, with the possible exception of more serviceable 
logistics. He argued that the existing regimental combat teams had greater inherent 
flexibility than the proposed combat commands. Lynch suggested to retain the structure 
of the old infantry division and increase its personnel to 21,678 officers and men. Major 
General Robert Howze, commander of 1st Armored Division, found the suggested 
armored division generally acceptable, albeit with minor changes. Howze did not specify 
the personnel increase that his alterations would require, but the commanding general of 
Fourth Army, John Collier, estimated that the armored division needed 15,819 officers 
and men.13 
During this period of testing and debate, Army Field Forces had been disbanded 
and replaced by Continental Army Command (CONARC). In 1956 CONARC circulated 
tables of organization for ATFA divisions. The infantry division remained controversial, 
but CONARC had reinstated the three regiments and stressed improvements made in 
flexibility and protection against atomic attack. It was to have 17,460 officers and men, 
 
12Ibid., pp. 267-68. 
 13Ibid., pp. 268-69. 
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an increase of eight personnel slots over the old infantry division.14 As envisioned by 
General Ridgway in 1954, ATFA may have become a transformation, but by 1956 the 
study had been altered to a more conservative reform proposal and exercises had revealed 
that tactical atomic war could not be simulated.15 The army still lacked a clear 
understanding of the effects of atomic weapons on command and control of large 
formations. ATFA-1 was rejected by Army Chief of Staff General Taylor in April 1956. 
For political reasons, the army needed smaller divisions with integrated atomic weapons. 
 In June Taylor outlined his conception of future army organization to the service 
chiefs and leaders of the defense establishment. He argued that the proper combination of 
firepower, movement, and skilled personnel would determine the success of ground 
forces. Heavy firepower would come mainly from rockets and guided missiles. But the 
launchers had to be protected and they had to be maneuvered to critical points on the 
battlefield. Mobility was also significant because rapid dispersion and concentration of 
force would be the most important tactical principle on the atomic battlefield. Taylor 
stated that lightweight equipment, armored troop and weapon carriers, and army aviation 
were crucial to achieve greater tactical mobility. He pleaded that the army needed capable 
and intelligent personnel, attempting to reverse a trend that led most young men to 
consider the more glamorous options in the air force and navy, generally leaving the 
army with the bottom of the recruitment pool. Taylor concluded that limited regional 
 
14Headquarters, Department of the Army, Table of Organization and Equipment 
(hereafter: TOE) 7 ATFA, 10 August 1956. All TOEs used for this dissertation are in the 
collection of the Military History Institute. General Taylor had rejected ATFA earlier that 
year, but he had decreed that ongoing projects, such as the drafting of TOEs, were to be 
completed. 
 15Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, pp. 269-70. 
100
aggression would pose the greatest military threat once the Soviet Union had achieved 
nuclear parity with the United States.16 
For some, the immediate application of Taylor’s proposal seemed unlikely. 
Willard G. Wyman, commanding general of CONARC, noted in July, three months after 
Taylor had rejected ATFA, that “the army, of late, has been criticized for failing to 
organize its forces to fit existing developments of weapons.” He reassured his audience, 
however, that the results of recent maneuvers in which the ATFA concept had been tested 
were being evaluated. He cautioned that “whatever the outcome, reorganization cannot 
take place over night.” Wyman considered the possibility of modernizing existing units, 
such as platoons, companies, and battalions.17 
Taylor disagreed. He found that a doctrinal and organizational study of the Army 
War College, which had been undertaken in response to General Ridgway’s request of 
November 1954, offered a basis for immediate reorganization. “Doctrinal and 
Organizational Concepts for Atomic-Nonatomic Army During the Period 1960-1970,” 
usually referred to as the PENTANA study, provided a broad perspective on sustained 
ground operations in Europe. It called for fully air-transportable divisions. There should 
be no more infantry, armor, or airborne divisions, but one standard combat division built 
upon five battle groups that were self-sufficient and contained their own artillery. The 
new division was set at only 8,600 officers and men. Tactical atomic weapons were to be 
 
16Summary of Remarks by General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chief of Staff, United 
States Army, at Quantico Conference, 23 June 1956. Maxwell D. Taylor Papers, 
Digitized Collection, National Defense University (hereafter cited as Taylor Papers, 
NDU)  (http://www.ndu.edu/library/taylor/mdt-0112.pdf).  
 17Willard G. Wyman, “Let’s Get Going on Our New Combinations for Combat,” 
in: Army, Vol. 6, No. 12 (July 1956), pp. 39-43, 69. The quotations are on page 69. 
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controlled at the division level. There was immediate widespread criticism within the 
army to the PENTANA study, ranging from not enough armor to insufficient 
conventional artillery and doubts about staying power.18 
While Taylor liked the dynamic and forward-looking PENTANA concept because 
it could be portrayed to the civilian leadership as a lean combat division for the nuclear 
age, he did not find that the universal division was entirely practical.19 More importantly, 
Taylor did not believe that dual capability could be achieved. The Army Staff thus 
decided to develop separate proposals for atomic and non-atomic armies. Once 
completed, the differences could be adjudicated under the guidelines of the PENTANA 
study. Taylor concurred but feared that such a force could not be created unless the 
army’s budget was significantly increased.20 He nevertheless approved the concept on 
June 1, 1956 as a long-term objective.21 
Even prior to approving the PENTANA study, Taylor had called for a reorganized 
airborne division of 10,000 to 12,000 officers and men, with five battle groups and 
 
18Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, pp. 270-71 and Glen R. Hawkins and James 
Jay Carafano, Prelude to Army XXI: U.S. Army Division Design Initiatives and 
Experiments, 1917-1995 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 
1997), p. 13. 
 19Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Memorandum for 
Record, 15 May 1956 Briefing for Chief of Staff on Army Organization 1960-1970 
(PENTANA), p. 4. MHI stacks, UA 25.E32 1956. The author of the memorandum was 
Lieutenant General Clyde Eddleman, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. 
 20Ibid., p. 3.
21General Donn Starry, the principal architect of the AirLand Battle Doctrine of 
the 1980s, believes that Taylor adopted the pentomic concept before it had been 
thoroughly considered. Starry to author, October 4, 2004. 
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tactical atomic weapons.22 Expanding the self-contained combat elements from three to 
five was perceived necessary in order to carry out a new approach to area defense. Each 
battle group was to have the capability to fight in all directions, thus creating islands that 
would cause the enemy to amass forces and present targets for atomic weapons.23 
Questions remained, however, whether the commander of a division could effectively 
control five battle groups and the battle group commander five companies. Colonel James 
Shepherd, then teaching at the Command and General Staff College, argued that even the 
attachment of a tank company to a battle group would overtax the commander.24 Taylor 
pressed ahead despite such criticism, mostly because he felt that making tactical atomic 
weapons organic to the division would lead to more intense consideration of their proper 
employment, which was still largely unexplored.25 Contemporary critics charged that the 
pentomic division was at least in part a public-relations stunt. Taylor himself coined the 
 
22Historian John McGrath argues that Taylor’s command of an airborne division 
in Northern Europe during World War II conditioned his belief that five combat elements 
were better than three. Nominally, both 82nd and 101st Airborne Division had three 
regiments, but in the field, two parachute regiments were added. John J. McGrath, The 
Brigade: A History (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), p. 59. 
Kalev Sepp goes beyond that and argues that the pentomic division was a reflection of 
the airborne experience of generals Gavin, Ridgway, and Taylor in World War II, rather 
than a response to the military and political circumstances of the 1950s. Kalev I. Sepp, 
“The Pentomic Puzzle: The Influence of Personality and Nuclear Weapons on U.S. Army 
Organization, 1952-1958,” in: Army History, No. 51 (Winter 2001), pp. 1-13. 
 23Bacevich, Pentomic Era, pp. 103-6, 115-19. It is unclear how the battle group in 
the center of the target area would have escaped the atomic attack. 
 24James M. Shepherd, “Type Divisions for Atomic Warfare,” in: Military Review,
Vol. 36, No. 8 (November 1956), pp. 24-37, particularly pp. 24-27. 
 25The Army Staff had published drafts of Field Manual 101-31: Tactical Use of 
Atomic Weapons in 1951 and 1955, but it was clearly stated that the publications were to 
provide only temporary guidance, while internal discussion continued. In addition, there 
was Reinhardt and Kintner, Atomic Weapons in Land Combat, a semi-official monograph 
that originated at the Command and General Staff College. 
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term pentomic, combining the pentagonal structure and atomic armaments, because the 
army needed to appear less stodgy and more in tune with advances in cutting-edge 
technology.26 
In August 1956, CONARC called for an airborne division (ROTAD) of 11,500 
officers and men, a personnel decrease of 5,600 from the traditional airborne division. 
ROTAD consisted of five battle groups with five infantry companies apiece. Each battle 
group had a mortar battery and a headquarters and service company. Aviation and 
reconnaissance companies, along with headquarters and service companies as well as a 
signal battalion and combat engineers, were attached to the division. Division artillery 
fielded twenty-five 105-mm howitzers and four Honest John rocket launchers. But 
conventional firepower was limited by the desire to transport the entire division by air. 
This meant that the division did not have any 155-mm howitzers. The Honest Johns also 
could not be transported by air in the theater of operations, but they offered the only way 
to incorporate atomic capability at the division level. The new airborne division needed 
only half of the air lift required to move the triangular division.27 One army captain 
summed up the basic idea: “concentrate to fight - disperse to live.”28 
Dispersion, mobility, and flexibility became the central features of the combat 
division in the nuclear age. PENTANA was the long-term model, but in the short-term 
the pentomic division was introduced as a five-year experiment to be conducted in the 
 
26General Westmoreland recalls how Eisenhower told Taylor that the army 
needed a more charismatic public image. He instructed Taylor to “sex up the Army.” 
Hawkins, Force Design Initiatives, p. 35.
27Headquarters, CONARC, TOE 57T ROTAD, 10 August 1956. See also Wilson, 
Maneuver and Firepower, pp. 271-73. 
 28Captain Everett Royal quoted in Bacevich, Pentomic Era, p. 68.
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field. The risk was obvious. The experimentation period was short, as most 
reorganizations needed more time to develop, especially given that much of the 
equipment for more mobile land forces, such as armored personnel carriers, better tanks, 
more reliable helicopters, and crucial communication systems were not yet available.29 
The end of the experimentation period would, however, coincide with the termination of 
the expected second term of the Eisenhower administration. It is possible that Taylor had 
already gauged the need to reform the reorganized division at the beginning of the next 
decade and was hoping for a more congenial strategic and political environment. 
Unlike ATFA, ROTAD was not tested in a large-scale field exercise. Instead, the 
capabilities of individual units of the division were evaluated separately by elements of 
the 101st Airborne Division. The result was sobering. While the division was suitable for 
airborne assaults of short duration, there were questions about the artillery. The lighter 
field guns that could be moved by air transport suffered from short range and inadequate 
lethality. The division leadership thus requested that 155-mm howitzers should be 
returned to the division, except for parachute assaults. Also, the logistics of the division 
were regarded as less effective than that of the old triangular formation. Manpower in 
logistics and support elements had dropped to a point that made it impossible to fulfill 
routine garrison duty and maintain combat readiness. The test director proposed a ten 
percent increase in personnel strength to the base division, and a garrison complement at 
 
29For the pentomic division as a failed attempt at transformation see Arthur W. 
Connor, “The Army and Transformation, 1945-1991” (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War 
College, Strategy Research Project, 2002), pp. 10-14. The critical failure to develop 
suitable communications systems, particularly radios with enough channels for all 
elements of the pentomic division, is discussed in Paul C. Jussel, “Intimidating the 
World: The United States Atomic Army, 1956-1960” (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State 
University, 2004), pp. 147-54.  
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the home station. He also noted that commanding officers of rifle companies, mortar 
batteries, and howitzer batteries would bear much greater responsibility and had to be 
capable of independent actions. CONARC and the Army Staff, unwilling to sacrifice air- 
transportability of the direct support guns, rejected the suggested changes in artillery. 
ROTAD was finally adopted in the summer of 1958, with an increase in mortar strength 
but without heavy howitzers or additional manpower.30 
In the meantime, Taylor and CONARC had set their sights on the reorganization 
of the infantry division along the lines of the pentomic concept. In December 1956, 
CONARC presented organization and equipment charts for the Reorganization of the 
Current Infantry Division (ROCID). Taylor had provided guidelines that included five 
battle groups, conventional and atomic artillery organic to the division, tank, signal, and 
engineer battalions, and a reconnaissance squadron that could move on the ground and in 
the air. CONARC found that it was possible to provide the division with the necessary 
and requested elements, but only if it was slightly larger than Taylor had intended. 
CONARC proposed an infantry division of 13,700 officers and men. It had five infantry 
battle groups, one tank battalion, a light artillery battalion with thirty 105-mm howitzers, 
and a heavy and atomic artillery battalion with two Honest John rocket launchers, four 
 
30Headquarters, Department of the Army, TOE 57D, 31 July 1958. See also 
Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, pp. 274-75. 
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heavy 8-inch howitzers, and twelve 155-mm howitzers.31 But not all infantry battle 
groups in USAREUR received a fifth rifle company prior to June 1960.32 
The armored division was left largely intact. The tables of organization and 
equipment for the Reorganization of the Current Armored Division (ROCAD) also were 
published in December 1956. ROCAD had more conventional artillery than the infantry 
division, but did not have Honest John rocket launchers and relied entirely on four self-
propelled 8-inch howitzers for atomic fire support. CONARC had added a reconnaissance 
and surveillance platoon to the reconnaissance battalion, supported by additional aircraft 
in the aviation company. Despite the initial assumption that the number of vehicles 
should be reduced due to their vulnerability to nuclear attacks, ROCAD did not actually 
see such a reduction, mainly because the new division required more transportation 
resources than the old armored division. ROCAD totaled 14,617 officers and men, 655 
more than the proposed ATFA-1 armored division. Its armor strength rested on fifty-four 
light-gun tanks (M41 Walker Bulldog), and 324 medium-gun tanks (M47 and M48 
Patton). The latter were grouped in four tank battalions, while the light-gun tanks were 
utilized in supporting functions.33 Armored divisions retained armored infantry units, but 
all M 59 APCs were centralized in a transportation unit. While APCs could be assigned 
 
31Headquarters, CONARC, TOE 7T ROCID, 20 December 1956. The transitory 
nature of this proposal can be gauged from the hand-written substitution of battle groups 
for regiments on the organizational chart. See also Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, pp.
276-77. 
 32Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, Annual History United States Army, 
Europe, 1 January 1960-31 December 1960 (Heidelberg: Headquarters, USAREUR, 
1961), pp. 11-12. 
 33Headquarters, CONARC, TOE 17T ROCAD, 1 December 1956. See also 
Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, p. 277.
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to infantry units, only one infantry battle group at a time could be mechanized, a shortage 
that also affected ROCID. Moreover, only one additional battle group could be motorized 
if the divisions used all of the light trucks of the transportation battalion. This left the 
infantry component of three battle groups without armor or trucks.34 
The pentomic reorganization was far-reaching and Taylor faced opposition both 
inside and outside of the army. In the fall of 1956, the Army Staff prepared a 
demonstration that could showcase the capability of the atomic army. It was intended to 
convince government officials that the army could exploit the firepower of tactical 
nuclear weapons, survive Soviet nuclear strikes, and regain the initiative. General Taylor 
had ordered the demonstration because “the advent of modern weapons of the massive 
retaliation variety has created a growing feeling within the government that sizeable 
Army forces may no longer be required.”35 Fort Benning, Georgia, was the preferred 
location for the demonstration because there it was possible to deploy an entire battle 
group. The only problem was that the atomic army was not ready: “It will be necessary 
for the Army to develop fully before the demonstration date those concepts of the tactical 
employment of participating troops and equipment which are not yet firmly 
established.”36 
34McGrath, The Brigade, p. 62. For ROCID mechanization and transportation 
capacity see also John K. Mahon and Romana Danysh, Infantry, Part I: Regular Army 
(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1972), p. 92. 
 35Proposed letter from Gen. Taylor to CG CONARC, Tab D attachment to Chief 
of Information to Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, 3 October 1956, Atomic 
Army Demonstration. Attachment: DCSOPS, Draft Summary Sheet, Atomic Army 
Demonstration. Records of the Army Staff, Records of the Office of the Chief of 
Information, Entry 45, Box 1, “Atomic Army 1956,” RG 319, NA. 
 36Ibid., Attachment DCSOPS, Draft Summary Sheet, Atomic Army 
Demonstration. The quotations are on page 1. 
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Internal criticism centered on the battle group, which replaced the traditional 
battalions and regiments. Proponents of the regimental system were particularly 
outspoken. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel argued that regiments were crucial 
for the esprit de corps of the entire army.37 He conceded that questions of tactics were 
outside of his responsibility, but he suggested that the regiment be kept as an 
administrative unit. Combat units could then be assembled into battle groups as the 
situation warranted. He estimated that 185 regular regiments would form the core of the 
army.38 This was derived from the 540 active combat battalions in the army, consisting of 
159 field artillery, 155 antiaircraft artillery, 123 infantry, fifty-seven armor, twenty-three 
armored infantry, and twenty-three airborne battalions.39 Furthermore, regiments would 
make mobilization easier and ensure greater coherence in the reserve. Taylor did not find 
the objections convincing, but in 1957 he accepted the Combat Arms Regimental System 
(CARS), which designated distinguished regiments as administrative parent units of 
battle groups, battalions, and companies.40 
To persuade doubters, Taylor emphasized the need for dual capability. He pointed 
out that the pentomic division could fight on an atomic battlefield if strategic deterrence 
failed. Simultaneously, the new division ensured that the army could also fight in a 
 
37Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, 15 August 1956, Combat 
Arms Regimental System: Outline Plan (Draft). Records of the Army Staff, Records of 
the Office of the Chief of Information, Entry 45, Box 1: Security Classified 
Correspondence, 1956, “Combat Arms 1956,” RG 319, NA. 
 38The specific breakdown was seventy field artillery, forty-two infantry, thirty 
antiaircraft artillery, twenty-five cavalry and armor, ten airborne infantry, and eight 
armored infantry regiments. Ibid., Annex D. 
 39Ibid., Annex B: Combat Arms Battalions, Active Army, FY 1957. 
 40Mahon and Danysh, Infantry, pp. 96-98. 
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conventional environment. More importantly, the new division was innovative and would 
advertise a modern army to the public. Taylor did not stress this point at the time, but in 
his memoirs he pointed out that the conventional arms needed for limited war lacked 
glamor. He claims that Defense Secretary Wilson once returned an army budget proposal 
that included mainly rifles, machine guns, trucks, and “unsophisticated aircraft,” directing 
him “to substitute requests for ‘newfangled’ items with public appeal instead of the 
prosaic accoutrements of the foot soldier.” Taylor explained that nuclear weapons “were 
the going thing and, by including some in the division armament, the Army staked out its 
claim to a share in the nuclear arsenal.”41 
For public consumption, emphasis in re-equipment was put on atomic and tactical 
nuclear weapons, surface-to-surface missiles such as the Corporal or Redstone,
intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) such as the Jupiter, and rockets for close-
range nuclear combat such as the Honest John, Little John, and Davy Crockett.42 In 
addition to tactical nuclear weapons, pentomic divisions also needed new conventional 
weaponry and equipment. A disparate collection of small arms of the World War II era, 
the M1 rifle, carbine, submachine gun, and Browning Automatic Rifle, were to be 
replaced by the M14 rifle, which fired 7.62 caliber rounds and could be set to either 
semiautomatic or automatic firing modes. In addition, the M60, a new machine gun 
modeled on the German MG 42, also using 7.62-mm ammunition was to be substituted 
for Browning .30 caliber light and heavy machine guns. In August 1957, Taylor approved 
a program intended to replace light, medium, and heavy tanks with a main battle tank and 
 
41Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, p. 171.
42Bacevich, Pentomic Era, pp. 82-96.  
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an airborne assault vehicle.43 The M113 armored personnel carrier, an air-transportable 
vehicle, also was to become available.44 From the perspective of procuring improved 
weaponry and equipment, the pentomic division proved useful, but most of the new 
conventional weapons did not reach U.S. forces in Europe before the height of the Berlin 
Crisis in 1961 and after the termination of the pentomic division had already been 
announced.45 
Tactical changes brought about by the reorganization of the combat divisions 
were not elevated to the level of doctrine.46 Army doctrine thus still emphasized infantry 
attacks at deliberate pace, supported by tanks and heavy artillery. Andrew Bacevich, a 
retired army officer and historian, has shown that atomic weapons deepened the army’s 
belief in the application of firepower. Atomic artillery would blast a hole in the enemy’s 
line of defense, enable ground forces to achieve a breakthrough, and afford armored and 
motorized formations the opportunity for maneuver. More importantly, atomic fire would 
 
43Hunnicutt, Patton, pp. 149-50. 
 44Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, p. 286.
45Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, Office of the Commander in Chief, 
13 September 1961, Priorities Governing the Issue of New Equipment to Troops in 
USAREUR. Norstad Papers, Personal Name File, Box 61, “Clarke, Bruce C. (4),” DDEL. 
 46FM 100-5 did not see a new edition between 1954 and 1962. The 1956 
supplement came too soon for the pentomic division, and the 1958 supplement did not 
address the new formation sufficiently. The Command and General Staff College 
submitted a draft manuscript to CONARC in 1958, but it was returned with the comment 
that it needed to be revised entirely. Col. Adam S. Buynoski to Commanding General, 
U.S. Continental Army Command, 20 December 1958, Final Manuscript of FM 100-5, 
FSR, Operations. Records of the United States Continental Army Command, U.S. Army 
Schools, Command and General Staff College. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Box 30, 
Manuals, RG 546, NA. Mataxis and Goldberg addressed atomic warfare in their 1958 
monograph for infantry training Nuclear Tactics, Weapons, and Firepower in the 
Pentomic Division, Battle Group, and Company, but a semi-official publication was 
hardly the equivalent of a formal statement of doctrine.  
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shake the enemy so thoroughly that maneuvering units would encounter little resistance 
in their task to disrupt command, control, communications, and intelligence. But this was 
a theoretical conception of the effect of atomic weapons rather than tactical doctrine for 
their employment. Bacevich doubted that firepower would have been as decisive in a war 
against the Soviets as it had been in World War II and the Korean War.47 
Maxwell Taylor predicted that future wars would be fought with atomic and 
conventional weapons and that they would be won by the side that applied firepower 
more effectively. Taylor acknowledged the need to be prepared for conventional wars, 
but his emphasis was on atomic weapons. He explained that strong forward-deployed 
ground forces in Germany were necessary to ensure that atomic weapons could be used 
on Soviet tactical formations before they had closed with the bulk of NATO forces. 
Taylor believed that “one of the primary purposes of ground combat will be to discover, 
or to develop, targets for our [atomic] weapons, so that if we are successful in doing that 
we can virtually destroy any target on our front, so that our movements thereafter will 
largely be in the nature of exploitation.”48 Maxwell Taylor did not refashion the army to 
suit the strategy of Massive Retaliation. Instead, he redefined the army’s mission, which 
implied the adoption of a more flexible national strategy. 
Limited Nuclear War: Maxwell Taylor and the Army’s Mission 
Taylor had been appointed Army Chief of Staff in June 1955. The magnitude of 
his task has been described by historian Jonathan House: “In order to justify its existence 
 
47Bacevich, Pentomic Era, pp. 108-10. 
 48Taylor,  “Mission of the United States Army” [March 1956 discussion of Taylor 
with students of the Armed Forces Staff College], pp. 12-15. Quotations are on page 15. 
Taylor Papers, NDU (http://www.ndu.edu/library/taylor/mdt-0095.pdf)  
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and mission, the U.S. Army had to develop a doctrine and structure that would allow 
ground forces to function effectively on a nuclear battlefield.”49 Taylor intended to find 
“ways and means to improve the combat readiness of the Army in support of a strategy of 
Flexible Response and to improve its morale depressed as it was by the precedence given 
to the needs of the Navy and Air Force by the ex-Army man in the White House.”50 
During his command tenure in the Far East Taylor had written a position paper on “The 
National Military Program.” 51 He argued that in order to deter general war, the army 
needed the capabilities to respond quickly to limited aggression.52 Taylor stressed that 
deterrence required the possession of real strength. Only a strong army would serve as a 
deterrent to Soviet aggression. It was not enough to deploy five combat divisions to 
Germany. The U.S. Army also needed sufficient reserves, transportation capacity, and an 
operational concept that reflected the changing face of warfare in the nuclear age.53 
49House, Combined Arms Warfare, p. 206. 
 50Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, p.166.
51Ibid., pp. 165-66. The document, as amended by the Army Staff and approved 
by the Secretary of the Army in October 1956, is reproduced in Taylor, The Uncertain 
Trumpet, pp. 30-34. 
 52Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, p. 34.
53See, for instance, Notes for Remarks by General Maxwell Taylor, Chief of Staff, 
U.S. Army, Before the Calvin Bullock Forum, New York, NY, 7 December 1955. Taylor 
Papers, NDU (http://www.ndu.edu/library/taylor/mdt-0065.pdf); “The Army for Peace,” 
Address by General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, to the Dallas Council 
on World Affairs, Hotel Statler, Dallas, Texas, April 6, 1956. Taylor Papers, NDU 
(http://www.ndu.edu/library/taylor/mdt-0082.pdf); and Address by General Maxwell 
Taylor to the National Strategy Seminar at the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 
Pennsylvania, 6 June 1956, “The Role of the Army in National Strategy.” Taylor Papers, 
NDU (http://www.ndu.edu/library/taylor/mdt-0114a.pdf).  
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Taylor’s memoirs leave no doubt that he intended to alter national military 
strategy. An article written for Foreign Affairs in the spring of 1956 outlined the basic 
tenets of his views on deterrence based on balanced conventional and nuclear forces.54 
For this reason, the argument that Taylor adopted the pentomic division for the purpose 
of adjusting the army to the strategy of Massive Retaliation is unpersuasive. To the 
contrary, the reform was prompted by political considerations. Taylor’s bold reform 
proposal was motivated by his view of future war, which could be conventional or 
nuclear. But since the army’s viewpoints about future war did not match those of the rest 
of the defense establishment, reform had to be presented as being in compliance with 
current policy and strategy. Since limited war was not a fashionable concept, the army 
needed to find a concept that would appear to be well suited for general war while 
allowing improvement in the capacity to fight limited wars. The pentomic division was 
intended to enhance the army’s position with respect to the other armed services, redefine 
the army’s operational mission, and promote a change in national military strategy.55 
Despite contrary evidence provided in the ATFA studies, Taylor publicly 
supported the notion that increased firepower with atomic weapons would lead to smaller 
 
54The article “Security Through Deterrence” was not cleared for publication 
because of concerns raised by the Defense and State departments. It is printed in the 
Appendix to Taylor’s Uncertain Trumpet, pp. 181-97. 
 55Douglas Kinnard shows that the army’s challenge to President Eisenhower’s 
national security policy was the most pointed of all the services. He argues that Taylor’s 
views provided the basis for the new strategic approach of the 1960s. He concludes, 
however, that Taylor’s challenge was repelled by the administration prior to Taylor’s 
retirement in 1959. Douglas Kinnard, “Civil-Military Relations: The President and the 
General,” in: Parameters, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Summer 1985), pp. 19-29. 
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combat units.56 He also explained the army’s push for tactical nuclear weapons under his 
leadership as a desire to obtain greater deterrent value. He admitted that he believed at the 
time that once obtained these weapons would stay in the arsenal for a long time and the 
army could achieve a sound balance of nuclear and conventional weapons. Taylor later 
claimed that the great costs associated with tactical nuclear weapons came as a surprise.57 
To complicate matters, the army needed to maintain the ability to fight large and small 
wars alike. The ideal army, Taylor told the annual conference of Service Secretaries in 
1955, “would include forces that would be readily available to carry out separately any of 
our various missions.” This entailed a ready force to meet the commitment to NATO as 
well as a separate force for local contingencies elsewhere. Taylor concluded that the ideal 
solution would be “exceedingly difficult to attain” and that the army would have to do its 
best within the available means.58 
In September 1955 General Taylor told an assembly of the 101st Airborne 
Division that the army was in a period of revolutionary transition from the gunpowder to 
the nuclear age.59 Strategic mobility, crucial for rapid reinforcement of overseas-deployed 
 
56He did, however, acknowledge that the greater need for supporting units would 
not allow for significant overall manpower reductions. Taylor, “Mission of the Army,” 
pp. 13-14. 
 57Senior Officers Debriefing Program, Conversations between General Maxwell 
D. Taylor (USA, ret.) and Col. Richard A. Manion, USAWC, [1972 - 1973], Part Four, 16 
February 1973, pp. 8-9. Maxwell D. Taylor Papers, MHI. 
 58Maxwell D. Taylor, “The World-Wide Role and Capability of the Army,” in: 
The Army Combat Forces Journal, Vol. 6, No. 2 (September 1955), pp. 24-26. The 
quotations are on page 25. 
 59Address by General Maxwell Taylor, Chief of Staff, United States Army, at the 
Tenth Annual Reunion of 101st Airborne Division Association, Sheraton Plaza Hotel, 
Boston, Massachusetts, Saturday, September 3, 1955. Taylor Papers, Box 2: Speeches 
1955-1959, “Speeches 1955,” MHI. 
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forces, was to be achieved through superior air lift. The nuclear battlefield required 
greater tactical mobility. This was to be achieved through the air-transportability of all 
infantry combat divisions and their organic equipment.60 Consequently, the weight of 
equipment had to be kept low. While firepower, especially if provided by atomic 
weapons, was deemed essential to winning defensive and offensive battles alike, it was 
crucial to concentrate fire and mass at critical points of the battlefield. Furthermore, 
dispersion was critical so as not to present an attractive target for Soviet nuclear strikes. 
Taylor stressed that skilled soldiers were needed to manipulate complex machinery and 
allow for an optimal admixture of firepower and mobility. 
 Taylor had little time to consider operational needs as the army continued to be 
put on the defensive in the budget debates. A critical moment came in February 1956 
when Taylor and Secretary of the Army Wilbur Brucker appeared in the House of 
Representatives. The appropriations committee was an ideal forum for the suave and 
intellectual Taylor, who presented a stark contrast to Matthew Ridgway.61 Taylor 
defended the adequacy of the army’s budget for 1957, thus calming Republican fears of 
outright opposition. But he also presented his views on the army’s role in deterrence and 
 
60This was a theme that Taylor struck at several occasions. Air mobility was a key 
part of his argument to the 101st Airborne Association and he reiterated it six weeks later 
in a speech to the National Defense Transportation Association. But Taylor also told the 
transportation industry executives that sea transport remained vital. He expressed great 
expectations in the helicopter, which he thought had performed admirably in Korea. 
Address by General Maxwell Taylor, Chief of Staff, United States Army, at the Tenth 
Annual Convention, National Defense Transportation Association, Sheraton Plaza Hotel, 
Boston, Massachusetts, Thursday, October 13, 1955. Taylor Papers, Box 2: Speeches 
1955-1959, “Speeches 1955,” MHI. 
 61For Andrew Bacevich, the transition from Rigway to Taylor symbolized a new 
era of politicization rather than traditional military professionalism. Bacevich, “The 
Paradox of Professionalism,” pp. 332-33.  
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outlined a strategy that would become known as flexible response, based on strategic and 
local deterrence and the ability to fight limited wars with appropriate means. When the 
committee chairman asked whether Taylor’s acceptance of the budget was “a forced 
attitude,” Taylor replied that he considered “the funds allocated marginally sufficient to 
maintain the Army I have described.” If, however, purely military considerations 
prevailed, Taylor preferred an army of 1.5 million men in twenty-eight active divisions. 
He stated that such a force should be balanced and capable of fighting with nuclear and 
conventional weapons in any environment.62 
Taylor followed up on his critique and told President Eisenhower that the current 
over-dependence on nuclear weapons should be replaced by deterrence and response 
proportional to the level of threat or attack. The medium-term war plan for 1960 
remained focused on general war with the Soviet Union, characterized by almost 
immediate resort to nuclear weapons, but Taylor pointed out that the National Security 
Council had already assessed a Soviet attack on the United States as the least likely 
scenario in future war. Thus, Taylor argued, it was necessary to prepare the armed forces 
 
62Richard M. Leighton, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense: 
Strategy, Money, and the New Look, 1953-1956 (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2001), pp. 613-615. Rep. Mahon and Taylor are 
quoted on page 614. For Taylor’s prepared remarks in the House of Representatives see 
Statement of General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, before the 
Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations, House of Representatives, 
Relative to the Department of the Army Budget for Fiscal Year 1957. Taylor Papers, 
NDU (http://www.ndu.edu/library/taylor/mdt-0054.pdf). Here, Taylor stressed deterrence 
through balanced forces, the need for a versatile Army, the deterrence mission of the 
overseas-deployed forces and the need to provide a sufficient strategic reserve to back 
them up, and the army’s role in training and assisting 200 divisions in forty-four nations. 
Taylor reiterated these points in the Senate in May 1956. Statement of General Maxwell 
D. Taylor, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, before the Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations, United States Senate, Relative to the Department of the Army Budget for 
Fiscal Year 1957. Taylor Papers, NDU (http://www.ndu.edu/library/taylor/mdt-
0073.pdf). 
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to deal with the more realistic threat of local and proxy Communist attacks. Taylor noted 
that the U.S. military needed diverse types of forces to deter both small and big wars. Too 
much emphasis on air power would leave the free world vulnerable to limited and local 
aggression that could only be countered by ground forces. He concluded that it was 
unwise to pursue policies that would alienate potential allies.63 Eisenhower responded by 
emphasizing the capability of tactical nuclear weapons, allied ground forces, and strategic 
deterrence.64 
From a strategic and operational perspective, the objective was not to defeat the 
enemy’s military forces, but to destroy his will to wage general war. It was, of course, 
generally assumed that the threat of nuclear escalation would discourage aggression and 
war would not break out, but if it did, NATO declared its intention to employ nuclear 
weapons at the outset. Maxwell Taylor believed that a strategy that risked national 
survival to counter even limited aggression was unwise and that proper use of the army 
offered better alternatives. With sufficient capability to wage both conventional and 
atomic war, the army could extend the concept of deterrence even after the outbreak of 
war. At the outset, general deterrence might fail, but there was still the possibility that 
spirited and skillful defense of West Germany could persuade the Soviets to seek an 
armistice and return to the controlled crisis state of the Cold War. This was important 
because western intelligence sources assumed that war could only break out by accident 
 
63Unattributed report, probably 17 September 1956, Discussion of Major Issues,
Section I, pp. 1-2. Records of the Army Staff, Records of the Office of the Chief of 
Information, Entry 45, Box 1: Security Classified Correspondence, 1956, “Current Army 
Thinking on Major Issues 1956,” RG 319, NA. The bulk of the report was submitted on 
May 9, 1956, but there is a hand-written date of September 17 on the cover sheet.  
 64Leighton, Strategy, Money, and the New Look, pp. 39-40. 
118
or miscalculation. In either case it would be crucial to convince the Soviets rapidly that a 
negotiated settlement was preferable to a protracted war. 
 Army and ground forces of the European allies would have to be able to contain 
or delay the Soviet offensive. This would expose the enemy to atomic strikes. For Taylor, 
limited war meant any conflict that did not include the use of strategic nuclear weapons.65 
Hence, deterrence could work at the general level, fueled by the capacity for strategic use 
of nuclear weapons, but also at the conventional and the tactical-nuclear levels. General 
Lauris Norstad, SACEUR from 1956 to 1962, suggested that a “pause” before resorting 
to nuclear weapons would be appropriate. But while army leaders suggested that use of 
tactical nuclear weapons need not automatically lead to general nuclear war, Norstad 
assumed that it would trigger immediate escalation. Norstad, a proponent of strategic 
deterrence, nevertheless felt that Massive Retaliation did not provide the proper means to 
counter limited aggression.66 
The army position held that the U.S. military should be concerned first with 
deterring general war, then with deterring local war, thirdly with winning local war, and 
only lastly with winning general war. To this avail it was necessary to maintain the 
technological edge over the Soviets; build a continental defense system that would reduce 
U.S. vulnerability to nuclear attacks; deploy adequate armed force abroad with the 
capacity to sustain protracted combat; form a powerful rapid response force to intervene 
 
65General Maxwell Taylor, Address to the National War College, 18 November 
1960, “Limited War,” particularly p. 6. Taylor Papers, NDU 
(http://www.ndu.edu/library/taylor/mdt-0138.pdf).    
 66For a more detailed discussion of Norstad’s position see below, “Toward a 
Forward Defense of West Germany.” See also Robert S. Jordan, Norstad: Cold War 
NATO Supreme Commander: Airman, Strategist, Diplomat (Houndmills, Basingstoke: 
Macmaillan, 2000), p. 208. 
119
in local crises, including the capability to employ nuclear weapons; continue military and 
economic aid to the allies; emphasize rapid mobilization of reserve forces in the United 
States; increase stockpiles of critical materials at home and abroad; and devise an 
industrial mobilization plan for protracted war. Unfortunately, “the army’s capability to 
fulfill its role in the national defense structure is impaired by serious limitations on its 
state of readiness, by inadequate strategic and tactical mobility, by the absence of a 
flexible logistics system, and by a lack of understanding and support for the Army’s 
needs.” First order of the day was therefore to convince the civilian leadership of the 
army’s utility in the nuclear age.67 
The immediate objective was to reform the army into a “ready, mobile, hard-
hitting, modern [force] capable of moving by land, sea, or air, anywhere in the world to 
deal with any threat the United States government may decide to meet.” The report 
concluded that the army was prepared to fulfill its most important tasks but that there 
were great risks in the event of active military operations. General Taylor believed that 
the army constituted a serious deterrent force, but he had doubts about its actual combat 
capability. Tactical atomic weapons could help to address this problem, but the army had 
to ensure that this did not lead to reliance on atomic weapons in situations that were best 
addressed by conventional means. To counter the strategic threat, the West had to 
continue its military build-up, but greater emphasis needed to be placed on unified and 
joint commands. Operationally, the army hoped to employ aviation to enhance greatly the 
mobility of combat units in theater. New missile technology could address some of the 
 
67Unattributed report, probably 17 September 1956, Discussion of Major Issues,
Section I, pp. 3-5. The quotation is on page 5. Section II, pp. 1-3, discusses the suggested 
National Military Program in detail. 
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weaknesses in tactical air support. Finally, atomic weapons had changed the dimensions 
of time and space in battle. There would be much greater depth to the combat zone and 
events would unfold rapidly. The tactical and operational goal had to be the annihilation 
of the enemy forces.68 
The army found itself pushed toward “an extremely rapid transition to atomics.” 
This was “for a number of reasons, not all of them military.” The complex tactical and 
doctrinal concepts for new kinds of war had not yet been fully developed. Doctrine had to 
consider that the most modern army would present the best targets for nuclear strikes. 
This was the result of mechanization, which tied combat formations to their vehicles, and 
of the sophistication of logistics. Ports, supply stocks, and headquarters would make good 
targets and losses could not always be replaced or otherwise redressed. In addition, the 
army realized that its capability to fire atomic weapons surpassed its target-identification 
capacity by a wide margin. The army also lacked vehicles needed to achieve the degree 
of mobility necessary. This would not be decisive in Europe, however, as the enemy was 
in a similar situation. Army leaders found some solace in the belief that tactical atomic 
weapons were a means of deterrence and war fighting, while strategic nuclear weapons 
could only deter war or cause annihilation.69 
General Taylor’s assessment of the operational capability of NATO in Central 
Europe was upbeat. Forty Soviet and Warsaw Pact divisions faced sixteen combat-ready 
NATO divisions. Seven more NATO divisions were to become available within thirty 
days of mobilization. In addition, there were forty British, French, Spanish, and Italian 
 
68Ibid., Section III, pp. 3-8. The quotation is on page 3. 
 69Ibid., Section VIII, pp. 1-6. The quotations are on page 1. 
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divisions that could be mobilized, but only about half were anywhere near combat ready. 
It was anyone’s guess how many divisions the Soviets would employ in an offensive if 
they chose to forego surprise and deliberately built up their forces. In any scenario, Soviet 
and East European reserves were more plentiful than NATO’s. Nevertheless, Taylor 
expressed confidence that a forty-division attack could be stopped east of the Rhine if 
NATO forces received sufficient tactical air support and the authority to apply atomic 
firepower. Chances against an all-out attack were much more doubtful, since the military 
mobilization base of the European NATO partners was still too small and U.S. 
reinforcements were far away. Much would depend on the West German military build-
up over the course of the next three years. To increase the mobility and flexibility of U.S. 
forces in Europe, Taylor revealed that a second armored division and an airborne division 
would replace two of the four infantry divisions presently stationed in Germany.70 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that atomic weapons had to be used in the 
defense of Western Europe. The short-term defense plan for 1956 conceded that the 
Rhine-Ijssel line might fall.71 The defensive phase, possibly holding on to the Pyrenees, 
would be characterized by strategic nuclear attacks on Soviet targets, before the Western 
allies could commence their offensive. War might last for three years and the army had to 
be prepared to deploy eighty-five divisions. The Air Force Chief of Staff disagreed with 
 
70Ibid., Appendix B: Statement by General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chief of Staff, 
United States Army, before the Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations 
of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Relative to the DA 
Budget, FY 1957, pp. 3, 8. 
 71The plans of the late 1940s and early 1950s are briefly discussed in the first 
chapter of the dissertation. Ross, American War Plans, 1945-1950 offers the best 
available synopsis. Several of the plans have been published in Rosenberg and Ross, 
America’s Plans for War Against the Soviet Union, 1945-1950.
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the assumption that there could be major military operations after a prolonged nuclear 
exchange. Admiral Radford argued that immediate use of tactical nuclear weapons would 
be necessary if American forces came under attack by the Soviets. Taylor consented, 
because he saw no alternative to defending crucial areas in Europe and the Middle East 
without nuclear weapons at that point.72 He believed that the possession of tactical 
nuclear weapons served as a deterrent, prevented the enemy from massing forces in war, 
and limited aggression. Their use would offset the Soviet numerical advantage in ground 
forces and bring about the stalemate that would force the enemy to decide whether to 
escalate.73 
The debates of the Joint Chiefs about strategic objectives for the medium term 
afforded Taylor the opportunity to press upon the other service chiefs the need for a more 
flexible strategy. When Admiral Radford attempted to include the immediate use of 
atomic weapons in medium-term as well as emergency planning, Taylor formally 
objected. He argued that the threat of Massive Retaliation would deter Soviet aggression 
in Europe only as long as the U.S. had a significant advantage in the number of nuclear 
warheads and long-range delivery vehicles. Taylor expected that the Soviet Union would 
catch up to the U.S. by the end of the decade. Since current contingency plans were based 
on the principle of rapid escalation from tactical to strategic use of nuclear weapons, 
limited aggression would lead to general war. Automatic escalation made no sense once 
 
72Kenneth W. Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Volume VI: The Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1955-1956 (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, 
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 73Maxwell Taylor, “A Military Strategy for NATO,” [Speech before the Council 
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the Soviet Union had acquired the means to strike at military and civilian targets inside 
the United States. Instead, Taylor argued, the U.S. military needed to develop capabilities 
to respond to limited aggression with measured force.74 
Taylor’s objections were brushed aside in the revised guidance for medium-range 
and short-term plans, but use of nuclear weapons was only assured in case of an attack on 
the U.S. or its armed forces. Admiral Radford decided to resolve the issue once and for 
all. On May 16, 1956, he forced a vote of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that redefined general 
war as “any war in which the armed forces of the USSR and the U.S. are overtly 
engaged.” In other words, any Soviet incursion, no matter how limited, would cause the 
United States to use nuclear weapons. Radford carried a three-to-two majority, with 
Taylor and Marine Corps Commandant Pate in opposition. Taylor and Pate insisted that a 
limited conventional and atomic conflict with the Soviet Union remained possible 
because both sides would be restrained by the risk of mutual annihilation. In a meeting 
with Taylor and Radford on May 24, President Eisenhower, who did not believe that war 
in Europe could be controlled, endorsed Radford’s position. At the same meeting 
Eisenhower also stated that only active armed forces mattered in a general war. The 
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President implied that army reserve divisions committed to reinforce ACE could not be 
moved to Europe fast enough to affect the outcome of the conflict.75 
The pressure on the army either to conform with or try to force adjustments to 
national strategy was increased by the Radford Plan of July 1956.76 Admiral Radford 
suggested that army combat divisions should be withdrawn from Europe.77 In their stead, 
small atomic task forces and European conventional forces could achieve the same 
deterrent effect as currently deployed forces. Historian Richard Leighton argues that 
Radford’s plan was supported by President Eisenhower and that it was the keystone to a 
revision of strategy, in order to defeat the critics of Massive Retaliation. Within the year, 
army forces overseas were to be reduced to the aforementioned atomic task forces that 
could repel limited communists aggression. The limited-war mission was to be carried 
out by the air force, the navy, and a smaller Marine Corps. All were to be armed with 
nuclear weapons. Army strength was to decline significantly and civil defense was to 
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become its main task. Marc Trachtenberg claims that the withdrawal of American armed 
forces from Europe was a central pillar of Eisenhower’s defense policy and global 
strategy. For that purpose, nuclear weapons had to be shared with the allies.78 
Taylor opposed Radford’s proposal because it was designed for general nuclear 
war against the Soviets. He thought that it would seriously compromise the ability to 
fight regional wars. While the plan, if implemented, might deter the Soviets from 
initiating nuclear war, it would open the door for limited forms of aggression. Taylor 
objected forcefully in the meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on July 9, 1956: 
The Chairman’s concept represents a program which prepares for one improbable 
type of war, while leaving the United States weak in its ability to meet the most 
probable type of threat. It fixes the form of possible military reaction, with a 
resultant loss of flexibility and adaptability for the political and military policy of 
the United States. It will frighten and alienate our friends. It will play the Russian 
game directed at getting our forces out of Europe and of Asia. It substitutes the 
concept of ‘Fortress America’ for our former strategy based upon forward 
deployment of deterrent forces in co-operation with our Allies of the Free World. 
I repeat the opinion that it represents an unacceptable military program for the 
United States.79 
The other service chiefs greeted Taylor’s statement with silence. It was only the reaction 
in Congress and in European capitals to the publication of elements of the plan in the 
New York Times on July 13 that caused Eisenhower to bury the Radford Plan. 
 All of this was not merely a philosophical debate about strategy. The army was in 
serious danger of being reduced significantly. On June 30, 1956, there had been eighteen 
active divisions and almost one million men. In July 1957, the services proposed new 
force objectives. The army hoped to limit personnel cuts to 50,000 officers and men and 
 
78Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, pp. vi-x, 146-200. Trachtenberg’s argument 
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 79Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, pp. 40-41. 
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retain at least fifteen divisions. The air force, in contrast, did not think that the army 
needed more than eleven active divisions, and both air force and navy agreed that 
800,000 officers and men would be sufficient. Admiral Radford even suggested a gradual 
reduction of the army to eleven divisions and 700,000 officers and men. It was crucial for 
the survival of the army, both as a significant part of the deterrent and as a fighting force, 
to prevent Radford’s proposal from implementation. Eisenhower decided to reduce the 
army to 850,000 officers and men by 1959 but offered no decision for the longer term. 
The debate continued well into 1959, but in the end Maxwell Taylor and his successor, 
General Lyman Lemnitzer could claim a partial victory, as the army stood at fourteen 
divisions with 873,000 officers and men on June 30, 1960.80 
The debate about force structure was defined less by sound strategic thought than 
by meeting budget constraints.81 The defense budget, and the army’s share remained 
contentious through the later parts of the 1950s. When the services provided their 
estimates for 1958 in the fall of 1956, the total added up to over $48 billion, or $10 
billion above the ceiling set by the administration. About half of the total was requested 
by the air force. The army claimed a need for $12 billion to increase manpower and 
deploy more atomic support forces to Europe. Secretary Wilson, in his final year in the 
Pentagon, objected and set a firm force goal of one million men for the army. Still, in 
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November the services requested more than $45 billion. The administration’s defense 
budget request, presented to Congress on January 16, 1957, totaled $38.5 billion in new 
authority for an expected $38 billion in obligation expenditures. The army’s share was 
$8.54 billion, or about half of that of the air force. In line with President Eisenhower’s 
decision, army force objectives were reduced to 900,000 men by June 1958 and 850,000 
men by the following year. Moreover, 1957 saw a movement for greater economy in 
Congress and the final appropriation was even lower. On August 1, Congress approved a 
defense budget of $33.76 billion. The army’s share stood at $7.26 billion, while the air 
force received almost $16 billion.82 
The pressure on the military in general, and the army in particular was relaxed in 
1958. The budget for 1959 benefited from the changing political climate in the aftermath 
of the Sputnik shock. Soviet advances in rocketry and missile technology had alerted 
congressional leaders that the U.S. military might not have the technological edge that 
had been supposed and that the relatively small size of the active armed forces was thus a 
major problem. Secretary Wilson had initially set the guidelines for the 1959 budget at 
$37.2 billion, with an army share of $8.6 billion for 850,000 men. Army Secretary 
Brucker warned that this would force the army to withdraw one division from Korea and 
two battle groups from Europe. Eisenhower’s budget request of January 1958 asked for 
only $8.5 billion for the army. Congress thought this to be inadequate.83 The two houses 
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compromised on a defense budget of $39.6 billion, including almost $9 billion for the 
army. The military construction bill that followed pushed the defense budget above $40 
billion for the first time since the Korean War.84 
After Sputnik, defense policy and strategy were reviewed and the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff were asked to give greater consideration to a force structure adaptable to either 
general or limited war. The public, and indeed many high-ranking military and civilian 
officials, assumed that a force capable of fighting general war could cope with more 
limited conflict. Maxwell Taylor had consistently challenged such views. He argued that 
armed forces that were well prepared for limited war might be able to function in general 
war, but that while “there’s nothing of use in the little war not applicable to the big war, 
...the reverse is not true.”85 Even John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State and architect 
of Massive Retaliation, now pushed for limited-war capability in a potential European 
theater. The threat of massive retaliation was clearly less useful than it had been in 1954. 
 Neil McElroy, the new Secretary of Defense, found his hands tied by rising costs. 
He projected defense expenditures of $41.25 billion in fiscal year 1960. The army could 
only expect $9.1 billion, which would lead to a further force reduction to 825,000 men. In 
the service proposals of October 1958, the army had maintained that $10.2 billion were 
necessary to maintain the approved strength of fourteen divisions through 1960, with a 
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slight increase in manpower to 880,000. President Eisenhower eventually requested a 
defense budget of $40.95 billion in expenditures, including $9.26 for the army. Congress 
ultimately approved $39.2 billion for defense and $9.38 billion for the army. Again, this 
was increased to slightly over $40 billion through a supplementary military construction 
bill.86 National military strategy had undergone a subtle change in philosophy, but there 
were not sufficient funds yet to implement the dual capability for limited and general war 
across the armed forces. 
 The debate of the 1961 defense budget was characterized by a split between the 
State and Defense departments. Dulles urged a thorough review of national strategy, 
based on the assumption that nuclear deterrence had to be supplemented by a serious 
capability for conventional war. In many respects, State had returned to the basic premise 
of NSC-68. To implement Dulles’s proposals, a significantly higher budget was required 
to sustain the necessary force levels or the military would have to reduce the nuclear 
deterrent and shift funds within the budget. Either option seemed unreasonable and 
unobtainable to the Defense Department. The service budget requests topped out at $43.6 
billion, including $10.3 billion for the army. Secretary McElroy reminded the services of 
their manpower authorization for 1960, which stood at 870,000 in the army’s case. 
Eventually, the services agreed to lower their request to $41.4 billion, but there was little 
agreement on the respective shares. The army thought it should get thirty-four percent, 
while the air force demanded fifty-six percent for itself and would have granted only 
twenty percent to the army. On January 18, 1960, Eisenhower asked Congress for $40.58 
billion, including $9.55 billion for the army and a relatively modest $17.74 billion for the 
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air force. The appropriations bill signed by the president on July 7, reached just below 
$40 billion. Appropriations for the army were $9.54 billion.87 
Early in his tenure as Army Chief of Staff, General Taylor had found little support 
among the Joint Chiefs of Staff for his arguments for greater strategic flexibility. But in 
1958, the Navy and Marine Corps came to support the need for limited-war capability in 
meetings of the JCS, and State Department representatives made similar arguments in the 
National Security Council.88 The new JCS chairman, air force general Nathan Twining, 
argued that any military force built for general war would also be useful in a limited-war 
environment. Taylor, Admiral Arleigh Burke, and Marine Corps Commandant Pate 
contested this proposition. Part of the problem was that limited war was a poorly defined 
term. Twining defined it as limitations imposed by the political leadership upon military 
commanders. As an example he cited the Korean War, where, he believed, President 
Truman’s refusal to authorize the application of air power north of the Yalu River had 
negatively affected the course of the war. Taylor, on the other hand, defined limited war 
as any war in which no strategic nuclear weapons were used.89 Twining disagreed with 
Taylor’s assumption that war in Central Europe could be limited. He argued that limited 
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war was a “philosophy of weakness.”90 The president supported Twining’s position, 
despite the fact that his views were backed solely by Air Force Chief of Staff General 
White. The defense of Europe still rested on the assumption that war between the United 
States and the Soviet Union could only be general.91 
The discussion of the defense budget and the increasing debate over adjustments 
to strategy highlight the centrality of fiscal considerations in the Eisenhower years. Even 
after John Foster Dulles had come to agree with the army’s long-standing position on the 
need for a capability to fight limited wars with an admixture of conventional and tactical 
nuclear forces, a thorough review was not forthcoming. Discussions of the basic defense 
reviews for 1958 and 1959, showed greater receptiveness among administration officials 
to consider limited war. But it became obvious that both strategic nuclear deterrence and 
sufficient military capability for limited war could only be achieved if the defense budget 
was increased significantly. That, however, was impossible because Eisenhower 
maintained that sound fiscal policy for economic growth and security were more 
important than short-term improvements in the defense posture. The fundamental 
problem was thus fairly simple, yet impossible to solve given the fiscal constraints. An 
increasing number of administration officials understood the army’s point about realistic 
deterrence and there was a general trend toward the thinking of NSC-68, but Eisenhower 
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and the Defense Department were convinced that it was too expensive to act upon such 
considerations. 
 Taylor had never been shy about expressing his concerns about Massive 
Retaliation, but he was enough of a diplomat to function effectively within a system that 
he considered to be defective and unlikely to last for much longer. He assumed that the 
approaching nuclear parity would force administration and military services to shift the 
emphasis of strategy away from strategic nuclear deterrence. Based on the assumption of 
greater need for limited-war capability and more flexible, dual-capable forces, Taylor 
outlined his vision of future army personnel structure in an address to the Defense 
Secretary in June 1958. He called for a modest increase from 870,000 to 915,000 officers 
and men.92 He also proposed that 15,000 men should be added to the overseas 
deployments by June 1962. The reductions in manpower in USAREUR from 240,000 in 
June 1956 to a planned 225,000 by June 30, 1959, had left the ground forces short of 
combat units and logistical support.  
 The difference in thinking between the army, the other services, and the 
administration rested on the assumption that atomic and nuclear weapons would require 
less manpower. Taylor objected to such estimates on the basis of the complexity of the 
weapons, the greater need for maintenance and training, the greater need for speed, 
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mobility, and flexibility, and the greater strains on logistics.93 Yet his pentomic division 
had been oriented on the principle of smaller combat forces. In the areas of limited war 
and dual capability, Taylor warned about equating firepower and military capability. He 
was particularly concerned about the collateral damage that high-yield payloads of 
atomic weapons could cause. As he pointed out, the after action analysis of the 
SAGEBRUSH maneuvers indicated that actual use of such weapons as simulated in the 
exercise would have destroyed the army forces and killed most if not all inhabitants of 
Louisiana, Texas, and the entire Southeast.94 
Maxwell Taylor and the U.S. Army were not alone in identifying the linkage of 
mutual assured destruction and limited war. Once the Soviets obtained the capability to 
destroy significant parts of the United States with intercontinental ballistic missiles, the 
use of strategic nuclear weapons in a regional conflict would become less credible. In 
other words, while the weapons would be as destructive as before, the psychological 
impact on the Kremlin leaders would be lessened by their assumption that the United 
States would not risk its own destruction. Consequently, the capacity to wage limited war 
would become more important. That was exactly the point made by a Pentagon staffer to 
a colleague in the State Department in May 1960. The defense analyst claimed that it was 
present U.S. policy to build as large a force for limited war as possible once the deterrent 
had been served. In addition, he added that Great Britain, once staunchly in the massive-
retaliation camp now pursued a similar approach. Moreover, the Pentagon analyst 
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doubted that NATO war plans calling for the immediate use of nuclear weapons in case 
of a Soviet invasion stood any chance. The U.S. military expected to be called upon to 
fight a rather prolonged phase of conventional war “while the politicians talked.” In 
addition, prior to the employment of tactical atomic weapons, the president would likely 
make an unequivocal public statement that we were not prepared to use strategic nuclear 
weapons at this point.95 This acknowledged that the concept of deterrence could extend 
into war and that restraint might allow for limitation of tactical nuclear war.  
 Maxwell Taylor retired in 1959. He followed the example of his predecessor and 
quickly published an account of his frustration with national security policy. But where 
Ridgway had placed his criticism in the later chapters of a memoir, Taylor took a more 
direct approach. The Uncertain Trumpet was a serious indictment of the shortcomings of 
Massive Retaliation and a passionate plea for a greater role of ground forces in a more 
flexible strategy. This was to become one of the founding statements of the strategy of 
Flexible Response and it paved Taylor’s way into the inner circle of the next president of 
the United States, John F. Kennedy.  
 Flexible Response was formally adopted in 1961, but American strategy had been 
moving away from a dogmatic interpretation of Massive Retaliation since 1957.96 In the 
United States, the transition was propelled mainly by the army. The arguments of 
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Maxwell Taylor, supported at times by his colleagues in the navy and marine corps, had 
contributed greatly to the transition from Massive Retaliation to Flexible Response. 
Moreover, the introduction of the pentomic division and subsequent debate of 
organization and doctrine assured that the army was prepared to operate under a new 
strategy. But the transition of strategy was also driven by operational planning in the 
NATO alliance, and by the strategic and political considerations of the supreme 
commander, General Lauris Norstad. 
Toward Forward Defense of West Germany 
When NATO was formed in the spring of 1949, its military strategy rested upon 
the nuclear monopoly of the United States. U.S. Army forces in Europe were insufficient 
to defend Western Europe. European armies had been demobilized after World War II 
and remaining troops were often preoccupied with colonial or post-colonial wars. After 
the successful test of a Soviet atom bomb, forward defense became the expressed 
objective of NATO force planning, although actual capability would not catch up with 
rhetoric for several years.97 Still, Europeans needed to be told that they would be 
defended rather than abandoned at the outset of war. General Omar Bradley succinctly 
stated the political, if not military necessity for forward defense in April 1949, even 
before the atomic monopoly had been broken: “It must be perfectly apparent to the 
people of the United States that we cannot count on friends in Western Europe if our 
 
97General Eisenhower estimated that between sixty-five and ninety-five divisions 
were needed to defend Central Region at the Rhine river. By 1957, due to the integration 
of tactical atomic weapons into NATO planning, the requirement had been reduced to 
thirty divisions and General Norstad argued that the line of defense could be moved 
forward to the Iron Curtain once that objective had been reached. Summary of SACEUR’s 
Presentation to the Permanent Representatives of the NATO Council - 28 May 57.
Norstad Papers, Policy Files Series, Box 87, “Forces (5),” DDEL. 
136
strategy in the event of war dictates that we shall first abandon them to the enemy with a 
promise of later liberation.”98 Despite such considerations, NATO members agreed that 
immediate use of nuclear weapons in case of a Soviet attack was necessary. 
 Limited war entered into the discussions of NATO leaders in 1956.99 The North 
Atlantic Council decided in December that localized Soviet attacks of any degree of 
intensity should be met with conventional force. This upset German Chancellor 
Adenauer, who saw it as step toward American abandonment of Western Europe. To him, 
only the threat of nuclear retaliation could deter Soviet aggression.100 Adenauer had spent 
the year worrying about signs that Massive Retaliation was no longer the basis of policy 
for the Eisenhower administration. In the event, the Chancellor anticipated the softening 
of the American position. 
 Maxwell Taylor questioned NATO force structure in Central Europe. On his way 
to Washington, to take command as Chief of Staff, he had received briefings at SHAPE 
in Paris and at USAREUR headquarters. Taylor recalled that he was particularly 
concerned about the fragility of the logistics base, whose failure would compromise the 
sustenance of combat operations. He concluded that “it was clear to me that we had too 
many forces in Europe if we were going to depend on the ‘trip-wire’ strategy supported 
by the Massive Retaliation school and not enough balanced strength for a sustained non-
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nuclear defense.” Taylor expressed hope that tactical atomic weapons would make 
possible the territorial defense of Western Europe.101 But the question of trip-wire 
strategy or forward defense raised doubts about the relationship of strategy and policy. 
Officially, NATO insisted on forward defense as policy objective. The strategy of 
Massive Retaliation, however, did not support this objective. Why should large combat 
elements be moved closer to the intra-German border if ground troops were merely meant 
to trigger a nuclear response? 
 By 1956, ACE had improved its force posture and SACEUR called for the 
defense of large parts of West Germany. Previous NATO contingency plans had foreseen 
the Rhine and Ijssel rivers as the main line of resistance with varying degrees of defense 
to the east. Emergency Defense Plan (EDP) 1-57 stated the new objective as “arresting 
the Soviet land advance in Central Europe as far to the east as possible...and contain the 
Soviet advance forward of the Rhine-Ijssel.” SACEUR particularly referred to the 
defense of Kassel, Frankfurt, Würzburg, and the surrounding areas. Operational planning 
relied on heavy and early use of atomic weapons.102 
The new main line of defense extended from Bremen along the Weser River, to 
the Harz mountains, the Lech River, and the German-Austrian border.103 German military 
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officers were disappointed. General Adolf Heusinger complained that this was not the 
kind of forward defense envisioned when Germany had joined NATO. Norstad replied 
that deterrence, not forward defense was the primary mission of the alliance and that a 
shift of the main line of defense to the Iron Curtain would be ill-advised until ACE had 
enough troops. Until then, forward defense as envisioned by Heusinger and deterrence 
were incompatible.104 EDP 1-57 noted the shortage of German forces. This problem was 
exacerbated by the deployment of French forces from Central Region to Algeria. Still, 
containing the Soviet offensive east of the Rhine was SACEUR’s first priority in the land 
battle.105 
General Jean Etienne Valluy, the Commander in Chief of Allied Forces Central 
Europe (CINCENT) referred to the current deployment as “this half-forward strategy” 
and criticized the lack of logistical preparation. He lamented that ACE had not positioned 
a large amount of supplies east of the Rhine. Valluy estimated that stockpiles for fifteen 
days of combat were essential and that depots had to be built to withstand nuclear attacks. 
Medium-range plans, calling for more divisions to defend a wider area of Germany, 
required fundamental changes to NATO infrastructure and depot plans as well as to the 
command organization in Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT). The current structure 
could not accommodate twelve German divisions stretched across both Northern and 
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Central army groups.106 Valluy suggested that Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) 
should be responsible for the defense of Denmark and could, in return, hand over the 
Kassel area to Central Army Group (CENTAG). Currently, the line of demarcation 
between CENTAG and NORTHAG interfered with Valluy’s vision of a defensive battle 
in the Kassel Gap. He suggested that northern and southern portions of CENTAG would 
have to hold while the counterattack developed out of the center.107 
Norstad paid no attention to Valluy’s suggestions. The Minimum Force Study 
conducted by SHAPE in 1957 was based on a different concept of war. SACEUR did not 
think that planning for operations beyond the initial nuclear exchange in a general war 
was very important. Clearly, Lauris Norstad expected atomic war to be short. Therefore, 
only active forces and immediately available stockpiles of equipment were critical. The 
British Chiefs of Staff considered unrealistic the ready forces that Norstad requested. 
Great Britain was asked to commit an additional 100,000 men to ACE. Furthermore, the 
Chiefs of Staff thought that plans for maintaining maritime lines of communication to the 
U.S. were absolutely critical and should be better coordinated with Norstad, who was 
accused of neglecting the issue beyond a general expectation that reinforcements from 
North America could be obtained. These were minor quibbles, however, compared to the 
COS’s real concern. SACEUR proposed that in the future ground forces might be crucial 
to deterrence and should be capable of dealing with limited aggression. Britain, on the 
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other hand, had built her national strategy around earlier concepts of Massive Retaliation 
that emphasized nuclear weapons and airpower.108 
The emergence of tactical nuclear weapons and the slow build-up of German 
armed forces caused NATO to amend Massive Retaliation in 1957. Officially, the 
alliance continued to rest its strategy on the immediate use of nuclear and atomic 
weapons in a general war, as expressed by the Military Committee in MC 14/2. This 
document confirmed the strategy of Massive Retaliation, but allowed for more 
independent operational use of tactical nuclear weapons in the territorial defense of 
Western Europe.109 Nuclear deterrence, it was argued, all but assured that the Soviets 
would not embark on general war, but war by accident or miscalculation remained 
possible. A short section on limited war suggested that localized conventional Soviet or 
satellite state attacks should be met initially by conventional forces, but that nuclear 
weapons would be employed as the situation required since “in no case is there a NATO 
concept of limited war with the Soviets.”110 Still, there was a degree of ambiguity, largely 
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because an increasing number of military officers wanted an alternative to the immediate 
use of nuclear weapons. But despite the concession that limited war, defined by the 
Standing Group as “armed conflict other than unlimited nuclear war,” might occur, it was 
seen as an extra-European phenomenon.111 
Limited war outside of Europe did not concern NATO planners directly, but the 
Military Committee realized that the conventional defense of Germany was weakened by 
the colonial and post-colonial commitments of France, Great Britain, and possibly also 
the United States: “We should recognize that the forces of certain NATO nations may 
need to retain the flexibility required to permit action to meet limited military situations 
short of general war outside the NATO area.”112 It may seem that such commitments and 
the conventional defense of Western Europe had common characteristics, but wars of the 
kind fought in Algeria or Southeast Asia required different equipment, weaponry, 
logistics, and organization of combat units. More importantly, they required a different 
approach to operations. The U.S. Army was less than a decade away from discovering so 
in a very painful manner. 
 Massive Retaliation was now more deeply engraved in NATO strategy, while the 
Supreme Commander attempted to guide the alliance toward a modified, more graduated 
responsive capability. General Speidel, who had taken command of Allied Land Forces 
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Central Europe (LANDCENT) in the spring, explained that tactical nuclear weapons 
offered a degree of flexibility not found in earlier NATO strategy. Without determination 
to use them, the credibility of the deterrent would be lessened.113 U.S. Army intelligence 
acknowledged that the Soviets might test Western resolve with limited aggression at the 
border or in Berlin. There was no direct recommendation how to counter such actions, 
but it was implied that all means, including nuclear weapons, should be available from 
the outset of hostilities.114 
The state of readiness of European ground forces remained unsatisfactory. In a 
review of the national security program in the summer of 1957, the JCS concluded that 
NATO still was far from achieving force posture that could reasonably be expected to 
defeat the Soviets. The defense of Central Europe had been improved, but shortcomings 
in logistics of all ground forces but Seventh Army made sustained operations nearly 
impossible. This was a problem even in case of general war, because the nuclear phase 
still had to be followed by a counteroffensive on the ground to secure victory. The 
official opinion of the JCS underscored that the deterrent was nevertheless strong. But 
earlier drafts had been more pessimistic. There it had been stated that neither combat nor 
support forces of European armies had achieved the 1956 force goals. In addition, some 
countries were capable of maintaining internal security but could not defend their borders 
against a determined enemy. The JCS found that NATO forces in Central Region could 
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conduct substantial defensive operations, but were incapable of taking the offensive. 
Most likely, the JCS decided to omit the more critical portions of the assessment in the 
final evaluation for political reasons.115 
Maxwell Taylor criticized the lack of military involvement in the process of 
deciding upon NATO force objectives. He pointed out that the JCS had not been asked 
for advice. He proceeded to offer his assessment. In 1957, the U.S. Army deployed five 
combat divisions to Germany, committed three of its stateside divisions to SACEUR as 
rapid reinforcements, and promised to move nine divisions to Europe as second-echelon 
reinforcements. Altogether seventeen army and national guard divisions were committed 
to the defense of Central Europe. Taylor thought that this was sufficient. In 1959, there 
would be three infantry and two armored divisions in Germany, two more infantry and 
one airborne division ready to be deployed upon mobilization, and six infantry, two 
armored, and one airborne division in the second echelon.116 
The Military Committee submitted MC 70 on the same day that Taylor 
complained about the process.117 The report expressed concern about the vulnerability of 
concentrated forces to Soviet nuclear attacks and concluded that it was necessary to 
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deploy small battle formations, supported by heavy firepower. Mobility was crucial and 
communications had to be reliable.118 Readiness and qualitative superiority of the NATO 
forces were to be the basis of deterrence. Even though MC 70 was founded on the 
strategic guidance of Massive Retaliation, it included orders to SACEUR to prepare 
responses to any kind of incursion, possibly without having recourse to nuclear 
weapons.119 If aggression escalated to war, the land forces of the alliance would be called 
upon to defend NATO as far to the east as possible in order to safeguard territory, defend 
the population, and, most importantly, secure the base area from which the nuclear 
counter-offensive was to be conducted.120 Forward defense was to be achieved by forces 
that had good balance of nuclear and conventional means. Once suitable local targets had 
been identified, tactical atomic strikes were likely to be authorized.121 
The Military Committee believed that combat operations should be conducted by 
divisions comprised of combat groups of all arms, each capable of independent action. 
This was more advanced than the pentomic concept, in the sense that NATO sub-
divisional combat groups were to be fully combined-arms forces. The structure of the 
combat groups was to be flexible. This would allow for specific adjustments to the terrain 
and the nature of the threat and enemy forces. The committee thought that tactical nuclear 
weapons systems might be integrated at division level, but did not necessarily have to be. 
The same point was made for ground reconnaissance and air observation, additional 
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armor, and helicopters. In essence, the NATO military planners suggested a division that 
more closely resembled ROAD, the future U.S. Army divisional organization, than the 
recently reorganized pentomic division.122 
The NATO partners had committed forty-two active divisions and sixteen 
regimental combat teams to SACEUR. Sixteen additional divisions were committed to 
the first echelon of reinforcements and twenty-four divisions to the second echelon of 
reinforcements. The Military Committee recommended an increase of eight active and 
five first-echelon reserve divisions by 1961.123 Most of them were to be provided by the 
Bundeswehr.124 The U.S. Army was not called upon to increase its active forces in 
Europe or significantly increase its reserve commitment to SACEUR.125 The question 
was whether U.S. Army divisions earmarked for SACEUR could be brought into the 
theater as quickly as they would be needed. The current JCS- approved contingency plan 
of USCINCEUR called for the rapid deployment of all four divisions of the newly 
created Strategic Army Command (STRAC). Maxwell Taylor urged the other service 
chiefs to draft movement plans to assure that sufficient transportation would be 
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available.126 Immediately upon mobilization, the United States was committed to deploy 
two infantry divisions and one airborne division to Europe. The movement of all three 
divisions was to be concluded within thirty days. NATO was informed that sufficient 
transportation capacity existed.127 
Meanwhile, the majority of Western Europeans wanted more balanced forces and 
greater strategic flexibility, according to a CIA report of November 1957. The exceptions 
were the governments of Great Britain and West Germany, who found that deterrence 
beyond Massive Retaliation was unaffordable and that talk of greater flexibility 
diminished the value of the nuclear deterrent because it signaled unwillingness to use 
strategic nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, the Europeans were not willing to pay the price 
for the adjustment in forces. Still, the danger of limited aggression was perceived clearly 
on both sides of the Atlantic. Lauris Norstad argued that limited war was a much more 
likely scenario than a full-scale Soviet invasion of Western Europe.128 
126J.C.S. 2285/2, Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 18 June 1958, 
Strategic Mobility for U.S. Forces. Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal 
File 1958, CCS381 (11-22-57), Sec. 2, RG 218, NA. Also see Enclosure A: Joint Chiefs 
of Staff Approved Contingency Plans for Limited War Which Provide for Movement of 
Forces from CONUS. Besides the four-division contingency plan for Europe, three 
divisions and two armored cavalry regiments were slated for Korea, one airborne or 
infantry division accompanied by two battle groups for Indonesia, two battle groups of 
infantry or airborne infantry for the Caribbean, and two divisions for the Middle East. 
Handling multiple crises at a time would have been very difficult, yet plans for general 
war always presumed operations in several theaters.  
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Nevertheless, NATO strategy remained wedded to the assumption that the first 
phase of war with the Soviets, which was unlikely to exceed thirty days, “would be 
characterized by the greatest intensity of nuclear exchange.” This would be followed by 
“a longer period of indeterminate duration for reorganization, resupply and the 
accomplishment of necessary military tasks leading to a conclusion of the war.”129 Air 
defense was the greatest weakness in Central Region. It remained critically short of the 
requirements set in MC 70 despite the introduction of new surface-to-air missiles. This 
could endanger the effectiveness of the nuclear retaliatory force because the Soviets were 
expected to attack NATO airfields. ACE was seven first-echelon divisions short of the 
MC 70 land-force requirements and SACEUR commanded only thirty of the required 
forty-seven nuclear delivery units. Current trends pointed at a shortfall of almost two 
active divisions, nine first-echelon divisions, and thirty-six nuclear delivery units out of a 
total of eighty-eight, by 1961.130 This of course threatened both Massive Retaliation or a 
more flexible strategy but it seemed particularly harmful to the prospects of the latter. 
 The divide between expressed strategy and practical operational concepts was 
widening. General Norstad did not believe that MC 14/2 offered the best answer to a 
military challenge. He could not change NATO strategy, but it was possible to steer the 
military posture of the alliance toward a modified form of nuclear deterrence. Norstad 
thought that the ability to wage limited war in Europe, at least for a short period of time, 
was an important element of graduated deterrence for the next decade. He referred to it as 
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the need to force a pause in the continuity of military action, thus giving the enemy time 
to consider the consequences of continued aggression. Toward the end of General 
Norstad’s tenure, SHAPE explained:  
Our forces must be of such a size and composition, and so organized, trained, and 
equipped, that they can react promptly to and hold an attack short of general war, 
at least long enough to identify the nature and scope of the enemy effort and the 
intention behind it, and to establish clearly the fact that the Alliance will defend 
any part of NATO Europe subjected to aggression, using atomic weapons, if 
necessary. The resulting pause would make it possible for NATO to determine the 
degree of force and weaponry necessary to meet the situation. It would also 
permit the aggressor to make a conscious decision whether to continue the 
aggression and thus risk general war.131 
Norstad’s argument for graduated deterrence was shared by other senior NATO 
commanders. General Speidel specified that “it is the mission of the ‘shield forces’ to 
impose this pause on the enemy.”132 Norstad believed that the pause concept would be 
enhanced if conventional and nuclear capabilities were separated in lower level army 
units, thus reducing the need to employ tactical nuclear weapons.133 
All senior commanders of LANDCENT participated in a war game in Paris in 
November 1958.134 This was the first AFCENT war game of its kind. Its purpose was to 
harmonize military thinking among the commanding generals. The scenario was 
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daunting. Within two days, a full-scale conventional Soviet attack had achieved deep 
penetration at the boundary of NORTHAG and CENTAG. SACEUR had authorized the 
use of nuclear weapons almost immediately, mostly because it was politically impossible 
to appear hesitant in the matter. HOSTAGE BLEU proceeded under the assumption that 
NATO would use nuclear weapons first if necessary. In the specific scenario, 
intercontinental nuclear exchange rapidly followed upon the instigation of in-theater use 
of nuclear weapons. In order to ensure the orderly conduct of the war game, it was 
concluded that the effect of Soviet nuclear attacks on NATO rear areas was weakened 
significantly by NATO first strikes. War game planners had assumed that too much 
simulated chaos in the rear area would reduce the benefits of the exercise. The realism of 
the exercise may thus be cast in doubt, but it was undeniable that SACEUR employed 
nuclear weapons first, that he did so without much hesitation within hours of the outbreak 
of war, and that strategic nuclear war followed swiftly. 
 Turning to operational concerns, the LANDCENT commanders agreed that 
salients were attractive targets for nuclear strikes; thus, the formation of enemy salients 
should be encouraged under certain circumstances. The use of nuclear weapons allowed 
for a quicker start of the counter-offensive than would be the case on an entirely 
conventional battlefield. Weaker forces could attack after nuclear preparation. Speed was 
of the essence, since radioactive fallout would slow attacking units if they were not 
mounted in armored vehicles and could not cross the contaminated area quickly. There 
was less agreement on the deployment of the two army groups. The boundary was 
troublesome and it was unclear whether LANDCENT could indeed coordinate 
converging attacks on enemy forces that had penetrated the area. While both army group 
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commanders felt that General Speidel could do so, several of the lower-tier commanders 
thought that one of the army groups should direct the campaign. Potential problems with 
the command arrangement would be magnified if either army group had been given 
atomic weapons of relatively high yield. The problem was not solved during the war 
game and discussions in Paris.135 
Corps commanders were concerned that counter attacks would depend on rapid 
deployment of forces over a wide area and almost immediate offensive actions without 
spending much time in assembly areas. Simultaneously, targets in the infantry combat 
zone needed to be struck with atomic weapons and atomic strikes should also neutralize 
the enemy artillery. Once atomic fire had been applied, any resurgence of enemy forces 
was to be suppressed by continuous conventional artillery fire. The priority of targets was 
unclear. One corps commander suggested that the physical damage created by atomic 
strikes on the infantry combat zone would be so great as to slow the momentum of the 
counterattack. Therefore, it would be better to target the enemy’s local reserve areas and 
use conventional artillery at the point of break-in. Another corps commander, however, 
considered the advantage of using atomic weapons at the break-in point as so great that 
even the risk of casualties among his own forward troops was acceptable.136 
To introduce additional land forces into the battle, helicopters were deemed better 
than parachuting, since parachuting operations required more time and extremely good 
communications. On the other hand, helicopters were vulnerable and atomic bursts might 
neutralize landing zones. The corps commanders agreed that the offensive in atomic 
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warfare required command of the air space in order to deny the enemy from making a full 
reconnaissance. By the same token friendly intelligence about enemy formations, 
particularly pertaining to the reserve, were vital. One could then work out detailed atomic 
fire plans and advance behind the barrage. Friendly troops, of course, had to remain 
dispersed as much as possible and therefore communications and mobility remained 
critical. In the unfolding scenario, General Speidel ordered Central Army Group to 
advance to Leipzig after seven days of fighting, while Northern Army Group had yet to 
reach the Weser River. Admittedly, this war game was not intended to test specific 
operational plans, but the timing of the counteroffensive is curious. The most optimistic 
American plans foresaw months on the defensive, yet here NATO forces were invading 
East German territory in the second week of the war.137 
One and a half years later, forward defense remained but in doubt. In April 1960 
the Military Committee submitted an evaluation of progress toward the attainment of the 
MC 70 force goals. The conclusions were unsatisfactory. Overall, the commitments of 
the NATO partners were not commensurate with actual capabilities. The situation in 
Central Region was particularly problematic because there was a significant shortage of 
atomic delivery means, resulting in inadequate short- and medium-range ground atomic 
fire support. The shortfall in atomic weapons made it difficult to compensate for 
minimum force levels. Manning levels of active divisions stood at eighty-five percent of 
wartime requirements. Ammunition reserves and back-up missiles for atomic delivery 
units were also well below expectations. Under such circumstances, sustained combat 
would be difficult if not impossible. The Military Committee concluded that “the ground 
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forces in the Central Region have deficiencies which are substantial and critical.” The 
outlook for 1963 revealed that critical shortcomings would remain in the areas of 
modernization of strike forces, timely provision of ground atomic delivery means, 
manning of the shield forces, and modernization of the air defense system.138 
The NATO Council of Ministers also expressed concern about the effects of 
nuclear parity on deterrence. At its December 1959 meeting, the Council initiated a 
thorough review of the tasks of the alliance in the coming decade. For the United States, 
the State Department asked Robert Bowie to draft a report, which was completed in the 
summer of 1960. Bowie emphasized that the strategic deterrent remained credible for 
general war. He agreed with General Norstad that thirty combat divisions in Central 
Europe would offer a credible regional deterrent. This force, however, needed to be tied 
to a European nuclear deterrent such as the multilateral force (MLF), then under 
consideration. Bowie implied that President Eisenhower agreed with the greater 
flexibility for NATO that was entailed in the report. Later he would argue that it was the 
failure to realize the MLF proposal that forced NATO to maintain its strong reliance on 
strategic deterrence well into the 1960s.139 
General Norstad agreed with the thesis of the Bowie Report that NATO had to 
enhance the non-nuclear capabilities of the shield forces in order to assure deterrence in 
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the future.140 But he also indicated that a set of principles had to be established for 
adequate non-nuclear defense. First, SACEUR should command sufficient ground forces 
to “defend successfully against the readily available Communist Bloc forces arrayed 
against ACE, without recourse to nuclear weapons.” Second, “the measure of success in 
this defense would be the prevention of significant loss of ACE territory.” Third, tactical 
nuclear weapons had to be provided in sufficient numbers to ensure strong defense 
against the Soviets even if they brought reinforcements into the battle or resorted to the 
use of tactical nuclear weapons. This is intriguing because Norstad admitted that NATO 
would use nuclear weapons preemptively but he also implied that there might be a pause 
between conventional and tactical nuclear war as well as between tactical and strategic 
nuclear war. Discussion of the fourth principle remains classified in part, but it can be 
surmised on the basis of the available record that Norstad wanted a force structure that 
included a clear distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons. He stated that 
this could be achieved by providing no nuclear weapons to any echelon below the 
division.141 
140Even the Secretary of Defense, Thomas Gates, admitted that he thought the 
Bowie Report constituted the first “reasonable approach...to the problem of reduced 
confidence in the concept of massive retaliation.” Memorandum of Conversation, 16 
September 1960, Meeting between Secretary of Defense, United States, and General 
Norstad. Norstad Papers, Policy File Series, Box 91, “US Support of NATO 1958-60 
(2),” DDEL. 
 141SACEUR’s Comments on the Bowie Report, n.d. DDE lib, Norstad Papers, 
Subject Series, Box 98, “Bowie Report (2).” The quotations are on page 2. This 
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In December, Norstad reiterated that there could indeed be a firebreak between 
limited use of tactical nuclear weapons and general nuclear war.142 He explained the basic 
tenets of his position to the Defense Department: 
The NATO forces must be organized and equipped to insure a high level of 
conventional response and should operate under policies which will guarantee that 
atomic weapons will be introduced into the battle only after a particular decision 
taken by an authority at a higher level than that of the basic combat unit. These 
forces must have a balanced capability, nuclear and non-nuclear, which will 
provide a flexibility of response, ranging from the capability (1) to meet any overt 
Soviet Bloc military action with sufficient strength and determination to force the 
Soviets either to withdraw or continue the military action with the full knowledge 
that such continuation will constitute general war and that NATO will retaliate 
with all weapons and forces, to the capability (2) to destroy, in conjunction with 
external retaliatory forces, the will and ability of the Soviet Bloc to wage general 
nuclear war.143 
Thus the Bowie Report and Lauris Norstad’s pause concept both stand as examples for 
attempts to strengthen regional nuclear and conventional elements of deterrence under a 
modified concept of massive retaliation, although Norstad suggested stronger 
modifications than Bowie. 
 Maxwell Taylor realized in his retirement that Massive Retaliation had evolved 
“from its early purity to a hybrid which...bore some resemblance to the strategy of 
Flexible Response soon to be adopted by the Kennedy Administration.”144 The debate of 
appropriate strategy for the United States and NATO had indeed revealed that ground 
forces were to play an important role. Both Maxwell Taylor and Lauris Norstad advanced 
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concepts of proportional response to initial Soviet aggression. They disagreed on the 
possibility of limiting nuclear war, but even Norstad’s pause concept afforded the army 
strong arguments in the strategic and budgetary debates of the second term of the 
Eisenhower administration. At the end of the decade, it was the Air Force Chief of Staff 
who found himself isolated among the Joint Chiefs of Staff.145 But with the approach of 
greater strategic flexibility, the defects of the pentomic division took on additional 
significance and the army had to find ways to improve the operational capability of its 
forces deployed in Germany.
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Chapter 4: The Pentomic Army in Germany 
 
The assessment of the pentomic division in Seventh Army was ultimately 
negative. At first, there was optimism that use of atomic weapons by the division might 
compensate for the numerical inferiority of NATO ground forces in Central Europe. 
Hope turned into disappointment as army commanders discovered a number of practical 
difficulties. Communications were cumbersome and effective control by the division 
commander of five battle groups as well as division artillery and support units was 
difficult to achieve. As a result, steps were undertaken in the field to address the most 
glaring problems and the practical effect of the reorganization on operational deployment 
and tactical plans in the theater was negligible. The pentomic division failed to improve 
fighting capability, but it served its political purpose by halting the downward spiral in 
funding and manpower that had threatened the army’s future. In the meantime, the 
German army introduced combat divisions based on brigades and a flexible number of 
maneuver battalions. Just as army commanders were considering the replacement of the 
pentomic division, the new German division was accepted as the model NATO combat 
division. By 1961 the army was prepared to present a wholly new approach to the 
structure of the combat division to the Kennedy administration. 
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Seventh Army and the Defense of Western Europe before the Reform 
Prior to the outbreak of the Korean War, the army had not played a prominent role 
in U.S. war plans for the defense of Western Europe. Only two infantry divisions were to 
be deployed to the theater. Korea, however, prompted politicians and military leaders in 
Washington to improve the defenses of NATO territories. Within less than two years, the 
lone infantry division on occupation duty in Germany became part of a five-division 
force. U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) was created as a theater army headquarters and its 
operational arm, Seventh Army, was reinstated into the list of active field armies. This 
was the beginning of the largest permanent overseas deployment of American armed 
forces in peacetime.  
 Planning for a significant increase of U.S. ground forces in Western Europe was 
already advanced in military circles in the summer of 1950. In early September, the Joint 
Strategic Plans Committee stated that “our planning now envisages over-all U.S. forces in 
Europe on the order of four infantry and the equivalent of one and a half armored 
divisions...to be in place and combat ready as expeditiously as possible.”1 Moreover, the 
committee recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed how many additional 
combat divisions could be deployed at the outbreak of war in Europe. At this point, 
western forces in Korea were still confined to the Pusan Perimeter. By mid-October, U.S. 
representatives to NATO estimated that the current figure of eight army divisions and 
two division equivalents earmarked for the alliance would rise to fourteen divisions and 
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four division equivalents by July 1, 1952. These would be ten infantry, two armored, and 
two airborne divisions, as well as five infantry and airborne regimental combat teams and 
six reconnaissance regiments and armored combat commands.2
Seventh Army quickly grew into the most potent combat force in Allied 
Command Europe. By the end of 1953, army  forces deployed to Germany included V 
Corps with headquarters in Frankfurt and VII Corps with headquarters in Stuttgart. V 
Corps, guarding the approaches into Hesse, had two infantry and one armored division as 
well as 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment and 19th Armored Cavalry Group. VII Corps, 
guarding Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg, consisted of two infantry divisions and two 
armored cavalry regiments, but 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment was stationed in Fulda 
and thus would have likely been appropriated by a hard-pressed V Corps. Within one 
month of mobilization, seven infantry, two airborne, and one armored divisions were to 
arrive in the command. One of the infantry divisions would come from the Far East and 
the remainder from the United States.3 The order of battle that can be derived from the 
force deployment list allows for the conclusion that USAREUR expected to fight for 
Hesse and the Rhine, while the defense of large parts of Bavaria was to be left to the 
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French First Army. But the rapid reinforcement schedule raised questions. There was no 
indication that the U.S. military had the means to transport ten combat divisions to 
Western Europe in such a short period of time. The discrepancy between largely political 
force deployment planning and available air and sea lift was addressed in subsequent 
deployment plans. 
 One year later, both timing and force deployment had been adjusted. The two 
corps remained, of course, as did the five combat divisions, three under V Corps and two 
under VII Corps. V Corps had gained 373rd Armored Infantry Battalion and three heavy 
tank battalions. VII Corps now had two armored infantry battalions and 2nd Armored 
Cavalry Regiment had moved from Fulda to Nuremberg, in the VII Corps sector. Both 
corps had a generous helping of field artillery. V Corps had four field artillery groups and 
fourteen battalions and VII Corps commanded two field artillery groups and twelve 
battalions. The mass of U.S. Army forces remained in the north of the CENTAG sector. 
Seventh Army could expect to be reinforced by 2nd Infantry Division, 1st Armored 
Division, and 82nd Airborne Division within one month of mobilization. Two months 
later, four infantry, one armored, and one airborne division were to follow. This 
amounted to one fewer division than in 1953 and the timetable had been extended 
significantly.4 On the other hand, USAREUR had received its first atomic weapons in 
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December 1953, and by the end of 1954 it had five 280-mm atomic cannon battalions and 
was awaiting the arrival of the first Corporal battalion and four Honest John batteries.5
The JCS were unable to resolve major differences over strategy and operational 
planning. In March 1955, the Joint Chiefs earmarked seventeen divisions and one 
regimental combat team as well as four tank battalions for assignment to ACE within the 
first half year of a war. All but one of the Chiefs of Staff found this to be a realistic 
expectation. General Ridgway dissented.6 He stated that the army could send only 
thirteen combat-ready divisions to Europe in that period of time. He rejected the notion 
that National Guard and reserve divisions could attain combat readiness and be deployed 
within less than six months. In addition, one tank battalion should be dropped from the 
list as a consequence of army-internal reorganization. There was no compromise and the 
report was prepared to be forwarded to SACEUR with the split opinions of Ridgway and 
the other chiefs.7
In the spring of 1956, 2nd Armored Division replaced 4th Infantry Division in V 
Corps and in VII Corps 11th Airborne Division replaced an infantry division. The first 
echelon of reinforcements, to arrive in theater within one month of mobilization, still 
consisted of three divisions, but the airborne division that had previously been in this 
group had been replaced by an infantry division. 82nd Airborne Division was to arrive 
four months from mobilization. Within the following month 4th Armored and 25th 
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Infantry divisions were to arrive in Europe and another thirty days later five more 
infantry and one additional armored division could be expected. Still, the reinforcement 
schedule had again been pushed back, which raised the question whether the Joint Chiefs 
expected a long war.8 This deployment schedule cast further doubt on the cooperation 
between JCS and ACE, with USEUCOM and Seventh Army caught in the middle. 
Current USEUCOM planning, based on JCS guidance, called for the counteroffensive to 
begin four months into the war. But only nine of the earmarked seventeen U.S. Army 
combat divisions were to be available at that point. On the other hand, atomic capability 
had been increased by a sixth battalion of 280-mm atomic cannons and two additional 
Honest John batteries.9 The question was now how Seventh Army envisioned the 
operational use of these forces. 
 A series of command-post (CPX) and field-training exercises (FTX) in VII Corps 
in the mid-1950s offered a rare glimpse at operational implications of doctrine on the eve 
of the pentomic reorganization.10 CPX WOLF CALL was conducted in July 1955. 
Emphasis was placed on communications, liaison, and the planning and use of “special 
weapons.” All major tactical formations of VII Corps, except for 2nd Armored Cavalry 
Regiment, participated in the exercise, but it is well to bear in mind that the corps did not 
 
8J.C.S. 2073/1223, 30 January 1956, Report by the Joint Strategic Plans 
Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Order of Battle Report to SACEUR for U.S. 
Forces Assigned, Earmarked for Assignment, and Earmarked for Assignment on 
Mobilization (as of 31 December 1955). Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Geographic 
File 1954-56, CGS092 Western Europe (3-12-48) (2), Sec. 49, RG 218, NA.  
 9Karber, “Nuclear Weapons and the Army in Europe,” p. 13. 
 10By nature of the subject, this study is mainly concerned with the American and 
West German forces in CENTAG. For maneuvers and exercises in NORTHAG in this 
time period see Maloney, War Without Battles, pp. 85-93. 
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sit across the most worrisome terrain feature in the CENTAG sector, the Fulda Gap. The 
basic concept of the exercise was “an Army Group in defense of a wide front with the 
possibility of a withdrawal to a second defensive position.” The scenario stipulated that 
WOLF CALL would begin thirty days after the enemy had first attacked CENTAG.11 It 
would be unwise to make too much of a scenario for an exercise that essentially 
amounted to a war game, but it was nonetheless a curious feature that an entire month 
would pass before the corps became engaged.  
 The southern boundary of Seventh Army was set from Erlangen in Franconia to 
Rothenburg, Heilbronn, Durlach, and the Franco-German border at the Rhine River. 
French First Army was responsible for points south, including most of Bavaria, 
Württemberg south of Heilbronn, and the Black Forest region of Baden. The boundary 
between V and VII Corps ran along the Main River, traversed the hills of the Odenwald, 
and ended near Heppenheim in the Palatinate. CENTAG had specified two defense lines 
for VII Corps: GANDER from Gemunden to the Main River, south to Ochsenfurt and 
Lipprichhausen, and from there to Neustett and Rothenburg and TURKEY from the Main 
River on south to Miltenberg, Erlenbach, and Neuenstein.12 The corps was to practice 
defense of line GANDER and fighting withdrawal to line TURKEY. The defense of line 
GANDER would force the enemy to mass his forces. Consequently, “enemy penetration 
will be reduced by counterattacks, or by the use of atomic weapons followed immediately 
by counterattacks to destroy the STYGIAN forces and restore line GANDER.”13 The 
 
11Headquarters, VII Corps, 9 June 1955, CPX WOLF CALL, 19 - 22 July 1955,
pp. 1-6. U.S. Army Commands, VII Corps 1953-1966, Box 32, RG 338, NA. 
 12Ibid., Annex B (Boundaries) to Initial Instructions, CPX “WOLF CALL.” 
 13Ibid., Operation Order 1 - CPX “WOLF CALL.” 
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corps reserve was weak, consisting of a single armored cavalry regiment with two combat 
battalions and two more battalions as reinforcements.14 But the main force for the 
counterattack was 2nd Armored Division, which was held in reserve by Seventh Army.15 
WOLF CALL was followed by FTX CORDON BLEU in October, part of the 
annual CENTAG fall maneuver. Seventh Army was to execute the counteroffensive, 
whose objective was seizure of the entire area from the Fulda Gap through the 
Thüringerwald to the Hof Gap. Subsequently, Seventh Army was to continue the attack 
to the northeast. For training purposes this exercise was conducted along a north - south 
axis. It tested premises for the counteroffensive by pitting two American and two French 
divisions in deep operations against a simulated aggressor force. All new weapons 
systems in ACE were made available, including 280-mm atomic cannons, Honest John 
rockets, and Corporal missiles. Simulation of atomic strikes against tactical targets in 
West Germany was planned. Overall, “the NATO forces in central Europe will be given 
an opportunity to practice coordination, cooperation and liaison between inter-allied 
forces as well as to gain further experience in improving techniques and staff procedures 
in the employment of special weapons and utilization of airborne troops.”16 
VII Corps, reinforced by 7th French Mechanized Division and two armored 
infantry battalions, was charged with attacking across the Jagst River toward Rothenburg, 
 
14Ibid., Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 1 - CPX “WOLF 
CALL.” 
 15Ibid., Annex J (Counterattack Plans - Seventh Army Reserve) to Operation 
Order 1 CPX “WOLF CALL.” 
 16Headquarters, Central Army Group, 22 September 1955, Internal Press Release 
for CENTAG Use Only, FTX CORDON BLEU. U.S. Army Commands, VII Corps 
1953-1966, 354 Maneuver “CORDON BLEU” Oct. 1955, Box 30, RG 338, NA. 
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and preparing to cross the Main River between Ochsenfurt and Kitzingen, while linking 
up with 5th French Division and 16th British Independent Parachute Brigade.17 The city of 
Würzburg was to be re-captured and the attack would drive on to Karlstadt and 
Schweinfurt. Eventually, VII Corps would cross the intra-German border and drive 
toward Eisenach. Atomic weapons were to be used “where remunerative targets are 
available and to assist in maintaining the momentum of the attack.”18 
Intelligence reports estimated enemy forces to be at only sixty-five to seventy-
eight percent of personnel strength and equipment, leading to a morale rating of “fair.” 
VII Corps would have to conduct its drive into East Germany against XII Corps of Sixth 
Soviet Army, consisting of two tank divisions, one mechanized and one artillery division, 
and a rifle brigade. There was, of course, the risk that the enemy would deploy his 
strategic reserve: 1st Airborne Division in the vicinity of Berlin and two divisions in the 
Thüringerwald area. In addition, five divisions were reportedly in the vicinity of 
Eisenach, Erfurt, Ilmenau, and Bad Salzungen.19 At least NATO forces could assume that 
air superiority had been secured by the time they were to cross the border. This would 
make the movement of Soviet reserve divisions more difficult. V Corps was to operate to 
the north and east of VII Corps. But a new U.S. Army element also appeared in the plans 
of the exercise. U.S. XX Corps had the task of seizing Nuremberg and then drive to the 
 
17Headquarters, VII Corps, 12 October 1955, Operation Order 1 - FTX 
“CORDON BLEU.” Appendix 1 (Troop List) to Annex A (Task Organization) to 
Operations Order 1 FTX “CORDON BLEU.” U.S. Army Commands, VII Corps 1953-
1966, Box 32, RG 338, NA. 
 18Ibid.,Operation Order 1 - FTX “CORDON BLEU.”  
 19Ibid., Annex B (Intelligence) to Opn O 1 FTX “CORDON BLEU.” 
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northeast.20 For the purposes of this maneuver, play of XX Corps had to be simulated. 
The VII Corps orders give no definitive clues as to the composition of XX Corps, but it is 
likely that some of the reinforcements earmarked for Seventh Army were to be assembled 
in a separate corps in order to launch the counterattack on a wider front.  
 In its evaluation of the exercise, SHAPE stressed the high level of leadership and 
excellent state of equipment of U.S. Army forces, but also noted that the effectiveness of 
atomic firepower was crucial to the attacker. Here, the NATO command staff insisted 
that “the effectiveness of atomic weapons against troop concentrations is dependent in 
large measure upon timely processing and approval of requests.”21 In order to get 
permission to launch rockets with nuclear warheads or fire atomic artillery shells, the 
division commander would have to ask permission from SACEUR through the chain of 
command. But by the time permission to engage had been granted, a target of opportunity 
might well have been lost. It is difficult to imagine that the field artillery commander 
would withhold atomic weapons if his batteries were on the brink of destruction. There is 
no evidence that any arrangements for pre-delegation of authority to use atomic weapons 
had been made within ACE itself.22 
20Ibid.., Operation Order 1 - FTX “CORDON BLEU.” 
 21M.C. 43/3, 28 May 1956, Report by the Standing Group to the North Atlantic 
Military Committee on NATO Exercises, 1955. Enclosure A: SHAPE/70/56, 28 February 
1956, Report on NATO Exercises 1955, pp. 30-33. International Military Staff, NATO 
Archive. The quotation is on page 32. 
 22Theoretically, any use of nuclear weapons would have to be approved by 
President Eisenhower. Marc Trachtenberg claims that pre-delegation of nuclear weapons 
use from Eisenhower to SACEUR had indeed been arranged. But even if that was the 
case, it would still not explain how field army, corps, and division commanders could get 
the green light from Paris in time before the tactical situation had changed. Trachtenberg, 
A Constructed Peace, pp. 165-73.   
166
The operational concept for the counteroffensive was outlined in even greater 
detail in FTX WAR HAWK in the fall of 1956. Objective of Seventh Army was to seize 
the hill mass between Zwickau in East Germany, Cheb in Czechoslovakia, and Fürth and 
Zwiesel in northeastern Bavaria. VII Corps was to attack with main effort along the axis 
Weissenburg - Regensburg - Fürth - Pilsen. The maneuver forces were to be supported by 
atomic and conventional artillery, as well as air support, and additional nuclear weapons 
from field army. Orders for WAR HAWK called for “atomic and massed conventional 
artillery preparation followed by a coordinated attack to achieve a breakthrough between 
Ellwangen and Wasseralfingen.” The main effort of the VII Corps offensive was to come 
from 4th Armor Group, while 8th Infantry Division and 11th Airborne Division were 
supposed to attack to the right and left, respectively, of 4th Armor Group, in order to seize 
the shoulders of the penetration area. Once the three objectives had been achieved, 2nd 
Armored Division, deployed from CENTAG reserve, was to pass through 4th Armor 
Group and drive into the area between the intra-German border and the German-
Czechoslovakian border. 8th Infantry Division was to follow 2nd Armored Division and 
mop up bypassed enemy formations, while 11th Airborne Divisions was to protect the 
southern flank of the corps.23 
CPX LION NOIR in the spring of 1957 was the first major exercise that included 
Bundeswehr divisions and the last CENTAG exercise prior to the conversion of Seventh 
Army divisions into pentomic formations. It was a comprehensive exercise that mirrored 
the aggressive mind-set of General Bruce C. Clarke, the new commander of Seventh 
 
23Headquarters, VII Corps, 12 November 1956, FTX “WAR HAWK,” 5 - 12 Dec 
56, Annex M (Counter Offensive Plan) 1-56 - FTX “WAR HAWK.” U.S. Army 
Commands, VII Corps 1953-1966, Box 28, RG 338, NA. 
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Army. CENTAG was to keep 2nd Armored Division and 1st French Armored Division in 
reserve for employment against airborne attacks on critical terrain features, but also for 
later counterattacks on the axes Frankfurt - Leipzig and Stuttgart - Nuremberg. Seventh 
Army was to defend its sector, directing the main effort along the axis Frankfurt - 
Leipzig. Armored cavalry screening the border, supported by atomic demolition mines as 
well as atomic and conventional artillery fire, was to delay the enemy advance. 
Meanwhile, the bulk of Seventh Army was to conduct a coordinated mobile defense by 
establishing a strong-point system in depth at the Weser-Lech line, from south of Kassel 
along the Fulda River in a crescent to Schweinfurt, very close to the border. This would 
force the enemy to channel his advance into selected killing zones where enemy force 
concentrations could be destroyed by massed atomic and conventional fire as well as by 
counterattacks on the ground.24 
This initial defensive phase was to be followed, on order from CENTAG, by a 
coordinated delaying action from the Weser-Lech line to the Ems-Neckar position, which 
ran from north of Marburg through the Spessart to Frankfurt, and on south through the 
Odenwald to the Neckar River. Again, the combination of strong-point and mobile 
defense was to force the enemy into killing zones. All along, the northern flank of 
Seventh Army would be protected by II German Corps, which was to engage the enemy 
in delaying actions east of the Weser-Lech line, participate in the mobile defense of that 
position, and repeat the process of forward delaying actions and position defense during 
the withdrawal to the Ems-Neckar line. V Corps to the south and VII Corps even further 
 
24Headquarters, Seventh Army, 18 January 1957, Operation Plan 1-57, CPX 
“LION NOIR” and Appendix I (Barrier Trace) to Annex G (Barrier Plan) to Opn Plan 1-
57 CPX “LION NOIR.” U.S. Army Commands, Seventh Army 1954-65, 250/6 Perm 
Record Set - Ops Plan 1-57 - CPX “LION NOIR,” RG 338, NA. 
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south had been given similar tasks.25 V Corps, of course, had lost 2nd Armored Division 
to Army reserve, but VII Corps expected 3rd Portuguese Infantry Division to become 
available within fifteen days of mobilization.26 
The assessment of LION NOIR raised doubts that NATO forces in the defensive 
phase of the war would be as organized and cohesive as the CENTAG planners 
anticipated. Soviet ground forces attacked behind a cloud of nuclear explosions that 
destroyed West German cities all the way to the Rhine River. Eighth Guard Army broke 
through the disorganized defense at the Fulda Gap and reached Frankfurt, and the Rhine 
near Mainz and Wiesbaden, within days. At that point, CINCENT, already played by 
General Hans Speidel, who was about to take over the command, requested the use of 
tactical nuclear weapons. This request was granted by the president and SACEUR 
ordered the immediate employment of 100 warheads on Soviet spearheads.  
Simultaneously, the strategic nuclear counteroffensive had gotten under way, following 
the operational concept established in DROPSHOT. In West Germany, the employment 
of tactical nuclear weapons became the starting point of a counteroffensive of the 
remaining ground forces. Play of LION NOIR ended with the reestablishment of West 
German territorial integrity.27 
The objectives for the counteroffensive expressed in pre-exercise orders had been 
more ambitious. CENTAG ground forces, supported by 4th Allied Tactical Air Force, was 
 
25Ibid., Operation Plan 1-57, CPX “LION NOIR.” 
 26Ibid., Annex A (Task Organization) to Opn Plan 1-57 CPX “LION NOIR.” 
 27Frank Buchholz, Strategische und Militärpolitische Diskussionen in der 
Gründungsphase der Bundeswehr 1949-1960 (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1991), pp. 
244-45. 
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to seize the Eisenach area and link up with NORTHAG forces southeast of Kassel. Then, 
the Thüringerwald was to be captured and further operations to the east prepared. Seventh 
Army was to attack on the axis Wertheim - Bad Kissingen - Eisenach. The entire 
counteroffensive was to be “strongly supported by air and ground delivered atomic fire 
power.” The rapid seizing of the Eisenach Gap and linking up with NORTHAG forces 
were critical. Speed and shock was supposed to prevent the enemy from withdrawing to 
defensive positions further east, thus allowing for the physical destruction of his combat 
forces. VII Corps, now with 2nd Armored Division attached, and with orders to drive into 
East Germany to the south and east of Gotha, had first priority of reinforcement. At this 
stage, 11th Airborne Division, having traded assignments with 2nd Armored Division, 
provided the bulk of the army reserve.28 Further objectives for CENTAG were the 
crossing of the Saale River in the vicinity of Halle and Jena, and ultimately the crossing 
of the Oder River into Poland. 
 To sustain the offensive, “strongly supported by air and ground delivered atomic 
fire power,” two corps abreast were to “rapidly seize and secure principal crossings over 
the Saale River between Halle and Kahla to establish a lodgment area.” The objective 
was to envelop enemy forces in the Eisenach - Jena - Bayreuth triangle by linking up with 
elements of First French Army at Triptis. Once the bridgeheads northeast of the Saale had 
been established, the offensive was to drive on to the Elbe River. V Corps was to carry 
the brunt of the attack on the Mühlhausen - Halle axis, while VII Corps was to function 
as the northern pincer of the envelopment. This counteroffensive, intended to drive 
 
28Headquarters, Seventh Army, 18 March 1957, Operations Plan 2-57 CPX 
“LION NOIR.” and Annex A (Task Organization) to Opn Plan 2-57 CPX “LION NOIR.” 
U.S. Army Commands, Seventh Army 1954-65, 250/6 Perm Record Set - Ops Plan 2-57 - 
CPX LION NOIR, Box 57, RG 338, NA. 
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beyond the East German - Polish border, was to be aided by the arrival of fresh U.S. 
Army divisions. 20th and 21st Infantry Divisions were to become available and 10th 
Infantry Division could then be taken out of the front-lines and recover in army reserve. 
V Corps was to gain a regimental combat team from Luxembourg. VII Corps was to gain 
2nd Armored Division from army reserve.29 Overall, the plan for LION NOIR revealed a 
reliance on tactical nuclear weapons as compensation for numerical inferiority. There is 
very little operational detail about how such weapons were to have been employed 
without interfering with the counter-offensive. 
 These were the last European maneuvers of the old army divisions. They were 
pervaded by a spirit of optimism that was probably unwarranted. They also showed little 
understanding of exactly how nuclear weapons were to be integrated into a campaign, 
other than as an extension of heavy artillery. Moreover, beyond speed and dispersion, 
there were no new ideas on how to address the threat of Soviet nuclear weapons. This is 
not surprising given the lack of nuclear tactical doctrine in the army in general. That in 
itself, however, is difficult to explain because army commanders in the U.S. and Europe 
expected that tactical nuclear weapons would have to used early in a war against the 
Soviets. General Maxwell Taylor hoped that the shift to pentomic divisions would 
consolidate the army’s claim to be a major user of nuclear weapons - a position strongly 
attacked by the air force - which would as a matter of course lead to the development of 
proper doctrine for their use. This was indeed central to his conception of army 
transformation. 
 
29Headquarters, Seventh Army, 26 March 1957, Operation Plan 3-57, CPX 
“LION NOIR.” U.S. Army Commands, Seventh Army 1954-65, 250/6 Perm Record Set 
- Opn Plan 3-57 - CPX LION NOIR, Box 57, RG 338, NA. 
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Seventh Army, the Pentomic Division, and Operational Planning 
At the end of 1956, Seventh Army retained its command structure of two corps 
with five combat divisions, but the reinforcement schedule had been accelerated. There 
still were to be one armored and two infantry divisions arriving in Europe within thirty 
days of mobilization, but then 25th Infantry Division was to follow within the month. 4th 
Armored Division and 82nd Airborne Division were expected to be in theater within 120 
days and 3rd Infantry Division in the following month. Five National Guard divisions, 
four infantry and one armored, were to follow within six months of mobilization. This 
was, at least to some extent, an expression of good faith to the alliance partners. Army 
generals doubted that guard divisions would be ready and deployed in such a short span 
of time. This force deployment list was the first year-end statement that explicitly noted 
that the last earmarked echelon of reinforcements came from the National Guard.30 
Questions about transportation capacities raised by the Army Staff remained unanswered. 
The timing of the reinforcement schedule was based on availability and expected combat 
readiness of the divisions, rather than a thorough assessment of logistics, supply, and 
transportation. Army, navy, and air force maintained separate planning staffs for overseas 
deployment. Maxwell Taylor recalled that lack of coordination posed a serious problem 
for the army. Strategic mobility was perceived as a given by the political leadership in the 
 
30J.C.S. 2073/1346, 11 January 1957, Report by the Joint Strategic Plans 
Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Order of Battle Report to SACEUR of U.S. 
Forces Assigned, Earmarked for Assignment, and Earmarked for Assignment on 
Mobilization (as of 31 December 1956). Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Geographic 
File 1957, CCS092 Western Europe (3-12-48) (2), Sec. 71, RG 218, NA. 
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Pentagon, but the army doubted that all requirements of transportation could be fulfilled 
in a crisis.31 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff expected that the reorganization of army divisions, 
despite the resulting reduction of manpower in combat divisions, would not lead to a 
significant change in U.S. Army personnel in Germany. This was partly due to the greater 
need for technical support brought about by the more widespread deployment of atomic 
weapons systems. The atomic armament of USAREUR had grown to six Corporal 
battalions, one Honest John battalion as well as five batteries that were directly assigned 
to the combat divisions, and six 280-mm atomic cannon battalions.32 The personnel that 
was cut from combat divisions was to be redeployed in combat support elements at the 
corps level. At the end of November 1956, there were 202,580 officers and men in army 
units in Germany. The personnel ceiling for USAREUR after the pentomic 
reorganization, which was to be concluded in the spring of 1958, was set at 230,000 
officers and men, of which 202,200 were to be deployed in Germany.33 
In 1957, Seventh Army proposed a re-stationing of its units, hoping to vacate the 
region south of the Danube, which was to be defended by French and German forces. The 
proposed forward sector to be covered by Seventh Army would thus be reduced by 100 
miles. In addition, flank security and the combat-readiness posture of U.S. ground forces 
in Germany would be improved in the process. Four of five U.S. Army divisions were to 
 
31Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, pp. 143-44, 151-52, 168. 
 32Karber, “Nuclear Weapons and the Army in Europe,” p. 18. 
 33J.C.S. 2124/183, 26 February 1957, Decision on J.C.S. 2124/183, A 
Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army on U.S. Forces in Germany. Records of 
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be moved. The main problem was the cost of such an operation. The German government 
would have to pay for the necessary new installations north of the Danube and could 
expect only old installations south of the river in return. General Taylor approved of the 
plan in principle, but he preferred a simpler version involving the movement of fewer 
American divisions. General Speidel at LANDCENT was also in agreement, but could 
not say whether the Adenauer administration would approve of the plan. Moreover, 
approval was needed from the governments of the United States and France as well as 
from SACEUR.34 The re-stationing plan was tied to a proposal by General Valluy, 
Speidel’s predecessor at LANDCENT, to create a Franco-German army of eight divisions 
south of the Danube and another Franco-German army in the Koblenz-Trier region.35 
The proposal to re-station Seventh Army units north of the Danube stemmed from 
the threat of atomic warfare that called for a more effective readiness posture of all 
combat and support elements. Full combat readiness was seen as closely related to the 
development of fully operational atomic capabilities. Operation Seventh Heaven, which 
accomplished some elements of the re-stationing proposal, began in 1957 but was only 
completed in the early 1960s when responsibility for the defense of large parts of Bavaria 
was given to II German Corps. First French Army, which was stationed in the southern 
 
34Memorandum for Captain Blouin, Joint Staff, from Colonel Twitchell, Deputy 
for NATO Affairs, European Region, I.S.A., 20 June 1957, Seventh Army Re-Stationing 
Plan and Acquisition of NIKE Sites. Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman’s 
File, Admiral Radford 1953-1957, Box 9, 091 Germany, RG 218, NA. 
 35Memorandum for Record, 24 January 1957, Gen. Valluy’s Proposals Bearing 
on Re-Stationing and New Operational Plans. Records of U.S. Army Europe, Assistant 
Chief of Staff, G-3 Operations, Plans and Policy Branch, Policy Section Organizational 
Files 1954-58, Box 158, “Organization Planning Files 1957” RG 549, NA. While 
CINCUSARAUR General Hodes liked the proposed Franco-German army south of the 
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parts of Baden-Württemberg presumably would have moved forward to battle stations in 
Bavaria upon alert. While many elements of the original plan were achieved through 
routine stationing actions, the operation could not be completed in the 1950s because 
USAREUR headquarters and the German Ministry of Defense could not agree on proper 
financing. Nevertheless, Seventh Heaven contributed to the redeployment of American 
troops further forward and to the north, as well as to the realignment of supplies and 
equipment that brought fast moving items closer to the projected front line.36 
Maxwell Taylor urged deployment of combat units east of the Rhine. In October, 
General Clarke explained to Andrew O’Meara, commanding general of 4th Armored 
Division, a unit soon to be deployed to Germany, why the originally intended area of 
deployment near Baumholder at the Saar River was no longer considered to be 
appropriate. Instead, the division was to take over an area in northern Württemberg that 
was to be vacated by 8th Infantry Division, which in turn would take over the area of 2nd 
Armored Division, a unit that was to return to the United States. Clarke explained that 
“this is a part of a plan that has been cooking for several months and is in furtherance of 
General Taylor’s expressed desire to get two Armored Divisions east of the Rhine River.” 
This move, involving three divisions on two continents, depending on well-timed air and 
sea lift, would be complicated.37 Approval of the plan had come only less than three 
 
36Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, Annual Historical 
Report, 1 July 1957 - 30 June 1958, p.1.
37General Clarke to General O’Meara, 4 October 1957. Records of U.S. Army 
Commands, Seventh Army 1954-65, Box 51, 250/16 Organization Planning Files, RG 
338, NA. 
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months before the scheduled movement of 4th Armored Division.38 It stands as an 
indication for the greater urgency of the Army Staff to move U.S. combat divisions closer 
to the intra-German border. It illustrated the desire to shift the main line of resistance 
from the Rhine River into West Germany. Both armored divisions were now stationed 
well to the east of the Rhine. Only two of the fifteen infantry and airborne battle groups 
remained west of the river, while three were stationed at its banks. 
 The forward-defense concept found further expression in CENTAG’s Emergency 
Defense Plan of July 1958. This came in response to a new AFCENT operational 
directive that envisioned a more forward deployment, made feasible by increased 
effectiveness of German land forced assigned to CENTAG as well as by the considerable 
increase of atomic weapons that was scheduled to become available after July 1. In the 
course of 1958, Seventh Army added one Redstone and three Honest John battalions to 
its armaments. In addition, there were nine 203-mm howitzer battalions and five 
composite battalions armed with Honest John rocket launchers and 8-inch howitzers.39 
The new EDP served as guidance for all American, French, and German forces assigned 
to the command. For First French Army in southern Germany it meant a much greater 
area of responsibility as the initial defensive positions were moved forward and the focus 
of American ground forces shifted to the north and east.40 
38Minutes, 8 October 1957, Seventh Army Commanders Conference. Record of 
US Army Commands, Seventh Army 1954-65, Box 57, 250/16 Organization Planning 
Files (Plans), RG 338, NA. 
 39Karber, “Nuclear Weapons and the Army in Europe,” p. 28. 
 40Headquarters USAREUR, Annual Report, 1957-58, pp. 115-19. 
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CENTAG EDP 2-58 provided for forward defense along four separate lines, all of 
them to the east of the Rhine River. This eastward movement of the defensive positions 
was embraced by General Speidel.41 Upon taking command of LANDCENT in April 
1957, he had proclaimed forward defense to be a critical objective. NATO had to be 
steered away from viewing West Germany merely as the battlefield in a forward defense 
of France and the BENELUX countries.42 The new lines of resistance began in Fritzlar at 
the boundary with NORTHAG and ran to the Vogelsberg, just west of Fulda. There they 
branched off. Line ETHNOLOGIST continued southeast, passing to the east of Bad 
Kissingen, Schweinfurt, Bamberg, and Nuremberg, before turning south and east to 
Landshut. From there it veered south to the Inn River and the Austrian border. Line 
RUMOR was further to the west, running from the town of Schluechtern to Augsburg, 
passing to the east of Würzburg. It followed the Lech River to the Austrian border. Line 
OINTMENT, projected as the position that was to be defended forty-eight hours after the 
invasion, ran due south from Schluechtern to Ulm. South of Ulm, the French would be 
responsible for the defense of Württemberg and southwestern Bavaria. The battle plans 
were built around the objective of delaying, neutralizing, and destroying enemy forces 
along their main axes of penetration in order to create the conditions necessary for the 
NATO counteroffensive.43 
41Speidel recalls his tenure as commanding general of LANDCENT in Aus 
Unserer Zeit, pp. 359-402. 
 42Ibid., p. 361.
43Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, Annual History, United States Army, 
Europe, 1 July 1958-30 June 1959, pp. 48-51.
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The army forces charged with these tasks were largely similar to those of 1956. 
At the end of 1957, V Corps commanded one infantry and two armored divisions and VII 
Corps had one infantry and an airborne division. The reinforcement schedule had been 
slightly altered, effecting the later echelons and insuring that a tenth combat division 
would be in theater within four months of mobilization. The first echelon of 
reinforcements, two infantry divisions and the Screaming Eagles of the 101st Airborne, 
was slated to arrive within thirty days, the 82nd Airborne Division after three months, 2nd 
Armored Division one month later, 3rd Infantry Division after 150 days, and, finally, five 
infantry divisions and one armored division of the National Guard after six months. Thus 
there were still seventeen divisions earmarked for deployment to Central Europe, but 
more than one third were National Guard divisions.44 
Active divisions deployed to Europe had gone through the process of 
reorganization into the pentomic format in the course of 1957. 10th Infantry Division and 
2nd Armored Division became pentomic organizations by July 1. 8th Infantry Division 
followed on August 1 and 3rd Armored Division completed what little reorganization it 
needed by the end of September. Shortly thereafter, in December and January, 2nd 
Armored was replaced by 4th Armored Division, and in the spring of 1958, 3rd Infantry 
replaced 10th Infantry Division.45 The incoming units had previously been reconstituted 
as pentomic divisions in the United States. Under the new organization the infantry 
 
44J.C.S. 2073/1502, 8 January 1958, Report by the Joint Strategic Plans 
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divisions in Germany lost one 155-mm and two 105-mm howitzer battalions. They 
gained a nuclear-capable composite artillery battalion, consisting of one 8-inch howitzer 
battery, one Honest John rocket battery, and two 155-mm howitzer batteries. Infantry 
divisions also lost their regimental tank companies, but gained an armored cavalry 
battalion that replaced the former reconnaissance company. Each infantry division lost 
3,400 men, but the front-line infantry elements were reduced by only 450 men.46 General 
Taylor, and the proponents of the pentomic division and tactical-nuclear warfare, 
assumed that atomic weapons would give the division overwhelming firepower. Army 
requirement studies of the time called for the employment of 151,000 tactical nuclear 
weapons in the defense of Western Europe.47 
With the conversion of all major combat units of Seventh Army to pentomic 
organizations came the need to adjust training practices. On paper, Seventh Army was 
now a streamlined, highly mobile force that would soon possess even greater atomic 
capability. It became necessary to translate the theoretical mobility and dispersion 
capability into actual coordination of all arms and all battle groups of a division. A point 
of emphasis was the defense against tactical air forces. USAREUR had recognized that 
the close integration of Soviet ground and air forces in East Germany, coupled with a 
shortage of effective anti-aircraft artillery east of the Rhine, gave the Soviets air 
superiority at the outset of war. Hence U.S. Army forces had to be prepared to take 
defensive and evasive actions. This led to an emphasis on evasion, camouflage, and 
massed small arms fire. At any point in training tests and exercises, enemy air superiority 
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was stressed and included in the tactical scenarios.48 NATO exercises, such as 
COUNTER PUNCH, a SHAPE joint atomic exercise in September 1957, underscored the 
shortcomings of allied air defenses as well as the expected slow reaction of NATO air 
forces that would allow the Soviets to sustain the initial advantage. Largely, this was due 
to the projected destruction of airfields and difficulties in their repair.49 
Other exercises showed that tactical conceptions had to be reconsidered 
fundamentally. LION BLEU, an AFCENT command post exercise in March 1958 that 
involved all major headquarters in Central Region to the level of divisions, emphasized 
SACEUR’s atomic procedures and the adjustment of tactical thinking to the atomic 
battlefield. Critical communications and logistics capabilities were tested. The atomic 
scenario revealed significant differences between major commands, such as CENTAG 
and Seventh Army, whose atomic plans needed to be better coordinated. More 
problematic was the philosophical difference in target selection of air and ground 
commanders. Air Force generals recommended to implement preconceived strike plans, 
targeting fixed structures such as bridges, the destruction of which would slow down the 
enemy. Ground commanders preferred to expend the atomic arsenal mainly on enemy 
force concentrations and feared that the preconceived target lists would lead to a rapid 
depletion of the arsenal. Commanders of ground forces also were hesitant to destroy fixed 
installations because operational plans for the counteroffensive assumed that many of 
these features remained intact.50 
48Headquarters, USAREUR, Annual Report, 1957-58, pp. 155-56. 
 49Ibid., p. 166.
50Ibid., pp. 168-69. 
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LION BLEU revealed that traditional notions of established lines, protected 
flanks, and attack en masse “were best forgotten.” Atomic battlefield tactics would have 
to be adjusted to a combat area of great depth and fluidity. Certainly, the density of forces 
had to be reduced. This was indeed a major feature of the pentomic battle-group concept. 
In general, LION BLEU underscored the need for mobility, dispersion, and ability to 
reassemble and strike quickly.51 As a result of both COUNTER PUNCH and LION 
BLEU, ground-force commanders concluded that atomic weapons were best used against 
enemy reserve formations. For the purpose of target acquisition and rapid processing of 
requests to employ atomic weapons on specific targets, a special targeting section was 
created within the CENTAG operations center of G-2 (Intelligence) and G-3 
(Operations). Seventh Army tested small-unit tactics under simulated atomic conditions 
in the biggest maneuver to date, field training exercise SABRE HAWK from February 10 
to 20, 1958. Both corps were involved, V Corps as defender and VII Corps as aggressor, 
and 125,000 troops participated in the exercise. To assure the same training benefits to all 
troops, both sides assumed offensive and defensive, including delay and withdrawal 
operations. Neither side scored a maneuver victory.52 
At the beginning of 1959, V Corps in the northern sector of Seventh Army had 3rd 
Infantry, and 3rd and 4th Armored divisions, one armored cavalry regiment, and three 
independent tank battalions. VII Corps had 8th and 24th Infantry divisions and two 
armored cavalry regiments. All three U.S. Army divisions of SACEUR’s strategic reserve 





upon to react to other crises if necessary. Currently these were 4th Infantry and 101st and 
82nd Airborne divisions. They were to arrive in Germany within thirty days of 
mobilization. Additionally, Seventh Army could expect 1st Infantry Division to arrive 
four months after mobilization. Thirty days later, it was supposed to receive an armored 
division and three infantry divisions, two of which would be from the National Guard. 
After six months, four more National Guard divisions would arrive, three of them 
infantry and one armored.53 The force deployment plans were left nearly unchanged in 
the course of the year, but the two corps in Germany traded divisions. V Corps lost 4th 
Armored Division to VII Corps but gained 8th Infantry Division in its stead.54 In 1959, 
USAREUR added a second Redstone battalion, a fifth Honest John battalion, and five 
composite Honest John and 203-mm howitzer battalions.55 
The forces earmarked as reinforcements for SACEUR underscored the primary 
significance of the European theater in the event of war. In 1958, Strategic Army Corps 
(STRAC) had been created under CONARC in order to increase the strategic mobility of 
the army. Four divisions, the 82nd and 101st Airborne and the 1st and 4th Infantry were 
attached to the new corps. Ideally, STRAC forces would respond rapidly to crises and 
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conflicts around the globe. In actuality, however, all four divisions were part of the first 
and second echelon of reinforcements earmarked for SACEUR. Three quarters of the 
corps would be in Europe within the first month of a crisis or war. The army thus retained 
the possibility for deployment of STRAC divisions outside of Europe, but left no doubt 
that they were to be deployed to Europe immediately in case of mobilization of NATO 
forces.56 
American war plans for Central Europe envisioned a multi-phased course of 
operations. A study for field army logistics, released in May 1959, was based on the 
assumption that Seventh Army would conduct a delay-withdrawal action of twenty to 
thirty days.57 Given the shortness of the east-west axis in Western Europe such a 
withdrawal would have to be slow. At the waist of West Germany, the distance from the 
intra-German border to the Rhine was only little more than 100 miles, and the total 
distance between the English Channel and the Rhine was approximately 250 miles. The 
delay-and-withdrawal phase would be followed by a period of defensive action along a 
front that might not be stabilized. This meant local attacks and counterattacks to wear 
down the enemy forces. This indicated that mobile, active defense was now included in 
operational planning. The defensive phase was estimated at three months at the 
minimum, but it might last ten to eighteen months. Eventually, the war was to be won in 
a period of offensive action characterized by rapid movement over long distances. The 
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duration of this third phase could not be anticipated. But in any case, both sides would 
probably use atomic weapons throughout. This was indeed consistent with the large-scale 
exercises within USAREUR in the mid-1950s. It is nevertheless puzzling, as none of the 
publicized defense plans of ACE or the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered more than two 
phases, defense-delay and counteroffensive. Furthermore, the defensive alone could last 
one year. But over a year of atomic warfare, without stable front-lines, on German, and 
possibly other Western European territory, would not leave much inhabitable land and 
few civilians to inhabit it. 
 Unfortunately, the staying power of pentomic divisions for such extended 
operations was questionable. Most observers within the army doubted whether the 
fighting capability of the battle groups amounted to much in the first place, but they were 
certainly not capable of sustained operations in a protracted war. Seventh Army found the 
new divisions wanting in some of the most critical aspects of modern warfare: fire 
support, mobility, and communications. The insufficient number of armored personnel 
carriers and trucks was particularly problematic.58 Communication systems were 
insufficient for the complex coordination of five battle groups. Most seriously for an 
army that relied upon the application of heavy firepower, the commanding general of 
Seventh Army artillery concluded that the pentomic infantry division had insufficient 
conventional and atomic firepower. He believed that the 4.2-inch mortar battery could not 
provide adequate direct fire support for the battle group. He concluded that the 
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reorganization had taken away the strength of American artillery: centralized command, 
flexibility, and massing capability.59 
Logistics were not mobile enough to maintain a network of small general supply 
points in the forward areas, of which at least two were necessary for a corps of three 
divisions. Each general supply point carried enough stocks for three days, but obviously 
such a delicate timed-delivery resupply system was very dangerous. Yet the only 
alternatives were to amass larger forward supply depots that could easily be destroyed by 
enemy nuclear fire or to have no forward depots and rely entirely on same-day delivery 
of supplies. Other aspects of logistics, such as maintenance, suffered from the same 
problems of mobility and exposure due to the need for forward deployment. A more 
immediate problem, manpower, was raised by General Williston Palmer in a discussion 
with General Norstad: “Logistical support forces have already been cut below the safety 
point. If we were involved in a shooting war, it is doubtful that our combat forces could 
be supported by the current logistical support forces.”60 
USAREUR planners concluded that significant changes to the current system of 
field army logistics were needed. Every support unit that was at least 100 miles forward 
of the army rear area had to be fully mobile.61 If that could be achieved, the forward 
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general-supply-point concept might be feasible. It remained doubtful, however, whether 
such delicate operations, depending on timing and communications, could have been 
sustained in a protracted atomic war. No one knew how atomic weapons changed the role 
of support units and the environment in which they would have to operate. A related 
question was how supplies were to reach the rear area distribution centers once the thirty 
or sixty day stocks that were in the theater had been expended. Naturally, maritime 
communications across the Atlantic Ocean were stressed as critical to the defense of 
Western Europe, but it was unclear to what extent ports would be functional after nuclear 
attacks. Pentagon reports of beaching operations for logistics purposes abounded, but left 
vague how such operations would work and how a line of communication from beach to 
rear area centers was to be established and maintained. 
 SACEUR doubted that Seventh Army had the logistical means to conduct 
sustained combat operations. In his Combat Effectiveness Report of 1958, General 
Norstad criticized the insufficient number of trucks, ammunition handling units, and 
chemical, bacteriological, and radiological (CBR) defense capability. This exposed the 
anomalous position of NATO’s supreme also being USCINCEUR. In essence, SACEUR 
Norstad criticized his direct subordinate, USCINCEUR Norstad for being remiss in this 
area, since theater logistics fell within the realm of USEUCOM. This assessment must 
have reflected badly upon his own headquarters. Of course, this was merely thinly veiled 
criticism of the army brass, the Defense Department, and the civilian leadership in 
Washington for generally misplaced priorities. The army acknowledged the lack of 
trucks, but it was assumed that mobilization and subsequent deployment would provide 
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adequate means of transportation. Other deficiencies could be quickly addressed, in part 
through the reassignment of former combat troops to support roles.62 
Continental Army Command evaluated the pentomic division more positively. It 
was well suited for both conventional and atomic warfare. Consequently, the modified 
table of organization and equipment for infantry divisions in 1960 did not entail major 
changes. Overall manpower remained below 14,000 officers and men, although the 
personnel of division artillery was increased by nearly twenty-five percent.63 Armored 
and airborne divisions were left intact. In the field, however, the pentomic division still 
elicited little enthusiasm. General Harold K. Johnson, just prior to becoming Army Chief 
of Staff, voiced the opinion that this division “would have had a difficult time fighting its 
way out of a wet paper bag.”64 He particularly mentioned problems with 
communications, conventional fire support, and transportation. Other soldiers, like 
Anthony B. Herbert, a platoon leader of an infantry battle group in Germany in 1959, 
thought that the reorganization made no sense from an operational perspective and thus 
had to be a publicity ploy. Herbert argued that greater dispersion was of little help on an 
atomic or even nuclear battlefield, as blast radii and subsequent radiation would destroy 
all life in a wide area. Herbert also recognized a problem that had been largely ignored in 
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the planning stages, namely the gap between senior commanders and junior officers once 
the regimental and battalion command levels were combined at battle group. Quite 
possibly, this could have been made to work with an as yet to be invented 
communications system, but not with existing technology.65 Moreover, by combining the 
functions of regiments and battalions in the battle group it removed one command level 
and thus reduced the chances for promotion of junior grade officers.  
 Army internal studies of the 1960s concluded that the pentomic division lacked 
organizational flexibility and committed the U.S. Army to a particular kind of warfare in 
Central Europe with great reliance on atomic weapons. Tactical mobility was restricted 
by its cumbersome organization and the division commander was overtaxed with the 
control of five battle groups, the division artillery, the tank battalion, and the 
reconnaissance squadron. Finally, conventional firepower had been reduced to less than 
that of the division of World War II and Korea.66 Army officer and historian Robert 
Doughty concluded that “the resulting unpreparedness of the Army illustrates the dangers 
of a strategic concept dictating tactical doctrine without consideration of the technical and 
intellectual capability to follow the doctrine.”67 
Command structure under certain circumstances was also a concern. In peacetime, 
the NATO military structure did not become operational, and USAREUR’s mission 
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statement for 1959 foresaw the possibility that fighting might occur under the auspices of 
army command in Europe without direct involvement of NATO. Geographically limited 
crises would then have to be dealt with unilaterally.68 For such a contingency, 
USAREUR had three operational plans, one addressing the transition from peace to war 
and the other two outlining combat operations. OPLAN 302 delineated how USAREUR 
would deploy Seventh Army if SACEUR failed to take control. OPLAN 303 addressed 
the most dire situation, a rapid Soviet advance across the Rhine-Ijssel line that did not 
leave enough time for SHAPE to take command of NATO forces in Central Europe. In 
such a case, USAREUR forces would be ordered to retreat to prepared defensive 
positions in the Pyrenees.69 
U.S. forces in Europe were also called upon to prepare for political crises short of 
war. In 1958 and 1959, USAREUR developed an emergency plan that offered military 
countermeasures to a potential blocking of Western access to Berlin. 11th Armored 
Cavalry Regiment was instructed to prepare for actions to reopen access on the ground. 
Most likely, a battalion-size task force would escort a convoy through Soviet control 
points and proceed to the city, but in February 1959 more aggressive alternatives were 
revealed. New plans included the deployment of an armored combat command or even an 
entire armored division.70 The latter would have been a provocation that might have 
caused nuclear war. A Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 100-6-59, pursued 
the question how the Soviets and others would react if the U.S., Britain, and France 
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undertook military actions to resolve the Berlin crisis. This could range from “a 
substantial effort to reopen ground access to West Berlin by local action,” meaning the 
dispatch of a reinforced battalion with a reinforced division and tactical air support in 
ready reserve, to “preparations for general war.”71 Maxwell Taylor was appalled by the 
discussion of military options. The army did not yet possess sufficient capability to fight 
a limited-nuclear war. Hence, even a skirmish of patrols on the access routes to Berlin 
might result either in general nuclear war or a political surrender of the U.S. government 
to Soviet pressure tactics. Taylor thought that the Berlin crisis underscored the need to 
develop greater flexibility to respond to local emergencies.72 
USAREUR suffered from the consequences of the Lebanon operation in 1958 far 
more than it did from the Berlin crisis. Eisenhower’s decision to contain actively the 
spread of support for the policies of the Egyptian leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and his 
desire to maintain stability in the Middle East need not have affected troops in Europe 
very much, as STRAC had the means to deploy ample force to Lebanon or anywhere else 
in the region. But operations in the Near and Middle East fell under the auspices of 
USEUCOM and when the crisis in the Lebanon became acute, American forces 
intervened. The U.S. deployed one reinforced airborne battle group of the 24th Infantry 
Division, more than 2,200 men, thus degrading the division’s infantry strength by twenty 
percent. A second airborne battle group was put on twelve-hour alert but was ultimately 
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not deployed. USEUCOM and USAREUR also had plans for deployment of emergency-
response forces in North Africa.73 
By 1960, USAREUR was stretched thin. When the Defense Department indicated 
that five Hawk antiaircraft missile battalions would be attached to USAREUR, General 
Eddleman, the commander-in-chief, plainly told SACEUR that these could not be 
absorbed without negative effect to the combat capability of Seventh Army. General 
Norstad endorsed the position of the Army Staff that the battalions could be manned 
entirely by German personnel. Nuclear warheads, however, had to be guarded and 
maintained by American troops. Eddleman suggested that a rotation system of airborne 
brigades could alleviate the strain on USAREUR. He proposed to send the airborne 
brigade of the 8th Division to the United States and in return deploy two battle groups 
from the airborne corps, which could then form a new airborne brigade in Germany. This 
would guarantee that at least one airborne brigade was in the theater at any time. Two of 
the four separate armored infantry battalions in Seventh Army would be sent west of the 
Rhine to bolster 8th Division. General Norstad expressed his opposition to any action that 
would lead to a reduction of U.S. forces in Europe, particularly with respect to 
conventional forces that were already “pared to the bone.” Norstad hoped that an increase 
in conventional capability of Seventh Army could be achieved and the threshold of 
nuclear war adjusted accordingly.74 
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FTX WINTERSHIELD II, a large maneuver in Bavaria in February 1961 
demonstrated the difficulty of simulating tactical nuclear operations. It involved both 
corps headquarters and their artillery, 8th Infantry and 4th Armored divisions, one German 
Panzergrenadier division, a French mechanized brigade, 4th Armor Group, and two 
armored cavalry regiments. The exercise was carefully controlled and unrealistic in the 
nuclear simulation in the interest of training efficiency. To keep the exercise moving, all 
effects and nuclear casualties were erased after six hours. Tactically, the defenders were 
charged with establishing contact with the aggressor as far forward as possible, delay the 
advance, hold the enemy east of the defensive line at Grafenwöhr for at least forty-eight 
hours, defend the Grafenwöhr position, and eventually delay and prepare to defend a 
secondary line between Bamberg and Bayreuth. The weather conditions made aerial 
surveillance impossible. The difficult conditions imposed a heavy responsibility on 
ground surveillance assets. Useable intelligence and targets for atomic strikes were 
provided mainly by long-range patrols and agents behind enemy lines. Once the targets 
had been determined, corps artillery performed well. The most immediate problem 
arising from the exercise was the realization that there was neither doctrine nor stated 
policy for guidance on nuclear target designation and that too much time was lost in 
obtaining authority to fire. General Clarke concluded that winter maneuvers of this scale 
should not be repeated.75 
75ORO-S-1647, Staff Memorandum, 25 April 1961, Trip Report: NATO FTX 
WINTERSHIELD II by Edward W. Girard. Command and General Staff College, 
Combined Arms Research Library, Archive, –16454.900. See also Robert B. Asprey, 
“Wintershield 2: War in a Nuclear Climate,” in: Army, Vol. 11, No. 10 (May 1961), pp. 
40-46. 
192
Clarke had returned to Germany in October 1960 to take command of 
USAREUR. His command philosophy was based on constant realistic training. But this 
assumed reliable organizational structure, whereas the pentomic divisions were supposed 
to be tested and adjusted in the field. Clarke argued that exercises should be conducted to 
train men and, not to test unit structures. Within the year, however, he expressed 
considerable satisfaction about the strides made by his troops. Marksmanship and the 
ability of tank crews to engage rapidly an identified enemy target with the appropriate 
weapon received special mention. Field exercises of Seventh Army were now 
“realistic.”76 Clarke thus implicitly criticized the tendency of his predecessor, General 
Eddleman, to experiment with division and battle groups on such occasions. He 
overlooked, however, that his command would have been much less operationally 
capable had it not been for the alterations to the divisional structure made by Eddleman. 
By late 1961, Clarke was satisfied that USAREUR had achieved a very high state of 
combat readiness but he nevertheless warned that Germany could become “a second 
‘Bataan’ in case [Seventh Army] is hit without the essential tactical strength and mobility 
and without the essential logistical requirements for an adequate time and without 
logistical mobility and flexibility.”77 
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The Bundeswehr, LANDCENT, and the Brigade 
 The build-up of German forces was critical to the forward-defense posture of the 
alliance. In September 1955, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer publicly insisted that all 
twelve divisions would be ready in three years time, but various U.S. agencies that 
monitored German rearmament were highly skeptical. In a review of U.S. policy toward 
West Germany, the State Department noted in May 1956 that “disappointingly little 
progress is being made.” Sticking points were the deliberate parliamentary investigation 
into the assurance of civilian control of the military, the unwillingness of the Adenauer 
administration to raise the defense budget above nine billion Deutsche Mark, and the 
increasing support in political circles for shortened conscription of twelve rather than 
eighteen months.78 The debate of the Radford Plan did not help in the matter. As 
Bundeswehr Inspector-General Adolf Heusinger pointed out to the NATO Standing 
Group, it provided the political opposition in Germany with ample ammunition. 
Nevertheless, Heusinger believed that by the end of 1956 nearly 100,000 men would be 
under arms. The biggest military problem was the lack of qualified and experienced non-
commissioned officers. The Second World War had ended more than a decade before and 
many career soldiers who were not politically tainted had aged to the point of being 
ineffective.79 
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The gap between promised NATO commitments and Bundeswehr forces in 
existence only grew wider. On February 14, 1957, Admiral Radford expressed his 
concern about inconsistencies in statements by the new German Minister of Defense, 
Franz-Josef Strauss, who had been in office since mid-October.80 Strauss advocated a 
reduction of the West German manpower objective, while retaining the goal of twelve 
active army divisions. In December 1956, it had been conveyed to Radford that five 
German divisions were to be combat-ready by June 1957, two more by January 1958, and 
the rest at an undetermined date in the future. Under the original timetable, the 
Bundeswehr should have had 96,000 men under arms at the end of 1956, but by late fall 
there had been only 68,000 men in five divisions and two regimental combat teams. By 
the end of 1957 only 135,000 men were to be expected, even though the objective had 
been set at twice as many. Only three of the five promised divisions had indeed been 
committed to ACE.81 In the event, Strauss had already adjusted the force objective from 
500,000 to 350,000 officers and men, without informing West Germany’s NATO 
partners. He argued that the 500,000-man force objective was based on the creation of a 
European Defense Community (EDC), a plan that had failed in 1954. Strauss wanted to 
see what changes the ongoing NATO strategy review might bring. Radford deduced from 
Strauss’s public statements that the new force objective might be below 350,000. 
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The Germans followed the lead of the New Look and began to consider to what 
extent atomic weapons could compensate for smaller ground forces. Behind such 
contemplation was the fundamental question of whether a conventionally equipped force 
still had major utility. The trend of using smaller units as maneuver elements of the 
division, greater flexibility and mobility, dispersion, and integration of tactical atomic 
weapons was undeniable. On the other hand, Germany had agreed not to seek production 
capability for atomic weapons and it was unlikely that the European NATO partners 
would concede the point. Even more, complete nuclear sharing was ultimately a political 
liability, despite efforts of the Eisenhower administration to promote the idea.82 The West 
German public viewed nuclear weapons with a great degree of skepticism. There was 
little support for atomic weapons for the Bundeswehr. German land forces were designed 
for a defensive mission, supported by atomic weapons that would have to be obtained 
from the Americans in case of war. While the reduction by about 150,000 men in the 
active force diminished the staying power of the army, there was hope that twelve fully 
functional divisions could be fielded nevertheless at the beginning of the 1960s.83 
German army divisions were intended to be significantly smaller than the 
triangular U.S. Army divisions and smaller even than the combat divisions under the 
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pentomic concept. A German infantry division had 13,000 officers and men, an armored 
division only 12,000. By October 1957, the three existing infantry and two armored 
divisions had reached between sixty and seventy percent of their authorized full strength. 
Two regimental combat teams, one airborne and one mountain, formed the nucleus of the 
planned airborne and mountain divisions.  They stood at about half of their expected final 
strength of 8,000 men.84 
Bundeswehr land forces had been organized along the same principles as their 
American counterparts in the first half of the 1950s, with divisions consisting of three 
regiments or combat groups. By March 1959, however, a significant reorganization was 
underway that replaced regiments with brigades.85 Infantry divisions were re-designated 
as armored infantry divisions with one tank and two infantry brigades. Armored 
divisions, conversely, had two tank brigades and one infantry brigade. The German army 
intended to fight mounted as much as possible, relying on tanks, armored personnel 
carriers, and Schützenpanzer, or infantry fighting vehicles (IVF), an area in which the 
U.S. Army lagged far behind. In the course of the reorganization, the number of combat 
units was doubled by splitting existing tank and artillery battalions in half and then 
bringing them up to strength with conscripts and reservists. One third of each infantry 
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battalion was used to form a new unit so that a fourth battalion was created from every 
three existing infantry battalions. Battalions were reduced in size and their command 
structure was simplified to adjust to the projected nature of a nuclear battlefield. The tank 
battalion was reduced from seventy-seven to fifty-four medium-gun tanks in three 
companies. Armored infantry battalions retained thirty-nine infantry fighting vehicles. 
The tank battalion of an armored infantry division had an additional anti-tank capability 
of sixteen self-propelled rocket launchers. The bulk of artillery was controlled at the 
division level, but one artillery battalion was assigned to each brigade.86 
This reorganization was conducted in all German army divisions simultaneously 
because of the great urgency to create additional units. Observers in CENTAG feared that 
doing so weakened the German forces at a time when such weakness could be ill 
afforded, but there seemed no alternative short of expanding the defense budget 
dramatically.87 Unlike later U.S. Army models, the German brigades were largely self-
sufficient and would be grouped under existing divisions, which served as administrative 
units, on an ad-hoc basis rather than by permanent assignment. This meant that 
Bundeswehr divisions could interchangeably be armored, mechanized, or infantry.88 
On October 27, 1959 General Heusinger, now Chief of the German Armed Forces 
Staff, met with the NATO Standing Group to discuss Germany’s current military 
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problems. At the time, the Bundeswehr had 146,000 officers and men in eleven under 
strength divisions. Seven of the armored and mechanized divisions were at approximately 
seventy to eighty percent personnel strength while the other two were only at cadre 
strength, slightly above one-third of their allotment. Heusinger provided no details on 
either the mountain or the airborne division. He did say, however, that the twelfth 
division would be activated in 1962. The shortage of young officers and non-
commissioned officers had not been addressed. But Heusinger looked beyond immediate 
problems and pondered the future of deterrence, as nuclear parity was approaching. Much 
like Maxwell Taylor, Matthew Ridgway, or James Gavin, he concluded that the danger of 
limited war was growing. Heusinger suggested that it would be better for political leaders 
to have a degree of flexibility than to be faced with the alternative of nuclear war or 
surrender. The threat of limited war would have to be addressed by ground forces, but 
Heusinger thought it unlikely that the Soviets would be deterred by purely conventional 
combat formations. NATO ground forces needed atomic weapons.89 
In the course of the ensuing discussion, Heusinger expressed concern about the 
territorial defense of his country. NATO forces were insufficient for forward defense as 
far east as intended. This had forced a concept of the defense of fixed lines upon the 
Germans, a situation that would only change once all twelve divisions were at full 
strength and increased air power was made available. Presently, every division was 
responsible for a frontage of between forty and fifty kilometers, which constituted a 
dangerous overextension even for forces armed with atomic weapons. Heusinger argued 
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that the territory between the Main River and Kassel had to be defended rigidly while 
areas to the south of the Main and north of Kassel might afford more flexibility. Any 
hope for success depended upon the cohesion of the defensive forces and on the rapid 
onset of the counter-offensive. But he feared that the three German brigades deployed 
east of the Weser River could not hold. That problem was currently considered by 
SHAPE and LANDCENT. Additional problems existed in the likely separation of forces 
in Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein from Central Region and in the vulnerability of the 
lines of communication across the Rhine.90 
In the event, Heusinger had been generous in his accounting of active German 
army divisions. According to the 1960 NATO review, the Germans had only seven 
divisions assigned to ACE. Another four divisions and an independent brigade were in 
various stages of recruitment and training. By the end of the year the airborne division 
was expected to be committed to ACE and in the course of 1961, a fifth infantry division 
was to follow. But there were only two armored divisions, well short of the six requested 
in the MC 70 force goals. Eleven German army divisions were to be committed to ACE 
by the end of 1962, but seven of them would be infantry, rather than four, as had been 
intended. This was tempered to some extent by the conversion of infantry into 
mechanized infantry divisions and there was hope that a third armored division would be 
in an advanced state of training in 1963. The delay of committing forces to ACE was in 
part the result of a change of heart. Germany had intended to commit less-than-ready 
divisions, but now only combat-ready units were assigned to NATO commands. It was 
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also apparent that the Germans considered the brigade rather than the division to be the 
essential operational formation in the future.91 
By the turn of the decade, the German understanding of deterrence resembled in 
most respects that of Maxwell Taylor and Lauris Norstad. It was clear that NATO could 
not renounce the use of tactical nuclear weapons by its Shield forces in the defense of 
West Germany. But at the same time, the alliance need not pursue an all-or-nothing 
policy. Naturally, the Bundeswehr aspired to be equal in weaponry and equipment to 
allies and enemy alike. German generals argued that deterrence had distinct phases. They 
stated the need for balanced forces, conventional, tactical-nuclear, and strategic-nuclear. 
The conventional and tactica-nuclear forces were necessary to deter limited aggression or 
allow for the defense against limited incursion, but they were still regarded as 
supplementary to the strategic deterrent.92 
In the late 1950s, LANDCENT adopted the brigade structure as basis for a 
standardized NATO division for conventional and nuclear warfare. The driving force 
behind this project was SACEUR’s belief that all ground forces needed to have a high 
degree of operational compatibility. The LANDCENT division could be assigned up to 
four self-contained brigades and it could favor armor or infantry depending on the 
situation. This was quite different from the pentomic division of the U.S. Army. That in 
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itself is revealing as earlier European advocates of the NATO division had argued that the 
U.S. combat division should be the model for standardization since American planners 
had a fuller appreciation for the effects of nuclear weapons.93 General Speidel explained 
the concept to an American audience in September 1960: “This division is based on the 
brigade concept and divisional troops. In the infantry division two of the three brigades 
are capable of engaging in combat for a certain length of time independent of the 
division. The composition of our division can be changed to meet the developments of 
the situation.”94 General Valluy, now commanding all Allied forces in Central Region, 
believed that brigades allowed for an excellent admixture of infantry and armor. He 
expected that the brigade would over time take on the tasks of a current division, 
including intelligence and atomic fire, while the division would resemble a corps.95 
The NATO Standing Group concluded that the LANDCENT divisional concept 
was very well suited to combat in Europe, that it was compatible with the forces in being, 
and that it should be accepted as NATO’s standard division. This could be achieved if all 
NATO partners adopted the concept as guidance for future reorganization of their army 
divisions. The extent to which the standard division would be adopted was up to each 
member nation. The Standing Group cautioned that warfare was evolving and that the 
standard division needed to be reviewed periodically. As new weapons became available 
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and tactics were adjusted the structure of the division might have to be altered 
accordingly.96 By the end of the decade, France had stated her intention to reorganize 
army divisions along the lines of the LANDCENT proposal. Belgium intended to adopt 
the concept for her two active divisions, Portugal seemed willing to do the same for her 
active division, and Denmark had also embraced the idea.97 At this point, the U.S. Army 
was in the planning stages of the second major structural reorganization of combat 
divisions within five years.   
Designing the Army for Limited War? Bruce Clarke and Clyde Eddleman 
Bruce Clarke had fought valiantly in the Second World War, achieving lasting 
fame as the leader of an armored combat command that delayed the German Ardennes 
offensive at the village of St. Vith in the vicinity of Bastogne in December 1944. There, 
Combat Command B of 7th Armored Division had held a crucial road junction for six 
days despite being attacked by more than five German divisions. Clarke was later 
assigned to Seventh Army in Bavaria and missed most of the Korean War, receiving 
command of I U.S. Corps only in the spring of 1953, three months before the cease-fire 
agreement was signed.98 This did not allow him to get a full taste of corps command in 
wartime, but he nevertheless rose to command the army forces in the Pacific region. 
Clarke returned to Germany in 1956, chosen by the Secretary of the Army to straighten 
out Seventh Army, which appeared to lack strong direction. Clarke took charge, 
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reminded the troops that they were in Germany because the Soviets maintained a 
threatening presence within striking distance, overhauled training and alert measures, and 
took stern measures to weed out ineffective officers.99 
Clarke’s military philosophy was formed during the Second World War and 
codified in the lessons he drew from the defense of St. Vith. He believed that tanks lost 
their strength if they were strung out in support of several units. Therefore, it was his 
central conviction that tanks should always be massed. Clarke was an aggressive 
operator, but he had made his name in defensive operations. He concluded that 
concentrated rapid counterattacks threw off the enemy and altered his perception of the 
defensive forces. At St. Vith, the German commander, General Hasso von Manteuffel, 
had assumed that he was facing at least one corps rather than merely two battalions. On 
the offensive, it was crucial to keep moving, as enemy command and control functions 
would be more deeply disrupted with every mile that one advanced in his rear. This 
operational philosophy ran counter to current doctrine, which featured more deliberate 
offensive operations and a more static defense. But as his biographers put it, “Clarke was 
essentially an armored attack officer. And he believed armor should attack on a narrow 
front - fast and in depth, a spear....His defense was an unending series of swift 
counterattacks.” Between 1956 and 1958, Clarke was in a position to instill this 
philosophy into Seventh Army and remake army operations in his image.100 
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While the pentomic divisions made their way to Seventh Army, Clarke was 
worried about the armored cavalry regiments on border duty. The battalions had revealed 
their weaknesses in training exercises, such as SABRE KNOT and WAR HAWK in 
1956. Clarke was convinced that they had to be reorganized. At the same time, however, 
he argued that the regiment should be maintained, at least as administrative units. His 
suggestion was a structure of three self-contained battalions per regiment.101 Clarke also 
voiced reservations about the artillery support of the ROCID division. In April 1958 he 
reported that the results of the recently concluded field training exercise SABRE HAWK 
showed that the division artillery was not strong enough to provide adequate conventional 
or atomic firepower. Clarke criticized the lack of centralized command of the artillery at 
the division level. Consequently, the flexibility and concentrated fire of division artillery, 
the strength of U.S. Army artillery in World War II and Korea, had been lost.  
 As for the battle groups, their direct fire support, provided by a mortar battery, 
was deemed inadequate, and the 4.2-inch mortar unsatisfactory. Clarke was not one to 
complain without constructive ideas, however. He submitted a proposal to CONARC to 
remedy the weaknesses. Centralized command of the artillery at the division level, a 
direct fire-support battalion for each battle group, and elimination of the mortar from the 
artillery direct- support role would fix the problems. Clarke also called for an additional 
medium gun battery and more Honest John rocket launchers for each battery. While it 
would be necessary to cut the battalions and batteries of the division artillery to the bone, 
the required number of guns could be manned without reducing the strength of other arms 
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or exceeding the present strength of the ROCID division. This might sacrifice some 
staying power, but it would solve the immediate problem.102 Clarke’s proposal was 
realistic as far as atomic firepower went, since the army had just begun to provide atomic 
weapons to the division instead of retaining all at army and corps levels, but conventional 
artillery posed a different problem. To Clarke it appeared crucial to mass the fire of the 
entire division under the command of the division leader. This ran contrary to the 
intended semi-independent nature of the battle groups. 
 Clarke did not reject outright the battle group as a fighting formation. However, 
he began to ponder the question of the proper design for an atomic army more seriously. 
He outlined his thoughts in an article in January 1958. Essentially, Clarke offered his 
plans to overhaul Seventh Army. The purpose of publishing his preliminary ideas was to 
provide a “guide for a group of staff officers directed to design a field army to fight an 
atomic war in the North Temperature Zone...to stimulate them to come up with the 
optimum organization for a field army to be employed in the time frame 1965-70.” 
Clarke wanted to eliminate the corps in order to streamline command. He proposed a 
field army of 200,000 officers and men in six divisions, four in contact with the enemy, 
one in an intermediate reserve location and thus probably relatively quickly also in 
contact with the enemy, and one in the rear area, simultaneously recovering and 
providing security. Ideally, the divisions should be half infantry and half tank forces, with 
enough flexibility built in to address particular circumstances. Such a field army was to 
defend an area of 100 miles in width and 200 miles in depth. It needed four or five 
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armored cavalry regiments for flank security, target acquisition, surveillance, screening, 
and a variety of other tasks. Medium-range atomic fire support of about 200 miles was to 
be provided by the field army artillery command.103 
Shortly thereafter, Clarke moved from Seventh Army to CONARC, then the hub 
of innovative thinking in the army. The likelihood of atomic war reinforced Clarke’s 
concept to rely on armored formations, supported by centralized division artillery, but it 
was critical to eliminate the corps-level of command.104 The result of his tenure as 
CONARC commander was the concept for a Modern Mobile Army 1965-70 (MOMAR-
1).105 The study was based on the urgent necessity for the army to develop a 
comprehensive organizational, technological, and operational plan for reform in the 
1960s that could be applied toward the army’s role in American defense strategy. In 
essence, Clarke attempted to salvage the usable parts of the PENTANA studies, while 
trying to develop a model that was operationally more practicable. CONARC suggested 
that limited war, as defined in the 1950s by the army, was a more likely scenario than 
general war against the Soviets, that limited war may occur anywhere in the world, and 
that deterrence of general war remained a crucial objective even after limited war had 
 
103Bruce C. Clarke, “Design for An Atomic Army,” in : Army, Vol. 8, No. 6 
(January 1958), pp. 20-26. The quotation is on page 20. 
 104Clarke continued to argue this point from retirement. He was not particularly 
pleased with the ROAD division, but his bigger concern was the excessive number of 
command echelons. Johnson to Clarke, 31 January 1963 and Daley to Johnson, 22 
January 1963. Johnson Papers, 1962-63 (6 of 15), Box 91, MHI. 
 105Headquarters, United States Continental Army Command, Modern Mobile 
Army 1965-70 (MOMAR I) (Fort Monroe, VA: United States Continental Army 
Command, 1960). 
207
broken out.106 Western and Central Europe, however, were not listed as one of the 
regions where US forces might have to fight a limited war in the 1960s.107 
Based on his recent experience in Germany, Clarke could have assumed that any 
war directly involving American and Soviet forces would be unrestricted. But the stated 
objective of the army was to be capable of deterring general war even during a limited 
war. Other senior American officers in Europe at the time agreed with Maxwell Taylor’s 
conception of limited-nuclear war. James Polk, in succession commanding general of 4th 
Armored Division, Berlin Command, V Corps, and USAREUR, can serve as an example. 
In recalling his experience in Europe from 1957 to1971, he told students at the Army War 
College that he disagreed with the nuclear-firebreak theory developed by Defense 
Department analysts in the 1960s because all war games showed that the use of tactical 
nuclear weapons was necessary to defend the Fulda Gap against a full-scale Soviet attack. 
This, however, would not automatically lead to general nuclear war. Polk reasoned that 
the “surgical” employment of twenty to thirty low-yield nuclear weapons in the V Corps 
sector might delay Soviet penetration of NATO defense lines for two to three days. He 
thought that such a course of events would leave the Soviets with three alternatives: they 
could quit, retaliate in kind, or escalate. Polk assumed that if “you make it very 
disagreeable for him to escalate,” the Soviets were unlikely to do so, since they were 
rational people interested in their own survival.108 
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Clarke based the MOMAR concept on the assumption that the army of the future 
had to be capable of operations anywhere in the world, on nuclear and non-nuclear 
battlefields alike. He believed that the pentomic division did not have enough 
conventional firepower and that the dispersion of five battle groups critically reduced 
tactical mobility and maneuverability due to problems with command and control. 
Specifically, the divisions required more armored vehicles and aircraft to enhance 
mobility. Following earlier proposals of a universal division, the CONARC study called 
for two types of divisions, heavy and medium. Either type division was to consist of five 
combat commands, but there also were to be three task force headquarters that allowed 
for a return to the triangular structure. This was leaning heavily on the command 
structure of armored divisions and introduced the notion of building blocks, as the task 
forces could be assembled from a variety of tank, infantry, and support companies, with 
fire support from a proposed new battery of “moritzers,” a cross between a mortar and a 
howitzer that had been considered since the PENTANA study of 1955. These divisions 
should be entirely mechanized or at least motorized.109 The standard MOMAR field army 
was to contain two heavy and four medium divisions, but the organization was flexible. A 
field army operating in Europe, for instance, may have four or even five heavy and only 
one or two medium divisions, while the ratio would be inverse in Southeast Asia and 
other regions of the Third World.110 
109Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, pp. 291-92. See also Hawkins, Force 
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The downside to the MOMAR division was its heavy reliance on tanks and 
armored vehicles. In accordance with current tactical doctrine, both heavy and medium 
division were designed primarily for the offensive and for counterattacks during mobile 
defense.111 This was well suited to conditions in Europe, but despite the original purpose 
of the study to create a general-purpose force, the heavy division did not fit the bill in 
other potential theaters of war and the suitability of the medium division was 
questionable. Army historian John Wilson stated that this weakness was clearly revealed 
in several theoretical war games. As a result, the concept never made it past the drawing 
board. It was not tested in the field. Before its three intended follow-up studies could be 
concluded, MOMAR-1 was rejected in December 1960 by the army’s Vice Chief of 
Staff, General Clyde D. Eddleman, who thought that it lacked the “simplicity, 
homogeneity, versatility, and flexibility required by the Army for its diverse, worldwide 
tasks in the coming decade.”112 MOMAR was the expression of a more pragmatic form 
of the pentomic division, as it had emerged in Seventh Army after 1958, albeit with 
greater emphasis on armor. Clarke thus attempted to advance the transformation of the 
army that had been initiated by Maxwell Taylor.113 
Clarke’s concept of universal armor-heavy and mechanized divisions, somewhat 
reminiscent of the German Panzer and Panzergrenadier divisions of World War II and 
the Bundeswehr armored and mechanized divisions that had just been introduced, was 
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dismissed as impracticable. It would have tied the army entirely to the plains and hills of 
Germany. Two observations should be made at this point. First, Clarke was a practitioner, 
a World War II veteran, a hero of the Battle of the Bulge. In many respects he never 
developed further as a planner.114 Bruce Clarke is an example of a general who did 
attempt to transfer the principal lessons learned in the Second World War upon his 
conception of a major war in Central Europe. The result was suited only to the situation 
faced by Seventh Army. This makes it even more puzzling that he excluded Germany 
from the potential areas of limited war in the 1960s. Second, the army’s unwillingness to 
adopt the MOMAR concept indicated increased concern with deployment outside of 
Europe. This has been dismissed by critics of the institution who blamed the defeat in the 
Vietnam War on the lack of forethought put into non-European war.115 
The counterproposal for divisional reorganization also came from a general who 
had gained his most recent command experience in Germany and it did adopt some of the 
ideas purported in the MOMAR concept, most notably the principle of tactical units as 
building blocks. General Clyde D. Eddleman had been Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Operations under Maxwell Taylor when the pentomic division was designed, but he was 
dissatisfied with the product. In 1958 Eddleman succeeded Clarke as Commanding 
General of Seventh Army. Thus, he had to make the battle-group concept work in the 
field. In October he asked General Hodes, then CINCUSAREUR, to approve an 
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 115See especially Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam.
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experiment during which Seventh Army would reorganize two infantry battle groups in 
order to test various organizational concepts. Hodes approved the experiment. The 
artillery structure in ROCID was of particular concern to both Eddleman and Hodes.116 
Soon thereafter, units resembling brigades that combined battle groups made their 
appearance in Seventh Army, essentially reconverting the pentomic division to a 
triangular division of two brigades and one battle group. In 1959 Eddleman succeeded 
General Hodes. On December 23, he outlined the prospects for the upcoming year to his 
staff. One of the main events would be “reorganization in all our divisions and the Berlin 
Command.”117 
Eddleman was appointed Army Vice Chief of Staff in November 1960. One of his 
first actions was the rejection of the MOMAR concept. Then, he directed Clarke’s 
successor at CONARC, General Herbert Powell, to develop divisions to replace the 
pentomic structure. Clarke had attempted to provide a new division for 1965, but 
Eddleman wanted a much faster reorganization, which was to begin in 1961. The 
pentomic division had indeed been devised as a five-year experiment in the field, but it 
had only recently been fully implemented and some of its new equipment had not even 
reached the troops. Such rapid turnaround with little time to test any proposal CONARC 
would advance, served as an indicator of Eddleman’s unhappiness with the current 
divisional structure. Nor did the Army Chief of Staff, General George Decker, intercede. 
 
116Hodes to Eddleman, 14 October 1958. Records of U.S. Army Commands, 
Seventh Army 1954-65, Box 60, “250/15 Organization Planning Files,” RG 338, NA. 
 117Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, Office of the Secretary of the General Staff, 
Memorandum for Record, 24 December 1959, Commander in Chief’s Comments to Staff 
Division Chiefs on 23 December 1959. Records of U.S. Army Europe, Entry 2002, Office 
of the Commanding General, Administration Branch, Operations Planning Files, 1960-
62, Box 194, RG 549, NA. 
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Eddleman’s instructions to Powell were very precise, since the vice chief had been 
considering the issue in his commands in Germany. Given that his views must have been 
known to his superiors in Washington, his appointment as Vice Chief of Staff and his 
subsequent involvement in rapid reorganization of the division, indicated that the 
leadership of the army supported a rapid reorganization of the combat divisions.118 
Eddleman instructed CONARC to discard plans for universal divisions and 
instead devise outlines for separate infantry, armored, and mechanized divisions. 
Mechanized divisions were deemed particularly well suited to the nuclear battlefield. 
They formed the core of West German operational doctrine, but the U.S. Army lacked the 
necessary infantry fighting vehicles, which would not be available for several years. 
Eddleman nonetheless pushed for the inclusion of such combat divisions in the order of 
battle, hoping that this would accelerate the development of IFVs. In the meantime, 
mechanized divisions would have to rely on M113 armored personnel carriers and M60 
main battle tanks. Of course, all divisions needed to have both conventional and nuclear 
capability. The unpredictability of deployment, to any one of several regions around the 
globe, led Eddleman to believe that the new divisions should be flexible in their 
composition. For reasons of training, equipment, and interoperability, it was impossible 
to create specific divisions for projected tasks. Even the battle group was not 
automatically out of the question for the new organizational structure. Eddleman 
suggested that its merits be weighed against those of the battalion as the combat 
maneuver element. As in the case of the pentomic reorganization, the armored division 
remained essentially unchanged. In fact, it was the example of the armored division 
 
118For Eddleman’s early thoughts on what would soon become the ROAD 
concept, see Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, pp. 293-96. 
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command structure that led Eddleman to consider whether a command level between 
division and battalion should be reinstated, either as a regiment, a combat command, or a 
brigade. Eddleman hoped that none of the proposals would increase division size to more 
than 15,000 men.119 
The pentomic army never came into existence as a practicable operational force. 
But Taylor had not intended the pentomic infantry, airborne, and armored divisions to be 
the ultimate product of transformation. Instead, they were experimental units that were to 
be evaluated in the field. This opened the door to more creative thinking among senior 
commanders. As Massive Retaliation gave way to greater strategic flexibility, it was no 
longer necessary to adhere to bureaucratic and fiscal concerns quite as much as in 1955 
or 1956. Operational necessity was considered more thoroughly. Planning continued to 
emphasize war in Germany, but operations in Vietnam and other places received greater 
consideration. The result was the rejection of Bruce Clarke’s MOMAR division that too 
closely resembled the PENTANA roots of the pentomic division. Clyde Eddleman 
meanwhile initiated a new divisional structure, based on the example set by LANDCENT 
and the German army that integrated brigades and divisions. The rapid adoption of 
Eddleman’s division by the Kennedy administration indicated that the army was ready to 
sell the second phase of its Cold War transition. It was indeed a much stronger product. 
To dismiss the pentomic division as a failure, however, would be simplistic. It did not 
have much value from an operational perspective, but it was crucial to sustain the army 
through a very difficult phase of fiscal limitations. The key issue now was whether the 




Chapter 5: The ROAD Army and Flexible Response 
 
The strategy of Flexible Response followed by the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations was deliberately ambiguous. This has puzzled historians of the Cold 
War.1 In principle, Flexible Response called for the United States to meet political or 
military challenges with means that were proportionate to circumstances. It was put to the 
test in Europe, the Caribbean, and Southeast Asia. The maintenance of equilibrium in 
Europe in the face of chronic tension constituted the greatest success of the foreign policy 
of Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. The new strategy enhanced the role of the army 
through its dependence on ground forces to deter war in Europe and contain the spread of 
Communism worldwide. How ground forces were to achieve both was not explained. 
Most American political leaders favored planning for conventional defensive operations 
in Europe while European leaders retained belief in the deterrent value of nuclear 
weapons. The army found that the new emphasis on conventional war was not well suited 
to the Central European environment. Questions of conventional or tactical nuclear war 
were debated throughout the Kennedy and early Johnson administrations, and ultimately 
the army’s position of preparing for limited war that could be either conventional or 
nuclear gained the upper hand. Nevertheless, army leaders feared that strategic dogma 
 
1John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, pp.198-236, argues that the 
Kennedy administration intended to implement a strategy that was capable of deterring 
aggression of any kind, regardless of the cost. He regards Flexible Response as the 
antithesis to Massive Retaliation. Francis J. Gavin, on the other hand, finds little practical 
difference in the strategies of the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. Francis J. 
Gavin, “The Myth of Flexible Response: United States Strategy in Europe during the 
1960s,” in: The International History Review, Vol. 23, No. 4 (December 2001), pp. 847-
75. 
215
and rigid over-reliance on nuclear weapons had been replaced by strategic ambiguity and 
academic theories of conventional war in the nuclear age. 
The ROAD Reorganization 
 On May 25, 1961, John F. Kennedy informed Congress that army divisions 
needed more conventional firepower, greater mobility, and flexibility to fight in any 
environment. He found that ROAD offered the kind of army division that addressed the 
challenges of the new decade. CONARC had submitted the ROAD study to the Army 
Chief of Staff, General George Decker, in March. It outlined the future organization of 
airborne, armored, infantry, and mechanized divisions. CONARC had argued that army 
divisions had to be able to adjust their combat elements according to the tactical and 
operational situation. To accomplish this the division had three brigade headquarters and 
could add or subtract maneuver battalions in order to increase armor or infantry strength 
as circumstances required. Hence, a nominal infantry division could join the battle as a 
mechanized or even armored division, depending on the predominant maneuver element.2
The CONARC proposal installed the battalion as the basic combat formation of 
the division, which afforded better control than the battle group and simplified training. It 
also allowed for greater dispersion on the battlefield. One fifth of the combat strength of a 
pentomic division had rested in one battle group. The new infantry division, however, 
had nine battalions in its base formation. Therefore, the loss of a battalion would reduce 
the fighting power of the ROAD division much less than the loss of a battle group would 
 
2Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, pp. 296-97. See also McGrath, The Brigade,
p. 61 for the universal nature of the ROAD division in theory. For the sake of clarity, I 
will use the terms “mechanized” and “infantry” to express the distinction between 
mechanized infantry and infantry units, even though mechanized divisions remained 
listed as infantry divisions. 
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have affected the pentomic division. The return of the battalion and the formal 
reintroduction of the brigade added a second command echelon between division and 
company, thus providing a sturdier command structure and more command positions for 
junior officers. In order to maintain flexibility in assembling the building blocks of a 
division, the battalions were designed uniformly. Infantry, mechanized, and armored 
battalions consisted of three line companies, headquarters, and a headquarters and service 
company. The reconnaissance platoons were similar in all three types of battalions. It was 
thus possible to build task forces around available companies and platoons without much 
delay or confusion.3
General Decker approved the concept in April 1961 but expressed certain 
reservations.4 ROAD solved a critical problem that had arisen from the general-purpose 
force requirement of the Defense Department. It allowed for “strategic tailoring,” i.e, the 
ability to assemble divisions for specific missions, “internal tactical tailoring,” i.e., the 
ability to build combat teams within the division, and “external tactical tailoring,” 
allowing army or corps commanders to react to an evolving combat situation by 
requesting specific battalions from the strategic reserve. But Decker believed that 
standard divisions with permanently assigned battalions remained necessary. The army 
did not have the means to maintain the large number of independent battalions that were 
required to exploit the ROAD concept fully. He approved of the principle of 
interchangeability of units, but specified that it would have to be restricted to divisions 
within a theater of operations. Permanent assignment of battalions to brigades also 
 
3Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, pp. 296-97. 
 4Like the pentomic division, ROAD was not tested by a major experimental force. 
Hawkins and Carafano, Prelude to Army XXI, p. 17.
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fostered personal relationships between brigade commanders and subordinate officers 
and created a more robust and reliable chain of command.  
 General Decker wondered whether all artillery had to be self-propelled, given that 
the army still possessed many towed artillery pieces. In addition, the Chief of Staff 
questioned whether two Davy Crockett systems per infantry battalion were sufficient, and 
he argued that divisional transportation could be reduced. Most importantly, he pushed 
for changes in doctrine, specifically pointing at unresolved issues connected with the 
employment of nuclear weapons. In response, CONARC reinstated towed guns to the 
division and reduced the transportation capacity of infantry battalions by thirty percent. 
CONARC also added a third Davy Crockett launcher to infantry battalions and 
reconnaissance squads. In addition, CONARC began to draw up specific plans for a 
ROAD airborne division and a separate airborne brigade.5
The ROAD concept offered significant improvements in conventional firepower 
and mobility over the pentomic division. Armored, infantry, and mechanized divisions 
had identical artillery: fifty-four 105-mm howitzers, eighteen 155-mm howitzers, four 8-
inch howitzers, and four missile launchers. The only exception was the airborne division, 
which had only six 155-mm howitzers and no 8-inch howitzers. Moreover, battalions had 
some artillery capability of their own, including heavy 155-mm howitzers. Each division 
also had 100 light and medium helicopters or substitute fixed-wing aircraft. The infantry 
division had 108 main battle tanks (an increase of sixteen over the pentomic infantry 
division), 195 recoilless rifles (an increase of 145), 131 mortars (an increase of 12), 1,897 
machine guns (an increase of 1,236), ninety-three armored personnel carriers (a reduction 
 
5Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, pp. 298-303. 
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of ninety-five), 1,725 light trucks (an increase of 265), and 1,063 cargo trucks (an 
increase of 232). The airborne divisions, highly mobile formations to respond to crises 
anywhere in the world, had fifty-four 105-mm assault guns (an increase of twenty-four), 
249 recoilless rifles (an increase of 194), 132 mortars (an increase of seventeen), 925 
machine guns (an increase of 483), 1,411 light trucks (an increase of seventy-one), and 
523 cargo trucks (an increase of 371).6
The divisions primarily designed for combat in Germany reflected a similar 
development. The newly created mechanized division had 162 main battle tanks, 171 
recoilless rifles, 122 mortars, 1,970 machine guns, 798 armored personnel carriers, 1,286 
light trucks, and 1,127 cargo trucks. The armored division had 324 main battle tanks (an 
increase of eighteen), 123 recoilless rifles (the pentomic armored division had none), 109 
mortars (an increase of seventeen), 2,235 machine guns (a reduction of 221), 718 
armored personnel carriers (an increase of 157), 1,302 light trucks (an increase of forty-
one), and 1,192 cargo trucks (an increase of 135).7
The Defense Department quickly endorsed the ROAD concept. On May 10, 1961, 
Secretary McNamara informed President Kennedy that the reorganization would greatly 
increase the operational capability of army divisions. He criticized the pentomic division 
for its reliance on nuclear weapons. The new divisions possessed greater conventional 
firepower, which would increase the range of options short of nuclear war. McNamara 
 
6McNamara to President Kennedy, 10 May 1961 Reappraisal of Capabilities of 
Conventional Forces. Attached report “Appraisal of Capabilities of Conventional 
Forces,” p. 74. National Security Files, Departments and Agencies, Box 273, 
“Department of Defense, General, DOD Study on Conventional Forces 5/61,” John F. 
Kennedy Presidential Library (hereafter cited as JFKL). 
 7Ibid. 
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stressed the flexibility of ROAD and its compatibility with the LANDCENT division. He 
particularly emphasized improvement in mobility and means to counter Soviet 
mechanized warfare that was afforded by the proposed mechanized division. McNamara 
concluded that while the reorganization might be expensive, it should nevertheless 
commence as early as 1962.8
In the event, the reorganization of army divisions was delayed by the Berlin 
Crisis. The Army Staff decided to use the additional time to test the concept more 
thoroughly. The Infantry School at Fort Benning was instructed to convert all training 
plans to reflect the ROAD organization by July 1, 1962. For that purpose it received 197th 
Infantry Brigade as its model unit. The brigade had an artillery battalion, an armor 
battalion, a mechanized battalion, two infantry battalions, engineers, and chemical troops. 
In the course of 1962, 1st Armored and 5th Infantry Division, both assigned to the 
strategic reserve forces, were converted into ROAD units. General Decker was pleased to 
report to the Secretary of the Army that both divisions found the new structure to be 
superior to the pentomic organization. He told Cyrus Vance that “ROAD provides 
substantial improvements in command structure, organization flexibility, capability for 
sustained combat, tactical mobility (ground and air), balanced firepower (nuclear and 
nonnuclear), logistical support, and compatibility with Allied forces (particularly 
NATO).” This was achieved without increasing personnel strength of infantry divisions 
 
8Robert S. McNamara, Memorandum for the President, 10 May 1961, 
Reappraisal of Capabilities of Conventional Forces, pp. 2-3. National Security Files, 
Departments and Agencies, Box 173, “Department of Defense, General, DoD Study on 
Conventional Forces 5/61,” JFKL. See also pp. 64-73 of the attached report “Appraisal of 
Capabilities of Conventional Forces” for McNamara’s reasoning, particularly p. 68 on the 
relationship of the ROAD and LANDCENT division. 
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by more than two percent, although General Decker worried about the much higher 
operating costs.9
As requested by the Chief of Staff, ROAD divisions became standardized, at 
personnel strengths of 14,000 to 16,000 officers and men. Armored divisions contained 
six tank and five mechanized battalions. Mechanized divisions received three tank and 
seven mechanized battalions. Infantry divisions had two tank and eight infantry 
battalions. Airborne divisions had one assault gun battalion and eight airborne infantry 
battalions.10 To address concerns about personnel strength of the army, General Decker 
recommended that divisions in the United States and Korea had to make do with a lesser 
number of maneuver battalions. Concerns of the Army Staff that the reorganization 
would be difficult without personnel authorization above 960,000 officers and men 
proved valid in 1963 and 1964. Consequently, all divisions that were not stationed in 
Germany were left at reduced strength. The combat divisions of Seventh Army were 
converted to the ROAD format between February and October 1963.11 
ROAD gave the army significant advantage in combat capability over Soviet 
divisions. The new mechanized division had 5,000 more officers and men in its combat 
units than a Soviet motorized rifle division. A German mechanized division was even 
larger, at 19,000 combat troops, but the American division had more combat support 
 
9Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, pp. 306-7. Decker is cited on page 307. 
 10For the complexity of reorganizing an airborne division to the ROAD concept, 
see Headquarters, 82nd Airborne Division, 21 February 1964, Reorganization Plan All 
American ROAD. Command and General Staff College, Combined Arms Research 
Library, Archive, N–16289.29. The 82nd Airborne actually received nine infantry and one 
tank battalions.  
 11Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, pp. 308-10. Doughty, Evolution of U.S. Army 
Tactical Doctrine, p. 21, also discusses the standardization of ROAD divisions. 
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units. Overall, a U.S. mechanized division had a peacetime allotment of 25,700 officers 
and men, versus 14,700 in a Soviet and 23,000 in a German division. Armored divisions 
had 25,600 officers and men, as compared to 12,700 Soviets and 21,700 Germans. A U.S. 
armored division had nearly twice the number of officers and men in combat units than a 
Soviet tank division. While Germans and Soviets had a larger number of tanks in 
mechanized divisions, the U.S. Army had more tanks in armored divisions, and generally 
had more armored personnel carriers in any division. American divisions also held 
significant advantages in artillery tubes, mortars, aircraft, and, particularly, antitank 
weapons.12 
Commanding officers in USAREUR preferred ROAD over the pentomic division, 
but the reorganization caused concern. General Paul Freeman, who had succeeded Bruce 
Clarke as CINCUSAREUR in 1962, complained that the reorganization entailed the loss 
of twenty-six line companies in his command. He requested an increase in the number of 
rifle companies per battalion from three to four. The Army Staff explained that the 
pentomic infantry division had twenty-five infantry and five tank companies, while 
ROAD infantry had twenty-one and nine, respectively. The armored division, currently 
sixteen tank and sixteen armored rifle companies, stood to gain two tank companies at the 
loss of only one rifle company. Freeman was right, nonetheless, because 4th Armor Group 
was to be disbanded, and its twenty-eight line companies were to be integrated into the 
ROAD divisions. But the Army Staff concluded that a ROAD division had greater 
 
12Alain C. Enthoven, Memorandum for Bundy, Gordon, and Wiesner, 16 
November 1963, Recommended FY1965-FY1969 Army and Marine Corps General 
Purpose Forces, p. 45. Lyndon B. Johnson Papers, President, 1963-1969, National 
Security File, Agency File, Box 15, Defense Budget - 1965, Sec. 2, Lyndon B. Johnson 
Presidential Library (hereafter cited as LBJL). 
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artillery support, increased tactical nuclear capabilities, a division base that could support 
a greater number of maneuver battalions, improved mobility on the ground and in the air, 
and improved logistics for sustained combat operations.13 
James Polk, the commanding general of V Corps, was dissatisfied with the 
rigidity of the standard ROAD division. He found that 8th Mechanized Division “would 
be better oriented to its assigned mission if it had one less [mechanized] battalion and one 
more tank battalion.” The ROAD concept permitted for the corps commander to alter his 
forces, but Polk did not have the means to do so without taking armored strength away 
from another combat division. Polk also pointed out that the forward-deployed infantry 
forces, which were to fix the enemy in place, suffered from insufficient antitank 
capabilities. In the short term, this could be compensated for by adding tanks to the 
maneuver battalions, but that solution degraded the capability of the division’s armor 
reserve to counterattack. On the whole, Polk thought that the ROAD divisions were 
sound but argued that the ability to tailor combat units according to tactical and 
operational environment had been lost.14 In the event, USAREUR altered the structure of 
the mechanized division in 1966 by substituting one tank battalion for a mechanized 
battalion.15 
13Freeman to Wheeler, 30 December 1962 and Parker to Freeman, 11 January 
1963, Reorganization of USAREUR Units Under ROAD. Records of the Army Staff, 
General Staff, ODCSOPS/OACSFOR, Security Classified Correspondence, 1963, 201-45 
Series, Box 13, RG 319, NA. 
 14Polk to Girard, 3 May 1965. Polk Papers, Correspondence V Corps 1964/65, 
1965 [unnumbered box], MHI. 
 15John Steadman, Memorandum for Robert E. Kintner, 26 July 1966, Weekly 
Report for the President. Papers of Lyndon B. Johnson, President, Confidential File, 
Agency Reports, Department of Defense, July, 1966, Box 118, LBJL. 
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Along with the ROAD reorganization came a shift in the composition of U.S. 
ground forces in Europe. In 1961, there had been forty-one combat battalion equivalents, 
almost evenly distributed among tank (fourteen), infantry (thirteen), armored infantry 
(twelve), and airborne infantry battalions (two). In 1962 Seventh Army received two 
additional tank battalions. By 1964 the force had changed dramatically, to twenty-two 
tank, thirty-one mechanized, and three infantry battalions. Both airborne battalions had 
returned to the United States. The number of maneuver battalions had increased to fifty-
six. There was a minor adjustment in 1966, when three mechanized battalions were 
withdrawn and two tank battalions were added. At the end of the decade it was projected 
that USAREUR would command fifty-five maneuver battalions for the foreseeable 
future.16 
The return of the battalion and of the triangular division has obscured continuities 
between the pentomic division and ROAD. The trend toward smaller independent combat 
elements continued. The battle group of the pentomic division had replaced the regiment 
as the major combat formation of the army division. Now, the battalion was the division’s 
maneuver element and the Army Staff considered even smaller combat elements in the 
future. Whereas the pentomic division was designed primarily for nuclear war, ROAD 
was a step toward dual capability. But the long-term study Oregon Trail, conducted by 
CONARC’s Combat Developments Command (CDC) between September 1963 and May 
1965, concluded that the ROAD division would suffer great casualties in a nuclear war.17 
16Director of Budget, Comptroller of the Army, 13 November 1968, FY 62- FY 79 
Five Year Defense Program, Program II: General Purpose Forces. Records of the Army 
Staff, Entry 71B-003, Comptroller of the Army, Director of Army Budget, Program and 
Budget Systems Division, Program Branch, Box 1, RG 319, NA. 
 17Oregon Trail is discussed in Midgley, Deadly Illusions, pp. 115-23. 
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CDC concluded that even wider dispersion of combat units was necessary and 
recommended that companies, capable of independent action, should become the army’s 
flexible and mobile combat elements. USAREUR was charged with testing the concept. 
3rd Armored Division was selected to conduct the experiment and after preliminary 
testing in May and July 1965, troop units tested the Oregon Trail proposal from August 
28 to October 2.18 
Exercise FRONTIER SHIELD revealed that the gaps between dispersed 
companies were too small to permit effective use of friendly nuclear fire in order to 
accomplish attrition in depth of enemy forces. But the assigned sector of each company 
already was too large to maintain adequate surveillance. Existing means of surveillance 
could identify larger mechanized formations, but small dismounted patrols could not be 
detected. Small groups of aggressors could thus infiltrate the defensive front and 
reassembled into potent fighting formations in the rear area, which was a standard 
procedure of Soviet forces in World War II. The envisioned degree of dispersion also 
decentralized firepower of crew-served weapons and did not permit the tailoring of forces 
to specific missions. The test results showed that companies were too small to operate as 
self-contained units. Oregon Trail proceeded from the same basic realization as German 
operational planners had done after 1916: the battlefield was chaotic and could not be 
controlled. It had to be managed instead. But army field commanders insisted that 
command of dispersed companies and the ability to concentrate force could not be 
attained. Furthermore, implementation of the Oregon Trail proposal would have meant to 
 
18Headquarters, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Annual 
Historical Summary, 1 January to 31 December 1966 (Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe 
and Seventh Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Military History 
Branch, 1967), pp. 85-88. 
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provide companies with organic nuclear capability. It was questioned whether company 
commanders could be entrusted with such grave responsibility. In the event, the Army 
Staff ignored the findings of the Oregon Trail study.19 
ROAD was the end product of the army’s opposition to Massive Retaliation and 
its attempt to achieve greater strategic and operational flexibility for nuclear and 
conventional war. It served as the basic organizational structure of the army for the 
remainder of the Cold War. Despite the apparent compatibility of the new division with 
the strategy of Flexible Response, army leaders found the future to be uncertain. Most of 
John F. Kennedy’s advisers came to Washington in 1961 with the understanding that 
conventional defense of Western and Central Europe was largely a matter of persuading 
the allies to maintain a slightly larger number of combat divisions. The close integration 
of conventional and limited nuclear means that army leaders had intended since 1953, 
was dismissed. Ironically, the Kennedy administration started out from the same vantage 
point as Eisenhower’s national security team had done: tactical nuclear weapons were a 
force multiplier. But the new administration was willing to increase defense spending. 
Intelligence evaluations of Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional strength that were lower 
than previous estimates reinforced the conclusion that NATO ground forces sufficient for 
forward defense and credible deterrence were within reach. 
National Strategy: John F. Kennedy and Flexible Response 
Even prior to his election, John F. Kennedy had concluded that the United States 
and NATO needed a strategy that afforded greater flexibility and appropriate means to 
address different kinds of challenges. Flexible Response was a deliberately vague concept 
 
19Midgley, Deadly Illusions, pp. 121-23. 
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that evolved over time and has not yet been defined satisfactorily, mostly because, unlike 
its predecessors, the strategy was not outlined in a memorandum of the National Security 
Council.20 In 1959, Maxwell Taylor, arguing against Massive Retaliation and for a more 
flexible strategy, wrote that it “would restore to warfare its historic justification as a 
means to create a better world upon the successful conclusion of hostilities.”21 Senator 
Kennedy told Taylor in April 1960 that The Uncertain Trumpet had greatly influenced 
his thinking on defense policy and strategy.22 Kennedy intended to reinstate into national 
strategy a political objective beyond war avoidance.23 
Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson and his assistant Paul Nitze, two of 
President Truman’s most influential advisers, shaped flexible response through their 
work for the Advisory Council of the Democratic National Committee. In 1959, the 
council requested unequivocally to replace Massive Retaliation with a less rigid strategic 
concept. At the end of the Eisenhower administration, the active army had been reduced 
 
20Flexible Response thus has no signature document comparable to NSC-68 or 
NSC-162/2. The annual Basic National Security Policy reviews continued through 1963, 
but Kennedy did not approve the draft reports. See Philip Nash, “Bear Any Burden? John 
F. Kennedy and Nuclear Weapons,” p. 126, in: John Lewis Gaddis et al. (eds.), Cold War 
Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), pp. 120-40. The best monograph on Flexible Response remains 
Jane E. Stromseth, The Origins of Flexible Response: NATO’s Debate over Strategy in 
the 1960s (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988).  
 21Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, p. 146.
22Taylor quotes from the April 9 letter in his interview for the Kennedy Oral 
History Project. John F. Kennedy Oral History Project, Taylor interview by Elspeth 
Rostow, 12 April 1964, p. 4. Oral History Collection, JFKL. For Kennedy’s thinking on 
nuclear weapons prior to his presidency see Nash, “Bear Any Burden?” pp. 121-24. 
 23John Lewis Gaddis argues in We Now Know, pp. 221-59, that Massive 
Retaliation was a strategy of war avoidance, but carried tremendous risks. Flexible 
Response reopened the possibility of war fighting, even in Europe, but in doing so it 
elevated the credibility of deterrence. 
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to eleven combat-ready and three training divisions with a total of 876,000 officers and 
men. To secure the liberty of the free world through the prudent use of military force, 
Dean Acheson urged the creation of five new army divisions.24 Acheson and Nitze 
argued that nuclear parity would soon create a state of passive deterrence that made the 
use of strategic nuclear weapons by either superpower less likely. Consequently, ground 
forces were to play a much greater role in the deterrence of war. But unlike Taylor, 
Acheson and Nitze doubted the feasibility of limited-nuclear war. It was politically 
unthinkable and would destroy NATO. To them, tactical nuclear weapons were a 
deterrent and not an employable military means. The objective was to increase the risk to 
the Soviets inherent in the use of ground forces in an attack on Germany. Acheson and 
Nitze concluded that this could be achieved by maintaining a balanced force structure in 
Europe.25 
Most political analysts in Washington rejected plans for immediate use of nuclear 
weapons in the forward defense of NATO territory. Those close to the new 
administration agreed that there had to be substantial use of conventional force prior to a 
decision to use nuclear weapons.26 The State Department suggested that “the objective of 
improving NATO’s non-nuclear forces should be to create a capability for halting Soviet 
 
24Dean Acheson for the Democratic Advisory Council, “The Military Forces We 
Need and How to Get Them: Our Object Which Lies Beyond War and Weapons,” p. 8. 
Personal Papers of Roswell L. Gilpatric, Box 8, “Analysis of D.O.D. Budget for FY 1961 
(A),” JFKL. 
 25Weiss to Owen, 14 February 1964, Attached Paper on National Strategy, pp. 6-
10. General Records of the Department of State, Records of the Policy Planning Council 
(S/PC) 1963-64, Europe 1963-1964, Box 281, RG 59, NA. 
 26McNamara to Kennedy, 5 May 1961, Military Planning for a Possible Berlin 
Crisis, in: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. XIV: Berlin Crisis, 
1961-1962 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 61-63. 
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forces now in and rapidly deployable to Central Europe for a sufficient period to allow 
the Soviets to appreciate the wider risks of the course on which they are embarked.”27 
This sounded remarkably similar to the objective of Lauris Norstad’s pause concept, but 
unlike NATO’s supreme commander, the State Department opposed tactical nuclear 
weapons. Still, in the event of war in 1961, U.S. ground forces would have had little 
choice but to use tactical nuclear weapons at the outset of hostilities. 
 Robert McNamara, the Secretary of Defense, concluded that the force structure 
established in the Eisenhower years left the U.S. without the capability to respond 
proportionately to local and regional conflicts. In a report to President Kennedy in 
February 1961, he lamented that U.S. forces overseas “are...strongly oriented in their war 
plans, current capabilities, materiel procurement, and research and development, towards 
general nuclear war. This is at the expense of their ability to wage limited and especially 
non-nuclear war.” Consequently, the contribution of ground forces to deterrence was 
modest. McNamara recommended that “the primary mission of our overseas forces 
should be made non-nuclear warfare.”28 He proposed to increase the budget for army 
special forces, increase personnel, conduct more readiness and training exercises, 
enhance air and sea transport, build greater stockpiles of ammunition and equipment, and 
improve research and development. The immediate cost of this program was estimated at 
 
27Policy Directive, 20 April 1961, in: FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. XIII, pp. 285-91. 
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$740 million.29 In the long-term, McNamara suggested to increase the army to sixteen 
combat-ready divisions. 
 In 1961 twenty-one active divisions guarded Central Europe, but none of the 
sixteen European divisions matched the standards of the American units. The Defense 
Department estimated that the army provided more than half of the actual fighting power 
of the alliance. How many divisions were necessary, and for what purpose, remained 
ambiguous. NATO force objectives called for thirty active divisions. General Norstad 
thought that a thirty-division force could implement his pause concept. The Kennedy 
administration, however, saw thirty divisions not as a minimum deterrent, but as a force 
that could defend Germany for several weeks in a conventional war.30 Few among the 
army’s leaders thought this was feasible, but there was no open dissent to a policy that 
promised more money, better equipment, and higher status. General Freeman, for 
instance, heartily embraced Flexible Response, but doubted that NATO forces could 
contain a massive Soviet attack for more than a few hours without resorting to tactical 
nuclear weapons.31 
Maxwell Taylor, appointed military adviser to the President in July 1961, also 
voiced doubts about the emphasis on conventional warfare. Taylor believed that NATO 
ground forces were too small for purely conventional defense and that conventional 
forces alone did not compose a viable deterrent. He conceded that he had “advocated 
 
29Ibid., Annex A, Attachment 2: Limited War Proposals. 
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larger conventional forces which would give us some choice other than all-out retaliation 
or retreat.” But he feared that the administration had gone too far: 
My basic reason in the past for pressing for larger conventional forces has been to 
give us flexibility of response to hostile acts of aggression. It has always seemed 
to me that the aim of our military policy should be to increase the available 
alternatives in the possible uses of military force and thereby achieve a graduated 
series of possible responses. The development and use of very low yield atomic 
weapons for battlefield use has always seemed to me to offer the possibility of a 
very valuable intermediate stage in any escalating series of responses. 
 
Taylor was concerned that current policy directives “would reduce this possibility [of 
graduated response] to the point of eliminating it.”32 
Between 1961 and 1964, American military strength was greatly increased. The 
defense budget was raised by $30 billion. It was no longer distributed by share to the 
armed services. Instead, it was divided between strategic-retaliatory and general-purpose 
forces. The total payload of nuclear weapons available to the strategic alert force was 
doubled and the arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons grew by 150 percent.33 General-
purpose forces, including most of the army, the Marine Corps, and parts of the navy and 
air force, received about two thirds of the additional funding. As a result, army size 
increased to sixteen combat-ready divisions and nearly one million men. Funding for 
procurement of army equipment rose from $1.5 billion in 1961 to $2.9 billion in 1964. 
This allowed for modernization and improvement of the equipment of all sixteen active 
army divisions as well as the six reserve divisions that had first priority. It also provided 
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for the support of the entire twenty-two division force in sustained combat. In addition, 
the number of tactical nuclear weapons deployed to Western Europe was increased by 
sixty percent.34 
While NATO embraced the deployment of greater American armed force to 
Europe, the alliance did not adopt Flexible Response until 1967. In April 1961, President 
Kennedy had outlined the basic tenets of his strategy to NATO’s Military Committee. He 
explained that “there should be a re-enforcement of the capabilities of NATO in 
conventional weapons. NATO needs to be able to respond to any conventional attack 
with conventional resistance which will be effective at least long enough in General 
Norstad’s phrase, to force a pause.” The U.S. intended to maintain its current troop 
strength in Europe and increase the conventional capability of its army. Kennedy also 
stated that NATO needed nuclear weapons, but he had inverted the order of importance. 
Until that point, conventional forces had been the “shield” behind which the nuclear 
“sword” could be readied and employed. Now they were to take on offensive functions of 
the “sword,” while the threat of nuclear forces prevented escalation.35 
34Ibid., Schedule C: General Purpose Forces.
35President Kennedy’s Remarks before the Military Committee of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, Washington, D.C., on 10 April 1961. Norstad Papers, 
Personal Name File Series, Box 70, “Kennedy, John F. (President, USA) (1),” DDEL. At 
the same meeting General Norstad reiterated that conventional forces might be sufficient 
to deal with a transgression and that nuclear weapons would only be introduced in well-
defined cases of self-defense or after a thorough, established decision-making process 
that ensured that commanders of basic combat units could not make such a decision. 
USM-120-61, Office of the U.S. Military Representative to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 13 April 
1961, Summary Report of the Twenty-Sixth Session, NATO Military Committee in Chiefs 
of Staff Session (MC/CS), Washington, D.C., 10 April 1961. Enclosure 6: SACEUR’s 
Criteria for Developing End-1966 Force Requirements. Records of the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), 
Secret and Below General Files, 1961, 334 NATO Apr. 1-15, Box 17, RG 330, NA.  
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Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State, added that NATO had emphasized the 
development of nuclear-capable forces for several years and that it was now time “to 
redress the balance of conventional and nuclear forces so that the Alliance would in fact 
have a full range of forces to ensure flexibility of response.” Rusk believed that this was 
essentially what General Norstad had requested. Hence, while NATO strategy needed to 
be reinterpreted, it did not have to be replaced.36 Dean Acheson disagreed with Norstad 
and Rusk on how to achieve greater flexibility and elevate the nuclear threshold. 
Acheson, an advocate for a hard line of containment, had returned to the inner circle of 
foreign policy as a consultant to President Kennedy. In the winter of 1961, he chaired a 
study group to evaluate NATO strategy, made up of representatives of the departments of 
State, Defense, and the Treasury, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and McGeorge Bundy, the 
National Security Adviser. The report submitted in March was almost entirely Acheson’s 
creation. The National Security Council adopted the Acheson Report as a policy directive 
in April.37 
Acheson argued that it was time to build a more balanced force structure for the 
alliance. The nuclear deterrent was already sufficient. He suggested a modification to the 
pause concept, urging NATO to strengthen its conventional forces in order to “allow the 
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Soviets to appreciate the wider risk of the course on which they are embarked.”38 But 
while Norstad was convinced that his ground forces could halt the Soviets only if they 
had access to tactical nuclear weapons and the authority to use them as required, Acheson 
believed that purely conventional defense was feasible and called for a build-up of 
conventional capability to the point that the Soviets would have to consider to employ 
nuclear weapons to sustain their offensive.39 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were more sympathetic to Norstad’s selective use of 
nuclear weapons than to Acheson’s theory of conventional deterrence and war. The JCS 
agreed that it was necessary to be prepared for aggression short of general war, but they 
made clear that there must not be any doubt about NATO’s willingness to use nuclear 
weapons even if the enemy did not. A major problem for the JCS was Acheson’s 
recommendation that no tactical nuclear weapons should be forward deployed, to reduce 
the risk of accidental or unauthorized use. The Joint Chiefs concluded that SACEUR 
needed the authority to use such weapons immediately if the situation required it and that 
they would be of no use unless they had been placed close to the main line of resistance.40 
President Kennedy seemed to concur. In a meeting with the Joint Chiefs in July, he raised 
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the issue of conventional war in Central Europe and stated that he believed the U.S. had 
to be prepared to use nuclear weapons before the Soviets could do so.41 
German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer feared that the Acheson Report indicated 
growing unwillingness of the U.S. to use strategic nuclear weapons in the defense of 
Western Europe.42 German leaders also disagreed with the pause concept, which implied 
the loss of significant portions of their homeland.43 Moreover, the German government 
was convinced that the Soviet Union would not enter into any agreement with NATO 
after war had broken out.44 Defense Minister Strauss summed up the German dilemma: 
“We would be strange and pathological creatures if we, with our 210 people per square 
mile and with our vulnerability to nuclear attack, wanted to use nuclear weapons unless 
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they were absolutely needed to prevent war, not to make war.”45 The German 
administration was less concerned about lack of conventional military means than 
breakdown of deterrence in general.46 While the Kennedy administration believed that a 
level of deterrence below strategic retaliation was essential, Adenauer and Strauss warned 
that the Soviets would interpret this as a sign of weakening resolve.47 
General Norstad was caught between the European fear of abandonment and the 
American desire for strategic flexibility. As military commander of all NATO forces, he 
had to consider European politics. At the same time, he received direct orders from 
Washington in his role as commander of the American armed forces in Europe. Norstad 
had managed the delicacies of this situation since 1956, but President Eisenhower had 
been sympathetic to the general’s predicament as he himself had served in Europe and 
understood the inconsistency of his New Look with policies to strengthen the bonds of 
the NATO alliance. Now, Norstad was considered a holdover from the days of Massive 
Retaliation and his pro-European arguments came under attack in political circles in 
Washington. The pause concept had been a significant step toward addressing military 
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crises with appropriate means, but Norstad was unwilling to define the nature and 
duration of the pause and he disagreed with those who viewed ground forces as more 
than supplementary to the nuclear deterrent. 
 The Joint Chiefs of Staff were more forward in defining the duration of 
conventional war. In May 1961, they discussed scenarios for short-term (2-4 days) and 
long-term (1-2 months) conventional defense of Western Europe. In either case, 
penetration of a line from the Kiel Canal to Bremen, Kassel, Würzburg, Nuremberg, 
Munich, Innsbruck, and Venice by Warsaw Pact forces was unacceptable. In the event of 
combat operations exceeding one month in duration, the alliance needed twenty-eight 
active divisions in Central Region, six of them American. A sixth division for 
USAREUR had already been promised for 1963, and army reinforcements earmarked for 
Europe had been increased from twelve to thirteen divisions.48 Within ten days of 
mobilization LANDCENT required a seventh U.S. Army division and eight Allied 
reserve divisions. By the end of the first month of the war, NATO needed to have forty-
seven divisions in the field in Central Region, nine of them American. The JCS projected 
that ten American and forty-seven Allied divisions would stand in battle at the end of the 
second month.49 
48A sixth active division was never actually deployed. It is possible that the 
augmentation during the Berlin Crisis, which included the pre-positioning of equipment 
for two divisions in Europe, changed the force deployment planning. 
 49JCSM-306-61, JCS to Secretary of Defense, 5 May 1961, NATO Requirements 
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General Norstad discussed the strength of ground forces at the annual SHAPE 
exercise in May. Only forty-seven of fifty-four required active divisions for the entire 
command were available. Norstad pointed at improved combat effectiveness of his 
troops, but he expressed concern about the vulnerability of the air force and the lack of 
personnel in Central Region. There, twenty-one of the required twenty-seven active 
divisions were currently under arms, but most of them were under strength. Norstad 
estimated that their fighting power was equivalent to that of only sixteen full strength 
combat divisions.50 Nevertheless, Bruce Clarke, the commander of CENTAG, and 
General Smith, the commander of 4th Allied Tactical Air Force, thought that the ground 
and tactical air forces at hand were sufficient for forward defense if the use of tactical 
nuclear weapons was authorized shortly after the outbreak of war.51 
In addition to unresolved problems with the armed forces of the alliance, military 
leaders were concerned about Soviet capabilities. The Soviet army had ninety-seven 
active divisions deployed against NATO, but only seventy of them were rated combat 
ready by Western intelligence. Sixty Warsaw Pact divisions, of varying degrees of 
readiness and reliability, added to the total. That in itself was less daunting than the 
estimate of 175 Soviet divisions that had been maintained throughout the preceding 
decade. But Soviet divisions had been reorganized and their combat capability had 
improved. Intelligence officers believed that there had been a substantial build-up of 
surface-to-surface missiles aimed at Western Europe. The tactical air force in East 
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Germany had been increased as well. Soviet forces in East Germany, ten tank and ten 
motorized rifle divisions, constituted an impressive armored striking force with more than 
5,000 tanks.52 
ACE estimated that thirty-two active divisions would comprise a credible 
deterrent. Two thirds of them were to be American and German. In addition, ACE 
required a strategic reserve of five American, British, and French divisions. SACEUR 
also was to receive eight French army divisions shortly upon mobilization. Nine U.S. 
Army divisions were scheduled to arrive with the second wave of reinforcements. Once 
that group of forces had landed, SACEUR was to have sixty combat divisions for 
operations in Central Region.53 But the Military Committee acknowledged that the land-
warfare capability of the alliance remained insufficient. Most active and reserve units 
were short of personnel, there were not enough non-organic combat and support units, 
operational stocks were critically short, and obsolescent equipment remained in use. In 
Central Region the situation was better than in the north, but the desired nuclear delivery 
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capability had not been achieved because of delays in the construction of storage sites 
and lack of political agreements.54 
The Berlin Crisis accelerated the build-up of American forces in Germany.55 The 
U.S. response to the crisis illustrated the desire to increase and improve NATO ground 
forces for the long term. On May 5, Secretary McNamara, supported by the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, recommended deployment to Germany of two army divisions, to reopen access 
to Berlin in the event of a Soviet blockade of the Autobahn.56 But the Defense 
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Department rejected an army proposal to add a fourth combat division to the strategic 
reserve. As NSC staffer Henry Owen pointed out, deployment of two divisions to Europe 
would thus leave the U.S. with only one division in strategic reserve. Owen criticized that 
McNamara also rejected army recommendations to augment Seventh Army, especially in 
the critical areas of combat support, conventional artillery, and aviation to provide better 
reconnaissance, command, and control.57 
The Vienna summit between President Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita 
Khrushchev in June 1961 increased the urgency of a decision. Taken aback by 
Khrushchev’s aggressive rhetoric, Kennedy was convinced that he would have to face a 
showdown over Berlin.58 McGeorge Bundy listed the four military options that were 
available. First, the U.S. could immediately and substantially reinforce its armed forces. 
Second, the administration could enact measures short of declaring a national emergency, 
which would exclude the call-up of reserve units for the time being. Third, a declaration 
of national emergency could be issued, including limited call-up of reserves. Finally, the 
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U.S. could postpone a significant military build-up.59 In July, Kennedy decided to 
increase the armed forces.60 
On July 25, the President addressed the nation. He requested over $3 billion from 
Congress in additional funds for the armed forces. $1.8 billion were to be used for the 
procurement of non-nuclear weapons, ammunition, and equipment.61 As part of the 
temporary increase of army personnel to one million men, all five divisions in Germany 
were to be brought to full strength. In the event, 3rd, 8th, and 24th Infantry Division each 
received an additional 1,000 men and enough armored personnel carriers to allow for 
their complete mechanization. The influx of personnel was indeed necessary. USAREUR 
required 18,000 officers and men to ready its five divisions for combat. More than 19,000 
additional troops were needed to provide essential non-divisional support to allow for 
sustained combat operations.62 In the fall, the army accelerated the distribution of M14 
rifles and M60 machine guns, and sped up production of the new M60 tank and the M113 
APC.63 Additional steps to increase combat readiness in Europe included the pre-
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positioning of equipment for one armored and one infantry division as well as several 
independent battalions.64 In the event, the Berlin Crisis passed without deployment of 
additional combat divisions to Germany.65 The Joint Chiefs of Staff remained convinced 
that purely conventional war was impracticable.66 
The July decision to augment Seventh Army was based on the assumption that the 
Soviets would step up pressure over Berlin in the course of 1961, culminating in a crisis 
in the winter.67 Hence, the closing of the sectoral border on August 13, and Soviet threats 
to cut off all Western access to Berlin, came much sooner than expected.68 But while the 
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administration considered rushing additional forces to Europe, General Norstad believed 
that the timetable set in July remained sound. Rapid mobilization might preclude 
negotiations to end the crisis. Norstad believed that such negotiations were supported by 
all European governments except for the French.69 Historian Irwin Wall notes in his study 
of Franco-American relations: “The United States had called up its reserve, had more 
troops ready for combat over Berlin than all the other NATO powers combined, and was 
negotiating from strength.”70 
In Washington, the National Security Council debated political, psychological, 
economic, and military measures to prepare particular steps of escalation. The Germans 
were cautioning that proposals for an airlift or military probes to reopen the Autobahn 
were unrealistic. Defense Minister Strauss had told Norstad in March that Berlin was 
simply a question of “war or no war.”71 In accordance with U.S. policy, Norstad was 
planning incursions into East Germany in order to reopen access to Berlin if necessary.72 
On May 29, he had informed McNamara that “our battalion-sized probe plan has been 
 
69Norstad to Lemnitzer, 18 August 1961. Norstad Papers, Policy Files Series, Box 
86, “Berlin - LIVE OAK 1961 thru 30 Aug. (1),” DDEL. Chancellor Adenauer later told 
Dean Acheson that negotiations were the only option because NATO was too weak 
conventionally and he rejected the idea to use nuclear weapons in the Berlin Crisis. 
Acheson to Marshall Shulman, 23 November 1961. Dean Acheson Papers, Post 
Administration Files, State Department and White House Advisor, 1960-68, Box 99, 
“State Department and White House Advisor, 1961, October - December,” HSTL. 
 70Wall,  France, the United States, and the Algerian War, p. 251.
71Memorandum for Record, 25 March 1961, SACEUR’s Meeting with Minister of 
Defense Strauss, 24 March 1961. Norstad Papers, Subject Series, Box 105, 
“Memorandum for Record II 1960-1961 (4),” DDEL. 
 72See Maloney, “Berlin Contingency Planning” for a detailed discussion of 
Norstad’s options in 1961. 
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developed and agreed by the countries concerned.”73 Plans for a division-sized operation 
were not that advanced. SACEUR had convinced the British to drop their opposition, but 
he still had to address the lack of French forces. France was to contribute one division to 
LIVE OAK, but with her forces tied up in Algeria it could not spare more than one 
battalion.74 
Like Norstad, Bruce Clarke stressed the need for adequate forward defense. He 
assumed that the Berlin Crisis was part of a Soviet effort to discredit American leadership 
and destroy the cohesiveness of the western alliance. As commander of CENTAG, Clarke 
was responsible for the defense of the southern half of West Germany. While he was 
satisfied with the state of preparedness of Seventh Army, he expressed concern about 
allied troops. There still were only twenty-one NATO divisions for all of West Germany, 
and most of them did not have the desired degree of readiness. European armies masked 
shortfalls of personnel by assigning reservists to front-line divisions upon mobilization. 
This may have been practicable in the past, but the state of mechanization was now so 
advanced that capable operators needed constant training. Clarke’s greatest concern were 
the support units and the logistics system. He pointed out that the European armies relied 
on combat divisions without sufficient support. There was little he could do about it. 
Despite NATO’s efforts to combine all military and economic power of its members into 
a coherent defensive system, logistics remained a national responsibility.75 
73Norstad to McNamara, 29 May 1961. Norstad Papers, Policy Files Series, Box 
86, “Berlin - LIVE OAK 1961 thru 30 Aug. (4),” DDEL. 
 74Wall,  France, the United States, and the Algerian War, p. 242.
75Address by General Bruce C. Clarke, Commander in Chief, United States Army, 
Europe and Commander, Central Army Group (NATO) before the Staff, Faculty and 
Students, United States Army War College, 28 November 1961, Carlisle Barracks, 
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Clarke estimated that the Soviets initially may only have twenty-two combat 
ready divisions for an offensive against CENTAG. But he stressed that the potential for 
deployment of twenty-eight additional divisions within ten days of mobilization was 
unmatched by NATO. At best SACEUR could hope for six divisions to become 
available, but it was more likely that none would arrive in the theater of operations in the 
first two weeks. Clarke was deeply concerned by the Soviet advantage of short land lines. 
While it might take only three to four days to move an armored division from the western 
parts of the Soviet Union to Germany, the same movement from the U.S. could last two 
months.76 Furthermore, the Soviets had the advantage of initiative and they could exploit 
fissures in the NATO alliance, for instance, by announcing that they would not employ 
nuclear weapons.  
 Clarke doubted that the West could muster the political will to “authorize even the 
use of tactical nuclear weapons, which in turn might lead to all-out nuclear warfare.”77 
NATO, however, would have to resort to nuclear weapons rapidly in the defense of 
Germany. Clarke also requested more ground forces and close air support. The objective 
was to present a force strong enough to dissuade the Soviets from believing that they 
could reach the Rhine River in a rapid war of movement. To that avail, USAREUR had to 
 
Pennsylvania. Norstad Papers, Subject Series, Box 112, “USAREUR Dec. 57 - 30 Apr. 
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 76Clarke was pessimistic about the state of American air and sea lift. He thought 
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 77 Address by General Bruce C. Clarke before the United States Army War 
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be increased to seven divisions with adequate logistic support. NATO would have to 
furnish another twenty-three active divisions. These thirty divisions had to be armored or 
mechanized, to the greatest extent possible. Such a force could adequately guard the most 
likely axes of invasion in the North German plains and through Hesse toward the Rhine. 
It could also respond to other contingencies, such as the Berlin Crisis. Clarke feared that 
current NATO forces could not do either. This being the case, the most aggressive 
conventional military options debated in Washington were fanciful.78 
President Kennedy understood that ACE needed more troops if it was to 
implement LIVE OAK contingency plans and defend Western Europe. Even prior to the 
erection of the Berlin Wall, the administration had discussed deployment of additional 
combat divisions to Seventh Army.79 In September, deployment of six divisions was 
supported by army generals Lemnitzer and Decker, but the other service chiefs opposed 
the idea.80 It could be perceived as an escalation of the crisis, but there was also the 
danger that the Soviets might see it as tacit acknowledgment that the use of nuclear 
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 79McGeorge Bundy had considered an overall mobilization of one million men. 
General Lemnitzer thought that the army would then receive 564,000 new recruits. Seven 
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 80Maxwell Taylor, Memorandum for Record, 18 September 1961, Meeting with 
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History/Berlin Crisis Collection, Taylor Papers, Box 28, NSA. 
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weapons in the defense of Berlin was out of the question.81 General Jacquot, CINCENT, 
cautioned that the additional divisions would have to utilize the existing lines of 
communication, through France or from Bremerhaven to southern Germany. He 
suggested that one corps of three divisions could reinforce CENTAG while the other 
corps should be given to NORTHAG. It was to be placed in the area between Aller and 
Elbe rivers, to participate in the defense of Hamburg and Bremen.82 
General Norstad rejected the deployment of American combat troops outside of 
CENTAG.83 He feared that separation of American forces would complicate logistics. 
Moreover, he doubted that northern Germany could be defended in a conventional war 
unless current operational plans were altered. Norstad criticized British plans that called 
for withdrawal to the Weser River before using nuclear weapons. He thought that it was 
unnecessary to give up Hamburg and the advances to Jutland, and he doubted whether 
tactical nuclear weapons could be used effectively once the Warsaw Pact offensive had 
gained momentum. Instead, the enemy had to be forced to mass at the border, which 
would create lucrative targets for nuclear strikes.84 
81SNIE 2-5-61, 14 September 1961, Soviet Reactions to Certain U.S. Courses of 
Action. Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Estimates 
Concerning the Soviet Union 1950-1961, Box 4, Folder 126, RG 263, NA. 
 82Jacquot to Norstad, 3 August 1961. Norstad Papers, Subject Series, Box 95, 
“AFCENT (2),” DDEL. 
 83Norstad to Jacquot, 4 September 1961. Norstad Papers, Subject Series, Box 95, 
“AFCENT (2),” DDEL. 
 84Stoessel to Fessenden, 1 December 1961. General Records of the Department of 
State, Entry 5301, Bureau of European Affairs, NATO and Atlantic Political-Military 
Affairs (EUR/RPM), Records Relating to NATO Affairs 1959-1966, Organization & 
Administration SACEUR, Box 5, RG 59, NA. 
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Robert McNamara focused on long-term effects of a military build-up. He 
recognized that six additional divisions in Germany would add options between retreat 
and nuclear escalation. Unlike Norstad, he thought that several divisions could be 
stationed in northern Germany, where he expected the bulk of the Soviet attack to 
develop. As it stood, NATO would have no choice but to respond with nuclear weapons 
to an incursion aimed at Hamburg, but U.S. forces in NORTHAG might offer a 
conventional alternative. If NATO fielded thirty-two active divisions in Central Region, 
McNamara presumed that Western Europe could be defended against a massive 
conventional attack “for a significant period of time without having to use nuclear 
weapons.” A force of eleven U.S. Army divisions, and nine Bundeswehr divisions 
committed to ACE, could be supplied for two months of combat. McNamara estimated 
that the Soviets could not employ effectively more than fifty-five divisions in an 
offensive in Germany and that their lines of communication would be vulnerable. He 
added that a thirty-two division would be sufficient to defend Germany and allow for 
implementation of LIVE OAK plans.85 
The thirty-two division NATO force for Central Europe seemed within reach. In 
the summer, the European NATO partners had promised General Norstad to strengthen 
the posture of his command.86 Norstad hoped to have twenty-four active divisions 
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deployed in Central Region by the end of the year. He reiterated that the current force 
counted for only sixteen divisions by American standards, but this too was to be 
remedied. In addition, the strategic reserve provided by the U.S., Canada, and the United 
Kingdom was to be increased to about ten division equivalents, and France signaled that 
four combat divisions would be available shortly after mobilization. The six additional 
divisions under consideration in Washington, would increase the total of active divisions 
to thirty, with a large force in reserve, provided that logistical questions of air and sea 
transportation could be addressed.87 The German defense minister thought that thirty-two 
divisions might be capable of repelling the initial Soviet attack but not the second and 
third waves. For Europe, he argued, there was still no acceptable alternative to nuclear 
deterrence.88 
General Norstad warned the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the escalation from local to 
general war did not rest entirely with NATO. In case military action was taken, it would 
be essential to maintain the nuclear capability of ACE. Norstad argued that existing plans 
for the defense of Germany were applicable in the current crisis. He stated that “the 
Concept of Operations pertaining to aggression Less than General War establishes the 
proper courses of action for ACE. Specifically, it would be necessary, if possible, to force 
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 87SHAPE 188/61, Norstad to Dirk Stikker, 15 September 1961. Norstad Papers, 
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a pause in the continuity of military action.” This might prevent escalation to general 
nuclear war.89 Norstad had modified the official NATO strategy of nuclear deterrence, 
which stated that no plans for limited war were to be made. Operational plans in 1961 
contained the option to fight Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces with conventional weapons 
for a short period of time during which general nuclear war might still be avoided. 
 Despite his need for larger ground forces, General Norstad preferred that the six 
army divisions be held in ready reserve in the United States. He thought their deployment 
to Europe would send a dangerous signal of escalation to the Soviets. In case the Soviets 
interfered with Western access to Berlin, or elevated the political pressure otherwise, the 
divisions still could be deployed, two or three of them within fourteen days and the 
remainder and two marine divisions within one month. At the moment, the six division 
were not essential since “NATO would not agree to a 12 division assault up the Autobahn 
in an attempt to reach Berlin.” Norstad concluded that “the divisions could not make the 
difference between success and failure in general war.” At worst, the United States would 
have committed all of its combat ready reserves at the outset.90 General Taylor 
questioned Norstad’s motives: “This proposal, particularly the six to eight division 
requirement is very surprising to me. To provide these forces in the time indicated would 
put great pressure upon our transportation and logistical system and would result in 
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delivering units pell-mell into a strange environment which might soon become one of 
combat.” Taylor concluded that “it is hard for me to view this as a serious proposal.”91 
The medium-term force objective of the army remained undecided until later in 
the fall. Army leaders proposed sixteen divisions and eight independent brigades. 
McNamara, who agreed with an ultimate force goal of sixteen divisions, thought that in 
the short-term the defense budget would be better spent on improving the quality and 
equipment of the fourteen active divisions and seven independent brigades as well as the 
first-line reserve units. But in October, McNamara tentatively moved toward acceptance 
of the army’s proposal.92 When the defense budget for 1963 was debated, the crisis in 
Berlin had convinced most decision-makers that fourteen divisions were insufficient for 
operations outside of Europe in the event of two or more simultaneous crises. By late 
November, the administration had decided to increase the army to sixteen active 
divisions. At the same time, plans to deploy additional combat divisions in Europe for the 
duration of the Berlin Crisis were buried.93 
On October 20, President Kennedy had specified U.S. policy for military action in 
the Berlin Crisis. He informed Norstad that interference with access to Berlin short of a 
 
91Taylor to John F. Kennedy, 3 October 1961, General Norstad’s Proposal for 
U.S. Reinforcements to NATO. Papers of President Kennedy, President’s Office Files, 
Subjects, Box 103, “NATO - Norstad Meetings,” JFKL. 
 92Robert McNamara, Memorandum for the President, 6 October 1961, 
Recommended Department of Defense FY ‘63 Budget and 1963-67 Programs, pp. 9-12. 
National Security Files, Departments and Agencies, Box 175, “Department of Defense, 
Recommended DOD FY63 Budget 10/6/61,” JFKL.  The recommendation and 
McNamara’s rationale are still based on fourteen divisions, but two more divisions and an 
eighth brigade were added in pencil.   
 93Maxwell Taylor, Memorandum for the President, 22 November 1961, Support 
of Conventional Forces in the 1963 Budget. National Security Files, Departments and 
Agencies, Box 175, “Department of Defense, Defense Budget FY63 11/61-12/61,” JFKL. 
252
full blockade was to be countered by a platoon-sized probe. Kennedy assumed that this 
would not increase the risk of war. If that did not end the interference, the U.S. would 
resort to economic embargo, maritime harassment, and U.N. action, while mobilizing its 
armed forces. Next, NATO was to communicate the urgency of the situation once more 
before embarking upon non-nuclear military operations to regain access to the city on the 
ground and in the air. In this event, a force larger than a division was to advance to 
Berlin. This was still a limited military action that aimed at convincing the Soviets to 
back down. If all else failed, Norstad was told to employ nuclear weapons, at first 
demonstratively, then in “limited tactical employment...to achieve...significant tactical 
advantage such as preservation of the integrity of Allied forces committed, or to extend 
pressure toward the objective.” Kennedy acknowledged the possibility of general nuclear 
war.94 
Norstad’s relationship with Kennedy deteriorated. Norstad wanted greater 
flexibility of action, but he opposed the present emphasis on conventional military 
operations. He tried to convince Washington that greater sensibility for Allied concerns 
was needed. When this failed, he refused to alter SHAPE planning in accordance with 
Kennedy’s directive.95 Norstad supported a kind of flexible response that depended to a 
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much greater extent on the nuclear deterrent than the Kennedy administration in general, 
and White House and State Department in particular, were willing to concede.96 
U.S. intelligence agencies predicted that the Soviets would understand that use of 
nuclear weapons had been selective, but they still would have no choice but to respond in 
kind. The CIA also cautioned that the European allies would not endorse the use of 
nuclear weapons over Berlin.97 Norstad, who believed that the current crisis could be 
weathered without military escalation, knew that the German military opposed military 
action by forces larger than one battalion. He suggested a battalion-size or smaller initial 
probe, to be followed by urgent communication with the Soviets, political pressure by the 
U.N., maritime operations, a presidential announcement, and direct military action. 
Military planning centered on a limited-objective offensive in the border area that could 
be supported by selective use of nuclear weapons. Norstad opposed sending one or more 
divisions into East Germany.98 Plans for military operations to reopen access to Berlin 
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Norstad Papers, Policy Files Series, Box 90. “Strategy - General (1),” DDEL.  
254
remained on the books after the immediate crisis had been diffused in the fall and winter 
of 1961.99 
The first year of John F. Kennedy’s presidency was fraught with crises ranging 
from Cuba to Laos and to Berlin. Relations with European governments were difficult. 
Germany and France rejected Flexible Response because of the emphasis placed on 
conventional forces and limited war. The German and French administrations decried 
reckless calculations in Washington that pointed at the possibility of war in Europe 
instead of emphasizing the infallibility of the deterrent. Until 1967, Massive Retaliation 
remained alliance strategy, even though there were doubts that the United States would 
expend its nuclear deterrent in a European war. The political debate appeared detached 
from operational planning, however. In 1963 the forward-defense line was moved from 
Weser and Lech to the intra-German border.100 
Strategy and Operations: Forward Defense in Germany 
At the beginning of 1961, General Jacquot, the commander of AFCENT, had 
informed General Norstad that defense of Germany was impossible. 900 square 
kilometers of the intra-German border were to be defended by one light battalion of the 
border guard. A division was to defend 8,000 square kilometers. Jacquot pointed out that 
this meant that each soldier was responsible for one square kilometer of ground, and that 
he had only one tank and one cannon per eighty square kilometers. He concluded that a 
ten-division covering force could do nothing but withdraw unless it was fighting behind 
an obstacle. Jacquot continued: “Taking into account the scarcity of our strength, the 
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obstacle we are talking about must be continuous.” Moreover, Jacquot was dissatisfied 
with the command structure, which required of him to cede operational command to 
Norstad in case of war.101 General Norstad agreed with Jacquot’s assessment that the 
covering force was insufficient in northern Germany. He assured him that the matter 
would be addressed in the 1966 Force Goals. Norstad ignored the rest of the letter.102 
General Clarke believed that the troops in Seventh Army and Berlin Command 
were approaching the peak of readiness. Certain fillers and round-out units were on their 
way, as was the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, so that by the end of the year 
“USAREUR and all its components will reach a new all-time high in sustained combat 
capability.”103 Due to the augmentation of 1961, U.S. Army strength in Europe was 
above the NATO commitment of 232,000.104 By December 1963, 10,000 troops of the 
augmentation force were still in Europe, providing three artillery battalions, two armored 
battalions, and one armored cavalry regiment.105 
101CINCENT to Norstad, 8 February 1961. Norstad Papers, Subject Series, Box 
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6 October 1961, General Norstad’s Discussions with the JCS on Monday, 2 October, op.
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In January 1962, General Norstad advised President Kennedy not to pursue an 
alteration of NATO strategy at this point.106 He believed that U.S. objectives could be 
achieved through “flexible interpretation” of existing documents. He thought that it 
would be better to present specific proposals about forward defense to the North Atlantic 
Council than to engage in abstract discussions of strategy. The State Department 
nevertheless urged Kennedy to “point out that it is difficult to reconcile the present 
Political Directive, the strategic concept to which it gives rise, and current U.S. strategy.” 
Cosmetic alterations to MC 14/2 were not desirable. The alliance needed a completely 
new strategic approach.107 
In May McNamara explained in detail the guidelines for use of nuclear weapons 
in the defense of Western Europe. At the North Atlantic Council meeting in Athens, he 
stated that “alliance nuclear forces are numerically larger than those of the Soviet Union. 
They are more diversified, better deployed and protected, and on a higher state of alert. 
They are combat-ready and able to engage in flexible and decisive action.”108 At that 
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point, the U.S. had more than 5,000 nuclear weapons deployed in Europe.109 But 
McNamara explained that tactical nuclear weapons should be the “next-to-last option.” 
While it may be possible to control and limit tactical nuclear war, it was more likely that 
it would escalate to general nuclear war. Therefore, it was essential to counter local 
aggression with conventional means at the outset and use nuclear weapons only against 
full-scale attack. That being said, ACE was still ten divisions short of the thirty-division 
objective for Central Region that had been agreed upon by NATO members in previous 
meetings. McNamara concluded that the Berlin Crisis offered an example both for the 
need for conventional forces, backed up by tactical nuclear weapons, and for the effect of 
NATO troop augmentation on Soviet policy and strategy. McNamara speculated that the 
western force build-up during the crisis had promoted Soviet restraint.110 
In the discussion following McNamara’s formal statement, the German 
representatives, foreign minister Gerhard Schröder and defense minister Strauss, did not 
express an opinion about NATO defense policy as outlined by McNamara and Dean 
Rusk, who had spoken prior to McNamara’s remarks. While this silence need not be 
perceived as outright opposition, the absence of a record is striking.111 French defense 
minister Pierre Messmer objected to McNamara’s statement because it appeared that 
tactical nuclear weapons were to be taken from front-line forces once the conventional 
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build-up had been concluded. Messmer believed that this would lead to a breakdown of 
morale among ground forces and would expose them to defeat by the better equipped 
enemy. McNamara ambiguously retorted that the U.S. had no intention to withdraw 
tactical nuclear weapons from Europe.112 But in his formal statement, he had indeed 
warned of the negative effects of “highly dispersed nuclear weapons in the hands of 
troops” that “would be difficult to control centrally.”113 
In the summer of 1962, news of General Norstad’s retirement from NATO, 
intended for the fall, reached European capitals. Chancellor Adenauer was concerned 
about the appointment of Maxwell Taylor as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 
added that General Lemnitzer, chosen to succeed Norstad, was an unknown quantity.114 
Norstad replied that while The Uncertain Trumpet had been an indictment of Massive 
Retaliation, Taylor had always supported NATO and the deployment of tactical nuclear 
weapons. His influence in the Kennedy administration was an asset. He described 
Lemnitzer was a soldier of strong character, who was a fine choice for Supreme Allied 
Commander. Adenauer explained that his concern about eventual American withdrawal 
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was connected to the nature of a democracy in which administrations changed. Presently, 
there might be enough stability, although Norstad’s impending retirement suggested 
otherwise, but continental Europe had no voice in the Kennedy administration. Adenauer 
hinted that the friendship of President Kennedy and Harold Macmillan, the British Prime 
Minister, might well prove to be counterproductive to the interests of Germany and 
France.115 
Uncertainty about Flexible Response was also apparent in SHAPE. General 
Lemnitzer, who succeeded Norstad as SACEUR on January 2, 1963, was surprised to 
find that most of his officers equated flexible response with conventional defense and 
graduated deterrence. Instead, Lemnitzer argued, it was a strategy of appropriate 
response, which could be conventional or nuclear but should not follow a predetermined 
model of escalation. Lemnitzer found the prevailing interpretation in SHAPE so 
disturbing that he prohibited the use of the term “flexible response.”116 At the end of the 
decade, General Andrew Goodpaster (SACEUR 1969-1974), concurred with the 
substance of Lemnitzer’s concern. He endorsed Flexible Response, both as a strategy and 
a doctrinal term, but he warned that too many observers still equated it with graduated 
escalation. Instead, the strategic concept entailed several options: general nuclear 
response, deliberate escalation including the use of conventional and tactical-nuclear 
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forces, and conventional defense. At any point during a war any of the three responses 
could be initiated, although Goodpaster conceded that NATO was to attempt to rely on 
conventional defense as long as possible.117 
To counter widespread trepidation about the weakening of American resolve to 
use nuclear weapons, Robert McNamara reminded European leaders shortly after the 
death of President Kennedy, that the number of tactical nuclear warheads deployed in 
Europe had increased by sixty percent since 1961. Moreover, pre-positioned equipment 
enabled two divisions to move to Europe in a matter of hours, and the administration had 
programmed a 400 percent increase of airlift capability by 1968. Even now, the U.S. 
military was prepared to airlift several divisions and move 1,000 tactical aircraft to 
Europe within thirty days of mobilization. McNamara concluded that the alliance was 
strong enough to absorb an initial attack and retain sufficient counterstrike capability. 
This allowed for a shift of emphasis in the deterrent from reliance on nuclear weapons to 
a more balanced approach.118 
Pentagon analysts estimated that NATO forces were approaching the number of 
Warsaw Pact troops.119 They did not acknowledge that the Soviets could reinforce their 
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own forward deployed forces much faster because they had come to believe in the speed 
and reliability of NATO’s reinforcement schedule. The key lay in early warning. It was 
estimated that a Soviet attack could only succeed after a significant build-up of 
conventional forces. This presumably would be observed. That assumption, however, 
rested on the belief that Soviet actions would be interpreted correctly, and that European 
and American leaders responded with great urgency and efficiency. 
 In its estimate for 1962, USAREUR’s intelligence division stated that the 
increasing combat effectiveness of Western armies and the influx of nuclear weapons into 
NATO had caused the Soviet Union to reconsider the likelihood of success in an attack 
without previous build-up of forces. But the fall maneuvers of 1961 had shown that the 
Soviets could move reinforcements to the forward area covertly. USAREUR expected 
that the enemy could assemble an attacking force of forty-five to sixty line divisions in 
Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany, and that this force could be 
increased to 100 divisions within one month of mobilization. NATO forces could expect 
only about four days of advanced warning. Intelligence officers reasoned, however, that 
the Soviet numerical advantage was balanced by the fear that it would cause NATO to 
use nuclear weapons preemptively. Overall, USAREUR assessed NATO deterrent forces 
as strong enough to persuade the Soviets that a war could not be won quickly and 
decisively.120 
619,000 Warsaw Pact troops in Central Region. In addition, with the notable exception of 
tanks, the NATO forces had more and better equipment. Ibid., p. 148.
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The National Intelligence Estimate of December 1962 found that Soviet military 
doctrine stressed the use of all types of forces from the outset of war. After extensive 
debate, Soviet political and military leaders had decided to sustain forces that could fight 
a protracted war in a nuclear environment, even though this taxed the resources of the 
country. The ground forces, almost two million men in eighty combat ready and sixty-
five low-strength and cadre divisions, were well trained and equipped. The Soviets placed 
great emphasis on combined-arms operations with nuclear artillery, qualitatively 
improved tactical air forces, and other tactical nuclear support. Operational plans stressed 
rapid movement of armored and mechanized forces to the English Channel, with 
secondary offensives in Scandinavia, Southeastern Europe and the Mediterranean, as well 
as in the Baltic and Black Sea regions. But U.S. intelligence officers perceived limitations 
to tactical nuclear and air support. Soviet logistics support groups were much slower than 
the mechanized strike forces. Also, there were difficulties in command and control that 
limited supervision of subordinates once the forces had to disperse. The Soviets expected 
NATO to use nuclear weapons and escalate to general war. Therefore, they lacked 
doctrine for limited-nuclear warfare and would struggle with the conduct of operations in 
limited war.121 
But the state of readiness of NATO forces in Central Region remained 
unsatisfactory.122 Only seven of twenty-three European combat divisions were rated as 
 
121National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-62, 5 December 1962, Capabilities of the 
Soviet Theater Forces. Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, Historical Review 
Group, National Intelligence Estimates Concerning Soviet Military Power 1950-1984, 
Box 16, Folder 12, RG 263, NA. 
 122CM-966-62, Lemnitzer to McGeorge Bundy, 20 September 1962, Joint Chiefs 
of Staff Briefing NATO Nuclear Capabilities and Problem Areas, pp. 8-9. Records of the 
263
good or excellent, while the rest were considered fair or poor. Serious deficiencies 
remained in training, manpower, equipment, and deployments. In November 1962, the 
NATO Military Committee concluded that “these forces will have only a moderate 
capability of carrying out their mission.”123 The situation did not improve significantly 
over the next two years.124 Consequently, the JCS considered a case in which NATO 
forces had to withdraw to the Rhine before the counteroffensive could be launched. But 
in a more optimistic concept of forward defense, CENTAG forces seized the 
Thüringerwald, while Soviet troops advanced to the north and west of the Elbe River.125 
It was implied that occupied areas could serve as items of exchange in negotiations. 
SACEUR now had definite plans for limited war, even without use of nuclear 
weapons.126 
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At the end of 1963, U.S. intelligence estimated that between sixty and seventy-
five Soviet line divisions were at combat strength, i.e, at eighty-five percent or more of 
authorized wartime personnel strength. The remainder, fifty to sixty-five divisions, were 
at reduced or cadre strength. The Soviets still maintained twenty-two combat divisions in 
East Germany. Moreover, at least 105 Soviet divisions were located west of the Urals and 
could be brought onto a European battlefield in several echelons. Sixty-five of them were 
identified as combat ready. The initial attack against Central Region would be conducted 
by the fifty to sixty divisions that could be assembled in East Germany and 
Czechoslovakia within thirty days under non-combat conditions.127 The estimate was 
essentially unchanged in 1964, even though manpower of Soviet general purpose forces 
was lowered to 1.8 million. The Soviet strike force in an attack on Central Region would 
include between 14,000 and 17,000 tanks, 250 to 350 tactical missiles, and approximately 
2,000 tactical aircraft. Mainly because of political pressure on the military, the Soviets 
had increased their capability to fight a limited war against NATO forces.128 
In November 1962, the Bundeswehr had assigned its tenth and eleventh division 
to ACE. 7th Panzerdivision was put under the command of I German Corps in 
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NORTHAG and 10th Panzerdivision went to II German Corps in CENTAG.129 NATO 
now had twenty-six active divisions in Central Region, seventeen of them German and 
American.130 The final German division, 12th Panzer, was partially activated in early 
1964 and was to be assigned to ACE by the end of the year.131 The prospects for a 
successful conventional defense of Germany remained very doubtful nonetheless. 
Defense Department studies of the early 1960s stressed that defense without tactical 
nuclear weapons could not be conducted east of the Rhine with the means at hand.132 
Operational planning for most of the 1960s built upon the nuclear-centered 
concept of the previous decade. In January 1963, General Speidel, the commander of 
LANDCENT, told Henry Kissinger that his forces could contain an offensive of all 
Soviet divisions deployed in East Germany only at the Weser. He added that defensive 
operations would be hampered by uneven logistics. Dutch forces, for instance, were 
expected to hold their positions for only three days, while U.S. forces had sufficient 
support for three weeks. Nevertheless, it might be possible to hold the Weser-Lech line 
for nine days. If NATO had thirty divisions in Central Region, Speidel believed that a 
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Soviet offensive with forty-five divisions could be met initially, but after one week of 
defensive operations at the intra-German border, tactical nuclear weapons would have to 
be used or the front would disintegrate. Speidel estimated that it would take thirty-six 
divisions to contain all Warsaw Pact forces currently in Eastern Europe for up to two 
weeks without employment of nuclear weapons. Finally, Speidel pointed out that 
defensive operations with purely conventional forces would not enable NATO to fight 
exclusively in West Germany. On the other hand, the employment of tactical-nuclear 
weapons might allow for counter-offensive operations in the vicinity of Leipzig.133 
Despite doubts that northern Germany could be defended, ACE moved the main 
line of defense in Central Region to the intra-German border in 1963. This followed 
General Norstad’s optimistic assessment of January 1962 that the force build-up during 
the Berlin Crisis allowed for forward defense of all NATO territory.134 The official shift 
of the main line of defense was made to mollify the Germans, who had grown 
increasingly concerned over the Weser-Lech line and plans for the use of a great number 
of tactical nuclear weapons on West German territory.135 Ideally, forward defense should 
begin east of the border with the interdiction of Warsaw Pact reinforcements. Maneuver 
 
133Henry Kissinger, Memorandum of Conversation with General Speidel in 
Fontainebleau, 10 January 1963. Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files, 
Robert W. Komer, Box 417, “Germany (Berlin) 1961-1962 [Folder 1 of 2],” JFKL. 
 134Aide Memoire for Mr. Stikker [unspecified author], 19 January 1962, NATO 
Strategy. Norstad Papers, Subject Series, Box 110, “Secretary General - NATO (4),” 
DDEL. 
 135The German military representative to NATO argued that eastward movement 
of the main line of defense meant that “the deterrence will also be moved forward.” In 
particular, it meant that the cities of Hamburg and Munich could not easily be taken by 
Soviet troops and used as pawns in negotiations. NMR-Germany, 12 November 1962. 
Norstad Papers, Country File, Box 49, “Germany 1961-1962 (1),” DDEL. 
267
exercises of I German Corps in the winter of 1960 indicated plans for delaying actions 
deep inside East Germany. In a war game, Bundeswehr forces met the Soviets twenty to 
forty miles inside East German territory. Both sides renounced first use of nuclear 
weapons. The German main line of defense was prepared from Lübeck to Braunschweig 
and into the Harz Mountains, well forward of the northern segment of the Weser-Lech 
line. The delaying action to the east was to buy enough time to build up forces for the 
defensive, and assemble a force for counterattacks north of the Harz.136 
Prior to 1963, Allied officers had questioned whether Bundeswehr brigades would 
participate in a fighting withdrawal to the Weser River and subsequent defense in depth. 
Many of them expected that German troops would attempt to defend the border, NATO 
operational plans notwithstanding. Now, officers in SHAPE conceded that it was very 
likely that the Soviets would penetrate the new forward-defense line. They specified that 
nuclear weapons were to be used against Soviet formations that had broken through.137 
General Norstad had privately challenged the assumption that use of tactical nuclear 
weapons had to lead to general nuclear war. After his retirement, SHAPE no longer 
insisted that there could be no holding back of strategic nuclear weapons once tactical 
nuclear weapons had been used. Such a fundamental shift in the understanding of 
escalation had to be kept secret in order to maintain the credibility of the deterrent. 
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Protracted war in Germany was undesirable for any party involved. While 
briefing Secretary McNamara in July 1963, the German General Bertram argued that 
even limited aggression would have to be countered with selective use of battlefield 
nuclear weapons because it would likely be a probe to test NATO’s resolve. While the 
U.S. did not differentiate between types of tactical nuclear weapons, German doctrine 
distinguished between battlefield (range of 40 kilometers, yield of up to 10 kilotons), 
tactical (range up to 600 nautical miles, yields greater than 10 kilotons), medium-range, 
and strategic nuclear weapons.138 Since the German military expected a short war, reserve 
forces were deemed insignificant.139 General Taylor warned against the immediate use of 
low-yield nuclear weapons because it might compel the Soviets to employ medium-range 
ballistic missiles. He assumed that both sides would attempt to limit armed conflict below 
the level of strategic nuclear exchange. Taylor praised the forward-defense strategy, but 
he recognized that the active forces necessary for conventional and nuclear defense 
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limited to battlefield weapons could not be raised in the near future.140 The German 
military believed that a force of thirty to forty divisions at the intra-German border would 
confront the enemy “with the incalculable hazard of Western nuclear defense.”141 
The State Department was concerned about the support that the German position 
enjoyed among senior American officers. Even Secretary McNamara appeared to believe 
that nuclear war could be controlled.142 Dean Rusk asked McNamara to review JCS 
proposals for NATO military strategy, which outlined responses to deliberate Soviet 
aggression, a scenario regarded to be unlikely even though NATO doctrine still supported 
the deliberate-war theory. Rusk pointed out that “any strategy paper should...stress the 
more probable type of contingencies, such as unintended conflict arising over Berlin, out 
of disorders in East Germany or Southern Europe, or by miscalculation.” NATO had to 
be concerned with developing military forces that addressed limited crises without 
premature use of nuclear weapons. Rusk lamented that the procedure for release of 
tactical nuclear weapons was ambiguous. This was useful in principle to enhance the 
deterrent value of the weapons, but Rusk believed that the strategy paper included early 
use of tactical nuclear weapons mainly for political reasons and he was troubled by its 
implications.143 
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Despite the State Department’s pessimistic assessment of conventional defense, 
Rusk explicitly stated the need to counter a conventional attack with conventional force. 
He argued that only significant losses of troops or territory warranted first use of nuclear 
weapons. The Secretary of State expressed concern about the lack of emphasis on 
political control of NATO forces, particularly in the question of pre-delegation of 
authority to use nuclear weapons. Seymour Weiss of the Policy Planning Staff argued 
that pre-delegation was necessary in a combat situation. He and his colleagues did not 
believe that Germany east of the Rhine could be defended without the use of nuclear 
weapons, but they did not agree that tactical nuclear war in Europe could be controlled. 
The Policy Planning Staff concluded that the pause concept remained sound and should 
be retained, albeit with different terminology. Dual-capable ground forces had raised the 
threshold of war, but the State Department imposed a highly theoretical separation of war 
fighting and deterrence.144 
The Defense Department reached a contrary conclusion. Its studies showed that 
tactical nuclear warfare could remain limited. Moreover, according to the evaluation of 
European views of NATO strategy, West German planners considered immediate use of 
battlefield nuclear weapons to be absolutely necessary due to the lack of space to exploit 
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the advantages of mobile defense and the lack of sufficient mobile reserves. American 
officers believed that the imbalance of forces in Central Region was the main problem. 
CENTAG had sufficient conventional and nuclear capability to withstand a Soviet attack, 
but NORTHAG did not. It was likely that the Soviets would exploit this weakness.145 
At a December 1963 meeting of the U.S. and German defense ministers and 
chiefs of staff, General Taylor and his German counterpart, General Foertsch, continued 
the discussion of tactical employment of nuclear weapons. Taylor stated that 
conventional and tactical nuclear capabilities could not be separated. It was possible to 
imagine, however, that tactical nuclear weapons might be employed in one sector of the 
front but not in others. Foertsch agreed that conventional operations might continue even 
in a nuclear environment. At least, conventional forces were needed to determine the 
location of the enemy, conduct reconnaissance in force, and protect nuclear weapons 
bases and logistics installations. Foertsch concluded that conventional forces in depth 
were required to prevent infiltration. The defensive would be much more porous in 
nuclear war than it had been in the Second World War.146 The army’s assessment of 
1953, that nuclear weapons did not lead to lower force requirements, still applied. 
 General Foertsch reiterated the point Bertram had made in July: the U.S. was 
planning to withhold battlefield nuclear weapons for too long. He added his personal 
opinion that there should be no fixed timetables, but he made clear that nuclear weapons 
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had to be used as necessary. Taylor defended the need for time to ascertain the magnitude 
of the attack. As the situation required, nuclear artillery shells and Honest John rockets 
could be employed.147 The U.S. military and the Bundeswehr had similar concepts for the 
close integration of conventional and tactical nuclear forces, but differed in their 
application. For a decade, the U.S. Army had pursued limited-war capability for the 
purpose of deterrence, but also to contain a Soviet offensive east of the Rhine, while 
German generals intended to employ low-yield nuclear weapons almost from the outset 
of battle. The German concept had the advantage of bringing to bear immediately the 
most destructive tactical weapons. But it is questionable whether the Germans would 
have indeed initiated nuclear war on their own territory. The U.S. Army model on the 
other hand assumed that conventional war need not become nuclear, even though the use 
of tactical nuclear weapons was very likely, and that limited-nuclear war might serve to 
prevent general nuclear war. 
 By the end of 1963, the split between the departments of State and Defense in 
interpreting Flexible Response had grown wider. The State Department insisted on 
sustained conventional operations. Walt Rostow advised Dean Rusk to reject 
McNamara’s proposal for a new military strategy for NATO because it was based on the 
employment of tactical nuclear weapons. Rostow argued that even the appearance of 
abandoning the conventional option would cause the Europeans to spend less on defense. 
It would also embolden those in the U.S. who wanted to reduce the overseas deployed 
forces. Furthermore, de Gaulle’s desire to limit U.S. influence over European policies 
might gain ground among the allies. As a consequence, national nuclear forces would 
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proliferate. Rostow believed that such a chain of events would leave no viable option 
below the level of general war and all rationality that the Kennedy administration had 
introduced to NATO strategic policy would be lost.148 Scholars of NATO in the 1960s 
have argued that Washington, Bonn, and Paris fundamentally disagreed on the nature of 
deterrence.149 But government records reveal that Pentagon and State Department were 
more deeply split on strategy than German and American defense officials. 
 Officials at the State Department were appalled by studies of tactical nuclear 
warfare conducted by the Army’s Institute of Advanced Studies (AIAS), which 
concluded that nuclear war could be kept limited and that portions of the battlefield could 
be nuclear and others conventional. State Department officers questioned whether the 
intended limitation to battlefield targets was practicable. Could population centers be 
spared? At the very least there would be significant damage caused by radiation and 
fallout. Even AIAS analysts admitted that nuclear delivery vehicles were inaccurate. The 
State Department contended that the diffuse nature of future battlefields made the 
distinction between battlefield and other targets very difficult. This led to the conclusion 
that limited-nuclear operations, employing only battlefield and selected interdiction 
weapons, were unrealistic. Moreover, the State Department questioned whether fifty 
kilotons, the maximum payload called for by AIAS, was a low yield. AIAS clarified that 
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yield could be limited to ten kilotons for targets in NATO territory. Finally, State 
Department officers questioned whether the allies could accept the use of tactical nuclear 
weapons in the defense of major population centers. AIAS projected that both sides might 
use about 100 nuclear weapons in the vicinity of Hamburg.150 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff criticized the State Department for interfering with the 
process of strategic decision-making. Its evaluation of strategy was driven by political 
considerations, while the service chiefs wanted to maintain independence of strategy 
from politics. The JCS criticized that the State Department adhered to “strategic doctrine 
developed in 1961 which supports the development and employment of a large 
conventional force in Europe.” The rejection of tactical nuclear war was in any case 
“unjustified.” The JCS agreed that the president had to retain control of the employment 
of nuclear weapons, but they argued that “any idea of continuing control in full detail is 
both impractical and dangerous.”151 The JCS, much like McNamara and Lemnitzer, had 
thus adopted a position that was close to the army’s: a balanced territorial deterrent force 
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was to be maintained in Germany for limited war with conventional and nuclear 
weapons.152 
Eventually, the State and Defense departments agreed to set their differences 
aside. The modus vivendi was summed up by Deputy Undersecretary of State Llewelyn 
Thompson in October 1964: “There is substantial agreement between the two 
Departments on the principal issues of NATO strategy and specifically on the desirability 
of increasing the flexibility and capacity of NATO forces to fight conventionally.”153 But 
this only meant that the two departments would not delve deeply into the question 
whether such a force could be created. The U.S. and West Germany could have attempted 
to build conventional forces in Central Region that could contain a Soviet offensive near 
the intra-German border, but that was deemed prohibitively expensive by the German 
government. Nuclear deterrence had worked thus far and there seemed no political need 
for major changes in the context of decreasing political tensions. 
 But military requirements were another matter. By 1964, the German military no 
longer believed that strategic nuclear deterrence was credible. General Heinz Trettner, the 
Inspector General of the Bundeswehr, agreed with General Wheeler, the new Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary McNamara that graduated deterrence or 
flexible response were desirable. McNamara indicated that the U.S. and West German 
governments broadly agreed on changes to NATO strategy. The German Defense 
 
152Weiss to Johnson, 27 May 1964, Attachment: Johnson to Rusk, Meetings in 
Paris with Bohlen, Finletter, Lemnitzer and McConnell. General Records of the 
Department of State, Records of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military 
Affairs, Subject Files 1961-63, Memoranda (File 1 of 5), Box 1, RG 59, NA. 
 153Llewelyn Thompson, Memorandum, 30 October 1964, NATO Force Planning.
General Records of the Department of State, Records of the Policy Planning Council 
(S/PC) 1963-64, Europe Oct.-Dec. 1964, Box 258, RG 59, NA. 
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Minister von Hassel seemed less concerned with the strategic guidance of the alliance 
than with its political directives. That was a sensible position, given that SHAPE had 
interpreted Massive Retaliation pragmatically since the late 1950s. But as General 
Freytag von Loringhoven, the chief of the operations division of the German Armed 
Forces Staff, pointed out, Massive Retaliation had to be retained for the unlikely case of a 
nuclear surprise attack or an all-out conventional offensive by the Warsaw Pact. Thus, 
flexible response had to be tailored to environment and intensity of the conflict. In 
Germany, due to its population density, there would be less flexibility and operational 
freedom than in Southern Europe.154 
General von Loringhoven explained the German operational concept. In the event 
of an attack on northern Germany, ground and air forces were to engage the enemy with 
conventional means. Atomic demolition munitions (ADMs) that had already been placed 
at the border were to be detonated without delay. General Wheeler interjected that not all 
deployed mines had actually been armed with nuclear explosives because European 
troops were not fully trained in the use of ADMs. Loringhoven then stated that selective 
use of battlefield nuclear weapons would have to be ordered immediately once NATO 
forces were in danger of being destroyed. Further escalation could still be prevented if 
Soviet aggression was contained at that stage. The German concept envisioned the use of 
nuclear weapons only in Germany and not against the Soviet line of communications.155 
This left room for negotiations. Since the Germans did not believe that the detonation of 
 
154Memorandum of Conversation, 13 November 1964, Secretary McNamara’s 
Meeting with FRG MOD von Hassel, 12-13 November, Doctrine and Strategy, pp. 3-5. 
Papers of Robert S. McNamara, Memcons with Germany Vol. 1 Sec. 1, Box 133, RG 
200, NA. 
 155Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
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ADMs would lead to nuclear retaliation, the first phase of the war would be largely 
fought with conventional force, unless NATO faced imminent defeat. This differed from 
earlier German concepts that had called for immediate use of battlefield nuclear weapons. 
General Trettner added that improvements to mobility, conventional artillery, and reserve 
forces might compensate for some of the shortfall in numbers of NATO ground forces.156 
The German concept took on a darker connotation once civilian casualties were 
considered. NATO estimates for the scenario termed “engaged nuclear battle,” a two-
week battle that resembled the plans outlined by von Loringhoven, but expected use of 
battlefield nuclear weapons on the second day, assumed civilian casualties of 1.25 million 
to 1.75 million. In a theater nuclear war with minimal fallout, i.e., tactical nuclear attacks 
at military targets, the nuclear battle could remain restricted to Central Europe, thus 
excluding both British and Soviet territorial targets. Nevertheless, the civilian casualties 
in only three days of conflict could be as high as seven million and would certainly be 
above three million. If there was considerable fallout, casualties would rise to between 
seventeen and eighteen million dead. Finally, in general nuclear war, the civilian 
casualties in Central Europe alone would exceed 100 million and an even greater number 
of casualties was to be expected in the U.S. and the Soviet Union.157 This chilling 
estimate underscored the need for extended deterrence, even after the outbreak of war.  
 General Lemnitzer prepared plans for conventional as well as nuclear war. He 
acknowledged that MC 14/2 did not permit for such a distinction, but he argued that 
 
156Ibid., p. 12.
157MCM-161-64, Memorandum for the Members of the Military Committee, 2 
December 1964, Transmission of Additional Information to NATO Authorities.
International Military Staff, NATO Archive. 
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“unavoidable realities of the time required to reach a decision to resort to nuclear war 
require such considerations.” The Military Committee resolved the conflict between 
strategic guidance and operational planning, while allowing European leaders to reject 
publicly the strategy of flexible response. In essence, the Military Committee agreed with 
the position of the Supreme Allied Commander. To remedy the immediate clash with MC 
14/2, a revised mission statement for SACEUR was drawn up. It no longer included 
restrictions to operational plans for temporary conventional defense: 
SACEUR will defend the area of Allied Command Europe as far forward as 
possible, using available forces and weapons of the appropriate strength and kind 
including, as and when authorized, nuclear weapons. In this regard he is to 
maintain, until implementation is directed, the capability to carry out nuclear 
operations. 
 
Official strategy continued to emphasize nuclear deterrence, but for all intents and 
purposes, NATO had adopted flexible response as its military strategy.158 
The final holdouts against Flexible Response, Germany, Italy, Greece and Turkey, 
signaled readiness to change NATO’s official strategy only after the release of the 
alliance-internal Harmel Report, which emphasized deterrence and detente as closely 
related missions of NATO.159 Ironically, this shift came at a time when the projections for 
the defense of Central Region were on the decline. Flexible Response was adopted by 
 
158Record-MC 150, 14 January 1965, Summary Record: 150th Meeting of the 
Military Committee. International Military Staff, NATO Archive. The quotations are on 
pages 14-15 and 17, respectively. 
 159For the shift in the official German position in 1966 and the then still continued 
adherence to strict nuclear deterrence by the Mediterranean countries see American 
Embassy, Paris to State Department, 26 November 1966, December Ministerial Meeting - 
Defense Planning. PHP (http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/collections/coll_7.htm).  
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NATO in May 1967 and converted into military guidance by January 1968.160 By the 
time Flexible Response was finally accepted, the military situation of NATO had grown 
worse, due to the increased American involvement in the Vietnam War. Consequently, 
General Lemnitzer assumed that he would have no choice but to rely on tactical nuclear 
weapons.161 
In her study on flexible response in NATO, Jane Stromseth argued that NATO 
strategy in the 1960s was a hard-fought compromise that looked little like the initial 
proposals of the Kennedy administration. Stromseth recognized that the ambiguity of 
Flexible Response increased its deterrent value, but she nevertheless believed that 
Americans preferred conventional defense of NATO territory, while Europeans insisted 
on the use of nuclear weapons.162 But NATO military commanders had long adopted the 
pause concept and other models of graduated and extended deterrence. The nature of the 
problem was not the question of American commitment to the deterrence of war and to 
the defense of Europe. Instead, the lack of a clear definition of Flexible Response left 
administrations in Bonn and Paris to wonder whether they could trust those in 
Washington who professed adherence to nuclear deterrence while advancing arguments 
 
160DPC/D(67)23, 11 May 1967, Defence Planning Committee: Decisions of the 
Defence Planning Committee in Ministerial Session and MC 14/3 (Final), 16 January 
1968, Final Decision on MC 14/3: A Report by the Military Committee to the Defence 
Planning Committee on Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization Area, in Pedlow, NATO Strategy Documents, pp. 333-70. The JCS 
protested that this was nothing but nuclear deterrence differently phrased. JCSM-313-67, 
2 June 1967, NATO Force Structure, 10 May 1967. PHP 
(http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/collections/coll_7.htm). 
 161MC 39/18 (Military Decision), 15 February 1967, Military Decision on MC 
39/18: A Report by the Military Committee on An Assessment of the Overall Military 
Situation of NATO. International Military Staff, NATO Archive. 
 162Stromseth, The Origins of Flexible Response.
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for conventional defense. In the event, most European political leaders decided that 
Flexible Response was a strategy of graduated deterrence rather than a strategy of 
appropriate response.
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Chapter 6: The ROAD Army in Germany and Vietnam 
 
The Vietnam War revealed that American political leaders had overestimated the 
ability of the army to meet contingencies outside of Europe. Recent studies suggest that 
deterrence and containment of the Soviet Union in Europe remained the critical strategic 
objective even during the Vietnam War.1 But operations in Vietnam required substantial 
adjustment to unit organization and tactical concepts. The army was forced to deploy in 
Vietnam most of its strategic reserve. USAREUR became a manpower-reserve pool, 
particularly for junior officers and non-commissioned officers. The lack of experienced 
leadership in Germany contributed to a breakdown of morale. Furthermore, the vastly 
different requirements for the Vietnam War caused delays in the development of new 
weapon systems and vehicles as well as the formulation of operational doctrine for 
mechanized combat in Europe. But while the army had to shift personnel and equipment 
from Europe to Vietnam and the U.S., army leaders carefully maintained a fighting force 
in Germany that was strong enough to be a credible deterrent. The army decided to retain 
pre-Vietnam War ROAD structures. Practical adjustments to unit organization and tactics 
were only temporary, which reflected the desire of army leaders to concentrate on 
deterrence of limited war in Europe. While this has been criticized in the wake of military 
defeat in Vietnam, it was nevertheless prudent. In the Cold War, the specter of nuclear 
war in Europe was much more threatening than tactical defeat in a peripheral theater.  
1See, for instance, Thomas A. Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe: In the 
Shadow of Vietnam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003). See also George C. 
Herring, LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1996) for the deliberate decision to fight a limited war in Vietnam. 
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The Nature and Requirements of Deterrence in Germany 
In the classification of the 1960s, there were three major categories of war: 
general, limited, and sub-limited war. General war was equated with high intensity war, 
limited war with mid-intensity war, and sub-limited war with low intensity war. The 
boundaries between the categories were unclear. Many government officials understood 
any use of nuclear weapons to qualify as general war or its immediate precursor, while 
others believed that nuclear war could be limited. Political leaders often failed to 
differentiate between the means for different kinds of limited war, assuming that a 
capable army could function in any environment. The army’s definition of limited war 
included local aggression, conventional war, and limited nuclear war.2 The Korean War 
had proved that conventional war was still possible, even in the nuclear age.  
 NATO leaders agreed that war in Central Europe would be fought mainly by 
formations of armor and mechanized infantry, which could employ nuclear as well as 
conventional weapons. Light infantry seemed of value mainly in static defense of strong 
points and cities. The U.S. Army thus shifted its emphasis from conventional infantry to 
armored and mechanized divisions. In 1960, eleven of fourteen active divisions had been 
infantry or airborne infantry. By 1963, half of the army’s combat divisions were either 
armored (four divisions) or mechanized (four divisions).3 Doctrine reflected the new 
strategy of proportionate response and the army’s mission to deter general war. It stated 
that even after the outbreak of war, application of measured force could still contributed 
 
2FM 100-5, 1962, p. 5. 
 3Information provided by Dr. Bianka Adams and Dr. Robert Rush of the Center of 
Military History. See Appendix 3 for a breakdown by year and division type. 
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to the prevention of further escalation.4 Despite the defensive mission of NATO, army 
doctrine continued to emphasize offense over defense. The latter “may be forced on the 
commander, but it should be deliberately adopted only as a temporary expedient.” 
Offensive action, on the other hand, “is necessary to achieve decisive results and to 
maintain the freedom of action.”5 Army tactics had changed little since 1954, although 
the army now placed greater emphasis on the combination of mobile defense and heavy 
firepower to counterbalance the enemy’s numerical advantage. It was concluded that it 
would be more important to maintain one’s combat forces than to hold terrain.6 But the 
army’s doctrinal emphasis on European war raised doubts about its preparedness for 
operations elsewhere. 
 The degree of mechanization in the army had risen steadily in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s. Self-propelled guns replaced towed artillery pieces. Mechanized infantry 
divisions were built around armored personnel carriers as a temporary solution until 
infantry fighting vehicles would become available. Main battle tanks with greater 
cruising range and better armament replaced medium-gun tanks. None of these 
developments was useful for the purpose of combat in Vietnam, but other aspects of 
technological advance, such as airmobility and the design of attack helicopters, addressed 
the needs of general-purpose forces. Moreover, the army retained some of the older 
weaponry, vehicles, and artillery pieces to equip light infantry, mechanized, and armored 
units that were suitable for deployment in underdeveloped countries. 
 
4FM 100-5, 1962, p. 5. 
 5Ibid., p. 46. 
 6Ibid., pp. 75-76. 
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In the 1950s, army leaders had begun to consider airmobility as an important 
element of tactical nuclear war. During his tenure as Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations 
General James Gavin made the first significant proposal. He argued that infantry 
transported into battle by helicopters or light utility planes, that is, airmobile cavalry, was 
necessary for screening operations and as rapidly deployed reserve to reduce enemy 
forces or exploit breakthroughs.7 Considering the results of exercises at the Command 
and General Staff College, General Hamilton Howze, the first Director of Army 
Aviation, argued in a Pentagon briefing in early 1957 that an air cavalry brigade was 
better suited than an armored division to delay the advance of three Soviet tank divisions 
in Bavaria, as long as it was supported by ample conventional artillery, combat engineers, 
and tactical aircraft. Since the brigade was not road-bound, all bridges were to be blown 
up at the outset and air cavalry units would find it easier to disengage and lure enemy 
formations into established killing zones.8 Despite Howze’s efforts, the Army Staff did 
not request specific proposals for airmobile divisions, and army aircraft continued to be 
viewed as a supplementary means to the fighting force, particularly for purposes of 
transportation and logistics.9 Still, a structured way to study airmobility was established 
 
7Gavin, “Cavalry, and I Don’t Mean Horses.” 
 8Hamilton Howze, A Cavalryman’s Story: Memoirs of a Twentieth-Century Army 
General (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1996), pp. 233-34. 
 9The best works on airmobility are the recollections of practitioners such as John 
R. Galvin, Air Assault: The Development of Airmobile Warfare (New York: Hawthorne 
Books, 1969) and John J. Tolson, Airmobility 1961-1971 (Washington, D.C.: Department 
of the Army, 1973). Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, pp. 112-27 offers a convenient 
survey. A recent scholarly study by Christopher C. S. Cheng, Air Mobility: The 
Development of a Doctrine (Westport: Praeger, 1994) suffers from an incomplete source 
base and failure to consider air mobility in the context of broader institutional reform. 
Finally, Frederic A. Bergerson, The Army Gets an Air Force: Tactics of Insurgent 
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in the1950s, and enthusiastic army officers realized that the degree of tactical flexibility 
that could be achieved might serve the purposes of nuclear, conventional, and anti-
guerilla warfare.10 
During the Kennedy administration, the concept of airmobility evolved rapidly. 
Robert McNamara thought that aircraft provided a better balance between firepower and 
maneuver by improving the tactical mobility of infantry units. To study the matter, 
CONARC appointed a Mobility Requirements Board, chaired by Hamilton Howze. The 
Howze Board found that it was necessary to give commanders of ground forces the 
capability to deploy and supply their troops through the air. Howze proposed an air 
assault division with 459 tactical aircraft, air-transportable 105-mm howitzers, and Little 
John rocket launchers. It was to be supported by twenty-four Mohawk and thirty-six UH-
1 helicopters, armed with 2.75-inch rockets.11 This division was designed to move 
quickly and fight hard when on the ground. The concept was tested in exercise SWIFT 
STRIKE II in August 1962.12 The Howze Board also recommended the creation of air-
cavalry combat brigades with 316 aircraft, including 144 attack helicopters.13 These 
formations were to fulfill the essential cavalry missions that James Gavin had depicted in 
 
Bureaucratic Politics (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980) addresses 
the bureaucratic politics of planning and acquiring the means for tactical air mobility. 
 10Tolson, Airmobility, pp. 8-12. 
 11Tolson, Airmobility, pp. 22-24. 
 12Hamilton H. Howze, “Tactical Employment of the Air Assault Division,” in: 
Army, Vol. 14, No. 2 (September 1963), pp. 35-53. 
 13For a discussion of the development of the airmobile division see Wilson, 
Maneuver and Firepower, pp. 314-17 and Hawkins, Force Design Initiatives, 49-52. See 
also the recollections of Hamilton Howze, A Cavalryman’s Story, pp. 233-57. 
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1954: screening, reconnaissance, fire direction, flank protection, and delaying operations. 
McNamara accepted the army’s proposed airmobile units in 1963. 
 In public imagination, air cavalry and the air assault division have become linked 
with the Vietnam War, but they were created and developed for war in Germany.14 
Hamilton Howze envisioned the tactical deployment of combat sections of fifty men that 
were to be transported into battle by light aircraft.15 He estimated that three such units, 
150 men, could “protect an area which nowadays would be assigned a battle group.”16 
The combat sections lacked artillery, thus placing a greater burden on the performance of 
division artillery. Tank forces were to be used wherever they could be supplied in the 
forward area.17 For purposes of anti-tank defense, Howze foresaw the utility of 
helicopters armed with anti-tank missiles. He concluded that “atomic weapons may be 
used when they prove suitable.”18 
German observers viewed the experimental air assault division with skepticism. 
Major General Thilo, the Deputy Inspector General of the German army, thought that the 
concept would not work well in Central Europe but might be useful in Korea or Vietnam. 
Thilo recognized the need for airmobility in military operations, but he feared that the air 
 
14See FM 100-5, 1962, pp. 99-109. Andrew Krepinevich argues that the army 
aviation community emphasized the compatibility of air-mobile forces to war in Central 
Europe in order to increase the chances that their design would be accepted by the Army 
Staff. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, pp. 115-27. 
 15Hamilton H. Howze, “The Land Battle in Atomic War,” in: Army, Vol. 11, No. 
12 (July 1961), pp. 28-36. 




assault division could only be used once air superiority had been achieved. The Germans 
also believed that the division was too unwieldy for a nuclear battlefield. They even 
considered breaking up their own airborne division into three independent brigades, 
which could then be attached to the three German corps in Central Region.19 In the event, 
the Vietnam War delayed the introduction of large airmobile formations into USAREUR. 
 Germans and Americans were in agreement with respect to the need for a new 
main battle tank. As soon as the M60 tank had been distributed to Seventh Army, Franz-
Josef Strauss had voiced concern about its shortcomings.20 Strauss claimed that a Soviet 
T-10 tank could spot an M60 tank 300 yards before the American tank could see its 
opponent. The Germans had developed a tank prototype that Strauss believed to be 
superior to the M60. The German tank weighed thirty-five tons (almost ten tons less than 
the M60), had an 800-horsepower engine, a 200-mile operative radius, a low profile of 
only 2.4 meters in height (compared to about 3.2 meters of the M60), and was fast and 
highly maneuverable at speeds above forty-five miles per hour. Strauss thought that 
speed, range, and low profile were the essential criteria for a good tank, because anti-tank 
guns were so advanced that even thicker armor offered insufficient protection.21 U.S. 
 
19Memorandum for Record, 14 November 1963, Visit of Major General Karl 
Wilhelm Thilo to the Vice Chief of Staff. Records of the Army Staff, General Staff, 
ODCSOPS/OACSFOR, Security Classified Correspondence 1963, 201-45 Germany, Box 
5, RG 319, NA. A fourth German corps was deployed in the northern state of Schleswig-
Holstein, which was part of NATO’s Northern Region. 
 20Strauss-McNamara Conversation, 14 July 1961, pp. 9-10, op. cit. and 
Memorandum of Conversation, 15 July 1961, Meeting Between Secretary of the Treasury 
and German Defense Minister, Strauss, July 15, 1961, p. 3. Records of the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Secret and Below General 
Files, 1961, 092 Germany, July 1-20, 1961, Box 33, RG 330, NA. 
 21Strauss-McNamara Conversation, 14 July 1961, op. cit., pp. 9-10. See also 
Hunnicutt, Patton, p. 439 for characteristics of the M60 tank. 
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Army leaders did not agree that the M60 was inferior to Soviet tanks. Its 105-mm gun, 
using kinetic energy rounds, could defeat a T-54 tank at 2900 meters while the Soviet 
tank had to close to 2700 meters before its rounds could penetrate the armor of the 
M60.22 
In the event, the U.S. and Germany entered into a joint venture to build a main 
battle tank for 1970 (MBT-70). The agreement was signed by McNamara and Strauss’s 
successor, Kai-Uwe von Hassel, on August 1, 1963. Both defense ministers realized that 
the project would be expensive. The U.S. and Germany were to share equally the 
research and development costs of the program up to $80 million. An additional $20 
million could be added if both governments agreed.23 Eventually, the MBT-70 project 
failed because it became apparent during the Vietnam War that the needs of the two 
armies were different. The Germans needed a tank for combat in Central Europe, while 
the U.S. military had to consider requirements for operations worldwide. Resulting 
differences of opinion about weight limitations, radiation protection, and main armament 
 
22Memorandum for Record, 18 November 1963, FY 65 Tank Procurement.
Records of the Army Staff, General Staff, ODCSOPS/OACSFOR, Security Classified 
Correspondence 1963, 1401-01, Box 49, RG 319, NA. 
 23Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Federal Republic of Germany for a Cooperative Tank Development 
Program, Bonn, 1 August 1963. National Security Files, Country Series, Box 80a, 
“McNamara Visit to Germany, 1963,” JFKL. Strangely, however, the minutes of the 
discussion between McNamara and von Hassel, reveal that there was no joint-venture 
agreement drafted at that point and the two defense ministers concurred that an inter-
governmental agreement could be worked out by the staffs of the finance ministries. 
Secretary McNamara’s Meeting with Defense Minister von Hassel on Logistics Subjects, 
August 1, 1963. General Staff, ODCSOPS/OACSFOR, Security Classified 
Correspondence, 1963, 201-45 Germany, Box 5, RG 319, NA. 
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of the tank could not be resolved. German-American cooperation yielded prototypes, but 
the project also grew more expensive than anticipated.24 
In July 1968, German Minister of Defense Gerhard Schröder and his American 
counterpart Clark Clifford attempted to resuscitate the MBT-70 project with a 
supplemental agreement on funding, but neither side wanted to commit to specific 
production or procurement figures. Moreover, Schröder admitted that “the development 
project should continue because of its political and symbolic value, whatever the eventual 
results may be.”25 Design of the MBT-70 was abandoned in 1969 and the program was 
terminated by Congress in 1971.26 The two partners went their separate ways. The U.S. 
set out to develop a new tank design to replace the M60 series, ultimately leading to the 
Abrams tank of the 1980s.27 The Germans built a modified version of the Leopard tank.28 
The German concept of mechanized operations was based on the employment of 
infantry fighting vehicles alongside tanks. The U.S. Army agreed in principle, but its 
M113 APC was not an entirely satisfactory vehicle because of its weak armor protection 
 
24For the development of the MBT-70 and its ultimate rejection see Hunnicutt, 
Abrams, pp. 117-42. 
 25Memorandum of Conversation, 23 July 1968, in: FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XV: 
Germany and Berlin (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1999), pp. 721-27. 
 26Statement of Secretary of Defense Elliot L. Richardson before the Committee on 
Appropriations, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Department of Defense on 
the FY 1974 Defense Budget and FY 1974-1978 Program, 3 April 1973, p. 71. Records 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Secretariat, Central File 1973, 565 (27 Mar 73), Box 16, 
RG 218, NA. 
 27James H. Polk, “We Need a New Tank,” in: Army, Vol. 22, No. 6 (June 1972), 
pp. 8-14 and Royce R. Taylor, jr., “The Abrams XM 1 Main Battle Tank,” in: NATO’s 
Fifteen Nations, Vol. 25, No. 5 (October-November 1980), pp. 65-71. 
 28Wolfgang Flume and Paul Denning, “Main Battle Tanks for the Eighties,” in: 
NATO’s Fifteen Nations, Vol. 25, No. 1 (February-March 1980), pp. 48-57. 
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and lack of firepower. Moreover, the vehicle would transport soldiers into battle, but the 
troops were to fight dismounted.29 This was not ideal for the deployment of armored and 
mechanized divisions in mobile operations, particularly on a nuclear battlefield. The 
army planned to introduce an armored IFV by 1970 (AIFV-70). Both Germany and the 
U.S. regarded the IFV as a necessary companion to the MBT-70, but could not agree on 
the size of the squad to be carried and the extent of radiological protection.30 Army 
leaders hoped that an interim vehicle (AIFV-65) could address urgent needs and serve for 
experiments toward the design of the AIFV-70. USAREUR required 1,300 AIFV-65s for 
its armored and mechanized units, and an additional 360 for pre-positioned stocks of two 
additional armored divisions, but the prototype of the AIFV-65 was found inadequate and 
the vehicle was not mass produced.31 
Prior to the deployment of American combat forces in Vietnam, strategic 
priorities and needs for global military capabilities did not seriously impede development 
of weapons systems that were designed primarily for European battlefields. There was a 
 
29The Bundeswehr already had a armored infantry fighting vehicle in service in 
the early 1960s, the Schützenpanzer 12-3. This, as W. Blair Haworth argues, came in 
response to the difficulty of maintaining infantry support for armor on the Eastern Front 
in the Second World War. The Germans did not have much experience in World War II 
with armored infantry, but they did analyze the need for it and addressed it early on in 
their rearmament effort. W. Blair Haworth, jr., The Bradley and How It Got that Way: 
Technology, Institutions, and the Problem of Mechanized Infantry in the United States 
Army (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1999), pp. 39-41. 
 30Joseph Califano, Memorandum for Jack Valenti, December 1, 1964, Weekly 
Report for the President. Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, Confidential File, 
Agency Reports, Department of Defense, December, 1964, Box 112, LBJL. 
 31Lt.Col. Walter Arnold, 20 November 1963, US/FRG Armored Personnel 
Carrier Co-Production Proposal. Records of the Army Staff, General Staff, 
ODCSOPS/OACSFOR, Security Classified Correspondence 1963, 1401-01, Box 49, RG 
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widespread perception in Washington that armed forces built to combat the most 
formidable foe could deal with lesser challenges. But army leaders and administration 
officials nevertheless found themselves at cross purposes. The former intended to 
concentrate on the deterrence of war in Central Europe, while the latter believed the U.S. 
had to be prepared to oppose aggression on the ground anywhere in the world.32 Army 
leaders had assessed Massive Retaliation to be unsound in its reliance on strategic nuclear 
deterrence, but now they discovered that the pendulum had swung too far. Instead of 
trying to fashion general-purpose forces for global contingencies, they continued to focus 
on limited-nuclear war in Europe and the deterrence of general war. This meant that the 
army would be less than ideally prepared to fight in Vietnam, but given the nature of 
potential nuclear war in Europe, it was a prudent policy.33 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff also acknowledged the greater significance of the 
defense of Europe. In the event of a political crisis in Europe, Commander-in-Chief 
 
32Andrew Krepinevich argues that army generals contributed to the attitude that 
“any good soldier can handle guerillas.” He points at a statement made to this avail by 
General Decker to President Kennedy, and he implies that Lyman Lemnitzer, Earle 
Wheeler, and Maxwell Taylor agreed with Decker. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam,
p. 37. This account, apparently based on an interview with Maxwell Taylor in 1982, does 
not reflect the opinion Taylor had expressed as Army Chief of Staff, that armed forces 
trained and equipped for combat against the Soviets were not necessarily suited for 
conflict of lesser intensity. Moreover, H.R. McMaster relates that General Decker was 
asked to retire in 1962 because he did not believe that the United States could win a 
conventional war in Southeast Asia. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty, p. 22.
33Krepinevich argues that the Army Staff’s opposition to counterinsurgency 
doctrine was an expression of a deeply ingrained “Army Concept,” which favored large-
scale conventional war, based on the experience of the two world wars and the Korean 
War. He concedes that deterrence of war in Europe was the primary concern of the army, 
but concludes that this was a mistake because sub-limited war in Vietnam was more 
likely to occur. Krepinevich was aware of the prevailing attitude among senior army 
officers that failure in Europe was too costly, while defeat in Vietnam could be tolerated, 
but he nevertheless blames army leaders for transplanting the “Army Concept” to 
Vietnam.  
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Pacific would have to dispatch three divisions, even if his forces were engaged in combat 
in Southeast Asia.34 The Army Staff hoped to address some of the shortfall in combat 
divisions for global deployment by increasing the active army from sixteen to eighteen 
divisions, with seven independent brigades, but in the event the army saw only a 
temporary increase to eighteen divisions during the Vietnam War.35 
JCS studies in 1963 showed that the army would have had difficulty sustaining 
combat operations in more than one theater. The defense of Central Region east of the 
Rhine required twenty-six active NATO divisions as well as twenty-two ready reserve 
divisions that were to join the battle within one month from mobilization. The U.S. Army 
and Marine Corps were to contribute thirteen of these forty-eight divisions. The 
counteroffensive, expected to commence half a year after the outbreak of war, required a 
total of twenty-five American divisions. By then, at least six army reserve divisions were 
to be combat ready and deployed. As long as conflict was limited to one-theater war, the 
size of U.S. ground forces was sufficient. In the event of a  multi-theater war, Europe was 
the critical region, and even though force requirements and threat perception, as well as 
 
34CM-1294-64, Memorandum for the Director, Joint Staff, 14 April 1964, Logistic 
Capability Study of CINCPAC OPLAN 32-64, Phase IV. Records of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, Chairman’s File, General Taylor 1962-64, CM 1294-64, Box 2, RG 218, NA. 
 35Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, 3 April 1963, Recommended Force 
Structure for FY 1965. Records of the Army Staff, General Staff, Security Classified 
Correspondence 1963, Box 1, RG 319, NA. In 1966 and 1967, the army had seventeen 
divisions, two more in 1968, and eighteen in 1969. By 1970 it was back to the sixteen 
divisions of 1965, even though one airborne division had been converted into an air 
assault division. Since the number of armored and mechanized divisions remained steady, 
it appears obvious that the fluctuation was a direct result of the combat in Vietnam. See 
Hawkins and Carafano, Prelude to Army XXI, A-1, A-2. 
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friendly capabilities, had not been fully developed for such cases, it was apparent that all 
available reinforcements would have to be sent to Germany.36 
This issue was defined more precisely in 1964, when Maxwell Taylor, then 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, informed Secretary McNamara that in case of 
major hostilities in Europe “we could not continue operations in Southeast Asia beyond a 
possible holding action employing about four divisions.” If planned operations with eight 
combat divisions in Southeast Asia were continued, “any buildup in Europe, over and 
above the five divisions now there, would be limited initially to no more than seven 
divisions for a total of twelve divisions in Western Europe, and this could only be done 
by transfer of the two divisions from Korea.” He concluded that “further expansion of the 
US ground force contribution in Europe would have to await the availability of the six 
Army ready reserve divisions,” between four and six months from mobilization.37 
The army had first practiced rapid deployment of strategic reserve forces from the 
U.S. to Germany in 1962. Initially, the LONG THRUST exercise, testing the deployment 
of three battle groups, had been scheduled for May 1961. President Kennedy had 
cancelled it when it appeared that ground forces might have to be deployed in Laos. But 
in response to the Berlin Crisis, LONG THRUST was expanded to a strategic mobility 
exercise during which battle groups were rotated in and out of Germany from January 
 
36Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, 3 April 1963, Recommended Force 
Structure for FY 1965, Enclosure 4: Rationale for an 18 Division Active Army in FY 65.
Records of the Army Staff, General Staff, Security Classified Correspondence 1963, Box 
1, RG 319, NA. 
 37Memorandum from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor) to 
Secretary of Defense McNamara, 20 March 1964, Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for FY 
1969-1971 (JSOP-69) Part VI - Force Tabs and Analysis, in: FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. X: 
National Security Policy (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2002), pp. 60-
64. The quotations are on page 62. 
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1962 to April 1964.38 LONG THRUST units were not committed to ACE in order to 
indicate the temporary nature of their deployment. LONG THRUST was primarily a 
political signal to Moscow, but the troop rotation also had operational consequences.39 
One battle group of 4th Infantry Division was sent to Berlin to replace the battle group of 
24th Infantry Division, which in turn reinforced the division in West Germany. A second 
battle group as well as headquarters and support units of 4th Infantry Division were 
attached to V Corps reserve. In the future, the addition of U.S. reserve units to CENTAG 
was to permit for the shift of a German division to NORTHAG or a northward 
adjustment of the border between the two army groups. In either case, forward defense 
near the intra-German border would become feasible.40 
In 1963, LONG THRUST was eclipsed by an even larger troop movement. 
Exercise BIG LIFT tested rapid deployment by air of an armored division, whose 
equipment was pre-positioned in Germany. For the duration of the exercise, the U.S. 
Army had seven combat divisions and division equivalents in Germany.41 
38President Kennedy approved the shift of emphasis in LONG THRUST from 
101st Airborne Division to 4th Infantry Division on October 10, 1961. See McGeorge 
Bundy, Minutes of Meeting, October 10, 1961, in: FRUS, 1961, Vol. XIV, pp. 487-89. 
 39TNT/D-15, Position Paper for NATO Ministerial Meeting, Paris, December 16-
18, 1963, 6 December 1963, U.S. Military Force Levels in Europe. Papers of Lyndon 
Baines Johnson as President, 1963-1969, National Security File, Agency File, Box 38, 
“NATO: Ministerial Meeting - Paris, December 16-18, 1963 (Briefing Book),” LBJL. 
See also Joseph Califano, Memorandum for Bill Moyers, April 28, 1964, Weekly Report 
for the President. Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, Confidential File, Agency 
Reports, Department of Defense, April, 1964, Box 111, LBJL.  
 40US CINCEUR to JCS, 29 December 1961. Norstad Papers, Subject Series, Box 
103, “Joint Chiefs of Staff Nov 1961-Dec 1962 Vol. II (4),” DDEL. 
 41National Security Action Memorandum No. 270, 29 October 1963, Meeting 
with the President, Thursday, October 26, on European Matters. Records of the National 
Security Council (NSC), National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM), Box 3, RG 
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In December 1964, Secretary McNamara stated that air lift capability had been 
doubled since 1961, and he estimated that it would triple again by 1970, when the U.S. 
military was to be able to transport eleven combat divisions to Europe in the first thirty 
days of war.42 In 1965, the strategic airlift capability of the U.S. military to Europe and 
Southeast Asia was sufficient for movement of only one and a half combat divisions with 
fifteen days worth of supplies.43 On the other hand, initial response to a Soviet attack in 
Germany would not require the movement of entire divisions and their equipment, since 
the weaponry and supply stocks for two combat divisions were pre-positioned. Moreover, 
there was sufficient sea-lift capability to move more than ten divisions to Europe within 
sixty days. This capability was indeed needed, as studies showed that enemy armies 
could not be destroyed by thermonuclear attacks. Since the ability of European armies to 
meet their NATO reserve commitments was in doubt, the rapid movement of American 
reinforcements to Europe was critical.44 
During the Berlin Crisis, manpower of USAREUR had increased to 273,000 
officers and men. But by June 1963, it had been reduced to 256,000 and an additional 
 
273, NA. For the concerns in Europe see Memorandum for Record, Meeting of General 
Speidel, FRG, and General Taylor, CJCS [on October 28, 1963]. PHP 
(http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/collections/coll_7.htm). See also Duffield, Power Rules, p.
170. 
 42Rusk to American embassies in Europe, 23 December 1964, Secretary 
McNamara’s Remarks to NATO Ministerial Meeting, December 15-17, Paris. General 
Records of the Department of State, Formerly Top Secret Foreign Policy Files 1964-66, 
NATO, Box 22, RG 59, NA. 
 43Department of Defense, 1963-1969, Military Programs, Part III: Mobility 
Forces, pp. 7-8, 17. Administrative History for the Department of Defense, Box 1, LBJL. 
 44Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, 3 April 1963, Recommended Force 
Structure for FY 1965, Enclosure 4: Rationale for an 18 Division Active Army in FY 65,
op. cit. 
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16,000 were scheduled for withdrawal.45 The remaining forces had improved their 
combat capability. The ROAD reorganization was complete and more modern equipment 
had been issued to the troops. The number of Honest John rocket launchers per division 
had been doubled and the number of artillery tubes had been increased by twelve in 
mechanized and six in armored divisions. Each armored divisions had received an 
additional twenty-nine tanks. USAREUR had seventy-seven heavy Davy Crockett 
delivery systems. It was planned to replace the remaining 280-mm gun battalions, all 
Lacrosse battalions, and two of eight Corporal battalions with three Sergeant battalions 
and two 175-mm gun battalions, both nuclear-capable weapon systems. Coupled with the 
substitution of 155-mm howitzers for 105-mm howitzers in armored and mechanized 
divisions as well as armored cavalry regiments, this amounted to an increase in 
conventional and nuclear firepower over the pentomic division.46 
Operational planning reached a turning point as the forward-defense line was 
advanced to the intra-German border. In October 1963, Hans Speidel, who had retired 
from LANDCENT and served as defense consultant to Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, told 
 
45Background Paper, The Under Secretary’s Trip to Europe, November 1963, 30 
October 1963, U.S. Troop Strength in Europe. General Records of the Department of 
State, Records of the Policy Planning Council (S/PC) 1963-64, Europe Sept.-Dec. 1963, 
Box 259, RG 59, NA. 
 46Vance to Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), 31 October 1963, U.S. Force 
Adjustments and Modernization. Records of the Army Staff, General Staff, 
ODCSOPS/OACSFOR, Security Classified Correspondence 1963, 201-45 Services, Box 
15, RG 319, NA. The M109 155-mm howitzer had a range of 18,000 meters versus 
15,000 for the 105-mm howitzer. The downside was in the drop of the rate of fire from 
ten to three rounds per minute. Ammunition for the 155-mm howitzer had tested  up to 
five time more effective on target than ammunition for the 105-mm guns.  White House 
Fact Sheet, 19 November 1963, USAREUR Artillery Reorganization. Records of the 
Army Staff, General Staff, ODCSOPS/OACSFOR, Security Classified Correspondence 
1963, 1401-01, Box 49, RG 319, NA. 
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Taylor that he expected the bulk of the attack against NORTHAG, either in the vicinity of 
Hannover or Kassel. The Germans were proposing plans for an immediate counterattack 
through the Hof Gap against the southern flank of the attacker. This offensive operation 
was to be conducted by Seventh Army and the two German corps in CENTAG. Speidel 
argued that the counter-attack would have to be anchored by a strong defensive position 
at the West German-Czechoslovakian border, fortified with atomic demolition mines. 
Taylor admitted that he had never liked NATO’s passive defense planning, but he 
cautioned that ACE did not have enough reserve forces for a large counter-offensive.47 
In November, the National Security Council circulated a study on management 
and termination of war with the Soviet Union. The war aim was to be neither 
unconditional surrender nor complete destruction of the enemy forces, but “a cessation on 
terms acceptable to the United States.” The study concluded that cease-fire and 
negotiated settlement could be achieved.48 In the scenario based on initial limitation to 
conventional weapons, NATO’s armies were forced to withdraw slowly, but they were 
able to contain the Soviet advance east of the Rhine River. Two days after the Soviet 
invasion, the U.S. military first employed tactical nuclear weapons against battlefield 
targets and military installations in Eastern Europe. This was done for political more than 
military reasons, because it was believed that escalation would force the Soviets to 
 
47Memorandum for Record, Meeting of General Speidel, FRG, and General 
Taylor, CJCS [on October 28, 1963], op. cit., pp. 4-5. 
 48A Study of The Management and Termination of War with the Soviet Union 
prepared by the Staff of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee of the National Security 
Council, 15 November 1963. General Records of the Department of State, Records of the 
Policy Planning Council (S/PC) 1963-64, War Aims, Box 280, RG 59, NA. This 
document has also been published by the National Security Archive, 24 May 2000, “U.S. 
Planning for War in Europe, 1963-64.” Electronic Briefing Book No. 31, Document One.  
(http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB31/index.html). 
298
negotiate and withdraw their ground forces to the USSR. The option to terminate war at 
this stage included the liberation of Eastern Europe. But in the war game, the Soviets 
responded with nuclear strikes and the U.S. government sent an ultimatum threatening 
the destruction of military targets inside the Soviet Union.49 
After two days of deliberations, the Soviets resumed nuclear attacks against 
targets in Western Europe. The U.S. immediately retaliated against six military targets in 
the Soviet Union. On the fifth day of war, Soviet leaders expressed willingness to 
negotiate, albeit not on the basis of American proposals. Moreover, the attack on the 
Soviet Union could not go unpunished. Therefore, a counterstrike was conducted against 
the sites from which ballistic missiles had been launched. The U.S. maintained that the 
liberation of Eastern Europe was nonnegotiable and escalated the use of nuclear weapons. 
The attack was carefully constrained to reduce damage to cities and industrial plant, and 
no attacks were launched against the Kremlin. Both sides were determined to end the war 
before it escalated to a full-scale intercontinental nuclear exchange. The Soviets retaliated 
for nuclear strikes against targets in Russia, but at the same time they broke off the 
ground offensive in Germany and offered to withdraw their forces to the USSR. It is 
difficult to determine whether military, intelligence, and political officers in the U.S. 
indeed believed that theater nuclear war could be controlled, and it is unclear how they 
arrived at the conclusion that the Soviet leadership would order retreat. It is nonetheless 
notable that the war ended on the sixth day with a NATO victory.50 
49Ibid., pp. 21-25 
 50Ibid., pp. 25-27. 
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Current planning of ACE called for mobile defense at the intra-German border, 
but maneuvers revealed that counterattacks would open gaps between NATO forces and 
could destroy the cohesiveness of the front. SACEUR expected forward-deployed units to 
hold or give ground slowly, until it could be determined whether the Soviet attack was a 
full-scale onslaught or merely a probe. If it was the former, NATO would escalate to 
nuclear war. American observers were pessimistic about the feasibility of holding 
operations, since LANDCENT’s divisions would be decimated if the Soviets first 
employed tactical nuclear weapons. Both dispersion and nuclear tactics were insufficient 
in current doctrine. The crucial problem was that the attacker could mass his forces, while 
the defender had to cover the entire front and was critically short on reserves. It was also 
unclear how NATO forces would transition from conventional to nuclear war. Current 
doctrine might permit for one or the other in a relatively static environment, but it was 
not explained how NATO forces would both at the same time or in short progression. In 
addition, LANDCENT forces were deficient in quality and quantity, as training levels 
remained low, logistics poor, and support troops in short supply.51 But in its conclusion, 
the NSC study group pointed out that Warsaw Pact forces faced equally difficult 
problems and the prevailing attitude was one of hope rather than frustration.52 
The NATO fall exercise in September 1964 (FALLEX 64) showed how easily 
graduated deterrence could fail. Conflict started with rapid Soviet buildup of forces and 
limited aggression against Germany and Scandinavia, which rapidly escalated to large-
scale attacks. NATO responded with conventional force but it soon became apparent that 
 
51Ibid., Part IV: Analysis of SACEUR EDP, pp. 13-15. 
 52Ibid., p. 21.
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nuclear weapons had to be used. SACEUR requested authority for their selective release. 
The North Atlantic Council granted his request on the third day of war in Germany. In 
response, the Soviets almost immediately escalated to general nuclear war.53 There is 
evidence to suggest that this scenario was based more on political guidance than 
operational considerations. FALLEX 64 was the first major NATO exercise in which the 
North Atlantic Council and many national authorities participated. It is difficult to see 
how SACEUR could have presented a limited-war scenario, which was still excluded in 
political guidance. FALLEX 64 represented the beliefs of many European political 
leaders and aspects of the thinking of military officers. 
 At this time, U.S. Army divisions in Germany were at 100 percent of their 
authorized personnel strength, while the Soviet divisions in East Germany remained at 
about eighty percent. The Pentagon assumed that an American division had at least twice 
the combat power of a Soviet division. Intelligence reports estimated Soviet strength at 
sixty to eighty combat ready divisions, but in the eyes of the Secretary of Defense this 
only amounted to between twenty-four and thirty-five U.S. division equivalents, or about 
twice the size of the active army. This assessment was supported by a comparison of 
manpower. Soviet ground forces had about two million officers and men under arms, the 
U.S. Army one million. The army had increased its capability for sustained combat 
operations by increasing the inventory of equipment for all sixteen divisions to the point 
where they could be supplied out of existing stocks until the productive capacity of the 
nation would provide steady supplies. In addition, other NATO divisions were deemed to 
be slightly better than Soviet divisions. The thirty-four operational Soviet and Warsaw 
 
53MC 43/17, 8 November 1965, A Report by the Military Committee to the North 
Atlantic Council on Exercise FALLEX-64. International Military Staff, NATO Archive.  
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Pact divisions in East Germany and Czechoslovakia could be increased to sixty in three 
or four weeks time, but NATO could expand from thirty-five to fifty-seven Soviet 
division-equivalents within a month.54 State Department analysts found the Pentagon 
position overly optimistic. In their opinion, the U.S. would find it difficult to supply 
troops in Europe and Asia in the face of Soviet submarine attacks on vital shipping 
lanes.55 
Robert McNamara summarized the state of deterrence in his address to the NATO 
Ministerial Meeting in December 1964. He stated that the threat of all-out nuclear attack 
had been effectively deterred. He did not think that NATO should prepare specifically for 
limited nuclear attacks against Western Europe, because any such action would prompt 
the alliance to implement its plans for general war. McNamara believed that a deliberate 
Soviet conventional attack was less likely than it had been in 1961. The threat remained 
significant, and weaknesses in NATO forces still had to be addressed, but the tactical 
nuclear capability on the ground, coupled with the strategic deterrent, had reduced the 
risk of war. The U.S. had deployed or allocated forty percent of its tactical nuclear 
stockpile for the defense of the alliance. The aggregate yield of tactical nuclear weapons 
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 55Colbert to Gatright, 28 October 1964, Attached Correspondence re US 
Conventional Weapons Deficiency. General Records of the Department of State, Records 
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stored in Germany was 5,000 times greater than the atom bomb dropped on Hiroshima, 
and this calculation did not even include atomic demolition charges.56 
Naturally, it was desirable to absorb limited conventional attacks without resort to 
nuclear weapons, but McNamara’s address indicated to what extent the Secretary of 
Defense had adopted the concept of integrated conventional and tactical nuclear ground 
forces. Most Soviet experts in the State Department had come to similar conclusions, 
while other analysts, particularly on the Policy Planning Staff, remained skeptical. 
Former ambassador to Moscow Llewelyn Thompson questioned why a massive 
conventional Soviet attack against Central Region was still under internal discussion. The 
Soviets could not possibly believe that they would win quickly and decisively, thus 
preventing nuclear escalation. Thompson thought it was plausible that the Soviets might 
believe the West would accept military defeat rather than initiate the use of nuclear 
weapons. But if that was the case, Soviet plans had to include an option to accept a 
negotiated end to the conflict if the assumption was proven wrong. In the event, 
McNamara recommended significant improvements in territorial force posture. He was 
optimistic about the state of deterrence.57 Yet a strong deterrent, built for large-scale 
conventional or nuclear war in Central Europe, did not necessarily translate into a capable 
force for global deployment. 
 
56Rusk to American embassies in Europe, 23 December 1964, Secretary 
McNamara’s Remarks to NATO Ministerial Meeting, December 15-17, Paris. General 
Records of the Department of State, Formerly Top Secret Foreign Policy Files 1964-66, 
NATO, Box 22, RG 59, NA. 
 57Thompson to Weiss, 29 December 1964, Implications of a Major Soviet 
Conventional Attack in Central Europe. General Records of the Department of State, 
Records of Ambassador-a-large Llewellyn Thompson 1961-1970, Chron - July 1964, 
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ROAD, Global Deployment, and the Vietnam War 
 The Korean War and the nuclear arms race had spawned a debate on the subject 
of limited war that helped shape the perception of the political leaders who decided to 
commit American advisers and combat forces in Vietnam. Strategy analysts of the 1950s, 
such as Bernard Brodie and William W. Kaufman, questioned whether Massive 
Retaliation could deter limited aggression. Senior army officers and leaders of the 
opposition Democratic Party also questioned the reliability of Massive Retaliation as 
deterrence strategy. In 1957, two seminal books on limited war added to the argument 
against total deterrence. Robert Osgood argued in Limited War that the destructive power 
of nuclear weapons forced world leaders to limit their aims. The study of history showed 
that limited objectives translated into limited war. Henry Kissinger, a future National 
Security Adviser and Secretary of State, reached a wider public with Nuclear Weapons 
and Foreign Policy. Massive Retaliation, he maintained, was strategically problematical 
because it was reactive rather than active, and thus forfeited the initiative in case of lesser 
threats. He argued that the U.S. needed to recover the ability to respond to local and 
limited aggression in order to regain the initiative in the Cold War. Eisenhower’s focus 
on economy of means and reliance on nuclear deterrence had left the U.S. defenseless to 
all but the most dangerous forms of aggression.58 
Army leaders found that the arguments advanced by Osgood and Kissinger were 
useful for their purposes, but neither provided the army with a solution to the problem of 
dealing with multiple forms of limited war. Operational requirements and force 
objectives were clearly defined for war in Europe, but it was less apparent what 
 
58Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy and Osgood, Limited War. See 
also Weigley, The American Way of War, pp. 410-18.  
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capabilities were needed against less well-known enemy forces in the Third World. 
Maxwell Taylor had stated that the ideal Cold War army was to consist of two distinctly 
different components, a force equipped and trained for nuclear and large-scale 
conventional war in Europe, and a different kind of force for sub-limited or purely 
conventional war. The pentomic and ROAD reorganizations were steps in the direction of 
strategic flexibility of general-purpose forces. But the army was too small to operate with 
two or more sets of doctrine and equipment, and thus even ROAD formations remained 
tied to mid-intensity war. As a consequence, the army’s ability to fight a sub-limited war 
was underdeveloped. 
ROAD divisions offered greater flexibility for global deployment, but the 
organizational change in itself did not solve the problem how a division could operate in 
Germany and Vietnam. The Operations Research Office (ORO), a joint research 
organization of Johns Hopkins University and the army, suggested that all but a token 
American ground force should be withdrawn from Europe once the Bundeswehr had 
gained strength. Otherwise, two types of field armies would have to be created, one with 
and one without tactical-nuclear forces.59 The Army Staff never seriously considered 
proposals for a major realignment of forces in Germany. The pursuit of dual capability, 
on the other hand, became linked to the elementary question of the necessary kinds of 
combat capability for limited and sub-limited war in the 1960s. In Europe, an “in being” 
dual capability, i.e., the possession of nuclear weapons by maneuver battalions without 
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pre-delegated authority for their use, was desirable. This did not affect adversely the 
compatibility of army divisions and allied forces, whose tactical formations also were 
equipped with nuclear-capable weapon systems. But the possession of tactical nuclear 
weapons by any command echelon from platoon to field army caused concern with U.S. 
allies outside of Europe. It raised questions whether such weapons were to be employed 
in “brushfire wars” in the Middle East or Southeast Asia.60 Furthermore, it was difficult 
to guarantee the safety and security of nuclear weapons on the transport or in unstable 
regions.61 
ORO suggested that combat units were to be armed with conventional weapons 
only. They were to be supported by Special Nuclear Groups that could provide tactical 
nuclear fire support at any command echelon from company to field army, with weapon 
systems ranging from Davy Crockett to Pershing missile. It was estimated that Seventh 
Army would require between 100 and 125 such groups on the company level, twenty-five 
to thirty for the battalions, five to eight for the brigades, two for the corps, and one for the 
field army. But such theoretical proposals did not resolve the question whether ROAD 
divisions were capable of engaging vastly different enemy forces in dissimilar 
environments. ROAD was more adaptable to counter-insurgency warfare as well as to 
big-unit war in Europe than the pentomic division, but organization was not the only 
issue. Doctrine mattered as well.62 
60The Joint Chiefs of Staff indeed advised President Kennedy in 1961 that among 
the military requirements for a ground war in Laos were nuclear weapons. See McMaster, 
Dereliction of Duty, p. 7. See also Gacek, The Logic of Force, pp. 158-78 for an 
interesting discussion of army opposition to an invasion of Laos. 
 61Project KALIUM (I), Study 98.1, pp. 3-5, op. cit. 
 62Ibid., pp. 9-14. 
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To conform to the global nature of Flexible Response, the 1962 edition of the 
doctrinal manual for operations contained sections on jungle, desert, and mountain 
warfare, but none of them exceeded one page and were very general.63 There was a more 
detailed discussion of irregular war, emphasizing reliance on local personnel as well as 
economic, political, and psychological means of warfare. But major combat operations by 
American forces against guerillas were not intended.64 Nevertheless, army forces were 
supposed to be prepared to counter tactics that sought to limit the effect of their superior 
firepower and technology. This was to be achieved in decisive offensive operations by 
small task forces while heavy combat support units were to be held at central locations.65 
ROAD divisions, in short, remained calibrated to fight in terms of a big unit war in 
Europe. 
 The Kennedy administration assumed that wars of national liberation, conducted 
mainly by guerilla forces, posed an imminent threat and that U.S. ground forces had to be 
capable of addressing developing crises in Laos and Vietnam. But army leaders viewed 
deterrence of war in Europe as their primary objective and believed that a credible 
territorial deterrent to Soviet attack had to be maintained. This position was supported by 
defense experts in Europe, such as Otto Heilbrunn of the Royal United Kingdom Service 
Institute and Helmut Schmidt of the German opposition party SPD.66 Seventh Army and 
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the rapidly improving Bundeswehr provided the core of the deterrent forces.67 Army 
leaders did not intend to upset the balance of power in Europe by shifting their focus to 
peripheral areas of the Cold War. For the time being, i.e., prior to the 1965 escalation of 
the Vietnam War, this meant that the bulk of forces deployed in sub-limited war in any 
Third World country were to be light infantry formations. In the future, the development 
of airmobile combat forces promised to increase tactical mobility. 
 As early as 1962, General Earle Wheeler, then Army Chief of Staff, had informed 
Cyrus Vance that “type” divisions for Europe and Vietnam had been developed because 
“it is necessary to design packaged forces either to reinforce a well established theater of 
operations, such as Europe, or to deploy to trouble spots in relatively undeveloped and 
remote areas of the world such as Southeast Asia.” The ideal division for Southeast Asia 
was to be a reinforced ROAD infantry division of 36,776 officers and men, in seven 
infantry, two tank, and two mechanized battalions, with 24,000 men in combat elements 
and over 12,000 in supporting units. Germany was to be defended by standard ROAD 
armored divisions and by mechanized divisions with 32,732 personnel in three tank and 
seven mechanized battalions. The projected ratio of combat to support forces organic to 
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the division was nearly four to one.68 That combat-support ratio did not include non-
divisional elements, which later accounted for the bulk of U.S. forces in Vietnam. 
 ROAD infantry divisions had retained a great number of armored vehicles and 
heavy artillery in order to fight in mid-intensity war.69 But it was widely assumed, both 
within and without the army, that war in Vietnam was to be fought by infantry on foot 
and that there would be few targets for heavy guns.70 Based on the experience of the 
Korean War, where monsoon rains had made most of the countryside unsuitable for 
tanks, and a misreading of French operations with mechanized forces in the Indochina 
War, army leaders were convinced that tanks, APCs, and armored cavalry assault 
vehicles (ACAVs) would be of little use in Vietnam. Their understanding of French 
armored and mechanized operations was based on journalistic accounts of the Indochina 
War rather than careful study of French after-action reports. French armor had suffered 
from flawed operational philosophy and outdated equipment. French commanders had 
dispersed obsolescent armored vehicles over the countryside of Vietnam and had not 
retained concentrated armored formations to support infantry operations.71 The prevailing 
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negative attitude in the U.S. Army toward armored operations in Vietnam was reinforced 
by lack of doctrine for mounted combat outside of Europe.72 
The Army Staff recognized that the requirements of combat in Vietnam and 
Germany were vastly different. Besides obvious contrasts in climate and terrain, enemy 
objectives, tactics, mobility, and ability to seize and hold terrain were dissimilar. While 
Warsaw Pact armies were expected to deploy armored spearheads and mechanized army 
groups in order to defeat NATO ground forces and conquer Western Europe, Vietnamese 
guerilla and regular forces moved on foot, had little artillery support, and conducted 
raids, ambushes, and attacks on base camps. They intended to terrorize the local 
population and break the spirit of the South Vietnamese government and its American 
ally. For ground forces in Vietnam this meant that there would be no fixed front-lines or 
secure rear areas. This was particularly problematic with regard to artillery support that 
army units had come to expect. In the event, light and medium artillery was concentrated 
in fire bases from which all ground operations in the vicinity could be supported.73 This 
system, coupled with close air support and the lack of enemy field fortifications, was so 
effective that the role of artillery changed from softening enemy positions for infantry 
assault to destruction of enemy formations.74 The resulting reliance on firepower helped 
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to minimize friendly casualties, but contributed to indiscriminate killing of enemy 
combatants and local civilians. As army officer and historian Robert Doughty pointed 
out, it maximized the strength of U.S. forces in Vietnam.75 But at the same time it 
impeded attempts to pacify large areas of South Vietnam and win the support of the 
population. 
 The notion that Vietnam would be entirely an infantryman’s war was proven 
wrong after 1965. Initially, the employment of medium gun tanks by the Marine Corps 
and ACAVs by armored cavalry squadrons went largely unnoticed, but as the emphasis 
of the war shifted from counterinsurgency to operations against NLF and North 
Vietnamese regiments, the army called for systematic analysis of the terrain. In 1967, the 
Mechanized and Armor Combat Operations, Vietnam study (MACOV) found that despite 
monsoon climate and environmental features, armored vehicles could move in most of 
the country. The MACOV study assigned two-thirds of Vietnam during the dry season as 
traversable by tanks and APCs, although tank operations were expected to be curtailed 
during the rainy season.76 
Armor units had begun to employ tanks and ACAVs quite successfully in 1966, 
but they “had to invent tactics and techniques, and then convince the Army that they 
worked.”77 Specific deviations from operational conception for war in Europe included 
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the use of M113 APCs as assault vehicles and concentration of force on the defensive. 
The APC received two machine guns with shields and additional protection for the driver, 
thus converting it into an armored assault vehicle, which allowed riflemen to fight 
mounted.78 Dispersion on the defensive, critical in Europe where the enemy had heavy 
conventional and nuclear firepower at his disposal, was counterproductive in Vietnam. 
North Vietnamese troops and South Vietnamese guerilla used infiltration tactics and did 
not possess much heavy artillery. Army units in Vietnam thus resorted to the defense of 
strong perimeters as a means of avoiding defeat in detail. Once enemy forces attacked 
such defensive perimeters, they could be annihilated by concentrated artillery and small 
arms fire.79 For offensive operations, the MACOV study strongly suggested to combine 
armored, mechanized, and light infantry units.80 Eventually, the army deployed one 
dozen tank and mechanized battalions in Vietnam.81 
Tank battalions required little structural change. The main adjustment during the 
Vietnam War was the introduction of the M48A3 medium gun tank, an improved version 
of the Patton tank series.82 The M48A3 was armed with a 90-mm gun, but otherwise it 
had similar characteristics to the M60 tank that was used in Europe. The smaller gun 
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made the M48A3 more suitable for operations in support of infantry, while the M60 was 
built to combat Soviet tanks and armored vehicles in defensive and offensive 
operations.83 The M48A3 was designed for combat in Vietnam, as the era of medium gun 
tanks in Europe had already come to a close. Because of the difficult environment and 
lack of established support infrastructure, the tank battalion received a service company 
in addition to its regular three tank companies and the headquarters company.84 
In 1969, armored cavalry received the M551 Sheridan. In Vietnam, Sheridans 
replaced both Patton tanks and ACAVs. Soldiers in the field preferred the new vehicle to 
the ACAV, but found it a poor replacement for the medium-gun tank.85 As a hybrid 
vehicle, it ultimately failed to convince the army brass. There was little use for its light-
tank functions in Germany. Despite misgivings about poor performance as a cavalry 
scouting vehicle, USAREUR welcomed the Sheridan as a replacement for the M114 
ACAV in its armored cavalry regiments, because of the much greater tank-killing power 
of the 152-mm gun and missile launcher.86 But eventually, army leadership recognized 
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that armored cavalry was better equipped with a mixture of M60 tanks and M113 APCs 
until a mechanized fighting vehicle could be developed.87 
Despite innovations in armor, most of the engagements in Vietnam were fought 
by infantry with artillery support from fire bases. The army deployed five infantry 
divisions, one air cavalry division, and one airborne division, as well as four light 
infantry brigades, one mechanized brigade, and two airborne infantry brigades.88 Separate 
infantry brigades had been introduced in 1965, with four infantry battalions and a 
battalion of field artillery with eighteen towed 105-mm howitzers and thirty 3.5-inch 
rocket launchers. Unlike the division artillery of ROAD infantry, field artillery of the 
separate brigade did not have 155-mm or heavy 8-inch howitzers.89 By 1968, rocket 
launchers had been eliminated from field artillery battalions in Vietnam and Europe.90 
Typical infantry battalions deployed in Vietnam had no armored vehicles and only 
limited organic artillery. A standard infantry battalion in Vietnam had twelve 81-mm and 
four 4.2-inch mortars, twelve 90-mm recoilless rifles, twenty-six light machine guns, and 
110 40-mm grenade launchers as well as 841 5.56-mm rifles.91 An infantry battalion 
deployed in Europe had forty-nine APCs, forty-nine light and twenty heavy machine 
guns, eighteen 81-mm mortars (nine of them self-propelled), four 4.2-inch mortars, and 
four self-propelled 107-mm mortars as well as eighteen 90-mm and six 106-mm 
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recoilless rifles. Battalions in Europe were issued 606 7.62-mm rifles, which expended 
standardized NATO ammunition. 
 Infantry units in Vietnam adjusted tactical doctrine and unit organization to the 
nature of enemy threat and environment. Stripping away tanks and APCs left lighter 
formations that could be used in difficult jungle or mountain terrain.92 Heavy guns and 
mortars were taken away from the division artillery and integrated at corps level, but they 
could still be found in fire support bases. Most battalions stripped away other organic 
items, such as anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapon systems, that impeded the mobility of 
rifle companies and air assault elements.93 This freed up personnel, which allowed line 
battalions to add a fourth rifle company.94 In some circumstances, however, division and 
brigade commanders found it useful to retain one heavy battalion, with tanks, APCs, and 
heavy artillery. Tactically, infantry was deployed in search and destroy operations, trying 
to find, fix, and destroy the enemy during the daytime but then withdrawing into 
defensive perimeters at night. This had to be supplemented by a force for local security 
and another for ready reaction. The fourth line company allowed each combat element of 
the battalion to rotate functions and assured that one company could recover in reserve.95 
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Virtual Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University. Accessible at 
http://www.star.vietnam.ttu.edu. 
 93U.S. Army, Vietnam, ARCOV, Volume 4, Annex C - Firepower, 25 April 1966, 
pp. C-4 - C-16. Record 86742, Virtual Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University. 
Accessible at http://www.star.vietnam.ttu.edu.  
 94ROCID battle groups had four rifle companies, but ROAD infantry battalions 
had only three. Mahon and Danysh, Infantry, pp. 91, 102, and 115. 
 95For the change from three to four rifle companies in an infantry battalion see the 
25 April 1966 and 30 October 1966 editions of ARCOV, Volume 1: Basic Report.
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The helicopter was the most important army vehicle of the Vietnam War. 
Lieutenant General John Hay pointedly summarized the importance of the helicopter: “it 
extended the infantry unit’s area of control at least threefold. A commander could react to 
opportunities quicker, delay his decision, or even change his plans en route....His entire 
unit could be shifted to a new area on short notice.”96 Hay concluded that “in a land that 
favored the easily hidden, lightly loaded foot soldier, the helicopter balanced the odds.”97 
It was the employment of air cavalry and the Air Assault Division in Vietnam that 
convinced army leaders in Washington that the concept of airmobility was sound and 
should be retained. Helicopters were expected to perform even more effectively in the 
open countryside of Central Europe.98 The main tactical difference was that attack 
helicopters in Europe were intended to increase the anti-armor capability of USAREUR, 
rather than operate primarily against enemy infantry. 
 Organizational adjustments to infantry brigades and battalions as well as the 
introduction of a new tank model and armored vehicle for combat in Vietnam, led to 
distinctly different equipment and tactical organization in the field armies in Vietnam and 
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Germany.99 Tactics and operations in Vietnam were characterized by reliance on long-
range fire support, close air support, helicopter gunships, and airmobile formations that 
could be transported into battle by helicopter.100 Some of the tactical and materiel 
innovations of the Vietnam War might have been useful in future combat operations in 
Europe. The helicopter is the obvious example, but equally important were advances in 
signal communications that allowed division and brigade commanders to direct 
operations of all their maneuver and combat support elements.101 The army introduced 
satellite communications and manual switchboards were replaced by digital relays. 
Moreover, radio frequencies were improved over the limited equipment of the 1950s. 
Employing new technology under combat conditions greatly increased training and 
expertise of communications troops.102 This helped address the command-and-control 
problem that had haunted the pentomic division. On a European battlefield, it would 
contribute greatly to the effective employment of dispersed battalions and facilitate rapid- 
fire support or supply. 
 Combat in Vietnam did not change army operational doctrine significantly. The 
1968 edition of FM 100-5 emphasized the offensive and remained focused on Europe, 
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limited war, and graduated deterrence, rather than on the ongoing war in Vietnam.103 
Technological developments were addressed, particularly in the areas of electronic 
warfare and intelligence, but the chapters on “Strategy and Military Force,” “The 
Operational Environment,” “Command,” “The Principles of War and Operational 
Concepts,” and “Conduct of Battle” appeared essentially unaltered from the 1962 edition. 
In the latter parts of the manual, Vietnam experience led to an expansion of the 
discussion on airmobility, which was now treated separately from airborne operations. 
Surprisingly, there was no longer a chapter on military operations against irregular forces. 
Its main points were integrated in a short section on guerilla warfare. The army treated 
Vietnam as an exceptional case, even as the war escalated. Vietnam drew away much of 
the resources needed to defend Western Europe and deter war in the first place. The army 
was unwilling to compound this problem by adjusting operational doctrine to the type of 
war it had to fight in Southeast Asia. 
 The army has been criticized for fighting a mid-intensity war in an environment 
that called for tactics of low-intensity warfare. On the surface, that was certainly true, but 
it overlooked the strategic and political circumstances that had set the parameters within 
which army leaders shaped their institution in the decade following the Korean War. It 
was an expression of the army’s single-minded focus on European war. Given the dire 
consequences of nuclear war, the army’s focus on Germany was prudent. But in national 
strategy, the emphasis of containing the spread of Communism shifted to the periphery of 
the Cold War, thus divorcing it for several years from military strategy. Containment and 
attrition remained grand strategy and guiding policy of the United States. In light of this 
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basic truth, it is possible to view the military defeat in Vietnam with respect to a broader 
perspective. Much like tactical and operational success did not translate into strategic 
victory, local defeat did not lead to a breakdown of grand strategy. That being said, it was 
undoubtedly the case that the war weakened the deterrent in Europe. 
The Army in the Shadow of Vietnam 
 During the Vietnam War, U.S. military strength in Europe dropped from almost 
420,000 to 315,000 by September 1968. Army forces in Europe were reduced from 
272,000 officers and men during the Berlin Crisis to less than 170,000 at the end of 1970. 
USAREUR became a manpower and materiel replacement pool, which caused severe 
shortages of experienced command personnel and conventional ammunition. General 
Lyman Lemnitzer, the NATO supreme commander from 1963 to 1969, recognized the 
need to maintain combat and support units in Vietnam at a high level, but he assumed 
that the drawdown was temporary. The policy to move only individual soldiers out of 
Europe meant that the order of battle was unaffected. Lemnitzer reasoned that the return 
of combat veterans from tours in Vietnam would eventually provide expertise and 
experience, and that the improvement of the Bundeswehr compensated for some of the 
weakness of USAREUR.104 
Due to the decision of President Johnson to fight the Vietnam War without calling 
up the reserve, the U.S. military had to deploy most of its strategic reserve. This could not 
be sustained without weakening the deterrent force. By March 1966 the JCS called for a 
more permanent solution. In addition to forces requested by General Westmoreland for 
Vietnam, the U.S. needed an adequate strategic reserve, a strong training and rotation 
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base, and enough troops in Pacific Command for tasks not directly related to the war. All 
this had to be achieved without degrading the American military posture in Europe. 
Under existing Defense Department plans USAREUR stood to lose nearly 60,000 
officers and men, or twenty-one battalion equivalents of combat effectiveness. This 
would compromise critical maintenance and support functions. The recovery period of 
USAREUR logistics would last more than eighteen months. The JCS strongly advised 
against implementation: “The United States would assume a high-risk posture... and 
would place the security of the remaining forces in jeopardy by degradation of their 
structure, support, and the capability to reinforce in a timely manner.”105 
The army had enough combat battalions to sustain its posture in Europe and fight 
the war in Vietnam, but it lacked support units. Maxwell Taylor had warned about the 
imbalance of combat and support forces as early as 1964.106 This was particularly 
problematic because an American mechanized or armored division required twice the 
amount of support forces than a German or British division.107 As an alternative to the 
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Defense Department plan, the JCS suggested a more gradual and balanced buildup of 
forces in Vietnam that would cause USAREUR to lose 55,300 officers and men, 3,500 
less than the minimum drawdown under the rejected plan. This was more than a cosmetic 
change, because these 3,500 men were critical skill personnel whose loss USAREUR 
could least afford. The JCS plan led to a reduction of the degradation from 100 to less 
than fifty percent in some areas. It could not, however, reduce the loss of combat power, 
and restoration of U.S. Army posture in Europe would still take eighteen months.108 
For 1967, Pacific Command requested twelve additional maneuver battalions and 
support forces for deployment in Vietnam. The army could meet the request only on a 
delayed time schedule, lagging between six and eight months behind CINCPAC’s 
requirements. Afterwards, only two airborne brigades were left to reinforce Europe or 
react to a crisis elsewhere. In addition, the JCS feared that equipment shortages would 
keep divisions earmarked as NATO reinforcements from reaching combat-readiness until 
late 1968. The personnel shortage in USAREUR caused by the immediate drawdown of 
1965 and 1966 could still be alleviated, but command effectiveness would continue to be 
at a reduced level because skilled personnel could not be replaced. To make things worse, 
combat readiness of the reserve was at a low level because equipment had to be 
withdrawn from reserve units to support mobilization of forces. The army had a force 
deficiency of almost three active divisions to maintain the strategic reserve and other base 
requirements.109 The JCS feared that the U.S. would not be able to prosecute the war 
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decisively while also fulfilling its other commitments. The chiefs suggested withdrawal 
of two brigades from Germany.110 
In early February 1966, the army had begun to withdraw personnel from all 
commands in order to increase the training base in the United States. USAREUR had 
been assured that the Department of the Army did not intend to withdraw more than fifty 
percent of the authorized strength of any one branch. Nevertheless, USAREUR lost more 
than 4,500 officers, over 2,500 of them in combat units. By late September there were so 
few battalion and company grade officers left, that NCOs were commanding artillery 
batteries and other units. While that trend was reversed in October, the result was a 
severe depletion in leadership numbers. At the end of the year, USAREUR counted only 
slightly more than 10,000 of its authorized 17,000 officers. In addition, there was a 
serious shortage of military occupational specialists that degraded artillery, maintenance, 
and logistics functions. The majority of combat battalions fell below seventy-five percent 
of their authorized strength and readiness levels.111 
Despite the drawdown, Robert McNamara expressed confidence that the army 
was capable of fulfilling its mission in Germany. In order to compensate for the 
personnel and skill reduction, greater emphasis was placed on tactical nuclear weapons. 
McNamara stated in the Senate in January 1967 that NATO might have to use nuclear 
weapons even in limited war. The U.S. had about 7,000 tactical nuclear weapons 
deployed in Western Europe. But McNamara assumed that the theater nuclear capability 
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was a deterrent in itself, keeping the Soviets from using nuclear weapons during a ground 
offensive. Use of tactical nuclear weapons by NATO forces would only be advisable at 
the point where conventional defense faltered. McNamara believed that the defensive 
capabilities of NATO forces in Central Europe remained strong enough to contain a 
major Soviet conventional assault.112 But despite McNamara’s optimism, the criticism of 
NATO’s Military Committee, that “improvement in the modernization of equipment and 
mechanization of land forces is impeded by the serious shortage of major units,” 
remained valid.113 
The shortfalls in officer numbers in USAREUR, which continued throughout the 
1960s, caused a number of problems. As the war in Vietnam protracted, and opposition to 
the war grew in the United States, European-American relations soured. In Germany, 
American bases and personnel became targets for terrorist attacks. Incidents in the late 
1960s remained isolated, but by the early 1970s, cells of the Red Army Faction had been 
formed and the terror campaign became more coordinated. American soldiers did little to 
endear themselves to their German hosts.114 USAREUR’s crime rate rose dramatically 
after 1967 and the remaining officers were so heavily taxed that they had few resources 
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to address the problem. Germans became the target of violent robberies, rape, and 
homicide. Along with the soaring crime rate and the general decline in morale, came 
increasing drug abuse, a problem that was reduced only after the creation of the All 
Volunteer Force (AVF) in 1973. Race relations became so poor that pitched battles 
between white and black soldiers occurred in bars and on the streets of German cities. 
German newspapers and media outlets took up calls for American forces to “go home” in 
the later parts of the 1960s. Overall, morale and leadership in USAREUR were at a low 
point in 1973. Combat capability eroded in proportion.115 
Lemnitzer’s fears of declining U.S. military capability in Europe and diminishing 
defense spending of European states because of political detente were aggravated by 
further improvement of the Soviet military. In 1965, it had been estimated that there were 
108 combat ready line divisions and that Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe were at 
ninety percent of war strength. Forty-five Soviet and Warsaw Pact divisions and 2,900 
tactical aircraft were immediately available for employment against Central Region. U.S. 
intelligence analysts explained this as a response to heightened international tensions, 
directly related to the Vietnam War. Soviet doctrine emphasized nuclear war and saw the 
proper role of ground forces in the exploitation of nuclear strikes, but it considered 
conventional operations more prominently than had been previously the case. Intelligence 
analysts believed that the Soviets could not use more than eighty divisions in their strike 
force and theater reserve against Central Region. The necessary buildup could be 
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concluded within fifteen days.116 While the reliability of western intelligence estimates of 
Soviet and Warsaw Pact strength in the 1950s has been questioned, recently released 
records from former Warsaw Pact states indicate that the estimates of the late-1960s and 
1970s more or less accurately represented the actual threat.117 
The intelligence estimate of November 1966 reported 109 combat-ready line 
divisions and thirty-two cadre divisions. Apparently, the Soviets had eliminated the tier 
between cadre and combat-ready units. As a consequence there were more than fifty 
Soviet and Warsaw Pact divisions in Eastern Europe that could be used at the outset of an 
attack against Central Region. Thirty-five of these divisions were stationed in East 
Germany and Czechoslovakia, eleven in Poland, and seven in Hungary. Western 
intelligence analysts were uncertain whether the divisions in Hungary would be 
employed against Central or Southern Region. Moreover, the Soviet Union possessed a 
vast reserve. It was deemed likely that the attack would start only after a striking force of 
sixty divisions and a theater reserve of twenty divisions had been assembled. This could 
theoretically be achieved within two weeks, but weakness of the railroad network might 
extend the buildup period to about one month.118 In the long run, the U.S. intelligence 
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community assumed, Soviet ground forces would convert to a smaller number of larger 
divisions. 
 Western intelligence believed that Soviet doctrine of the mid- and late-1960s was 
based on ground operations following a nuclear exchange.119 Thus, USAREUR had to be 
prepared for nuclear, conventional, or mixed warfare. Combat forces were trained for 
small unit tactics on the nuclear battlefield.120 General Andrew O’Meara, the 
commander-in-chief, instructed his troops to advance as the cloud settled after a nuclear 
burst. That was the moment to close with the enemy and utilize concealment offered by 
the burst and the disorder that it had caused. O’Meara believed that the nuclear battle 
would be decided by small units, often acting in isolation. He concluded that “the leader 
on the nuclear battlefield must be a 20th century Jeb Stuart. He must surprise the enemy 
with his tactics and his daring, catch him off balance with his initiative, beat him with his 
aggressiveness and his plain battlefield horse sense.”121 
While the U.S. was becoming more deeply embroiled in the Vietnam War, France 
announced its withdrawal from NATO military commands in March 1966. The loss of 
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French combat forces, five active divisions and reserves, reduced NATO ground forces in 
Central Europe to twenty-two active divisions.122 Even more damaging to the army was 
the loss of its primary line of communication (LOC) from the Atlantic and North Sea 
ports through France to Germany.123 Supply depots had to be relocated, leading to a 
concentration of more than seventy-five percent of USAREUR’s vital materiel in the 
vicinity of Kaiserslautern. This caused alarm about the vulnerability of the logistics 
system to nuclear attack.124 After 1967, USAREUR depended on the pipeline and 
transportation system from the northern German port of Bremerhaven to the deployment 
area in the south of the country. This LOC ran parallel to the intra-German border, in a 
geographic area that might be overrun by Soviet forces. Plans to build a new LOC 
through Belgium and the Netherlands did not come to fruition. 
 Despite the difficulties, Defense Department analysts claimed that rough parity of 
forces would exist at the outset of hostilities. In a conventional attack without major 
preparation, forty-five Warsaw Pact divisions would face twenty-four NATO divisions, 
but NATO would have 50,000 troops more under arms than the Warsaw Pact. Even if the 
eastern bloc successfully concealed preparation for a major conventional attack, it could 
only amass a manpower advantage of 300,000, even though it might field eighty 
divisions to NATO’s twenty-six. While Warsaw Pact forces had a higher ratio of tanks to 
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men, NATO forces were superior in the areas of support and combat logistics. The 
Defense Department conceded that Warsaw Pact forces might swell to 1.625 million 
troops and 110 divisions after three months of mobilization, but at the same time NATO 
could raise 1.42 million officers and men in thirty-seven divisions and a slightly larger 
number of aircraft than the Warsaw Pact. If French forces came to the aid of NATO, the 
Soviet manpower advantage would be eradicated.125 
NATO leaders encouraged plans and exercises for tactical nuclear war. Unlike 
Pentagon analysts, they regarded existing ground forces as inadequate for forward 
defense and Flexible Response. In July 1967, the Military Committee concluded that the 
strategy could only be implemented after a transition period of four years during which 
proper force structure had to be built. This was disingenuous, given that operational plans 
since 1957 had been shifted from nuclear deterrence to forward defense and greater 
flexibility. Nonetheless, the committee members agreed that ACE was incapable of 
meeting crises without early resort to nuclear weapons. Uncertainty of French military 
cooperation and possible withdrawal of American and British forces increased the risk 
that Central Region could fall to a surprise attack. For practical measures, combat 
capability of the ground forces could be improved by an increase in firepower and in the 
number of active armored and mechanized units. Second-echelon reserve forces needed 
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to be upgraded to the same status as the first group of reinforcements. Furthermore, 
personnel levels had to be increased across the board, modern equipment procured in 
greater numbers, and operational stock levels raised.126 
In 1967, the Defense Department announced that in the following year two of 
USAREUR’s brigades were to be removed from Germany. This was the result both of a 
long-standing debate over the cost of maintaining American forces abroad and the 
requirements of the Vietnam War.127 It was done at least in part to preempt calls in 
Congress for more drastic force reduction in Europe. Washington tried to mollify its 
NATO allies by leaving one brigade of 24th Infantry Division, as well as the heavy 
equipment for the two withdrawn brigades, in Germany. Technically, the entire division 
remained part of USAREUR. The concept was called Redeployment of Forces from 
Germany (REFORGER).128 It introduced the notion of dual-basing, i.e., of combat and 
support units that were stationed in the U.S. but considered to be part of USAREUR. But 
this was essentially an accounting measure, withdrawing 34,000 combat and support 
troops while leaving them on the books. USAREUR commanders expressed their 
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dissatisfaction with the solution and pointed out that it made no sense to count units that 
were not actually present in Europe.129 
General Lemnitzer protested that the U.S. was withdrawing most of one combat 
division, while the Johnson administration explained that combat forces would be 
returned to Europe as the situation required. Annual REFORGER exercises after 1968 
served as valuable training experience for the brigades stationed in the U.S. and for the 
military transport system. In those exercises, one brigade moved to Germany, claimed its 
pre-positioned equipment, took part in a large-scale maneuver, and then returned to the 
United States. Lemnitzer pointed out that force objectives for 1970 called for 
approximately fifty-four active division, a strategic reserve of five divisions and two 
brigades, approximately ten divisions as first-echelon reinforcements, and about thirteen 
divisions as second-echelon reinforcements. For 1972, the aggregate force proposals 
indicated an increase of one active brigade and the mechanization of two infantry 
divisions. But at the same time, the second-echelon reinforcements would drop to less 
than ten divisions.130 Without a return of the two brigades and an increase of the U.S. 
strategic reserve, NATO stood little chance to achieve its objectives. 
 General Graf Kielmansegg, the commander of AFCENT, also believed that the 
enemy was improving in quality. Recent Soviet maneuvers indicated a greater planning 
for a conventional attack than had formerly been the case. Kielmansegg criticized 
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calculation methods of the Defense Department because mere numerical comparison 
overlooked that the enemy had the initiative and could amass forces for an attack 
anywhere between the Baltic Sea and the Alps. The German general assumed that the 
odds for a Soviet breakthrough were better than fifty percent. Soviet doctrine prescribed 
an advance of sixty miles per day, without regard for the flanks after a breakthrough. 
Kielmansegg opposed the American rotation plan. He feared that the withdrawn brigades 
could not be returned to his command in time. Moreover, he was convinced that early 
selective use of nuclear weapons was necessary while the defensive front still remained 
cohesive, but he was pessimistic that release authority would be granted.131 
Robert McNamara, who championed the REFORGER plan, nevertheless hoped 
that reliance on the strategic and theater nuclear deterrents could be minimized. 
Otherwise, the ability to control limited nuclear war was in doubt.132 Defense analyst Ivo 
Daalder has shown that the difficulty in defining Flexible Response after 1967 revolved 
around the role of theater nuclear forces.133 But there remained a significant conventional 
force component to the strategy. European leaders depicted the U.S. government as 
having forced them to accept conventional defense at the expense of credibility of the 
deterrent, but in fact there was no unified American position. The Europeans warned that 
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Warsaw Pact forces were better armed and equipped for conventional war than NATO 
forces. Indeed, more than half of the Soviet combat battalions in East Germany were tank 
battalions, as opposed to only one third of U.S. Army battalions in West Germany. But 
McNamara pointed out that the ratio of mechanized to tank forces in USAREUR was 
derived from operational plans rather than fiscal or materiel limitations.134 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were more skeptical than McNamara about rapid 
deployment of forces to Europe. By 1968, the protracted war in Vietnam had depleted the 
reserve and force deployment lists had become impossible to maintain. Two of three 
army divisions scheduled to reinforce ACE within thirty days of mobilization would need 
twelve weeks to achieve readiness. One of them, 5th Mechanized Division, was preparing 
a brigade for combat in Vietnam. The U.S. had agreed to make 82nd and 101st Airborne 
divisions available as rapid reserve for Europe, but the entire 101st and one brigade of the 
82nd were deployed in Southeast Asia. Finally, only one of the two Marine Corps 
divisions earmarked for ACE could be sent to Europe without redeployment from 
Vietnam.135 NATO planners began to disregard American reinforcement schedules. By 
1972, ACE and CENTAG defense plans for the initial phase of the war no longer 
included the first two American augmentation divisions, even though the JCS insisted 
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that both divisions could be deployed within one month and the army expected their 
arrival in Europe within one week of mobilization.136 
In August 1968, Warsaw Pact forces invaded Czechoslovakia. NATO forces were 
put on alert. General James Polk, the commander of USAREUR, responded to the 
invasion by increasing the number of forward observers and helicopter observance flights 
along the border. To what extent USAREUR could have responded to an attack is 
uncertain, since the readiness status of combat and support units remained 
unsatisfactory.137 Two days after the invasion, General Wheeler, the Chairman of the 
JCS, was informed about the army’s capability to reinforce NATO. Four combat 
divisions and the forward-deployed brigade of 24th Mechanized Division were in 
Germany. The remaining two brigades of 24th and three additional army divisions were 
scheduled to reinforce ACE for the initial defense of the NATO area. But 1st and 2nd 
Armored Division were so depleted in manpower and equipment that they would need 
between fourteen and fifteen weeks to achieve combat readiness and one brigade of 5th 
Mechanized Division was deployed in Vietnam. In the event, its two brigades stationed in 
the U.S. would not be combat ready for more than three months. The only forces that 
could reach Western Europe within one month of mobilization were two brigades of 82nd 
Airborne Division and 69th Infantry Brigade. In case of war in Europe, the army was to 
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re-deploy forces from Vietnam to Germany, but it was estimated that this would take at 
least four months.138 
The military chiefs of staff of the NATO countries soon realized that the invasion 
of Czechoslovakia had not increased the risk of war.139 But the military operation had 
improved the overall readiness of armed forces in the western USSR, thus reducing the 
accuracy of recent intelligence assessments. Moreover, with thirteen additional Soviet 
divisions in Czechoslovakia, Warsaw Pact forces opposite Central Region had grown by 
five division, even after discounting the Czechoslovak forces which were no longer 
considered reliable.140 NATO mobilization plans were based upon receiving early 
warning, but the new alignment of forces diminished the need for Warsaw Pact force 
buildup before an attack. Moreover, the Soviets had rapidly brought marginally capable 
divisions to full strength through a call-up of reserves and drafting of vehicles from the 
civilian economy. U.S. intelligence analysts concluded that the Soviet army had between 
113 and 126 combat-ready divisions. Overall, the Soviets had 153 divisions under arms, a 
buildup due to tensions with China. Forces assembled for an attack against Central 
Region could amount to 1.25 million men, 20,600 tanks, 370 nuclear-capable rocket and 
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missile launchers, 4,900 conventional artillery tubes, and 3,700 aircraft. This force was 
dual-capable, even though it was primarily designed for nuclear war.141 
In July 1968, Clark Clifford, the new Secretary of Defense, submitted a report 
about U.S. troop levels and the military threat to Europe. He argued that the security of 
the U.S. and Western Europe had become fully intertwined since the end of the Second 
World War. A significant reduction of ground forces would cause severe damage to the 
alliance and would endanger the United States. The Europeans had steadily increased 
their forces and U.S. ground forces constituted only twelve percent of the manpower in 
NATO Europe. But in Central Region, ACE still relied heavily on U.S. Army forces. 
About 600,000 active Warsaw Pact forces were faced by about the same number of 
NATO troops, about one fourth of the American. A drastic cut in U.S. force levels would 
upset that conventional balance. It would be militarily and politically unwise and 
endanger the improvement of the deterrent that had been achieved since 1961. Clifford 
believed that nuclear weapons could not replace soldiers and that conventional weakness 
might lead the Soviets to engage in acts of local aggression. His report concluded that 
“NATO’s security, and hence our own, requires balanced forces - conventional as well as 
nuclear. Such balanced forces now exist. We must not abandon them.”142 
Since 1961, the U.S. military had withdrawn more than 100,000 troops from 
Europe. Further reductions would reduce the credibility of the deterrent. Still, planners in 
 
141National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-68, 12 December 1968, Soviet and East 
European General Purpose Forces. Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, 
Historical Review Group, National Intelligence Estimates Concerning Soviet Military 
Power 1950-1984, Box 17, Folder 36, RG 263, NA. 
 142Attachment to Clark Clifford to Walt Rostow, 11 July 1968, p.3. Papers of 
Lyndon Baines Johnson, President 1963-1969, National Security File, Agency File, Box 
37, “NATO General, Vol. 6, 2/68-9/68,” LBJL. 
335
Washington intended to reduce U.S. forces in Europe by 40,000 in 1969, in an attempt to 
preempt more drastic cuts by Congress. Clark Clifford warned that force reductions must 
not be equated with savings in expenditures. The withdrawal of REFORGER units had 
reduced U.S. combat forces in Europe by thirteen percent, but reduced costs by only six 
percent. But Clifford’s aides feared that up to 100,000 officers and men might have to be 
withdrawn from Europe in 1968 and 1969, including the two REFORGER brigades.143 
Clifford proposed the return of 41,400 military personnel, 15,300 civilian employees, and 
53,000 military dependents to the United States, while making no changes to the order of 
battle of USAREUR.144 
The State Department expressed basic agreement: unilateral U.S. force reductions 
would weaken NATO defenses and precipitate reductions of European military forces. 
The political consequences would shake the foundations of transatlantic cooperation. 
Most significantly, a drastic reduction would lead to even greater reliance on nuclear 
weapons. It could damage disarmament initiatives, such as the nuclear non-proliferation 
treaty, which many European countries had yet to ratify, and mutual balanced force 
reduction talks, as unilateral reductions would give the Soviets a favorable result without 
having to adjust their own force levels. Despite the great strides made by European 
armies in general, and the Bundeswehr in particular, an unduly hasty withdrawal of 
American forces would cast in doubt whether Europe could be defended. 
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In his report to Clifford after a fact-finding mission in Europe in September 1968, 
General Wheeler pointed out that American forces were not ready for war. General 
Lemnitzer and the generals of the components commands of USEUCOM, had presented 
Wheeler with a concise analysis of the command’s readiness. It showed dramatic decline 
since 1965.145 NATO commitments had remained steady while U.S. forces had lost 
93,000 officers and men and suffered from reduced support and logistics facilities as well 
as lack of materiel. Combined with the shifting priorities away from Europe and toward 
Vietnam, this had led to a steep decline in combat readiness. U.S. Air Force, Europe 
(USAFE) suffered from a severe shortage of conventional ammunition. Its commander, 
General Wade, estimated that stocks would last for only five days of combat. General 
Wheeler feared that this was indicative of similar shortfalls in army and navy forces in 
Europe.146 Wheeler left Europe convinced that there were no non-essential elements left 
in USEUCOM that could be withdrawn. Any further force reduction would mean the 
elimination of vital functions. 
 Wheeler told his colleagues at the November meeting of the Military Committee 
that they should not forget how easily the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia could have 
spilled across the border. NATO was not prepared to deal with every eventuality that 
could have resulted. In order to elicit greater enthusiasm for improved military posture, 
 
145CM-3702-68, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 4 October 1968, 
Report of Visit to Europe. Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963-1969, 
National Security File, Agency File, Box 13, “Defense, Department of, Vol. VI [1 of 6], 
April, 1968,” LBJL. 
 146CM-3792-68, General Earle Wheeler, Memorandum for the Secretary of 
Defense, 4 October 1968, Report of Visit to Europe, p. 2. Lyndon B. Johnson Papers, 
President, 1963-1969, National Security File, Agency File, Box 13, Defense, Department 
of, Vol. VI, April 1968 [1 of 6], LBJL. 
337
he outlined the steps undertaken by the United States. These included a better fighter-
interceptor, other improvements to the air force in Europe, and, most recognizably to the 
public and the enemy, the upcoming deployment of two brigades of 24th Mechanized 
Division in the REFORGER exercise in January and February 1969. This showed the will 
and the capability of the U.S. to provide rapid reinforcements as required. In addition, the 
U.S. planned to increase the manning levels in the strategic reserve. General Wheeler 
outlined a balanced package of short- and long-term measures to improve NATO’s force 
posture.147 
LONG THRUST and BIG LIFT had provided some experience with large-scale 
troop movements to Germany, but the first REFORGER exercise was of a different 
magnitude. Troop movement began with an advance party on January 4. The bulk of the 
troops followed in the course of the next three weeks. Prior to that, there had been four 
planning and coordination conferences between August 7 and November 1, 1968. The 
actual field training exercise in Germany lasted seven days. Fifth Army, the coordinating 
agent for the exercise in the U.S., concluded that it had been difficult to provide the 
necessary training for all troops involved. CONARC recommended that in the future the 
units scheduled to participate should be furnished with all available personnel to achieve 
full strength 150 days prior to the exercise. That was a sensible recommendation, but 
REFORGER was intended as realistic training for rapid response to a crisis, which would 
not allow for thorough preparations. But otherwise, Fifth Army expressed satisfaction 
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with the course of the exercise. The pre-positioning of equipment was deemed sound, and 
the deployment and return of forces had progressed smoothly.148 
In 1969, the Nixon administration reviewed national strategy. Four alternative 
NATO strategies were proposed for consideration of the National Security Council. The 
first was to leave only 75,000 American troops in Europe. If these forces came under 
attack, the U.S. would use nuclear weapons. The second proposal, initial defense, was 
based on the assumption that within a period of about three months after a Soviet 
conventional attack war would have escalated or a cease-fire would have been effected. 
This was similar to the assessment of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. The 
third option was a strategy of sustained defense, based on the assumption that 
conventional war could last more than three months and that the U.S. would not initiate 
the use of nuclear weapons. Both initial and sustained defense could be achieved with the 
300,000 U.S. military personnel currently in Europe, but capability for sustained 
conventional defense would cost an additional $10 billion per year. The final option was 
total conventional defense, adding capability to withstand a surprise attack to the 
requirements for sustained defense. It required at least 425,000 active American forces in 
Europe.149 
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The Nixon administration decided to retain the strategy of initial defense.150 But 
the dissatisfaction with European complacency that had characterized most the 1960s did 
not vanish. Thus, the U.S. continued to evaluate ways to reduce its forces in Europe 
without severely limiting the capability to respond to a Soviet attack.151 Pressure from the 
Senate necessitated the consideration of force reductions.152 But the NSC confirmed in 
November 1970 that “increased emphasis should be given to defense by conventional 
forces” because it was “vital that NATO have a credible conventional defense posture” in 
light of the strategic balance between United States and Soviet Union. President Nixon 
decreed that the authorized level of U.S. forces in Europe at the end of June 1971 should 
be 319,000 officers and men. He hoped that the Allies would also increase and improve 
their armed forces.153 This hope was not entirely in vain, as the Europeans did indeed 
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promise to maintain their current force levels and “undertake significant improvements 
over the next five years.” What hampered conventional defense and the credibility of the 
deterrent, were “a questionable defense against armored attack, a lack of ready combat 
reinforcements in the period from M-day to M+30, shortages in selected ammunition 
reserves, electronic warfare capabilities, and limited effectiveness of air defense.” Not all 
of the weaknesses were addressed in the promise of the Allies.154 
Meanwhile, Soviet capability had increased further. By 1971, there were fifty-
eight divisions in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, fifty of them combat-
ready. Thirty-seven of these divisions were stationed close enough to the border for 
immediate use against Central Region. Seventy additional combat divisions could enter 
the theater of operations against NATO within three weeks. Approximately eighty 
divisions, 20,000 tanks, 10,000 to 11,000 artillery pieces, more than 2,500 aircraft, and 
almost 600 nuclear capable rocket and missile launchers were available for an attack 
against Central Region. Western intelligence still assessed Soviet doctrine as primarily 
nuclear-war oriented, but it was acknowledged that the Soviets were better prepared for 
sustained conventional operations than in the preceding decade, although they still had 
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serious shortcomings in logistics. It was not entirely clear to what extent Soviet military 
capability was affected by tensions with China.155 
Defense planning for Central Region had adapted to the NATO strategy of 
Flexible Response. SHAPE called for forward defense “to slow and stop the enemy to 
force negotiations.” To accomplish this, the enemy had to be fixed in place at the outset 
of battle. Senior commanders in USAREUR did not believe that NATO forces were 
strong enough for sustained conventional defense. In April 1973, the commander of VII 
Corps pointed at the weakness in tactical intelligence army units that cast doubt upon 
target acquisition. General Blanchard was particularly concerned with his counter-battery 
capability. He feared that “this inability to take on the enemy’s artillery could subject us 
to defeat in detail.”156 The initial phase of conventional defense would have to be brief, 
but it might still provide enough time to dissuade the Soviets from escalation. General 
Michael Davison, who commanded both USAREUR and CENTAG, estimated that his 
forces could execute defensive operations successfully for between three days and two 
weeks, depending on the arrival of reserve units from the Unites States, until use of 
tactical nuclear weapons would become necessary.157 Southern Germany seemed much 
more defensible than northern Germany, but the weakness of the British, Belgian, Dutch, 
 
155National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-71, 9 September 1971, Warsaw Pact 
Forces for Operations in Eurasia. Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, Historical 
Review Group, National Intelligence Estimates Concerning Soviet Military Power 1950-
1984, Box 17, Folder 41, RG 263, NA. 
 156Blanchard to Aaron, 16 April 1973, Tactical Intelligence Resources. George S. 
Blanchard Papers, CG VII Corps: Messages, January - December 1973, Box 2, MHI. The 
quotations are on pages 2-3 and 5, respectively. 
 157Davison to Weyand, 12 September 1973, p. 3.  Michael S. Davison Papers, 
CINCUSAREUR Declassified Documents 4 September to 26 December 1973, Box 2, 
MHI. 
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and German defenders or the strength and capability of Warsaw Pact forces should not be 
overstated. Moreover, the North German Plains, while an enticing invasion corridor on a 
map, had rivers, canals, marshes, and towns and cities that would be difficult obstacles 
for a large tank force.158 
In early 1971, USAREUR personnel levels had reached their lowest point. The 
two corps in Germany were at eighty-eight percent of their authorized strength, but more 
than one-third of USAREUR’s units were below seventy-five percent of their authorized 
peacetime personnel strength, resulting in a low readiness condition: not combat ready.159 
Maneuver analyses determined that V Corps could defend only forty-eight of its eighty-
two kilometer defensive frontage, while VII Corps could defend ninety-eight of its 192 
kilometers in conventional and 122 kilometers in “low-intensity nuclear war.” Taken 
together, the two corps could not defend about half of their assigned forward areas.160 
Consequently, General Polk shifted the tactical emphasis of the forward-deployed forces 
from area to mobile defense. This was aided by the introduction of the TOW missile, a 
wire-guided missile issued to mechanized battalions as a heavy anti-tank weapon. It was 
 
158Dwight D. Eisenhower had made that observation in late March 1945: “The so-
called ‘good ground’ in northern Germany is not really good at this time of year. That 
region is not only cut up with waterways, but in it the ground during this time of year is 
wet and not so favorable for rapid movement....Moreover, if, as we expect, the German 
continues the widespread destruction of bridges, experience has shown that it is better to 
advance across the headwaters that to be faced by the main streams.” Cited in Stephen G. 
Fritz, Endkampf: Soldiers, Civilians, and the Death of the Third Reich (Lexington: The 
University Press of Kentucky, 2004), p. 19. Nearly forty years later a major on duty with 
2nd Armored Division in a REFORGER maneuver reinforced Eisenhower’s outlook, 
adding that the area was now built-up to a degree where Soviet tank formations would 
have to fight their way through towns and cities. Michael A. Andrews, “Back on the 
Northern Plain, “in: Army, Vol. 31, No. 1 (January 1981), pp. 16-22. 
 159USAREUR, Annual Historical Summary, 1970, pp. 12, 98-100. 
 160Ibid., p. 35.
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mounted on M113 APCs and had a maximum effective range of 3,000 meters. Each 
mechanized battalion received twelve TOW launchers. This allowed Polk to group all 
tank battalions in reserve, while the front-line was to be manned by a thin screen of 
mechanized infantry and armored cavalry, which now had much greater anti-tank 
capability.161 
During the Vietnam War, the design process for a mechanized infantry combat 
vehicle (MICV) had continued. This was a critical requirement for mobile defense in 
Germany. In November 1967, the Soviet army had unveiled its first model. Thus both the 
enemy and the most formidable ally had a decided advantage over U.S. mechanized 
infantry. The Germans were in the process of replacing the Schützenpanzer with the 
Marder, which was designed to work closely with the Leopard tank. The U.S. Army did 
not adopt the Marder because it was too heavy and bulky for air transport and did not 
possess amphibious capabilities desired by American designers. The lessons of the Yom 
Kippur War in 1973 underscored the need for mobility, armor, and anti-tank capability. 
Consequently, the role and design of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles was 
reconsidered. Eventually, the Army abandoned the MICV design and developed the 
Bradley Fighting Vehicle, which was brought into service in 1983.162 
161Ibid., pp. 18-19, 38-39, 63. At the same time, the combat developments 
command of CONARC (CDC) introduced a reorganization study for area defense based 
on the future availability of mechanized fighting vehicles and high-tech anti-tank 
missiles. General Polk realized, however, that his corps could not hold their assigned area 
and that he would have to fight with the available means if war broke out. 
 162For the history of the Bradley and the complex developments surrounding the 
MICV in the decade from 1965 to 1975 see the excellent study of Haworth, The Bradley,
pp. 47-93 and Hunnicutt, Bradley, pp. 274-81. See also Eric C. Ludvigsen, “IFV: 
Gestation Long, Painful But Product is Superior,” in: Army, Vol. 29, No. 6 (June 1979), 
pp. 26-30. 
344
The developments in anti-tank weaponry as well as improved armored vehicles 
and tanks contributed to the deterrent value of U.S. Army forces in Germany, but General 
Arthur Collins, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of USAREUR, questioned the reliance on 
nuclear weapons. He proposed a review of the long-standing policy to employ tactical 
nuclear weapons early in a war against the Soviets, even if it was a limited conflict. The 
army had never unanimously endorsed this approach, but it had nevertheless been 
prevalent since the early 1950s. Collins argued that the new German political leadership 
did not agree with the policy. While Adenauer, Strauss, and their successors had 
advocated the deterrent value of battlefield and tactical nuclear weapons, the Social 
Democrats, and particularly their defense minister, Helmut Schmidt, considered the 
dramatic consequences of employment of such weapons on the civilian population and 
took a different position. Schmidt was a long-standing proponent of conventional 
deterrence.163 
General Collins pointed out that “both SHAPE strategy and exercises stress the 
importance of fighting a conventional war as long as possible.” It was widely recognized 
that the threat to NATO land forces lay in the preponderance of Soviet armor. Collins 
noted that the anti-tank capability of USAREUR was the most significant American 
contribution to the territorial defense of Germany. Increasing numbers of West German 
reservists provided the opportunity to turn towns and villages into “a hedgehog that 
would contribute to the delay of advance of Warsaw Pact forces and make the Western 
armor and aviation combined arms elements more effective.”164 But Collins worried that 
 
163See Schmidt, Verteidigung oder Vergeltung.
164Collins to Davison, 12 July 1971. Arthur S. Collins Papers, USAREUR 1971-
1972, Box 7, MHI. The quotations are on pages 2 and 3, respectively. For Collins’s 
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new anti-tank weapons, such as the Sheridan, TOW anti-tank missile, and M60A2 tank 
had not been integrated into tactical thinking. Thus he proposed a thorough review of 
operational doctrine.165 
By June 1972, Collins had gained a clearer appreciation of what needed to be 
done to adjust USAREUR force structure and the emphasis of its mission. He suggested 
that the army should reconsider its approach to a balanced force in two respects. First, 
many of the support and logistics elements could be supplied from local sources in the 
event of a crisis. There seemed little use in maintaining big support elements for a field 
army in a friendly country that had great civilian resources in engineering, construction, 
and maintenance. Moreover, the actual deterrent to impress the Soviets was the combat 
force. Therefore, Collins proposed a shift in the ratio between combat and support 
elements. He hoped that this might also address demands for further force reduction.  
 Secondly, General Collins believed that the army’s tactical-nuclear posture could 
be maintained without outdated weapon systems such as Honest John and Sergeant. He 
stressed that there would be sufficient nuclear capability on the ground and in the air as 
long as 8-inch guns, Pershing missiles, and tactical air support were maintained. Overall, 
Collins described USAREUR’s mission as projecting a credible fighting force both 
outward and inward, to deter the Soviets and reassure the Europeans, while 
simultaneously recapturing Congressional and public support in the United States. 
 
doubts about tactical nuclear war, see also his articles “The Other Side of the Atom,” in: 
Army, Vol. 10, No. 4 (November 1959), pp. 18-19, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Are They 
a Real Option?” in: Army, Vol. 32, No. 7 (July 1982), pp. 36-39, and “Tactical Nuclear 
Weapons and NATO: Viable Strategy or Dead End?” in: NATO’s Fifteen Nations, Vol. 
21, No. 3 (June-July 1979), pp. 73-82. 
 165Collins to Davison, 2 January 1973. Collins Papers, USAREUR 1973-1974, 
Box 7, MHI. 
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Collins advocated for a deterrent force first and foremost, but he was convinced that the 
lack of organic, yet costly American logistics could be compensated for, and that 
restructured ground forces could fight as well as the current divisions with their heavy 
logistics tail.166 This awareness of the armor threat and the resulting emphasis on anti-
tank warfare, ideally with conventional arms, became the centerpiece of U.S. Army 
doctrinal development in the decade following the Vietnam War.
 
166Collins to Davison, 30 June 1972. Collins Papers, USAREUR 1971-1972, Box 
7, MHI. 
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Chapter 7: The Cold War Army 
 
The institutional foundation of the army’s recovery from the Vietnam War was 
the newly established Training and Doctrine Command. Its work came to define the Cold 
War army.1 The defeat in Vietnam removed large-scale military interventions in the 
Third World from the strategic agenda. Thus, the army was able to focus on the defense 
of Germany and deterrence of war.2 Tactical and operational doctrine in the 1970s and 
early 1980s was based less on the lessons of the Vietnam War than on analysis of the 
Yom Kippur War of 1973, which had been fought with American and Soviet weapons 
and equipment, using Soviet, German, and Israeli operational concepts of mechanized 
warfare. The army retained ROAD, introduced infantry fighting vehicles and attack 
helicopters, and designed a new main battle tank to improve its mechanized and armored 
divisions. More importantly, the army adopted operational doctrine for war in Germany 
that emphasized close cooperation with the air force, anticipated fast-moving operations 
on a deep and chaotic battlefield, and provided methods to engage and defeat Soviet and 
Warsaw Pact reserves as well as their front-line units. With the publication of AirLand 
Battle doctrine in 1982, the Cold War army completed its transition, although it was a 
different force than Maxwell Taylor had envisioned three decades earlier. In the specific 
circumstance of the late Cold War in Europe, national strategic objective and army 
operational capability were finally brought into close alignment. 
 
1General Donn Starry, the second commanding general of TRADOC, succinctly 
describes its central role in the process of reorganizing the army after Vietnam in “To 
Change and Army,” in: Military Review, Vol. 63, No. 3 (March 1983), pp. 20-27. 
 2See, for instance, Andrew J. Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How 
Americans Are Seduced by War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 44-47. 
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1973: Annus Mirabilis of the Cold War Army 
Historians of the western alliance have depicted the early 1970s as a period of 
severe crisis and near-rupture.3 Different perceptions of detente in Washington and in 
European capitals, relative economic decline of the U.S. and growth of Western Europe, 
energy crises, a Western European desire for greater independence from the U.S., 
generally receding fear of major war, and public discontent in Western Europe with the 
Vietnam War that translated into broader anti-American feelings, posed the most serious 
threats to the future of NATO. 1973 and 1974 were indeed crisis years for the alliance.4
But taking a wider view of the evolution of U.S.-European relations throughout the Cold 
War, the eminent Norwegian historian Geir Lundestad concluded that the alliance 
remained strong and that the “American-Western European relationship was not 
redefined.” The U.S. needed its European allies, and the Europeans “while wanting to 
strike out more on their own, resisted anything that might reduce the role of the United 
States in Europe.” Lundestad argued that “the emphasis was particularly on the need for 
the American troops to remain. Europe’s dependence on America, especially militarily, 
 
3See, for instance, William C. Cromwell, The United States and the European 
Pillar: The Strained Alliance (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992). Argyris G. 
Andrianopoulos, Western Europe in Kissinger’s Global Strategy (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1988) argues that a fundamental misreading of Kissinger’s academic writings led 
Western European leaders to question whether the U.S. still intended to maintain a close 
relationship and Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, pp. 332-33 adds that Kissinger’s 
inattention to NATO contributed greatly to the crisis. For the different interpretations of 
detente and its effect on alliance relationship see especially Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO 
Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance (Westport: Praeger, 2004), pp. 57-
85. 
 4See particularly Cromwell, The United States and the European Pillar, pp. 79-
100. 
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endured.”5 Even in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as Western European public opinion 
turned more sharply against the U.S., “European leaders continued to invite American 
influence” and relied on American armed forces.6 In the event, the political crisis of the 
alliance had little effect on the preparedness of USAREUR. The Nixon administration 
pursued a policy of detente but did not trust the Soviet Union to disarm and therefore did 
not seek force reductions. 
 1973 was a year of political and diplomatic tensions between the U.S. and 
Western Europe, but it was also a critical point in the development of the Cold War army. 
First, U.S. participation in the Vietnam War ended. Second, the draft was replaced by 
volunteer enlistment, resulting in a more highly skilled and generally more professional 
force. Third, the Yom Kippur War between Israel and an Arab coalition that was mainly 
equipped with Warsaw Pact weapon systems, offered valuable insight into the interplay 
of modern technology, determination, preparedness, and operational doctrine. Finally, the 
army established a new command that was to direct training and oversee the writing of 
doctrine. 
 In January 1973, the U.S. and North Vietnam signed the Peace Paris Accords after 
several years of difficult negotiations. The agreement stipulated that all American 
military operations in Vietnam had to end and that U.S. troops had to withdraw by the 
end of March. In addition, a cease-fire was announced between the South Vietnamese 
National Liberation Front and the government of Nguyen Van Thieu. Larry Berman, a 
 
5Geir Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe Since 1945: From 
“Empire” by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 
p. 169. (Emphasis in original.) 
 6Ibid., p. 201. 
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political scientists and student of U.S. policy toward Vietnam, argues that Nixon and 
Henry Kissinger endorsed the peace agreement because it was certain to be violated by 
the North Vietnamese. Upon such violation of an international treaty, the U.S. 
government could reenter the battle without facing overwhelming domestic opposition. In 
the event, the U.S. did not intervene when North Vietnamese forces launched an 
offensive in the spring of 1975 that ultimately overthrew the Saigon government and 
reunified Vietnam by force. For the army, the Paris Peace Accords closed a chapter of the 
Cold War that had begun with a small group of military advisers in September 1950. 
During the Vietnam War, the U.S. military lost over 56,000 airmen, marines, sailors, and 
soldiers. The army’s casualties were 37,895 dead and 208,576 wounded in combat.7
Closing the chapter of the Vietnam War, however, did not immediately cure the 
ills that had befallen the army. Social and racial tensions brought forth in the U.S. during 
the Civil Rights movement and the anti-war protests were manifest in the military 
services. The decline of morale in USAREUR has been discussed already, but the army 
in its entirety suffered from similar symptoms: poor race relations, drug and alcohol 
abuse, crime, and a general lack of credible leadership on all levels. By 1973, soldiering 
was no longer a profession regarded as honorable by the public. Moreover, an entire 
decade had passed without modernization of doctrine, organization, or training. The 
defeat in Vietnam weakened the confidence of army leaders in the national political 
leadership. But Vietnam-era personnel policies were equally destructive, as they left most 
units ineffective and had caused serious depletion of the non-commissioned officer corps. 
 
7Larry Berman, No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam 
(New York: The Free Press, 2001). For U.S. policy under Nixon see also Jeffrey Kimball, 
Nixon’s Vietnam War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998). For U.S. casualties 
see Stanton, Vietnam Order of Battle, p. 346.
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As a result, combat troops in USAREUR saw themselves as little more than token 
impediments to a Soviet offensive.8
While the U.S. was preoccupied with the Vietnam War,9 the Soviet military had 
advanced concepts of mechanized warfare that blended its superiority in numbers with 
new equipment for mechanized and armored formations as well as artillery under the 
doctrine of mass-momentum-continuous land combat. In the early 1970s, the balance of 
forces in Europe favored the Warsaw Pact to a greater degree than during the preceding 
decade. General Andrew Goodpaster, SACEUR from 1969 to 1974, provided a rough 
tally in an address to the United Kingdom’s National Defence College. He credited the 
Soviet army with 125 divisions, supported by more than 4,000 tactical aircraft. In 
addition, Warsaw Pact member states had sixty divisions that were closely integrated 
with Soviet strategy, doctrine, and command. This force was backed by a vast array of 
tactical nuclear weapons.10 Warsaw Pact ground forces in Central Europe had added six 
 
8The crisis in confidence has been addressed by army officers such as William L. 
Hauser, America’s Army in Crisis: A Study in Civil-Military Relations (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), Edward L. King, The Death of the Army: A Pre-
Mortem (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1972), and Michael Lee Lanning, The 
Battles of Peace (New York: Ballantine Books, 1992). But Lanning, reporting with 
hindsight, was already more upbeat, as were Zeb B. Bradford, jr. and Frederic J. Brown, 
The United States Army in Transition (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1973). Specific 
symptoms were also noted by General Starry, who after more than three decades was still 
upset at the state of affairs in the army in general, and in Germany in particular. Author’s 
interview with General Starry, April 27, 2004 and Starry’s unpublished address of April 
2002, “Historical Perspectives on the Army of the Future: A Case Study in Change (aka 
Transformation): The United States Army from 1973 to 1991.” [In author’s possession]. 
 9General Starry viewed the army’s war in Vietnam as a prolonged period of being 
away from Germany, its Cold War home. Author’s interview with General Starry, April 
27, 2004. 
 10Remarks by General A.J. Goodpaster, Supreme Allied Command Europe, 
National Defence College, Latimer, England, 26 April 1974, p. 3. Goodpaster Papers, 
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combat divisions since 1968 and all active divisions had been re-equipped with new 
tanks, armored personnel carriers, missiles, and artillery pieces. Since 1968, 1,500 new 
tanks had arrived in Group of Soviet Forces in Germany alone.11 
But Goodpaster nevertheless retained an optimistic outlook. While the Vietnam 
War had drained the strength of the U.S. military, led to delays in mechanization, and 
made comprehensive programs to strengthen the alliance impossible, NATO was to gain 
strength in the post-war period: 
During the course of 1974, for example, the defensive strength of NATO’s armies 
will be increased by the introduction of four hundred and seventy-four new main 
battle tanks, more than a thousand other armored vehicles, and about two hundred 
medium-range anti-tank weapons....Similarly, air force capabilities will be 
enhanced by almost two hundred modern combat aircraft, in addition to new 
tactical transports, and one hundred forty helicopters. NATO’s air defense 
capability will be increased by eight hundred fifty anti-aircraft guns and over 
eight hundred anti-aircraft guided missiles.12 
The U.S. had raised the manning level of its forces in Europe since the end of the 
Vietnam War and four additional combat battalions had been created in the theater by 
restructuring headquarters and logistics units. Other improvements resulted from the 
increase of TOW wire-guided missile launchers and the replacement of older Honest 
John and Sergeant weapon systems with Lance missiles.13 
Box 37, Folder 4, GCML. This was one of several speeches Goodpaster made in 1973 
and 1974 in which he stressed Soviet conventional superiority. 
 11Ibid., p. 6.
12Ibid., p. 9.
13Ibid., p. 10. A Lance missile could fire a nuclear warhead for seventy-five miles 
or a conventional warhead for forty-five miles. It first appeared in USAREUR in 
September 1973. 
353
Despite Warsaw Pact superiority in numbers, General Goodpaster concluded that 
the state of deterrence in Europe was acceptable. In critical categories of weapon systems 
in Central Region, the Warsaw Pact led NATO by a wide margin. The eastern bloc 
deployed 10,000 more battle tanks and twice as many aircraft in the region than did 
NATO.14 Nevertheless, this did not prompt despair:  
The Warsaw Pact superiority is not so great that our Soviet military planner could 
be certain of a quick, easy victory....Everything that we do know, however, 
indicates that they are a prudent - I might even say a conservative - group....they 
want clear and overwhelming superiority before risking an attack.....Our forces 
are effective in deterring an attack, and this has always been our primary 
objective.15 
 
In 1973, the army established Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in 
order to centralize the process of reform in training and doctrine. Its first commander, 
General William E. DePuy, doubted that ROAD was a division heavy enough for war in 
Germany. He informed General Frederick Weyand, the Chief of Staff of the Army, that 
each brigade had to be increased in manpower, should have more armored and 
mechanized infantry battalions, and needed more fire support, which could be provided 
by anti-tank guided-missile companies. Even earlier, in 1971, the Army Staff had 
initiated tests of the triple capability (TRICAP) concept of mixed armor, air mobile, and 
air cavalry units. After three years of testing it was found that TRICAP divisions needed 
more tanks and less airmobile infantry. The division was too light for combat in Europe 
and as the army shifted its focus back to Germany, TRICAP was abandoned, although the 
air cavalry combat brigade became a separate formation in 1975.16 In January 1977, 
 
14Ibid., pp. 14-15 
 15Ibid., p. 15.
16Hawkins and Carafano, Prelude to Army XXI, p. 19.
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Weyand’s successor, General Bernard Rogers, approved a Division Restructuring 
Evaluation as a one-year test. The study was extended upon the request of General Donn 
Starry, who had taken command of TRADOC. Starry thought that division design should 
be integrated with changes in the corps or field army. In any case it had to be closely 
linked to operational doctrine. But test results were ambivalent and it was decided that 
ROAD remained the best option, especially since it had been updated with a new 
generation of conventional weapons.17 
General DePuy was convinced that the unsatisfactory state of the army at the end 
of the Vietnam War called for drastic measures. Indeed, 1973 offered opportunities for a 
radical departure from traditional procedures as the termination of the draft had led to the 
creation of an all-volunteer military. When termination of the draft was first discussed in 
1968, army leaders had opposed the idea, assuming that it could only lead to a shallow 
recruiting pool. In particular, it was feared that an insufficient number of well educated 
Americans would chose to join the military. This initial opposition was overcome and the 
army underwent a successful transition from draft to volunteer force.18 Nevertheless, the 
loss of college graduates as potential officers had an effect on the tactical and operational 
outlook of the army. DePuy was concerned with the quality of small-unit leadership.19 He 
 
17Ibid., pp. 19-20. 
 18For the political considerations that led to the All Volunteer Force and initial 
army opposition see George Q. Flynn, The Draft, 1940-1973 (Lawrence: University Press 
of Kansas, 1993), pp. 224-74. More specific on army policy is Robert Griffith, U.S. 
Army’s Transition to the All-Volunteer Force, 1968-1974 (Washington, D.C.: Center for 
Military History, 1997). 
 19See DePuy’s keynote address to the TRADOC Leadership Conference, Fort 
Benning, 22 May 1974, in Richard M. Swain (ed.), Selected Papers of General William 
E. DePuy (Ft. Leavenwoth, Ks.: Combat Studies Institute, 1994), pp. 113-20. See 
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favored a rigid training system that would compensate for a dearth in individual initiative. 
Even though the doctrinal manual of 1976 emphasized “the ability and willingness of 
leaders at all levels to act independently,”20 TRADOC clarified that the army had to train 
leadership rather than rely on finding natural leaders.21 
DePuy argued that the best way to rebuild the army was to design tactical and 
operational doctrine for the most dangerous case: a full-scale Warsaw Pact offensive in 
Germany. Previously, doctrine had been developed for an already existing force structure 
and with consideration of available weapon systems. DePuy believed that TRADOC 
should design doctrine first and that organizational structures, weapons and equipment, 
and training were to be tailored to match. He was convinced that the tank remained the 
critical weapon, but also noted that its defensive capability and new anti-tank missiles 
favored the defender. In spite of opposition by proponents of offensive warfare, this 
approach was more appropriate to the outnumbered forces guarding West Germany.22 
particularly pp. 114-15. DePuy feared that raw recruits of the all-volunteer army were of 
much poorer quality than Israeli recruits. 
 20Department of the Army, Field Manual No. 100-5: Operations (Washington, 
D.C.:Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1976), Ch. 1, p. 5. 
 21See particularly ibid., Ch. 3 (“How to Fight”), p. 2. This reflected DePuy’s 
method to express every tactical problem as a formula. Richard Swain, the editor of 
DePuy’s personal papers concluded that “DePuy was the ultimate Cartesian [who] sought 
to reduce all combat functions to their lowest denominator, define them with precision, 
and then regurgitate them.” Swain, “AirLand Battle,” p. 363. 
 22For DePuy’s tenure as commander of TRADOC see the excellent study by Paul 
Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done. See especially pp. 21-50 for DePuy’s first year 
in office. General Starry also stressed the trinity of organization, technological 
requirements, and training that was to be defined by doctrine. Author’s interview with 
General Starry, April 27, 2004. 
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General DePuy was particularly concerned about the compatibility of German and 
American operational concepts. He found German tactics superior to those of the U.S. 
Army. Moreover, DePuy was convinced that his intent to alter fundamentally the tactical 
and operational approach of the army would face strong opposition from within the 
service. He hoped that close cooperation with German officers during the process of 
developing new doctrine would reduce resistance. DePuy believed that the opening battle 
of the next war had to be fought on the defensive, with armored and mechanized 
formations bolstered by wire-guided anti-tank missiles. He agreed with the German 
concept of forward defense, which put the bulk of the active forces at the forward edge of 
the battle zone. In 1974, TRADOC initiated permanent consultations between doctrinal 
planners in the U.S. and Germany. This served the dual purposes of making tactical 
doctrine of the two premier NATO armies more compatible and persuade proponents of 
maneuver defense that the new concept was tailor-made for conditions in Central 
Europe.23 
A comparative study of German and American tactical doctrine conducted by the 
staff of 1st Infantry Division, found that the employment of German brigades in defensive 
roles under American command might suffer from the emphasis on “a defend degree of 
resistance” in German doctrine. In theory, the Bundeswehr had stressed mobile defense, 
but this had always been opposed by those who feared the permanent loss of territory. In 
the 1970s, the Germans advanced plans in which the bulk of defensive forces was to fight 
from strong positions with only a small reserve, perhaps twenty percent of the force, for 
counterattacks. Differing doctrinal approaches could not be tested in REFORGER 74, the 
 
23Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done, pp. 61-68.  
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basis of the comparative study, because 1st Infantry Division and 30th German 
Panzerbrigade had been selected to play the attacking force. Still, despite different 
doctrinal approaches, dependence on intentions of the American army group commander, 
and differences in combat task-force organization - the Bundeswehr relied on the brigade 
as its combined-arms base unit while the U.S. Army maintained the division base24 - the 
study concluded that joint operations from the battalion-level on up were feasible. U.S. 
Army officers nevertheless thought that German doctrine overemphasized the need to 
hold terrain and degraded the tactical reserve.25 This attitude did not bode well for 
DePuy, who intended to emulate German defensive tactics. 
 By 1976 the mission of the U.S. Army was clear. The first post-Vietnam 
operational doctrine stated bluntly: 
Battle in Central Europe against forces of the Warsaw Pact is the most demanding 
mission the US Army could be assigned. Because the US Army is structured 
primarily for that contingency and has large forces deployed in that area, this 
manual is designed mainly to deal with the realities of such operations.26 
Based on the lessons drawn from the Yom Kippur War, the authors of the manual 
emphasized the importance of tank and anti-tank capability as the centerpiece of modern 
 
24The most compelling reason to maintain the division base was logistics. While 
there was a group of army officers that favored independent brigades, General Starry 
expressed the opinion of the majority when he explained that brigades needed similar 
support units than divisions. He cited the example of the Vietnam War where three 
separate brigades had been combined to form the 23rd Division. As a result, the division 
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armies. In October 1973, Egyptian and Syrian forces had attacked Israel. The study of 
Israeli operations provided examples of both territorial and mobile defense. In the north, 
Israeli defenders against the Syrian attack had very little room for maneuver and the 
defensive positions in the Golan Heights lacked depth. On the Sinai Peninsula, conditions 
called for mobile defense, which favored the armor-heavy Israeli Defense Force. But 
political considerations, most notably the fear of an armistice at an early stage of war, had 
led Israeli leaders to conclude that purely mobile defense in depth risked losing valuable 
territory that served as a buffer zone between Egypt and Israel. As a result, the Israeli 
army employed a mixture of strong points at the Suez Canal and mobile defensive 
operations and counterattacks by its elite armored formations.27 
Army leaders learned valuable lessons from Israeli operations for the defense of 
West Germany. The Israeli army fought outnumbered against an enemy equipped with 
weapon systems of similar quality. TRADOC, which focused on the study of tactical and 
operational implications of the Yom Kippur War, found three fundamental lessons. First 
of all, modern weapons were far more lethal than earlier generations of weapon systems. 
Secondly, the army needed combined-arms teams of armor, mechanized infantry, field 
artillery, and air defense. These teams were to suppress enemy firepower in order to 
 
27Major-General Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement: October 1973 (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1975) remains the best account of the war, combining 
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Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Force (New York: Public Affairs, 1998), 
pp. 217-43. Herzog’s book was mandatory reading at the Armor Center and General 
Starry noted that it helped to shape the final version of army doctrine in 1976. Starry to 
Lieutenant Colonel Michael D. Mahler, 28 April 1976. Starry Papers, Box 4: Personal 
Correspondence, January - April 1976, “Personal Correspondence Files, Mar-Apr 1976,” 
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allow the outnumbered defenders to shift forces to critical areas of the battlefield. General 
DePuy concluded that movement was the principal tactical desideratum of land warfare. 
Finally, success in future operations depended on the training of individual soldiers as 
well as combined-arms teams. DePuy had informed General Creighton Abrams in 
January 1974, that the most impressive feature of the war had been the performance of 
Israeli tank crews. Israeli and Arab armor were qualitatively equivalent. The M-60 tank 
and the Soviet T-62 tank, in other words, were “a fair match.” DePuy concluded that 
“therefore, during the next ten years battlefield outcome will depend upon the quality of 
the troops rather than the quality of the tanks.” He deplored the army’s lack of training 
ammunition and that the best young NCOs of the armor branch did not seek assignments 
as tank commanders.28 
In the Yom Kippur War, during eighteen days of combat, more than 2,500 Arab 
and Israeli tanks were destroyed. General DePuy noted that the combined losses of 
Egyptian and Syrian forces - between 1,500 and 2,000 tanks as well as 500 artillery tubes 
- equaled the entire American arsenal in Europe.29 2,500 Israeli soldiers died in the Yom 
Kippur War - more than half were from the armored corps.30 TRADOC considered the 
 
28DePuy to General Creighton Abrams, January 14, 1974, in: Swain (ed.), DePuy 
Papers, pp. 69-74. The quotations are on page 71. 
 29Implications of the Middle East War on U.S. Army Tactics, Doctrine and 
Systems, a presentation by General William E. DePuy, Commander, U.S. Army Training 
and Doctrine Command, n.d. [most likely April or May 1974], Swain (ed.), DePuy 
Papers, pp. 75-111, particularly pp. 78-79. See also DePuy to Senator Culver, 12 May 
1975, in: Ibid., pp. 165-69. 
 30Gudmundsson, On Armor, p. 167.
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proliferation of modern weapons to be among the primary lessons of the war and army 
leaders were concerned about the great lethality of these weapon systems.31 
The rough parity in quality of Soviet and American weapon systems further 
emphasized the significance of Soviet numerical superiority in tanks and manpower. But 
the Israeli army had fought outnumbered and by the time a cease-fire was reached, it had 
been well on its way to Cairo and Damascus. General DePuy assumed that the 
effectiveness of the equally outnumbered NATO forces was a direct function of weapons, 
tank crew proficiency, and tactics.32 For USAREUR, it would be essential to create 
numerical equality or even superiority at critical points. DePuy believed that it would be 
possible to predict the path of a Soviet breakthrough effort. Drawing upon the tactical 
situation of 1st Armored Division in Germany, DePuy illustrated defensive operations. 
The division had to cover a frontage of sixty kilometers, which would overtax its 100 
platoons if they were spread out to defend the entire area. Any enemy concentration of 
force would lead to defeat, unless “at the critical time and at that critical place, units from 
the flanks of the 1st Armored Division which are not engaged are moved into the most 
important blocking position.” In order to avoid being outnumbered at any critical point, 
U.S. forces had to comprehend and exploit the battlefield terrain better than the enemy.33 
Detailed knowledge of the relevant topography thus became a decided advantage of 
American and German forces in Central Region. 
 
31DePuy to Weyand, 18 February 1976, inclosure to Starry to Simmons, 20 April 
1976. Starry Papers, Personal Correspondence Files, Mar - Apr 1976, Box 4, MHI. 
 32Decker, “The Patton Tanks,” p. 317. 
 33DePuy, Implications of the Middle East War on U.S. Army Tactics, Doctrine 
and Systems, pp. 93-94. Op. cit. 
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Infantry still had an important role to play in anti-tank defense and in built-up 
areas where the mobility and flexibility of individual soldiers were required. Israeli 
officers expressed great satisfaction with the M113 APC, but they used the vehicle for a 
different purpose than the army, essentially similar to the ad-hoc adjustment of assault 
vehicles in Vietnam. In Israeli practice, the APC, equipped with an additional mounted 
7.62-mm machine gun, was employed as an anti-personnel weapon to suppress enemy 
infantry armed with anti-tank rocket-propelled grenades.34 But General DePuy questioned 
the suitability of APCs for mechanized operations in Germany. The M113 was 
insufficiently armed, and the .50 caliber machine gun could not be fired effectively on the 
move because it was not stabilized. Moreover, the vehicle offered a hard ride for its crew 
that would lead to injuries if it had to operate with tanks at cross-country speed. Finally, 
its armor was weak. It could not even protect its passengers from 12.7-mm machine 
guns.35 De Puy noted that TRADOC wanted to “emulate the Germans but in order to do it 
well, we need a good tank, an infantry fighting vehicle, self-propelled artillery and 
effective mobility for the air defense systems.” He concluded that “our greatest defect is 
the infantry vehicle.”36 
By 1975, DePuy was aware that the prospects of the MICV were unpromising. He 
implored friends at the Pentagon to discuss the matter privately with Secretary of Defense 
James Schlesinger, who believed that the MICV was too expensive. DePuy pointed out 
that it was cheaper than the West German Marder and no more expensive than the Soviet 
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 35DePuy to Weyand, 29 April 1975, in: Swain (ed.), DePuy Papers, pp. 161-63. 
 36DePuy to Robert Komer, 24 April 1975, in: Swain (ed.), DePuy Papers, pp. 
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BMP. The situation required an urgent resolution, as TRADOC drafts of tactical doctrine 
were evolving toward the German conception. In practice army units found it difficult to 
adopt Panzergrenadier tactics without proper equipment. This reduced incentives to 
make needed changes. DePuy acknowledged that only one division of USAREUR had 
made strides toward new tactics, while all of V Corps remained wedded to older methods. 
He charged that “the German Army believes strongly that the U.S. Army does not know 
how to fight on a mechanized battlefield against the Soviets. They believe we are too 
much organized and oriented toward infantry combat. They also believe that our 
counterattack plans with large forces sweeping across the front are sheer bunk, or at least 
simply romantic.”37 
Next to tanks and mechanized vehicles with anti-tank guided missiles, the third 
critical component of the envisioned fire team was field artillery. By the mid-1970s all 
artillery in U.S. armored and mechanized divisions was self-propelled.38 USAREUR 
hoped that its tanks and anti-armor weapon systems were sufficient to defeat the much 
larger Soviet tank force. For that purpose, and advised by Israeli veteran commanders and 
German generals, TRADOC introduced doctrine that stressed the importance of balanced 
teams of combined arms that could lay devastating suppressive fire on enemy 
formations.39 The new doctrine reflected the temporary technological advantage of the 
defender. But General DePuy warned of too much enthusiasm for anti-tank guided 
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missiles. He believed them to be supplementary to the tank, even in defensive operations. 
He acknowledged their importance, which was reflected in their widespread distribution. 
Mechanized battalions received eighteen TOW and twenty-seven Dragon launchers. But 
DePuy criticized that tests of the weapon systems had not taken into account the most 
effective countermeasure - smoke. He found it hard to believe that the Soviets had not 
discovered this rather obvious antidote.40 
The U.S. Army’s organization in Europe was designed to maximize the ability to 
move and suppress enemy firepower. In 1974, USAREUR commanded thirty-three armor 
battalions. There were in addition to armor units, twenty-four mechanized battalions, 
thirty-one field artillery battalions, and fifteen air defense battalions. But combat teams 
comprised only forty-four percent of USAREUR’s overall strength. They were supported 
by intelligence (3% of USAREUR strength), which allowed USAREUR to see the 
battlefield better than the enemy, signal communications units (12%) that assured close 
control over all combat units and prompt transmission of orders, combat engineers (9%) 
that supported movement on the battlefield, aviation (2%), which supported intelligence 
and delivered ordnance, and supply and logistics forces (30% of USAREUR strength).41 
The doctrinal system proposed by General DePuy was not accepted by all army 
leaders. The most politically significant was the resistance of Major General John H. 
Cushman, the commander of the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, 
since CAC was to write combat doctrine, a critical component of DePuy’s intended 
tactical system. Cushman, an engineering officer, had the reputation of an intellectual. 
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Unlike DePuy he had not commanded large combined-arms organizations in combat. He 
believed in individual initiative and opposed the rigid system that General DePuy wanted 
to impose on the army. As army officer and historian Paul Herbert has argued, the main 
difference between DePuy and Cushman was that between training and education. Two 
distinct schools of thought about doctrine rallied around the generals. DePuy’s supporters 
believed that doctrine had to be simple, clear, and specific. Its substance was less 
important than its unifying institutional purpose. Cushman on the other hand emphasized 
function over purpose. In the fall of 1974, CGSC wrote a draft of FM 100-5 to “indicate 
and guide but...not bind in practice.” It was presented at a TRADOC conference in 
December. To stifle opposition, DePuy rejected the manual, citing the boring nature of its 
style. He believed that the new capstone manual had to be engaging. He offered Cushman 
the opportunity to submit a revised draft, but when Cushman failed to deliver at the 
meeting in April 1975, DePuy transferred responsibility for the manual from CAC to 
TRADOC headquarters.42 
Extensive study of the Yom Kippur War had convinced General DePuy that the 
next war would be characterized by rapid and decisive battle. He argued that strategists 
were the heroes of the great wars of the past, including the Second World War, but that 
they would play no role in the next major war because combat would be concluded 
before vast troop movements across continents could affect its outcome. Therefore, 
modern battle tactics were to be the deciding factor.43 But even if DePuy was right, this 
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did not mean the demise of the art of strategy. If anything, anticipation of a single 
decisive battle enhanced the need for proper planning both by military and political 
leaders. If forces could not be moved into place after the outbreak of war, i.e, if NATO 
mobilization and reinforcement plans were rendered meaningless, then the pre-war 
alignment of forces was critical. Moreover, there was greater need for intrinsic 
coordination of political guidance, strategic planning, operational conception, and tactics. 
DePuy’s approach, however, focused most attention on the latter. 
Active Defense: Doctrine for the First Battle in Germany 
Looking back at his career in TRADOC, General DePuy summarized his doctrinal 
perspective as follows: forward defense at the intra-German border, lack of space for 
mobile defense in depth in West Germany, an enemy force that outnumbered NATO 
forces by at least two to one, and the great advantage in reserve forces and reinforcement 
capability held by the Warsaw Pact. Only the right combination of new weapons 
technology and defensive tactics would enable NATO to succeed. All of NATO’s armies 
had to adopt a clearly delineated tactical system that would allow them to coordinate 
closely their operations. Similar tactics of the German and American armies were 
intended to form the nucleus of a NATO-wide tactical review.44 To DePuy, the western 
alliance held the advantage in close integration of modern weapon systems that could 
bring lethal firepower on the enemy in a succession of battlefield maneuvers. He 
concluded that “if ever there was an army that needed an alternative to the long, thin line 
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with its high casualties and dubious prospects it is the weapons intensive, manpower-
starved, all-volunteer Army of the 1980s.”45 
Active Defense doctrine stated in great detail how U.S. Army forces should fight 
the Soviets in Germany. Army leaders knew that their forces would be significantly 
outnumbered in the crucial opening battle of the war. General DePuy left no doubt that 
traditional mobilization concepts had lost all meaning and he advised field commanders 
to utilize all of their forces at the outset of battle. In past wars, the U.S. military often had 
lost the first battle, absorbed the initial attacks, mobilized its vast resources, and 
recovered to defeat the enemy.46 But in the next war, U.S. ground forces would find 
themselves at the end of a long and vulnerable line of communications. Moreover, 
modern weapons made protracted war unlikely. DePuy prescribed elastic defense, which 
would maximize the effectiveness of the outnumbered American battalions and their new 
weapon systems. A reconnaissance screen, deployed forward of the battle area, was to 
determine where the bulk of the Soviet attack could be expected. Then, six to eight 
battalions of a division were to be concentrated at the critical point. The remaining three 
or four battalions would be deployed in mobile operations, screening the remainder of the 
division’s area of responsibility. The main battle would be dominated by armor and anti-
tank weapons. DePuy envisioned defense through the massive application of firepower 
and maneuver specifically tailored to the anticipated movement of the enemy. Command 
responsibility was clearly delineated. Corps and division commanders were to 
 
45William E. DePuy, “One Up and Two Back?” in: Army, Vol. 30, No. 1 (January 
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concentrate force at the critical point. Brigade and battalion commanders were to direct 
and control the battle. Company commanders were to fight it.47 
Army objectives were stated in the opening chapter of FM 100-5. Fundamentally, 
the army was to “prepare to win the first battle of the next war.” If it was necessary to 
fight more battles “once the war is upon us, we shall aim at emerging triumphant from 
the second, third, and final battles as well.” Army doctrine and organizational structure 
were conditioned by planned operations in Central Europe. There, “the U.S. Army must 
prepare its units to fight outnumbered, and to win.” This was to be achieved through 
proper combination of the best weapons and skilled operators. The doctrinal manual 
stressed the importance of training leaders as well as their men. The individual soldier 
had to see himself as a vital member of a team. Therefore, training had to occur in the 
unit as much as possible, and “collective training in units should aim at maximum 
effectiveness with combined arms.” Advances in technology and changing combat 
environment and doctrine required constant training to achieve a state of immediate 
readiness. The authors of the manual, paraphrasing the Roman historian Josephus, 
demanded that “our drills must be ‘bloodless battles’ and our battles ‘bloody drills’.” It 
was the unit commanders’ responsibility to “produce a unit ready to fight and win 
now.”48 
The manual focused on operations of battalions and brigades. It emphasized the 
radically changed nature of modern weapons and the modern battlefield in a detailed 
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chapter on the lethality of weapon systems.49 The doctrine has been termed Active 
Defense, even though DePuy and his collaborators used the term only sparingly and 
elastic defense would have been a more accurate description.50 The objective of 
USAREUR was the attrition by firepower of the Soviet attacking force in the first, 
conventional battle.51 The battle was to be won by concentrating sufficient force and 
firepower at critical times and places, which was to be achieved through superior control 
and direction of the battle by brigade and battalion commanders. Units engaged in 
combat had to seek cover and concealment to minimize the effect of enemy fire. 
Simultaneously, enemy weapons were to be suppressed by combined-arms fire teams.52 
In short, the defense was “a race for time to detect the enemy’s main thrust and to 
concentrate combat power.”53 
Eventually, U.S. ground forces were to take the offensive in order to defeat the 
numerically superior enemy. But unlike in previous doctrine, where the offensive had 
been the primary type of operations, Active Defense prescribed patience and called for 
the offensive only after enemy forces had been severely bloodied. The basic tactical 
principles were surprise and deception. Attacks should be planned on the flanks or as 
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narrow penetrations with the goal of destroying enemy support and command and control 
in order to isolate and decapitate combat units, which could then be defeated in detail.54 
In order to achieve a psychological shock effect, the attacker was to concentrate 
overwhelming force and firepower at a weak point in the enemy’s front. The attack was 
to proceed on a narrow front and with great depth, so that additional forces could be 
committed as soon as the initial attack slowed down. Ideally, attacks should be conducted 
at night, but during the day the shock effect could be enhanced by use of smoke, artillery, 
and air deliverable mines. Ground forces were to “utilize the cover of the terrain, and 
suppress or obscure the enemy gunners.” This was quite similar to German tactics of the 
Second World War in that the attack should seek to disrupt command, control, support, 
and supply lines of the enemy. The effect of a well-coordinated attack would be fear and 
paralysis.55 
The ideal formations for offensive operations were combined-arms battalion-size 
task forces, based on either tank or mechanized infantry battalions with additional field 
and air defense artillery, engineers, attack helicopters, and close air support.56 While 
tanks remained the crucial battlefield weapon system, in spite of the advances in anti-tank 
guided missiles, mechanized infantry was to play a vital role in the firepower team. 
Ideally, mechanized infantry was to fight mounted, although the army still lacked an IFV, 
or engage the enemy on foot, supported by armored vehicles that could provide 
firepower. General DePuy reiterated that the M 113 armored personnel carrier suffered 
 
54Ibid., Ch. 3, p. 6 and Ch. 4, pp. 1-12. 
 55Ibid., Ch. 3, pp. 6-7. 
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from weak armor, insufficient armament, and that the vehicle “cannot keep up with tanks 
cross country without scrambling the rifle squad inside.” Against superior forces, 
mechanized operations were necessary. The army still needed an infantry fighting 
vehicle.57 
While offensive operations were necessary to defeat the enemy before he could 
bring all of his force to bear, the defensive was now stressed more than it had been 
before. Knowledge of terrain, carefully placed guns and combat units, and a well 
prepared defensive area in depth were cited among the main advantages of the defender. 
However, since initiative rested with the attacker, it was crucial that the defense should 
not be conducted without counterattacks. Emphasis was placed on understanding the 
enemy, concentration of force at critical times and places, combat with combined-arms 
teams, and full exploitation of the natural advantages of the defense. First, the enemy 
would have to engage a covering force, which could reveal his strength, location, and the 
general direction of his thrust, while at the same time preventing him from gaining a 
clearer picture about defensive alignments. The covering force was also tasked with 
gaining enough time for the main defensive force to deploy to battle stations and improve 
upon prepared defensive areas. In the main battle area it was important to maintain 
coherence at or near the forward edge, to limit the enemy’s room for maneuver. It was 
emphasized that defense had to be elastic in nature but should be anchored by strong 
points, usually terrain features that could be held by a reinforced company or battalion. 
Counterattacks were important, but they had to be well timed because the natural 
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advantages of the defender would be negated once they were underway. Counterattacks 
were to be conducted with anti-tank guided missiles and tanks that could hit the enemy in 
the flank or rear. Elastic defense could shift fluently from defensive to offensive 
operations.58 
Most of FM 100-5 was based upon drafts designed by the armor, artillery, and 
infantry training centers, but USAREUR also contributed.59 Coalition warfare in Europe 
posed operational difficulties. Efforts to make doctrines of various NATO forces more 
compatible were not wholly successful. In addition, coordination of unit organization, 
logistics, weaponry and equipment, and training methods was incomplete. U.S. Army 
commanders thus had to ensure that their units were “trained in NATO procedures and 
are alert to the differences in the various armed forces which may affect combat 
operations.”60 In addition, urban sprawl and infrastructure had altered the landscape of 
Central Europe. The army had previously considered urban combat and house-to-house 
fighting, but now it was necessary to develop techniques for operations in “continuous 
and contiguous built-up areas.” USAREUR suggested that adjacent villages and strip 
areas could be used as defensive strong points, with tanks and ATGMs operating in the 
gaps, while similar areas should be bypassed in an attack. Towns might serve as force 
multipliers, because a small force could hold out for a long time. But urban areas such as 
Frankfurt, Stuttgart, or the Ruhr Valley, would be difficult to defend and it was likely that 
the battle would devolve into infantry combat from street to street. Here it was useful to 
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employ airmobile forces. USAREUR concluded that combat in built-up areas would gain 
in importance and urged further systematic study.61 
In 1980, General DePuy recalled the fundamental lines of thought behind the 
manual. The Vietnam War with its emphasis on light forces was over and the army could 
focus on the defense of West Germany. The Vietnam War had delayed mechanization of 
the army, but the late 1970s were to be a period of intensive modernization. The 
keystones of the manual were the emphasis on European war, almost exclusive emphasis 
on armored and mechanized combat, and close integration of tactics and modern weapons 
technology. DePuy and his collaborators prescribed “an elastic defense” that could “cope 
with Soviet strength and the lack of maneuver room in Germany.” This was to be 
achieved through “superior concentration of combat power in the attack and in the 
defense through good intelligence, quick decisions, and high mobility...as the only 
solution for an outnumbered force.” In retrospect, DePuy maintained that forward 
defense had to be conducted at or near the intra-German border, with only small reserve 
forces. He believed that cohesion of the front was critical and that any penetration could 
spell defeat. He concluded that “all in all, it was a tall order.”62 
Despite DePuy’s close adherence to Panzergrenadier tactics, FM 100-5 was not 
an exact copy of German doctrine. Both German and Israeli armies had smaller tank 
platoons than the U.S. Army, three tanks instead of five. DePuy admitted that this 
provided for better control by the platoon commander and he noted that the army could 
create a greater number of tank battalions with existing materiel by adopting that 
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organization, but he recommended against doing so because the army did not have the 
additional officers that would be required.63 German officers criticized the American 
practice of giving company commanders the main responsibility for directing combat at 
the tactical level. Both in the German and Israeli armies, tanks were coordinated at the 
battalion level with other weapon systems, such as infantry, artillery, aviation, mortars, 
and engineers. But in the U.S. Army, this coordination was called for at company level, 
thus putting captains in a position of having to control much more than their base 
company. DePuy concurred with the criticism and stated that future manuals for 
companies and battalions were to move battalion commanders into a more central role.64 
This appeared to be a qualification to the dogmatic statement that company commanders 
fought the battle, while battalion commanders directed it. But by the same token, DePuy 
proudly reported that the Bundeswehr leadership endorsed Active Defense after a 
demonstration at Grafenwöhr in November 1976.65 
The principal weakness of the doctrine was that it did not address how to defend 
against additional echelons of attacking forces. It gave the army a clear and concise 
concept on how, and with what means, to counter the initial Soviet attack. In that sense it 
was superior to doctrine of the 1950s and 1960s, which had not paid sufficient attention 
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to enemy capabilities and operational thought. Army leaders professed that battles could 
only be won by ground and air forces in joint operations, but the chapter on “Air-Land 
Battle” lacked detail. Moreover, the army regarded close air support and interdiction of 
enemy air forces as supplementary to its own decisive role of employing mobility, speed, 
and firepower to win the land battle.66 In retrospect, Active Defense was a transition from 
earlier doctrine that was derived from previous experience of the U.S. Army and its 
current forces and weapons to operational art that characterized the approach of the 
1980s. The 1982 edition of FM 100-5 would succeed in combining army operational 
thought with joint and combined operations in order to defeat all enemy forces and not 
merely the first echelon. The greatest contributions of Active Defense doctrine were the 
public debate that began immediately after its publication and the continuation of army-
internal studies to improve upon current doctrine, force structure, and weapon systems. 
 TRADOC’s doctrinal system was not universally accepted. A group of army 
officers and defense analysts criticized the manual as overly defensive. Others pointed at 
the lack of consideration of combat actions beyond the first battle. Among the most vocal 
critics was William Lind, an adviser to Senator Gary Hart. Throughout the 1970s, Lind 
published a series of articles and essays on tactical and operational questions related to 
land warfare. He argued that the emphasis on the concentration of superior firepower to 
achieve attrition was misguided. Lind and his fellow reformers, most notably retired Air 
Force colonel John Boyd and Steven Canby, a leading defense analyst, suggested that the 
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army should emphasize maneuver over firepower.67 But Lind’s outspoken criticism of 
Active Defense galvanized the supporters of the doctrine.68 Consequently, there was a 
protracted debate between two distinctly different schools of thought. The Israeli scholar 
Shimon Naveh argues that the critical difference between the proponents of firepower 
and those who favored maneuver rested on their respective approaches to operations. 
Lind and the proponents of maneuver accused the authors of Active Defense of being 
rooted in the tactical thinking of the past, thus precluding the necessary reorientation 
toward operational art as a third level of war between tactics and strategy. Naveh believes 
that the ensuing exchange of opinions was “the longest, most intoxicating and creative 
professional debate which ever occurred in the history of American military thought.”69 
The official historian of TRADOC, John L. Romjue, discerned six distinct areas 
of public criticism. Initial opposition centered on the defensive emphasis of Active 
Defense. William Lind and the maneuver school charged that DePuy had neglected the 
offensive. But defense analyst Philip Karber noted that FM 100-5 called for 
counterattacks and questioned whether the kind of large-scale counteroffensive favored 
by Lind could be conducted in Europe. Military historian Archer Jones believed that the 
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 69Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational 
Theory (London: Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 256-76. The quotation is from page 263. For 
greater emphasis of the discussion within the Army see Richard M. Swain, “Filling the 
Void: The Operational Art and the U.S. Army,” pp. 154-56, in: B.J.C. McKercher and 
Michael A. Hennesy (eds.), The Operational Art: Developments in the Theories of War 
(Westport: Praeger, 1996), pp. 147-72. 
376
army’s rediscovery of the superiority of the defensive was the greatest contribution of the 
manual. Secondly, critics pointed at the centrality of the opening battle, which would not 
prepare the army for protracted operations. This was indeed a delicate issue, but 
TRADOC stressed the first battle to combat the traditional notion of the U.S. military that 
the enemy attack could be absorbed and that mobilization potential of the nation would 
even the odds. In the event, DePuy’s successor, General Donn Starry, redirected 
emphasis from first to central and later extended battle. Thirdly, critics and defenders of 
DePuy agreed that Soviet operational thought had evolved beyond the breakthrough 
maneuver, which remained at the heart of TRADOC’s tactical thinking. Philip Karber 
feared that the Soviet army was prepared to attack on a wide front and seek weak spots of 
the defensive. Steven Canby added that Soviet doctrine was more opportunistic and less 
static than Active Defense assumed and could render a line of fortified strong points 
useless.70 
Army officers and defense analysts alike were uneasy about the apparent 
reduction of the tactical reserve inherent in TRADOC’s order of battle. But this reflected 
the near overwhelming strength of the enemy and the resulting need to move as many 
units as possible close to the front. If the army in general, and USAREUR in particular, 
were to be expanded, tactical reserves would again be feasible. But Archer Jones liked 
the mobile defensive approach delineated in FM 100-5. He believed that it eliminated the 
need for a large tactical reserve, which in the past had been necessary to seal off enemy 
penetration or reinforce eroding defensive positions. Fifthly, the adherents of maneuver 
warfare lamented that the emphasis on firepower rendered all but useless the vehicle 
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technology of the army. Philip Karber asked why one should not acknowledge the 
awesome firepower of anti-tank weapons. General Starry’s concepts of the late 1970s 
relied even more heavily on firepower. Finally, both William Lind and Archer Jones 
pointed at difficulties arising from the concentration of forces on the defensive. Lind 
feared that U.S. commanders would have to rely too much on communications systems 
that could be jammed by the enemy and Jones questioned whether shifting all but three or 
four battalions of a division to a critical point would leave enough forces to cover the 
defensive area. Moreover, concentrating on the defensive would offer lucrative targets for 
enemy artillery, although none of the critics openly discussed tactical nuclear strikes.71 
Army-internal criticism of FM 100-5 also stressed the overemphasis of the 
defensive and commanders in the field came to realize the dangers inherent in attrition 
strategy, the emphasis on firepower, and the static nature of the doctrinal system. 
NATO’s supreme commander, General Alexander Haig, told DePuy that he “would like 
to see...a more explicit reminder that in general the ultimate purpose of any defense is to 
regain the initiative by taking the offensive.” Moreover, he feared that the focus on the 
defense of Germany, however necessary, might lead army officers to embrace defense 
“for its own sake.” Haig concluded that doctrine should stress “the importance of 
offensive maneuver in destroying an opponent’s will - as opposed to his capacity - to 
fight.”72 With this last point, Haig raised the question of the psychological impact of 
combat operations. There appeared to be a belief that the defensive was un-American and 
that being on the defensive might demoralize American soldiers. As textual analysis of 
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FM 100-5 Haig’s critique was unjustified, but as Paul Herbert has pointed out, he 
correctly gauged the reception of the manual and the likelihood of misinterpretation of its 
central points.73 
The criticism that Active Defense was too narrowly focused on European war, 
mirrored the concern with army doctrine prior to 1965. General DePuy believed that 
army doctrine was adaptable to other geographic locales, such as the Middle East, where 
the enemy would be equipped with Soviet weapons and indoctrinated in Soviet tactics 
and operational thought. The Yom Kippur War had shown that the Egyptian and Syrian 
armed forces fit that description. Moreover, DePuy expected that the army, if deployed 
outside of Europe or the Middle East, would face an enemy similar to Warsaw Pact 
forces in armament and operational concepts.74 
In November 1980, General DePuy acknowledged that too many army officers 
still regarded the defensive as inferior to the offensive. DePuy also conceded that too 
many commanders equated defense and delaying action and thus failed to consider the 
multitude of other defensive courses of action required on the modern battlefield. This 
could lead to the attrition strategy evoked by the adherents of the maneuver school. But 
this was a misinterpretation of doctrine rather than its intention. DePuy stated that Active 
Defense offered the diversified tactics necessary to stop a massive Soviet attack in the 
first battle, but brigade commanders needed to keep a view of the entire defensive area in 
order to shift their battalions to critical points and tell battalion commanders what tactics 
to employ. Elastic defense was to counter Soviet breakthrough maneuvers, but static 
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defense or counterattacks might be useful in other areas of the front. DePuy cited Bruce 
Clarke’s defense of St. Vith in December 1944 as a classic example of elastic defense. He 
concluded that the critics overstated the role of attrition in Active Defense and 
overlooked the maneuver elements of the doctrine.75 
Active Defense was an attempt to develop universal doctrine for land warfare in 
Central Europe. Some of the criticism that was extended in the late 1970s was certainly 
correct, but the critics missed the broader significance of DePuy’s doctrinal manual. Until 
1976, the army had treated doctrine as an expression of tactical and operational concepts. 
DePuy understood doctrine to be the first step toward creating entirely new operational 
philosophy. While traditionalists argued that doctrine should tell commanders how to 
fight, DePuy designed a universal theory of the next war, which contained tactical and 
operational thought as the basis for research and development as well as organization of 
combat units and logistics. As a tactical manual, Active Defense was too narrowly 
focused on a particular battle in Europe. It was too reactive to Soviet operational concepts 
that had evolved beyond the breakthrough maneuver. This raised fear that USAREUR 
was well prepared for a particular kind of attack but could not cope with different Soviet 
operations. In short, Active Defense was too rigid, a blueprint that did not consider the 
agency of the enemy and imposed an assumption of predictable Soviet tactics and 
operations. But DePuy had little choice in the matter. While he preferred a rigid doctrinal 
system, the climate of the mid-1970s would not have allowed for even bolder steps. In 
the end, DePuy succeeded in changing the mind-set and determining the future of the 
army. Active Defense fell short as an expression of tactics and operations, but it elevated 
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doctrine to the core of the army’s thinking about war and opened the door for AirLand 
Battle. 
AirLand Battle Doctrine and the Cold War Army 
Parallel to the public defense debate of the late 1970s, General Donn Starry 
considered improvement of army doctrine. As commanding general of the Armor Center 
at Fort Knox, Starry had been intimately involved in the process of drafting Active 
Defense. But his tenure as commander of V Corps in Germany in 1976 and 1977 
convinced him that far-reaching changes to doctrine were necessary. Eventually, he came 
to consider Active Defense doctrine as “a false start” in the process of rebuilding the 
army.76 Starry was convinced that the army and air force had the technological means to 
contain the attacker and engage his reserves before they could reach the battle area. As 
commander of TRADOC (1977-1981), Starry guided the army from the concept of the 
First Battle to the Extended Battlefield, where it was crucial to see and operate deep 
behind enemy lines. Between 1976 and 1982, he developed a doctrinal system that 
featured integration of armor, mobile infantry, artillery, missile forces, and air power.77 
Starry’s crucial experience came in 1976 and 1977, when he commanded V 
Corps, which guarded the Fulda Gap in Hesse. His immediate adjustments to the corps’s 
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General Defense Plan were based on the lessons of the Yom Kippur War.78 The new 
operational plan moved all available reserves to the corps commander in order to allow 
for greater depth in the defenses. Speed and mobility of the force were increased by 
storing all ammunition and necessary equipment directly on tanks and other vehicles.79 
Active Defense had eliminated the concept of prepared killing zones, with fortified 
defensive positions and well-defined fields of fire. This had been a staple of CENTAG 
plans in the early 1970s.80 Moreover, there was confusion throughout the army about the 
mission of the covering force. Eventually, General Starry’s working definition became 
standard: “the covering force mission was usually described as a delay.”81 Starry 
expected that the covering force in his sector could not hold for more than one day if the 
enemy attacked en masse. Moreover, he estimated that V Corps would lose seventy M60 
tanks and 120 M551 Sheridans during the covering-force battle. He assumed that the 
main battle would last less than ten days if the enemy’s main effort was directed against 
V Corps, but that his forces could sustain operations for twenty days if faced by 
secondary attacks. Losses during the main battle would amount to sixty-two tanks per 
day, and the corps’s 180 Sheridans would be destroyed after two days of combat. At the 
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rate assumed by General Starry, V Corps would have been out of tanks on the eleventh 
day of combat operations.82 
During his tenure in Hesse, Starry conducted a thorough study of corps operations 
in armored warfare, both based on historical campaigns and battles and on war games for 
his particular sector of Central Region. He discovered that the traditional calculus, which 
prescribed at least a three-to-one force ratio in favor of the attacker, was flawed. Instead, 
the study of tank battles revealed that there was little difference in the outcome of battles 
fought with superior or inferior forces, as long as the attacker did not possess at least six-
to-one superiority.83 In the mid-1970s, the Warsaw Pact had a two-to-one advantage in 
active divisions in Central Europe, but in ground-force personnel the advantage was less 
than ten percent.84 
From these studies, Starry concluded that the tension between the rather systemic 
nature of operational planning and the more random character of actual battle constituted 
a significant problem. War games were based on the assumption of predictable behavior 
of the commanders of friendly and enemy forces and could not replicate the uncertainty 
inherent to combat. To minimize this problem, Starry resolved that future operational 
doctrine should build a bridge between the general purpose of the battle and the chance 
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events of actual combat. Instead of viewing the corps area as a front that had to be 
defended, Starry looked at it as both front and depth and he included the future as a 
second dimension of time. The maneuver in depth was closely linked to the elimination 
of rear echelons of the enemy forces that had not yet reached the battle zone. In essence, 
the corps had to destroy the enemy’s future capability as well as its present one. The 
decisive battle in the defense of West Germany would thus not merely be fought against 
Soviet spearheads, but also against follow-on echelons in East Germany, Poland, or 
Czechoslovakia.85 
Nevertheless, Starry still thought that Active Defense addressed the strategic and 
tactical situation in Central Europe and made good use of the terrain and the means that 
were at the army’s disposal. But tactical-level commanders in Germany had failed to 
study terrain and were unfamiliar with their forward battle stations. During his command 
of V Corps, General Starry introduced his subordinate officers to the basic tenets of 
Active Defense doctrine, but he was less successful with neighboring VII Corps.86 In an 
article in Military Review in August 1978, Starry defended the concept against its critics. 
He embraced the debate as a means to improve upon tactical concepts, but he counseled 
the proponents of maneuver warfare that Active Defense was not simply a new name for 
the traditional concept of mobile defense and attrition by firepower. Instead, it allowed 
the defensive forces to concentrate rapidly at critical points and make best use of natural 
and man-made obstacles. It also offered some ability to observe the movement of enemy 
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formations that were still far away from the battlefield. Most importantly, tactical 
doctrine now drove force design and the development of new weaponry and equipment.87 
In practical terms for the defense of Germany, Starry emphasized the role of the 
covering force, which had to fight continuously rather than merely delay the enemy and 
retreat. The main functions of the covering force were to obfuscate enemy intelligence 
about the specific alignment of the defenders, draw the attacker away from its air 
defenses, and lead the enemy into terrain suitable for the defenders. For the main force, it 
was critical to achieve a very high rate of target destruction, possibly as many as 250 
targets per battalion in a ten-minute period. The division might be called upon to destroy 
upward of 2,000 more targets, mainly artillery and second-echelon forces, in less than 
one day. The corps might have to engage an additional 3,000 targets, mainly enemy long-
range artillery and rear-echelon formations, in three to five days. Division commanders 
had to be prepared to concentrate all but their air cavalry and helicopter units to prevent 
an enemy breakthrough, even though this would leave only two or three battalions for 
most of the approximately forty kilometers wide frontage of the division. Unlike in 
previous concepts of mobile defense, there was no centralized reserve for counterattacks 
once the Soviet offensive had been contained. In Active Defense, all units were needed 
immediately. The enemy had to be defeated in increasingly deep defensive areas and in 
counterattacks by divisions that were already engaged in the defensive battle. This was 
further indication that defensive, anti-tank weapon systems held a temporary advantage 
over armored vehicles.88 
87Starry, “FM 100-5,” pp. 2-11. Starry, as commander of the Armor Center, had 
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Starry conceded that the doctrinal emphasis on the first battle had to be 
broadened. His command tenure in Germany had illustrated the need to engage follow-on 
echelons of the attacking forces. Upon taking command of TRADOC, he developed a 
concept for corps operations that became known as Central Battle. U.S. ground forces in 
Germany were to be familiar with the terrain and could follow a particular “battle 
calculus,” which was characterized by predetermined ranges for different weapon 
systems and by knowledge how many and what kind of enemy units could advance in 
certain areas. Starry believed that the course of Central Battle could be expressed 
statistically in terms of minutes into the battle, force ratios, specific weapons, rate of 
advance, visibility, rate of fire, number of command decisions, and time from request to 
delivery of tactical air support. The principal objective of U.S. ground forces was to 
destroy or suppress all enemy targets. Based on the systematic study of tank battles, 
Starry concluded that an attacker needed more than a five-to-one numerical advantage to 
defeat a well-prepared and determined defensive force. Calculations for Central Battle 
specifically included the second echelon of Warsaw Pact forces. For Starry, Central 
Battle “was the place where all the combat systems and combat support systems 
interacted on the battlefield.”89 
While considering adjustments to Active Defense, General Starry also initiated a 
force design study. He intended to combine Division 86 with the new doctrine that was 
slowly crystallizing. The study was coordinated by the Command and General Staff 
College and tested in the training schools. It became the most thorough division design 
effort since World War II. The heavy division, approved in principle by Army Chief of 
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Staff Edward Meyer in October 1979, had 20,000 officers and men. It was to be as 
mobile and flexible as the ROAD division, but with air cavalry as a fourth brigade it 
would be better suited to counter Soviet deep operations on conventional or nuclear 
battlefields in Germany. Starry hoped that Division 86 would render tactical formations 
that could attack enemy rear echelons before the Warsaw Pact armies had an opportunity 
to concentrate their reserve forces. Following the concern of General Meyer that the army 
was too narrowly focused on war in Central Europe, Division 86 was combined in the 
Army 86 concept with studies of the corps, field army, and a non-mechanized infantry 
division for extra-European deployment. Eventually, the heavy division proved too 
costly, both in terms of manpower and resources.90 
By the summer of 1979, TRADOC had resolved to publish a revised edition of 
FM 100-5. But General Starry informed General Meyer that further study of global 
deployment, corps operations, and the role of firepower in defense and offense was 
needed. Meyer, who had just been promoted from Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations 
and Plans to Chief of Staff, had noted that the base beliefs of Active Defense still were 
not universally accepted or even understood. The most glaring tactical problem was 
disagreement about the emphasis on firepower over maneuver. But Meyer was also 
concerned about the widespread interpretation of FM 100-5 as a defensive doctrine. He 
acknowledged that this had not been the intention of the manual’s authors, but it was 
nevertheless the impression of many field commanders. Starry perceived an intrinsic 
linkage between the two items. He hoped that clearer language in a new manual would 
revive the offensive spirit of the army, but he cautioned Meyer not to accept the 
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arguments of the maneuver school, which “ignore the very real problems with space and 
depth...in Europe, and with logistical support of highly mobile operations.” Meyer pushed 
for greater consideration of global deployment. He was particularly concerned with the 
neglect of guerilla warfare and counterinsurgency. Starry acknowledged that TRADOC 
had not made much progress in this area, but he stressed that “we cannot generalize too 
much and still be compatible with the Germans whose only mission is to fight in Europe, 
and whose doctrine will always reflect that.” Starry was confident that TRADOC could 
design doctrine that worked in Europe, the Middle East, and Korea, but he did not believe 
that anything more was feasible.91 
Interdiction of follow-on forces and the integrated battlefield formed the core of 
doctrinal considerations between 1979 and 1981. Traditionally, interdiction had been 
perceived as a disruptive technique, featuring attacks on enemy lines of communication, 
logistics, and reserves. But technological advances in communications systems, target 
acquisition systems, and long-range strike capability with missiles, helicopters, and jet 
planes, permitted a more coordinated approach. Nuclear weapons in particular increased 
the need to plan for strikes on targets that were far removed from the front lines. Army 
planners began to consider whether a coordinated approach could negate the greatest 
Soviet advantage - numerical superiority. In order to win, the army had to manage the 
battle in depth, so that enemy forces would be put in a disadvantageous position. This 
included channeling enemy forces, opening gaps in their line, and delaying the arrival of 
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Warsaw Pact reserves. Interdiction tactics could allow American forces to gain the 
initiative and dictate the location and course of Central Battle.92 
In December 1979, the Field Artillery School presented a proposal for the 
integrated battlefield. This concept entailed close cooperation of air and ground forces, 
mutually supporting employment of maneuver and firepower tactics, and integrated 
conventional and nuclear fire support. This became the foundation of air-land battle. It 
emphasized the need to interdict enemy forces before they could join the battle. Tactical 
nuclear weapons enhanced the interdiction capability of the army and permitted to gain 
the initiative and go on the offensive. The depth of the integrated battlefield was defined 
in time. Brigade commanders were to be responsible for the delay or destruction of 
enemy rear-echelon forces that were less than twelve hours from the front. Division 
commanders had an area of responsibility of twenty-four hours, while corps commanders 
were to engage enemy forces that were within seventy-two hours from the front. The 
Field Artillery School recommended the use of tactical nuclear weapons against rear-area 
targets because it would force the enemy to disperse and would reduce the risk of a 
massed breakthrough maneuver. The best targets were command functions, rather than 
combat units, since the momentum of the offensive depended on coordination of 
reinforcements. But integrated battle could only succeed if tactical nuclear war was 
minutely prepared for and release procedures were simplified. Still, the Field Artillery 
School could not perceive a non-nuclear future battle.93 
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The concept of integrated battle was quickly accepted by doctrinal planners, even 
though General Starry himself harbored serious doubt that nuclear weapons could be used 
effectively by tactical or operational commanders due to the lengthy process of acquiring 
release authority.94 Force structure studies for Corps 86 in 1980 under guidance of CAC 
placed primary focus on interdiction of the second echelon of Warsaw Pact forces. 
General Starry maintained that the corps was the critical operational formation for air-
land battle. Corps headquarters also were to coordinate nuclear fire support. CAC 
suggested forward defense in Germany with emphasis on deep battle against enemy rear 
echelons. The areas of responsibility of the integrated-battlefield concept were 
supplemented by areas of interest, which extended to twenty-four hours, or seventy 
kilometers, for the brigade, seventy-two hours (150 km) for the division, ninety-six hours 
(300 km) for the corps, and up to 1,000 kilometers for field army and supreme 
commands. On the defensive, the corps was to contain the enemy attack by destroying 
first-echelon forces, cause reinforcements to disperse, disrupt command and control, and 
generally slow the momentum of the attack. On the offensive, it was critical to strike fast 
and attack command and control as well as logistics targets and reserve forces in the 
enemy’s rear area. While dispersal in depth was to minimize the effect of enemy nuclear 
strikes on the corps in defensive operations, mass on target on the offensive was to be 
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achieved by precisely timed arrival of attacking forces that advanced over different routes 
of approach.95 
With the concepts for integrated battle and force structure of a heavy corps, the 
crucial pieces were in place to revise FM 100-5, despite General Meyer’s concern for 
worldwide contingencies. It was to be written at the Command and General Staff 
College, because General Starry recognized that opposition from army schools had 
impeded army-wide acceptance of Active Defense doctrine. He reasoned that returning 
doctrine to its traditional place of origin would allow for better integration of the schools 
as well as field commands in the writing process. TRADOC retained control, however, 
through the personal union of the offices of Deputy Commander TRADOC and 
Commander CAC in Lieutenant General William R. Richardson. Starry himself exerted 
personal influence through close working relations with the principal authors of FM 100-
5, lieutenant colonels Huba Wass de Czege, L. D. Holder, and Richmond Henriques.96 
General Starry provided the working title “Extended Battlefield” to drafts that 
were written in the course of 1980. Extended Battlefield adopted characteristics of 
integrated battle and stressed the deep attack. Since NATO ground forces could not 
contain a sustained Soviet offensive in protracted operations, it would be necessary to 
collapse the enemy’s ability to fight. In other words, while doctrine and operational plans 
of the 1950s and 1960s had acknowledged the possibility of protracted war ending in a 
negotiated settlement, Starry’s concept required winning the campaign as the only means 
of avoiding defeat. Starry expected that soon to be available modern weapon systems 
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would alter the balance between offense and defense. The army was close to producing 
the Bradley fighting vehicle and the Abrams tank, and improved target-acquisition and 
fire-direction systems, a remotely-piloted vehicle, Pershing II missiles, a new attack 
helicopter, a multiple-launch rocket system, ground-launched cruise missiles, and a 
tactical communication satellite were also expected to be available before 1986.97 
Starry’s Extended Battlefield was based on TRADOC and CAC studies, but also 
reflected the contributions of John Boyd to the debate of the late 1970s. Boyd had 
introduced the concept of the OODA loop - observation, orientation, decision, and action 
- to see beyond the narrow battlefield on which the enemy’s first-echelon forces were 
engaged.98 More importantly, Boyd had developed an operational concept that depended 
on speed, which would leave the enemy off balance and incapable of matching the pace 
of operations.99 For Starry, Boyd’s ideas had practical application in the delineation of 
specific battle areas and areas of interest for the operational units. Brigades were to 
engage the lead elements of Soviet first-echelon divisions, but also stay alert to 
developments within a 10-15 hour march behind the enemy’s front. Divisions were to 
engage follow-on forces close to the battlefield and stay alert to developments in the 
enemy’s rear, at a distance of 16-48 hours from the front. Corps were to engage rear-area 
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forces of the Soviet first echelon and stay alert to movements of the second and later 
echelons, approximately 72 hours removed from the front. Starry was optimistic that the 
army possessed sufficient target acquisition capability to engage targets this far in the 
enemy rear area.100 
TRADOC historian John Romjue noted that the emphasis on initiative, which 
separated extended-battlefield doctrine from Central Battle, reflected the aggressive 
tactical philosophy that General Starry had developed during his TRADOC command. 
Much like integrated battle, however, extended battlefield did not adequately illustrate 
the nature of air-land battle. On January 29, 1981, a new title for operational doctrine was 
announced: AirLand Battle. In March  TRADOC circulated a draft of AirLand Battle 
throughout the army. It outlined operations against mechanized armies in Europe, Korea, 
and the Middle East. Unlike Active Defense, it emphasized the offensive. The operational 
concept reflected the fusion of integrated battle and Corps 86 concepts. AirLand Battle 
radically departed from the notion that the battle would be won in the main battle area. 
Instead, future battle should not be defined geographically and would not be restricted to 
traditional notions of front-lines and rear areas.101 
The draft of AirLand Battle doctrine was not universally embraced, although the 
response was favorable on balance. As a result of army-internal criticism and 
recommendations, TRADOC spent the next year working on revision before the official 
version of FM 100-5 was published in August 1982, one year after General Starry had 
 
100Donn A. Starry, “Extending the Battlefield,” in: Military Review, Vol. 61, No. 
3 (March 1981), pp. 31-50. The discussion of the battle areas and areas of interest for the 
operational units is on pages 35-44. See also Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence, p.
298. 
 101Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle, pp. 44-50. 
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moved from TRADOC to Readiness Command (REDCOM). Most noticeable among the 
changes was greater emphasis on the German concept of Auftragstaktik (mission-order 
tactics), which allowed for more decisions by tactical-level commanders. On a non-linear 
chaotic battlefield, division and brigade commanders could not expect to control all of 
their subordinate officers. AirLand Battle doctrine also adopted the German concept of a 
Schwerpunkt, which could be shifted according to the enemy situation and which 
required perfect understanding of command decisions by all inferior levels of 
command.102 Finally, TRADOC included the operational level of war as an intermediate 
stage between strategy and tactics.103 
Until 1976, doctrine had stressed that the primary mission of the army was to win 
the land battle. This was out of step with the strategic situation in Europe and it did not 
reflect deterrence as the primary mission of the army. In 1982, the revised edition of FM 
100-5 stated that “the fundamental mission of the United States Army is to deter war.”104 
Moreover, while Active Defense had outlined tactical operations of large formations, 
AirLand Battle recognized, and emphasized operational art. Operational art was defined 
as proper application of military means “to attain strategic goals within a theater of war. 
Most simply, it is the theory of larger unit operations. It also involves planning and 
conducting campaigns.” Tactics, on the other hand, were “the specific techniques smaller 
 
102Schwerpunkt is commonly translated as center of gravity, but this does not 
capture the full meaning of the German concept. A better translation would be “point of 
emphasis of operations at which decisive tactical success could be achieved.” 
 103Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle, pp. 57-61. The German army, 
which had recognized the operational level of war in official doctrine since the 1870s, 
had recently dropped the term from its central doctrinal manual, HDV 100/100 (1973). 
 104Department of the Army, Field Manual No. 100-5: Operations (Washington, 
D.C.: Hedquarters, Department of the Army, 1982), p. i. 
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units use to win battles and engagements which support operational objectives.”105 In 
practical terms, it required theater commanders to coordinate multiple battles, utilize all 
available tactical units, and apportion resources in order to achieve the strategic objective 
of a campaign.106 The U.S. Army’s conception of operational art reflected the close study 
of Soviet operational capabilities that had been conducted throughout the 1970s.  
 Operational art had been developed as a theoretical concept in the Soviet Union 
prior to the Second World War. But its main practitioners were among the military 
officers purged after 1937 and the Red Army employed conservative operational doctrine 
at the beginning of the war. In the later stages of the war, particularly during the 
offensives of 1943-1945, crucial elements of operational art, such as deep battle and 
continuous attack with mobile, mechanized formations were employed with great 
success. Operational art was largely neglected in the 1950s and early 1960s, as a result of 
emphasis on nuclear weapons. It was rediscovered by the Soviet army in the 1960s and 
1970s.107 To address the threat posed by Soviet deep-attack capabilities, Air Land Battle 
doctrine emphasized preparations to defeat multiple echelons of attacking forces before 
they could enter into close combat. It moved the thinking of senior commanders from the 
 
105Ibid., Ch. 2, p. 3. L. D. Holder, one of the principal authors of FM 100-5 (1982) 
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Operational Art, 1904-1940 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001), and Frederick 
W. Kagan, “The Rise and Fall of Soviet Operational Art, 1917-1941” and “The Great 
Patriotic War: Rediscovering Operational Art,” in: Robin Higham and Frederick W. 
Kagan (eds.), The Military History of the Soviet Union (Houndmills, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2002), pp. 79-92, 137-51. 
395
First Battle to the extended battlefield, reflecting the entirety of corps operations, the 
interdiction of enemy rear echelons, and the close integration of ground and air forces. 
AirLand Battle was specifically designed to defeat the numerically larger and 
technologically equal mechanized armies of the Warsaw Pact or Soviet client states. It 
was inspired by intellectual and operational concepts of the German Reichswehr in the 
1920s and 1930s.108 
AirLand Battle doctrine stated that “an Army’s operational concept is the core of 
its doctrine. It is the way the Army fights its battles and campaigns, including tactics, 
procedures, organizations, support, equipment, and training.”109 Officers at TRADOC 
recognized that battlefield victories would not automatically translate into winning the 
war. Vietnam had demonstrated that political will and strategic objective were critical. 
Nevertheless, army doctrine had to concern itself with “winning battles and 
campaigns.”110 FM 100-5 acknowledged the possibility of global deployments: the army 
had to be prepared to fight “light, well-equipped forces such as Soviet-supported 
insurgents or sophisticated terrorist groups,” but its main focus had to be on the “areas of 
greatest strategic concern, [where] it must expect battles of greater scope and intensity 
 
108Author’s interview with General Starry, April 27, 2004. General Starry pointed 
at the recent translation of Truppenführung to support his argument. See Bruce Condell 
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 109FM 100-5, 1982, Ch. 2, p. 1. 
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than ever fought before.” Moreover, while FM 100-5 stressed conventional operations, 
the army “must anticipate battles fought with nuclear and chemical weapons.” In future 
battle, it would be crucial to “retain the initiative and disrupt our opponent’s fighting 
capability in depth with deep attack, effective firepower, and decisive maneuver.”111 
The authors of AirLand Battle placed a premium on leadership and command. 
Since the future battlefield would be non-linear, i.e., characterized by the absence of 
well-defined, coherent front lines, commanding officers would face a high degree of 
chaos and uncertainty. This had a precedent in the German armies of the First World 
War, which shifted after 1916 from a tactical system based on strict and inflexible orders 
to mission-order tactics that permitted local commanders to decide upon the best method 
to achieve their objective.112 The draft armies of western democracies had not followed 
the German example mainly because too many commanders came from reserve units or 
where too inexperienced for such a complex and sophisticated system that relied upon 
similar interpretation of doctrine on all levels of command and great familiarity with the 
mind of one’s superior officer. The emergence of the all-volunteer army helped to 
address this problem. It was particularly important that all forward-deployed units were 
ready to fight on a few hour’s notice and that their commanders had effective plans for 
the battle. FM 100-5 concluded that “the fluid nature of modern war will place a premium 
 
111All quotations are from ibid., 1982, Ch. 1, p. 1. For the stated emphasis on 
conventional operations see p. i. 
 112The German tactical system of the last years of the First World War are 
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on leadership, unit cohesion, and effective, independent operations.”113 To insure 
preparedness, the doctrinal concept “must be broad enough to describe operations in all 
anticipated circumstances. Yet it must allow sufficient freedom for tactical variations in 
any situations. It must also be uniformly known and understood.”114 
Army operations were to be directed at destroying the enemy “by throwing the 
enemy off balance with powerful initial blows from unexpected directions and then 
following up rapidly to prevent his recovery.”115 Enemy forces were to be attacked in 
depth with “rapid, unpredictable, violent, and disorienting” operations. But while the 
pace of operations had to be fast enough to prevent effective countermeasures, it also had 
to be controllable in order to assure the cooperation of all arms. The basic tenets of 
AirLand Battle doctrine were initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization.116 For the 
purpose of fighting the Soviets in Central Europe, field commanders had to assure close 
integration of maneuver and firepower in an effort to break the cohesion and disrupt 
command and control of enemy forces. This would allow to isolate enemy units, which 
could then be defeated in detail. TRADOC had retained the emphasis on firepower that 
had characterized Active Defense doctrine, but the new manual was more successful in 
explaining the significance of maneuver. Firepower killed, but maneuver allowed to 
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create numerical superiority at critical points and contributed to retaining the tactical 
initiative and reducing vulnerability.117 
Given the need to combat and disrupt elements of the enemy force that were not 
yet on the battlefield, intelligence was a core ingredient of AirLand Battle doctrine. On 
the defensive, American commanders had the advantage of intimate familiarity with the 
terrain in West Germany. This advantage had not been fully exploited by tactical level 
commanders prior to the mid-1970s, but during his command tenure in V Corps General 
Starry had emphasized that all of his officers needed to improve their knowledge about 
the geography, topography, and weather conditions in their assigned areas and beyond the 
assigned borders. Moreover, modern technology made it possible to gather and analyze 
quickly tactical intelligence about the area of operation as well as the nature and 
capability of the enemy. It was necessary to see far beyond the battlefield and identify 
targets for conventional or nuclear strikes. For this purpose, AirLand Battle doctrine 
derived from integrated battle and extended battlefield the concept of clearly defined 
areas of interest and influence. Unlike in earlier editions of FM 100-5, the chapter on 
tactical intelligence painstakingly explained how different command echelons could best 
take advantage of current capability to observe the entire battlefield, including a large 
portion of the area behind the enemy’s front-line troops.118 
AirLand Battle operations hinged on coordination of the combined arms. 
TRADOC planners cautioned that future battles need not necessarily be short. They 
would certainly extend over greater distances than battles in the past. American armed 
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forces would be outnumbered, particularly in war in Europe, but with “complete unity of 
effort and thoroughly synchronized air and ground action...can defeat a much larger 
enemy force that is poorly coordinated.”119 FM 100-5 delineated the role each branch of 
the army was to play in the combined-arms battle. Light infantry would be most useful in 
the defense or capture of urban areas, but it could also open gaps for mechanized and 
armored forces, defend strong points, and mop-up enemy forces that had been bypassed 
by armored units. Mechanized infantry was to provide anti-tank fires and suppress enemy 
infantry and ATGM capability. Once IFVs became available, mechanized infantry could 
also accompany tanks in assault operations. The tank remained the primary offensive 
weapon, due to its lethal combination of firepower, speed, and armored protection, 
although it had obvious limitations in built-up or densely forested areas and could not 
easily traverse water obstacles. Field artillery provided vital fire support for the maneuver 
elements of the combined-arms fire team. It had become as mobile as armored and 
mechanized formations. Air defense artillery provided protection from enemy close air 
support and could secure command posts and logistics installations. Finally, army 
aviation - attack helicopters, air cavalry, and combat support - increased mobility and 
offered another dimension of firepower on defense as well as offense.120 
At first, army units would find themselves on the defensive. But AirLand Battle 
doctrine stressed the aggressive nature of defensive operations in future war. As in Active 
Defense, defense was to be elastic, i.e, combine elements of strong-point defense, 
delaying action, and particularly counterattack. In the event, the fundamental difference 
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between defense and offense was one of purpose rather than type of combat operations.121 
FM 100-5 acknowledged the inherent advantages of the defender. It was easier to deny 
success to the enemy than to seek a decision actively. The defender knew the terrain 
better than the attacker did. Also, the defender could fight under the cover of his own 
artillery and air defense systems. But the attacker had the initiative, which was deemed at 
least equally valuable. Army leaders expected that in a protracted conventional war the 
Soviets would have the advantage because they could draw upon their vast reservoir of 
manpower and overwhelm NATO combat divisions. The U.S. Army could not enter into 
a campaign of attrition, but had to seek a quick decision on the battlefield. Therefore, 
defensive operations had to be supplanted by offensive action at the earliest possible 
time.122 
On the offensive, AirLand Battle emphasized “rapid, violent operations that seek 
enemy soft spots, remain flexible in shifting the main effort, and exploit successes 
promptly.”123 Active Defense had intended to strike a balance between defensive and 
offensive operations, but the reception of doctrine in the late 1970s had shown that it 
failed to state its case successfully. AirLand Battle doctrine reestablished that “the 
offense is the decisive form of war, the commander’s only means of attaining a positive 
goal or of completely destroying an enemy force.”124 This was to be achieved through 
concentration of effort, surprise, speed of the attack, flexibility that allowed for pragmatic 
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changes to initial planning, and audacity. On offensive as well as defensive, the army 
would face a numerically superior enemy, with great technological assets to his disposal. 
But numbers mattered less in future war than the ability to strike with all one’s force at 
the critical moment. AirLand Battle doctrine assumed that the Soviet military could not 
wage a fast-paced combined-arms battle successfully. The audacity of army leaders may 
be admired or admonished, but short of building a much larger ground force, it is difficult 
to perceive a viable alternative.  
 From the perspective of inter-service cooperation, AirLand Battle doctrine 
presented significant improvement over the deep-seated rivalries that characterized the 
bureaucratic and fiscal aspects of the defense establishment throughout the Cold War. It 
was not the end of inter-service rivalry, but the army acknowledged that it “will seldom 
fight alone....joint operations will be the rule rather than the exception.”125 This terse 
acknowledgment of an obvious circumstance, may be contrasted to the intense debates of 
the 1950s over strategy, control of missile programs, and the share of the defense budget. 
FM 100-5 also paid greater attention to combined operations with NATO allies. This 
reflected both the army’s primary area of deployment and General Starry’s recent 
experiences in Germany.126 
In 1985, a panel of retired senior commanders concluded that NATO ground 
forces were still too weak to defeat a Soviet attack with conventional means. 
Nevertheless, the deterrent value of the combat divisions in Central Region was high, 
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because it now seemed likely that ACE forces could halt the initial attack of the Warsaw 
Pact. The problem was the inability to match the follow-on echelons of Soviet and 
Eastern European armies that would eventually overwhelm the alliance in a conventional 
war.127 The follow-on echelons could include between fifty and seventy percent of the 
overall strength of the attacking force, giving the attacker the flexibility to exploit a 
breakthrough or penetration, or mass decisive force at a critical point of the front. These 
forces had to be delayed and degraded before they could reach the battlefield.128 This 
concern of the panel had in fact been addressed in the most recent edition of FM 100-5. 
AirLand Battle offered many of the improvements in target acquisition, tactics, 
operations, and the extended and integrated battlefield that General Goodpaster and his 
colleagues found necessary. 
 AirLand Battle doctrine completed the transition from the army of the world wars 
to the Cold War army. The process had been initiated by General Ridgway and his 
colleagues who strove to create an atomic army, but it had been defined most of all by 
General Taylor, whose emphasis on limited nuclear war, deterrence, and the defense of 
Western Europe was the driving forces behind reorganization and tactical and operational 
doctrine. The organizational structure of the Cold War army was largely in place prior to 
the Vietnam War. The war, however, delayed crucial aspects of mechanization of ground 
forces and the development of specific aircraft and missiles for combat in Central Europe. 
 
127Andrew J. Goodpaster et al., Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in 
Europe: A Program for the 1980s (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), p. 67. This was the 
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Alastair Steedeman, and former Pentagon analyst - and future Secretary of Defense - 
William Perry. 
 128Ibid., pp. 67-82, 130-31. 
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Moreover, tactical and operational doctrine could not be tailored to European war until 
after the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam. At that point, TRADOC and its 
emphasis on doctrine as the centerpiece of the army became critical to the institution’s 
recovery from the defeat in Vietnam and the breakdown in morale that had characterized 
the late 1960s and early 1970s. Active Defense doctrine, despite its shortcomings as 
tactical doctrine and its lack of consideration for operational art, was a milestone because 
the debate that followed the publication of the manual permitted TRADOC to revise 
doctrine to a more radical format. Simultaneously, the introduction of new weapon 
systems and communications and fire control technology allowed army leaders to 
consider seriously an entirely different system of battle over hundreds of miles in depth 
and behind the lines of the enemy front. AirLand Battle stood as the result of the 
marriage of organizational structure, technology, and altered understanding of tactics and 
operations. It reflected the primary mission of the army, deterrence of war and defense of 
West Germany.
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
The problem faced by the U.S. Army in the 1950s and onward was unprecedented 
in U.S. history: creation and maintenance of a fighting force that was ready to fight 
effectively at the outset of a major war. This posed a fundamental challenge to the 
American system of government and politics. Army leaders intended to transform their 
service from a conventional fighting force to a cold-war army that could operate on 
conventional and nuclear battlefields. The U.S. Army indeed found itself transformed in 
1982 as compared to 1953, but events in between belied the common concept of military 
transformation. Instead, it was an evolutionary process, punctuated by changes in the 
nature and imminence of the threat, political and strategic developments in the United 
States, Europe, and Asia, the influence on American officers of operational and 
organizational thinking in European and Israeli militaries, and deliberate decisions by 
senior army officers to restructure their institution, introduce new weapon systems and 
equipment, and review doctrine. 
 Seventh Army was the largest and best prepared field army the United States had 
ever maintained in peacetime. Its preparedness for the defense of West Germany and its 
contribution to the deterrence of conventional and limited nuclear war in Central Europe 
became the primary mission of the U.S. Army. Army leaders recognized that local 
conflicts outside of Europe were likely and that war between the superpowers was not, 
but they also recognized that a confrontation in Europe could escalate to general nuclear 
war, while war over less critically important territory elsewhere would be fought with 
conventional weapons. Political leaders of the nation expressed belief that an army that 
was prepared to fight against the Soviets in Germany could adapt quickly to 
405
circumstances in other regions of the world, but army leaders knew that different 
operational environments required different organizational structures, logistics, weapon 
systems, and doctrine. An ideal solution would have been to create and maintain separate 
forces for conflicts in Europe and elsewhere. But this was impossible given American 
budgetary and strategic circumstances. Army leaders thus chose to emphasize deterrence 
of war in Germany over the creation of general purpose forces for global deployment. 
While this led to a high state of preparedness for an unlikely war and a much lower state 
of preparedness for likely war, it was nevertheless prudent, as only war in Europe by 
necessity would have escalated to nuclear war if the conventional battle was lost.  
 Maxwell Taylor identified the intermediate option of limited-nuclear war as a 
means of achieving a greater degree of graduated and extended deterrence. But he also 
realized that the army had to present an image of radical reform in order to prove its 
utility in the nuclear age. The focus on the NATO commitment and the integration of 
tactical nuclear weapons permitted the army to recover its status as the premier armed 
service of the nation. Matthew Ridgway had opened the path for the army into the atomic 
age, but his approach had centered on new weapons and the best operational combat 
formations to integrate them. Taylor, on the other hand, introduced the pentomic division 
as a political device to halt the decline of the army’s budget relative to the other services 
and reestablish the army in the public mind as a modern and capable fighting force. 
While civilian leaders envisioned an army that would fight in peripheral regions and 
provide occupation forces for the time after nuclear war, Taylor saw the army’s future in 
Europe.  
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The pentomic division itself was an improvised political expedient and as a 
consequence largely impractical. The strength of the concept rested upon its promise of 
dual capability for conventional and nuclear warfare. Taylor believed that altering the 
structure of combat divisions and adding tactical nuclear weapons to their arsenal, would 
force the army to reconfigure tactical doctrine and in effect alter it in form and function. 
As it were, most army officers perceived tactical nuclear weapons as a more powerful 
form of artillery and as a force multiplier, but specific concepts for their employment that 
clearly differentiated them from conventional artillery were not developed. Moreover, 
new conventional weapon systems and equipment, such as main battle tank and armored 
personnel carrier did not enter into service in Seventh Army until the final year of the 
pentomic division. Thus, the concept was abandoned just as the material components 
essential to effective function were beginning to arrive. While the pentomic division has 
to be regarded as a failure from a purely operational perspective, it nevertheless fulfilled 
its political purpose. This was a structure designed to provide a platform for change and 
the political leverage required to acquire the resources necessary to accomplish it. 
 By the end of the 1950s army planners returned operational considerations to the 
center of attention. Drawing upon their command experiences in Germany, senior army 
generals developed concepts for flexible combat divisions for the Cold War environment. 
Eventually, Clyde Eddleman emerged as the crucial figure in advocating ROAD, a unit 
that closely resembled the Bundeswehr combat division, which had recently been 
introduced. As a result, design of the new division was well advanced by the time John F. 
Kennedy entered the White House. It seemed suitable for the new strategy of Flexible 
Response. ROAD was based on the building-block principle, organized around three 
407
brigade headquarters to which a variable number of maneuver battalions could be 
attached. Thus, armored, airborne, mechanized, and infantry divisions could be tailored 
specifically to the strategic, operational, or tactical need. This was a significant step in the 
direction of creating general-purpose forces. It fell short of the expectations in political 
circles, largely because the danger of nuclear war in Europe continued to dictate the 
emphasis of army doctrine on large-scale conventional and tactical nuclear war. 
Ultimately, it was necessary to settle upon fixed structures with set numbers of maneuver 
battalions per division, thus negating ROAD’s greatest inherent strength. 
 Maxwell Taylor’s most significant contribution to the Cold War army was not the 
initiation of reform of the combat division, but the changes in national and alliance 
strategy that he helped to bring about. Under the nuclear-deterrence strategy of Massive 
Retaliation, the army had found its utility questioned and its defense budget share 
declining in comparison to that of the air force. Army leaders could not publicly oppose 
the strategic concept of White House and Defense Department without questioning the 
principle of civilian control over the military. Yet Taylor discovered that it was possible 
to uphold the principle while challenging the administration’s perception of reality. His 
argument that the rapid approach of nuclear parity required greater flexibility and a 
deterrent for lesser forms of war than all-out nuclear exchange slowly won over his 
colleagues among the service chiefs, with the notable exception of the air force. His call 
for a strategy of flexible response, publicized shortly upon his retirement from the post of 
Army Chief of Staff, won him the favor of the political opposition and eventually brought 
him into the inner circle of the Kennedy administration. The army, however, quickly 
discovered that the pendulum of strategic choices had swung too far. While the service 
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had found Massive Retaliation and its emphasis on strategic nuclear weapons unrealistic, 
it also questioned the viability of conventional-war concepts that were embraced by 
government officials in the 1960s. 
 Army leadership noted that the strategic environment had not changed 
dramatically. The ideal army could indeed fulfill the commitment to NATO and maintain 
forces to intervene in local conflicts in the Third World, even if they took on the scale of 
the Korean or Vietnam wars. In reality, however, the generals knew that the means to do 
so were not available and would not be forthcoming. Thus, they maintained the emphasis 
on the deterrence of limited conventional and nuclear war in Europe, despite the 
theoretical capability to alter ROAD divisions according to the environment. Maxwell 
Taylor’s warning that preparedness for large-scale war in Europe did not necessarily 
imply readiness for less intensive forms of warfare was proven correct by the course of 
events in Vietnam. Critically, the army had failed to adjust its tactical doctrine to anti-
guerilla and counterinsurgency warfare. This was not mere oversight. It was impossible 
to do so without weakening the deterrent posture in Germany. In the 1960s, the army 
discovered that it could not function as both a territorial deterrent and a power projection 
force at the same time. 
 The defeat in Vietnam should not be blamed entirely on the unpreparedness of the 
army to engage the enemy at hand. The war was not primarily a military conflict and it 
remains unclear how it could have been won militarily. The United States never 
developed a strategy to address the issues that were central to the insurgency in South 
Vietnam and failed to separate insurgent and North Vietnamese military forces from the 
population at large. In essence, South Vietnam could not build and sustain a South 
409
Vietnamese society. The army’s own post-war defense, however, centered on the 
argument that the war had indeed been winnable and that it was the limitations imposed 
by the Johnson and Nixon administrations that prevented the U.S. military from doing so. 
This argument may have served its purpose, as the army went through nearly an entire 
decade of recovery from the damage caused by the war, but it was a misleading 
rationalization of defeat. At heart, army generals must have realized that their pre-war 
premonitions and their emphasis on Seventh Army as the most important fighting 
organization of the United States had been validated. 
 In a different sense defeat was a blessing. It forced the army, now an all-volunteer 
force, to reconsider its tactical and operational conception of warfare. More importantly, 
it permitted for full concentration on the defense of Western Europe, as military 
intervention at the periphery of the Cold War was no longer fashionable. As a result, 
Training and Doctrine Command was created to rebuild the post-Vietnam army from the 
ground up. Generals William E. DePuy and Donn A. Starry recognized that the Arab-
Israeli war of 1973 offered useful insight into advances in Soviet weapons technology, 
particularly in the field of armor. It was also recognized that the Soviets had perfected 
concepts of deep battle and operational art that had been under consideration since the 
1920s. To counter Soviet numerical superiority and the imposing tank forces of the 
Warsaw Pact, TRADOC stressed the significance of the first battle and the extended 
battlefield that integrated front-line and enemy rear area and introduced the concept of 
AirLand Battle, the first U.S. Army doctrine that emphasized operational art rather than 
grand tactics. It was at this point, in 1982, that the main threads of the transition - 
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mission, technology, structure of the combat division, and operational doctrine - came 
together at last. 
 The transition process of the Cold War army was defined by external as well as 
internal pressures and considerations. The evolving strategies of the United States and 
NATO, and related budgetary policies, have been treated as the most visible 
phenomenon, but this was merely of political concern for army leadership. It did not alter 
fundamental operational concepts or the sense of purpose of the service. Nuclear 
weapons forced the army to adapt its mission to realities of the Cold War. This led to an 
emphasis on deterrence rather than war fighting. It also caused the army to look upon a 
specific kind of deterrence in Europe as the most important reason for being. It did not 
fundamentally alter tactical or operational conceptions prior to the Vietnam War. Army 
transformation in the decade between 1955 and 1965 failed in the area of doctrine. The 
groundbreaking changes did not come until after the defeat in Vietnam. Given the mind-
set of army leaders and the political and strategic circumstances of the early Cold War, it 
proved impossible to create operational doctrine to match the army’s mission. Internally, 
the army understood its task to be the deterrence of limited types of war in Europe, but 
expressing so in public - by way of doctrinal changes - would have led to serious 
questions by political masters who favored general-purpose forces that could operate 
outside of Europe when requested. Consequently, it was only after the nation turned away 
from direct interventions in the Third World that the army was able to focus its doctrine 
fully on the tactical and operational situation expected in a European war against the bulk 
of Warsaw Pact armies. The army of the 1980s was probably no more capable of 
operating against unconventional enemies than the army of the 1960s had been, but this 
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was of little significance because the strategic dilemma of several global missions that 
required vastly different forces and doctrines had been suppressed. 
 Throughout the transition process, the army was greatly influenced by 
developments in Europe. Officers serving in Seventh Army cooperated closely with 
German armed forces. German corps were assigned to Seventh Army and joint  
maneuvers were conducted. Consequently, a degree of interoperability emerged out of 
practical concerns. The German divisional structure, featuring brigades and a great 
degree of mechanization, appealed to American commanders. As a result, the U.S. Army 
adopted the German combat division in 1960 and 1961 with only minor adjustments 
necessitated by global considerations. This was done despite the lack of armored 
vehicles, which critically hampered the effectiveness of the mechanized divisions. That 
problem was exacerbated by the requirements and cost of the Vietnam War, which 
prevented successful German-American cooperation in the development of main battle 
tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. 
 Tactical and operational doctrine were influenced accordingly by developments in 
Germany. In the 1950s, U.S. Army tactical doctrine closely resembled French concepts of 
the world wars. A greater degree of mechanization, however, allowed army planners to 
consider mobile defense and quick counterattacks in a more favorable light. The 
fundamental problems were the numerical superiority of enemy ground forces and the 
uncertainty about the use and effect of tactical nuclear weapons. Dispersion, mobility, 
and flexibility became the watchwords of the day, but the U.S. Army remained wedded to 
the application of massive firepower on a clearly defined battlefield as the fundamental 
principle of warfare. The reorientation toward the defense of Europe during the army’s 
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recovery from Vietnam changed this dynamic. In studying the lessons of the Yom Kippur 
War, army leaders realized that concepts of time, space, and lethality on the conventional 
battlefield had changed dramatically. Military intelligence added a clearer picture of 
Soviet capabilities and operational intentions. It was recognized that the enemy remained 
superior in numbers and had a vast arsenal of tanks and armored vehicles. The Soviets 
had perfected concepts of deep battle and operational art that had been considered since 
the decades prior to the Second World War. As a result, TRADOC developed doctrine 
that was geared at combating specific Soviet tactics and operations. To do so, DePuy and 
Starry, the principal authors of the 1976 and 1982 editions of FM 100-5, turned to 
German operational doctrine. DePuy acknowledged that Active Defense was an attempt 
to adapt German concepts of mechanized warfare to the force structure of the U.S. Army. 
The result was not universally accepted, either within the army or by defense analysts. It 
was the beginning of a process of doctrinal change rather than its culmination.  
 Donn Starry, who had written several chapters of Active Defense, took the 
concept to V Corps, which he commanded in 1976 and 1977. He discovered that the 
emphasis on the first battle had to be altered in terms of time and space. Operations of the 
second, third, and even fourth echelon of Soviet forces had to be countered before they 
could engage American main force in battle. Deep battle needed to be fought 
aggressively with strikes into the rear of the enemy. Starry resolved to refine tactical 
doctrine and elevate it to the level of operations. For this, he found precedent in pre-
World War II Reichswehr doctrine of the 1920s and early 1930s. This in turn, of course, 
had been at the core of West German doctrinal considerations all along, as the architects 
of the Bundeswehr had gained their first command experience long before the Second 
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World War. The amalgamation of pre- and post-war West German operational doctrine 
with American tactical and operational conceptions and necessities eventually led to the 
adoption of AirLand Battle doctrine in 1982. Previously only fragments of German 
thinking had been adopted by the American armed forces. From the mid-1970s, the 
German army became the model for a new American army. Operational art, once a 
concept that existed only in the Soviet Union and to some extent in Germany, became a 
mainstay of the American military. Given the relative comparability of their strategic and 
operational circumstances, it is no surprise that American armed forces could learn much 
from the German and Israeli military experience. It is to their great credit that they did. 
 In addressing the history of the U.S. Army in the Cold War era, this dissertation 
has raised questions about the history of the Cold War itself. It no longer seems fruitful to 
consider national policies and strategies isolated from alliances. Since the end of the Cold 
War, political, social, intellectual, economic, and cultural historians have investigated the 
dynamics of relationships in both camps of the Cold War divide. This study shows that 
NATO was not entirely dominated by American policy. NATO strategy did not always 
conform to the strategy of the United States, and the debates of Flexible Response 
throughout the 1960s contributed to a crisis within the alliance. But the need to maintain 
a strong deterrent overcame centrifugal forces that threatened to separate Western Europe 
from the United States, and Germany and France from Great Britain. The U.S. Army was 
strengthened greatly by what it learned and experienced in Germany. By the 1980s, it was 
a force that resembled more closely the Bundeswehr than the U.S. Army of the Second 
World War. 
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The Cold War U.S. Army was born not in rapid transformation, as Maxwell 
Taylor had hoped in the mid-1950s, but in a gradual process of transition. Taylor had 
assumed that changes to the structure of combat organizations and introduction of 
modern conventional and nuclear weapon systems would lead to a radically different 
operational and doctrinal concept. But the pressure to deploy forces in Europe as well as 
outside of Europe negated the effect of structural change and locked doctrine in place. 
Only after the defeat in Vietnam, and the resulting changes in strategic outlook, did army 
leaders succeed in creating new operational doctrine for a new generation of conventional 
and nuclear weapon systems. The global nature of the Cold War appeared to require 
general-purpose forces, but the U.S. military was never capable of providing them. The 
defeat in Vietnam was a strong indicator of the weakness to project power into the Third 
World. The defeat of Soviet arms in Afghanistan served as a similar example. But while 
the protracted war in Afghanistan contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
America’s defeat in Vietnam did little to impede ultimate victory in the Cold War. 
Moreover, the deterrence of general war strongly implied that the choice of U.S. Army 
leaders to create and maintain a fighting force primarily designed for war in Germany 
was successful despite the initial failure to transform. 
 Beyond reevaluating U.S.-European defense relations and army transformation, 
the dissertation considers the value and effect of military institutions in peacetime. John 
Keegan, the eminent military historian, concluded that an army is defined by its actions 
on the field of battle.1 The opposite is true: its character is determined by how it trains 
and thinks in peacetime. A large body of literature has emerged that discusses military 
 
1John Keegan, The Face of Battle (New York: Penguin Books, 1978), p. 28. 
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doctrine, technology, strategy, and political culture in the interwar period.2 A similar 
integrative effort is needed to address the history of the Cold War more comprehensively. 
Ultimately, the Cold War was a global competition for access to markets, resources, 
skilled labor, and strategically placed military bases. But Western Europe, with its 
industrial societies and vast economies, was the prize. Possession of Western Europe was 
the decisive factor in the Cold War. As a consequence, nuclear war could have resulted 
most easily from conflict in Europe. There, deterrence, the primary mission of the army, 
and containment, the critical objective of American strategy, were closely related. But in 
Vietnam they were not. The failure of containment on the periphery of the Cold War did 
not lead to general war or a fundamental change in the socioeconomic and military 
balance of power. The army contributed greatly to the success of deterrence and of the 
containment strategy. The wars in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, serve to 
remind us that the outcome of the Cold War was defined by more than the sum of its 
military battles. 
 
2Among the best examples are Citino, The Path to Blitzkrieg, David French, 
Raising Churchill’s Army: The British Army and the War against Germany, 1919-1945 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), Habeck, Storms of Steel, Eugenia C. Kiesling, 
Arming Against Hitler: France and the Limits of Military Planning (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 1996), Roger R. Reese, Stalin’s Reluctant Soldiers: A Social 
History of the Red Army, 1925-1941 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996), 
David R. Stone, Hammer and Rifle: The Militarization of the Soviet Union, 1926-1933 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), and Harold R. Winton and David R. Mets 
(eds.), The Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918-1941 





Army Strength by Region, 1951-1972 
 
Courtesy of Dr. Robert S. Rush, Center of Military History 
Year CONUS Far East 
(Japan & 
Korea) 
Vietnam Europe Total 
1951 956,187 330,752  117,501 1,529,724 
1952 857,248 343,726  250,651 1,594,693 
1953 796,000 353,800  236,400 1,532,000 
1954 739,806 295,069  247,912 1,404,598 
1955 622,590 131,565  252,191 1,109,296 
1956 616,547  98,617  239,558 1,025,778 
1957 590,881  86,508  231,599   997,994 
1958 536,250  56,333  224,155   898,925 
1959 519,881  50,501  225,408   861,964 
1960 526,464  53,962  225,099   873,078 
1961 501,748  60,322  230,116   858,622 
1962 652,918  53,978  277,583 1,066,404 
1963 583,981  69,323  251,066   975,916 
1964 581,009  80,559  235,612   973,238 
1965 598,482  89,063  234,743   969,066 
1966 696,263  66,894 149,604 204,784 1,199,784 
1967 766,414  69,336 288,623 219,546 1,442,498 
1968 855,011  71,591 351,024 192,963 1,570,343 
1969 804,188  70,873 368,992 169,268 1,512,169 
1970 684,239  60,740 361,838 176,697 1,322,549 
1971 624,463  35,152 175,703 164,758 1,230,549 
1972 488,390  37,239  71,048 172,307   801,081 
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Appendix 2 
USAREUR Personnel Strength, 1945-1991 
 
Courtesy of Headquarters, USAREUR, Historian’s Office, Heidelberg, Germany 
Date Authorized Actual 
30 June 1945 Unknown 1,893,197 
30 June 1946 300,000   289,896 
30 June 1947 117,000   104,316 
31 December 1948  93,856    90,740 
31 December 1949  82,412    83,394 
31 December 1950  88,593    86,146 
31 December 1951 222,727   231,651 
31 December 1952 258,869   252,137 
30 June 1954 242,956   250,298 
30 June 1955 238,428   245,675 
30 June 1956 240,048   248,389 
30 June 1957 230,219   232,686 
30 June 1958 229,925   225,019 
30 June 1959 226,039   225,373 
30 June 1960 226,056   226,212 
30 June 1961 225,732   232,658 
30 June 1962 273,377   277,342 
30 June 1963 253,170   251,615 
30 June 1964 236,407   239,640 
30 June 1965 229,258   235,330 
30 June 1966 223,649   209,773 
30 June 1967 222,821   222,566 
30 June 1968 206,455   195,526 
30 June 1969 185,668   180,895 
30 June 1970 188,368   177,912 
31 December 1970 189,105   169,144 
31 December 1971 185,612   177,640 
31 December 1972 182,599   182,843 
31 December 1973 182,918   175,055 
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31 December 1974 180,708   176,568 
31 December 1975 179,585   179,304 
31 December 1976 179,855   182,096 
31 December 1977 181,971   191,500 
31 December 1978 193,106   198,664 
31 December 1979 196,564   202,604 
31 December 1980 198,514   199,146 
31 December 1981 197,540   198,139 
31 December 1982 199,464   200,584 
31 December 1983 202,535   195,212 
31 December 1984 198,345   200,544 
31 December 1985 196,253   193,871 
31 December 1986 197,616   194,567 
31 December 1987 196,141   194,500 
31 December 1988 197,092   197,147 
31 December 1989 197,364   195, 989 
31 December 1990 124,950   115,077 
31 December 1991 140,993   143,479 
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Appendix 3 
U.S. Army Force Structure, 1953-1982 
 
Hawkins, Force Design Initiatives, A-1, A-2 
Year Divisions Infantry Armor Airborne Air 
Assault 
Mech. Other 
1953 20 16 2 2 0 0 0 
1954 19 14 3 2 0 0 0 
1955 20 14 4 2 0 0 0 
1956 19 12 4 3 0 0 0 
1957 15 9 3 3 0 0 0 
1958 15 9 3 3 0 0 0 
1959 15 10 3 2 0 0 0 
1960 14 9 3 2 0 0 0 
1961 14 9 3 2 0 0 0 
1962 18 7 5 2 0 4 0 
1963 16 6 4 2 0 4 0 
1964 16 6 4 2 0 4 0 
1965 16 5 4 2 1 4 0 
1966 17 6 4 2 1 4 0 
1967 17 6 4 2 1 4 0 
1968 19 8 4 2 1 4 0 
1969 18 7 4 1 2 4 0 
1970 16 5 4 1 2 4 0 
1971 13 3 3 1 2 4 0 
1972 13 3 3 1 1 4 1 
TRICAP 
1973 13 3 3 1 1 4 1 
TRICAP 
1974 13 3 4 1 1 4 0 
1975 14 4 4 1 1 4 0 
1976 16 5 4 1 1 5 0 
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1977 16 5 4 1 1 5 0 
1978 16 5 4 1 1 5 0 
1979 16 4 4 1 1 6 0 
1980 16 4 4 1 1 6 0 
1981 16 4 4 1 1 6 0 
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